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ABSTRACT
In the international relations literature, two large narratives of power are sustaining a bipolar 
polemic on global governance, which is either supposed to foster the dynamics of 
empowerment (emancipatory narrative) or domination (critical narrative). Yet such 
presentations rarely rely upon detailed empirical work. Remarkably, International Relations 
(IR) scholars are paying little attention to the local power effects of global discourses.
This research takes issue with a key but under-studied discourse -  Community Participation 
(CP) -  in the protection of biodiversity. The first case study is located in the Caribbean 
island of Saint Lucia and relates to corals. The second is in the Brazilian Pantanal, the 
world’s largest wetland. Data were collected over four months of fieldwork, using face-to- 
face interviews, participant observation, focus groups and written material. To capture a 
broader diversity of power mechanisms, a grid drawn from recent works in IR was mobilised 
for the first time in this type of study. An analytical framework was also built that allows 
testable implications to be derived from macro-narratives and compared with micro-data.
Rather than engendering empowerment, it appears that CP has essentially set in motion 
various containment dynamics affecting local stakeholders. Yet, while our data impressively 
fit the critical narrative, they also underscore its fragilities and contingency. At local levels, 
global governance discourses can no longer be seen as “singular and accepted”, but rather as 
“contested and reinterpreted”. They do not produce either emancipation or domination per 
se. They are most fruitfully analysed as tools thrown into local arenas which rent-seeking 
actors scramble to seize and use for their own ends. This significance of local dynamics 
undermines notions of North-South dependency or global governmentality. Data favour a 
hegemony model of the exercise of power that works through alliances and compromises 
amongst global and local groups within what we call “power formations”.
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Introduction
Today’s world is filled with global discourses that make promises of emancipation 
and progress. Whether these focus on human rights, gender equality, sustainable 
development, democracy, good governance, or the fight against poverty, they 
provide aspirations for mankind that individuals can share in their heart of hearts, 
that states and civil societies can strive for and that the international community has 
been promoting in official terms and successive waves since 1945. Although far less 
constraining than institutional arrangements, discourses do provide significant 
drivers and components of global coordination phenomena. Thus, global governance 
as a multi-level process of international co-operation -  or rather synchronization -  
does not only develop through institutions but also through discourses. These cut 
across borders, mobilise and interact with a large variety of agents and contexts, 
translate into countless initiatives, projects, events, networks, partnerships, modes of 
actions, methodologies, etc. They have the ability to inspire myriads of public and 
private actors in both northern and southern countries. In this sense, “global 
discourses” are essential to current forms of international collective action -  which is 
increasingly meant to become “hyper-collective”1.
Global discourses are more than cognitive or linguistic phenomena comprising 
words, ideas and theories. They encompass all kinds of practices, formal and 
informal, such as work methods, procedures, policy recommendations, advocacy 
strategies, professional or civil society networks, etc. The interconnection of these 
practices can “create a story”, “make sense” (Selby, 2007) and emerge as a “power- 
knowledge structure” competing with others in framing what is legitimate or even 
merely thinkable in a given issue area. Global discourses may be characterised on the 
basis of their primary focus; how they identify problems and issues; what kinds of 
solutions they advocate; what assumptions they make about desirable changes; what 
community they refer to or how they relate to other discourses. They can also be 
looked at from a more empirical and impact-oriented viewpoint, exploring how they 
translate and are implemented on the ground and how they affect the lives of people.
1 Chamoz & Severino, 2008.
Introduction -  1
This is the line of enquiry that this study primarily follows as it concerns itself with 
the local power effects of global governance discourses.
Questioning the power effects of global discourses: bringing large narratives 
under scrutiny
Many of today’s leading global discourses shaping global governance talk the 
language of rights, democracy and the rule of law. Although they also encompass 
other concerns, such as the environment, they seem to draw their inspiration, basic 
norms and ideals largely from an identifiable strand of philosophical thought: 
Liberalism. Of course, there are many possible definitions and understandings of this 
latter notion, but there is also a fairly large agreement among historians, political 
scientists and philosophers that, since the Enlightenment, a recognisable ethical and 
political outlook has emerged that stresses the social, economic and political 
freedoms of individuals, their equal moral dignity and a belief in rationalism and 
human progress. It is this intellectual tradition that we refer to under the broad (and 
debatable) heading of “liberalism”, following authors such as Gray (1996, pp.286- 
287).
Politicians and scholars alike tend to have readily available opinions about how 
global liberal discourses are impacting the world -  or not. Certain observers see in 
their apparent diffusion a kind of “march of liberty” taking place in History: it helps 
to free individuals across the world in many different contexts and at many different 
levels -  whether this involves increased political participation or asserting then- 
sexual orientation or environmental rights. For the sake of convenience and clarity, 
we may refer to this rather celebratory view as the emancipatory narrative of global 
governance discourses.
On the other hand, some observers strongly disagree with such an optimistic view, 
which they find to be unduly naive. They rather seek to “unmask, demystify, and 
expose the real from the apparent”2 and show power at work where freedom  is said to 
be prevailing. In so doing, they build upon a well-established intellectual tradition 
marked by great “Masters of Suspicion”3 among whom Marx stands prominently. 
While the emancipatory narrative stresses dynamics of empowerment in global 
discourses, a range of critical narratives underline the phenomena of domination -
2 Ricoeur, 1970, p.32.
3 As Paul Ricoeur refers to Marx, Freud or Nietzsche.
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operating through either the dominance of Western countries (building on the 
concept of dependency), the self-surveillance of individuals through internalised 
“knowledge” (governmentality) or the alliances of various social forces underpinning 
a given world order {hegemony). In this type of perspective -  one we may broadly 
call the critical narrative -  global governance discourses are seen as fostering hidden 
forms of social control, strengthening pre-existing power structures and in the end 
various forms of domination.
Such competing accounts of power are arguably ubiquitous in the work of 
International Relations (IR) scholars, whether they play out explicitly or implicitly. 
Yet, as Barnet and Duvall (2005) point out, the issue of power in global governance 
remains largely under-studied and the same holds true for its global discourses. Such 
emancipatory or critical narratives are rarely put under direct scientific scrutiny and 
analysed in empirical terms, and little attention is paid to relevant empirical work 
done in the context of other academic disciplines. Thus, ready-made views often 
seem to replace detailed fact-based analysis. Recognising this culprit, some IR 
scholars have recently called upon their discipline to “interweave new directions in 
international relations theory with local level case studies [so as to reveal] the 
usefulness and the weaknesses of meta-narratives” (Duffy, 2004, p.307).
The present study may be included within this research programme. It aims to 
contribute to assessing the emancipatory and critical narratives of global discourses 
on the basis of locally gathered empirical data. It does so by taking issue with a key 
but vastly under-studied discourse of contemporary global governance, namely that 
of Community Participation (CP). It further looks at its empirical effects in a specific 
issue area of global policy making -  the protection of global biodiversity. This is 
done through two local case studies, one located in Brazil and one in St. Lucia, a 
small Caribbean island-sate.
In the next few pages, we shed light on the rationale for our three-step case study 
selection (selecting a discourse, a policy area and two field studies); we explain how 
we addressed the core methodological challenge of this work (comparing macro 
narratives to micro field data); we introduce some of the key concepts we use 
(notably on various forms of power); finally, we provide an overview of the 
empirical material touched upon as well as some of the main conclusions that emerge 
from their analysis.
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The global discourse on “Community P a r t ic ip a t io n a  hard test for the critical 
narrative
This study’s research strategy thus consists of “zooming in” from concerns about 
global governance discourses in general to their application in particular cases. It first 
selects and puts under scrutiny a specific global discourse. Second, it focuses on a 
specific issue area of global policy making. Third, it identifies actual local case 
studies that allow for fieldwork.
Among the many discourses that can be studied to enquire into the validity of power 
narratives, one may particularly think of considering Human Rights or Development 
discourses. They both evidently qualify as strong global discourses that are part and 
parcel of current forms of global governance, permeating many formal and informal 
global arrangements, initiatives, organisations, calls for action, etc.
This research, however, chose to focus on the discourse on Community Participation 
(CP). CP carries a general message in virtually all policy fields to give a more active 
role to local stakeholders, especially those who have little economic or political 
power. It bears strong connections with concerns over democracy and is often 
supported as a tool to achieve “real” democracy. It is also underpinned by more 
technical or instrumental rationales according to which local policies are better 
designed, implemented and cost-efficient if affected people are involved from the 
outset -  from design to implementation and evaluation.
The key reason for the choice of CP as our object of enquiry is that it is intimately 
connected to the emancipatory narrative and calls into question, by its very existence, 
the validity of the critical narrative. It thus constitutes in itself a hard-case or a hard- 
test for the critical narrative of global governance discourses, whose validity seems a 
priori doubtful when applied to a discourse entirely devoted to tackling domination 
phenomena. CP is indeed illustrative of a range of liberal values linked to talks about 
individual rights and freedoms, good governance, the need to address inequalities, 
social injustice and the rest.
Another reason why CP was chosen as our case study is that it is much less in the 
spotlight of research and public debate than the two aforementioned global 
discourses. It is also far less acknowledged and documented as an actual and active 
global discourse. Illustratively, if one types “global discourse on human rights” into 
Google, one finds over 4,000 hits, 700 for “global discourse on development”, but
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only one for “global discourse on participation” and one for “global discourse on 
community participation”.4
CP has nevertheless taken root as a cross-cutting discourse in most areas of global 
governance. Whether in international health, development aid, poverty reduction, the 
promotion of gender equality, environmental protection, water management, fair 
trade or conflict prevention, the call for broader community participation in policy 
initiatives has been growing fast. Since the early 1970s, this broad-spectrum theme 
has indeed emerged in global forums. States, multilateral organisations, bilateral 
agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foundations, think tanks, local or 
global activists as well as the media. The whole world seems to share a common 
enthusiasm for CP principles, as reflected in an ever-increasing number of 
comments, work procedures, international declarations and political commitments. 
CP has imposed itself as a rarely publicly rebutted or contested principle -  despite a 
more critical academic literature.
CP carries and spreads a set of core practices which are part and parcel of this global 
discourse. They are especially concerned with the mobilisation of local communities, 
the facilitation of participatory processes and their institutionalisation into dedicated 
organisations. The first set of practices, related to mobilisation, relies upon a social 
technology of action-oriented meetings that help “involve” and “engage with” 
community members -  through large-scale public gatherings, smaller workshops and 
focus groups as well as standing bodies bringing together various stakeholder 
“representatives”. A second group of practices is concerned with the concept of 
facilitation whereby an external agent holding no official decision-making authority 
helps local groups to be more effective and efficient in solving conflicts, planning, 
implementing, monitoring and evaluating. Facilitation is thus largely presented as a 
neutral and “agendaless” function that does not influence outcomes -  something that 
obviously needs to be questioned. Third and finally, a last set of key operational 
practices relates to the way CP tends to be institutionalised. Participatory schemes, 
whatever their policy field, are generally “based on a set of rules and one or more 
organisations in charge of developing, interpreting and implementing such rules on 
an on-going basis, as well as responding to varying circumstances and needs” 
(IUCN, 2004, p.47). What this study is thus enquiring into are the local power effects
4 These were the figures at the end of September 2010.
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of such practices and how they help understand, in turn, the nature of the global 
discourse on CP.
Yet, taking issue with the CP discourse is still too wide an angle to study global 
governance discourses at work and impacts “on the ground”. A policy area needs to 
be selected. To do so, it seemed especially important to choose one that first and 
foremost witnessed the development of the CP discourse, one that has been 
instrumental in extending and developing it on the global stage as well as at the local 
level. The protection o f  global biodiversity is certainly one such area. The history of 
this global governance area dates back at least to the end of the 19th century. It has 
gone through different waves of practices and has harboured debates over 
“participation” as early as -  or even before -  the field of development. Along with 
the latter, it is the primary global issue area in which CP came to be conceptualised 
and implemented. In other words, biodiversity protection is a very “mature” field 
where CP has developed and where learning processes have already taken place: it 
thus constitutes in its own way another “hard case” and “hard test” for the critical 
narrative.
discourse already has a long history,
The methodological challenge: comparing macro-narratives with field  data  on 
pow er outcomes
The key methodological challenge faced in this research is to enable a comparison 
between two macro-narratives of power and a set of micro-empirical data drawn 
from fieldwork -  in other words, from actual CP schemes (or “participatory 
projects”) in biodiversity protection. The link between the macro and the micro, and 
what renders the comparison possible, are the logical expectations of the large 
narratives about what is supposed to be occurring on the ground. These are a priori 
expectations that need to be logically deduced from the nature of the narratives, 
crossed with a detailed understanding of CP schemes in their various dimensions. If 
this research is properly done, two contrasting series of empirical expectations may 
be then drafted and compared with actual field data.
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Enabling such a dialogue requires the construction of an analytical framework that 
helps classify empirical findings in a systematic fashion, so as to compare them with 
logical expectations from the narratives. To this end, this study develops an original 
nine-step analytical grid5 to conceptualise and empirically assess the genesis, 
implementation and impact of community participation in projects related to 
biodiversity protection. This framework first questions CP schemes in terms of who 
created them, who participates (narrow or broad sections of the community), at what 
stage (from project identification to evaluation), how active participation is (from 
passive to more active forms) as well as how socio-economic costs and benefits are 
allocated across stakeholders. Further looking at impacts, it also enquires into the re­
allocation of local decision-making power, the modification of the balance and 
mechanisms of social control (how local behaviour is framed), their connection to 
market forces and how these dynamics interact with the community’s social capital. 
A wide range of tailor-made concepts and typologies are thus introduced as part of 
this analytical framework to help identify precise empirical expectations in such a 
manner that they become readily applicable to field data.
In general terms, as will be argued, the emancipatory narrative expects CP schemes 
to originate within the local community rather than be imported by external actors, to 
display active and socially inclusive participatory processes and lead to a relatively 
balanced allocation of costs and benefits among local groups and individuals. It also 
expects a relatively balanced form of co-management to take place with public 
authorities ensuring a significant influence of the local community itself, few 
exclusionary processes (that we call “containment processes”) affecting minority 
groups, increased market opportunities for most locals -  as well as the strengthening 
of local social capital, thus enabling even more collective action in the future. 
Conversely, the critical narrative will tend to expect CP schemes to rather originate 
from outside the community, be far narrower and elite-centred in their design and 
governance, be more nominal and passive than active and lead to a more uneven 
allocations of benefits, favouring dominant actors. From a critical standpoint, CP is 
also expected to provide non-local actors with significant local influence, turn the
5 The nine dimensions of CP schemes under analysis are the following: 1) CP origins; 2) 
inclusiveness; 3) scope; 4) intensity; 5) allocation of costs and benefits; 6) effects on power 
formations; 7) effects on social control; 8) effects through marketisation and commodification; 9) 
interactions with social capital.
Introduction -  7
“rhetoric” of emancipation into stronger practices of social control weighing upon 
“cumbersome groups”, enhance inegalitarian market-led phenomena and weaken, on 
the whole, local social capital. In the critical literature, the CP discourse has been 
particularly analysed as contributing to the expansion of the global capitalist order 
(e.g. Marti & Ritchie, 1999; Mohan & Stocke, 2000; Miraftad, 2004; Berner & 
Phillips, 2005; McCarthy James, 2005; Bosman, 2007).
These two lists of expectations may look like one-sided caricatures that cannot 
withstand the test of local complexities for even one minute. Do not standard wisdom 
and experience in empirical research together suggest that the truth will lie 
somewhere in the middle? Still, these lists flow quite logically from large narratives 
that are commonly used in macro-debates in IR, so setting them against local 
empirical data is always a contribution -  and a relatively rare one. Moreover, as we 
shall see, one narrative stands the test of reality much better than the other and the 
way empirical analysis renders the picture more complex and refined is not merely to 
say that things are “grey”, or “in the middle” -  but to allow a better understanding 
how things work and what factors catalyse outcomes.
Understanding the diversity of power mechanisms a t work 
Looking at power outcomes at field level, understanding how and why they play out 
as they do and comparing them with the expectations of large narratives, constitute 
the central endeavour of this research. However, if we are to understand how 
outcomes are produced, power mechanisms must also be researched, such as through 
what channels global discourse impacts local contexts and how the discourse is used, 
manipulated or contested by various stakeholders. In other words, this research is not 
only concerned with effects but also with “why” and “how” questions, as these can 
further a deeper assessment of the two narratives under scrutiny.
Access to data in the study of local power relations is extremely difficult given the 
subtle social interactions involved, the significance of the stakes, and the consequent 
reluctance of many actors -  both dominating and dominated -  to hand over 
information. There is also a fundamental conceptual challenge in this type of 
enquiry: power comes in various forms and expressions that cannot be captured by a 
single formulation. Most commonly, the social science literature describes “power” 
in terms of an actor A directly controlling an actor B. Concentrating just on this 
form, however, creates blind spots and black holes in the analysis. As Lukes (1975)
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pointed out, actors are for instance sometimes silently pushed into abiding by the will 
of others, while presuming to serve their own interests. One may thus define 
“subjective interests” as those that “are consciously articulated and observable”, 
whereas “objective interests” (or “real interests”) are the goals and desires that actors 
“would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice” (Lukes, 1975, p.34).
As this shows, power requires a very comprehensive analysis that goes far beyond 
immediately observable interactions. This is especially the case when trying to 
identify the power channels of a global discourse and how these are utilised by 
various actors. Drawing on Lukes and Foucault, Barnett and Duvall (2005) provide a 
suitably comprehensive grid that we use throughout this study. It pulls together 
complementary conceptions of power. The typology they build is based on a 
definition of power as “the production of effects that shape the actions or conditions 
of existence of actors” (p. 18). They then identify four forms of such power relations, 
each requiring to be explored in local case studies. Compulsory power refers to the 
direct control of an actor A over an actor B, by the use of material and ideational 
resources to produce incentives or constraints. Institutional power relates to the 
indirect control of A over B through the mediation of institutions, such as 
organisations or markets. Structural power provides privileged positions to certain 
actors through the reinforcement of long-standing binary social relations and 
categories -  for instance land owners vs. rural employees. Finally, productive power 
grants privileged positions to certain actors through the strengthening of new and 
emerging discourses that reshape identities and legitimate knowledge.
Selecting local case studies
This research adopts a qualitative approach on local case studies, as this method 
alone enables the in-depth exploration of local power relations that is required to 
compare macro-narratives to micro-facts. Data were collected during more than four 
months of fieldwork (19 weeks), using face-to-face interviews, participant 
observation, focus groups and a mass of written documents of all kinds. To better 
capture structural effects of the CP discourse, and so as not to misinterpret or over­
generalise singular features, it was also decided to base the empirical enquiry upon 
two case studies. The following seven criteria led the selection process.
First, we felt that each case study must first and foremost clearly epitomise the CP 
discourse. This was achieved by focusing on environmental endeavours entirely
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embedded in strong and official concern with community participation, leading 
notably most technical aspects and institutional practices.
Second, if we are to exemplify a global discourse, a good way to proceed is to select 
at least one world famous example of a participatory scheme. This case study should 
be widely acknowledged by practitioners, policy makers, academics and various 
international actors as providing a good example of a “best practice” and how CP can 
be most skilfully applied. This way, we deal with a triply hard case (or test) for the 
critical narrative, since not only does the CP discourse in itself contradict the key 
claims of this narrative, not only is biodiversity protection one of the most mature 
policy fields in terms of CP, but also an officially successful implementation of CP 
should be even more difficult to contradict for this narrative. Consequently, if the 
latter still proves pertinent for describing this triply hard case, its relevance would be 
manifested with even more strength.
Third, not only should we select a famous example of an officially “successful” 
participatory scheme, but we should also consider a CP endeavour that turned out to 
be less successful or sustainable. It seems indeed important to look at both instances 
of so called “success” and “failure” when studying the empirical incarnations of a 
global discourse. Critical theorists rightly argue that “failed projects” impact the 
world just as much as successful ones. Ferguson (1990), for instance, famously 
argues that failed development projects have strong side-effects such as increasing 
state bureaucracy or centralising power, which says a lot about the inner nature and 
meaning of these interventions. As he explains: “Developers set up projects that 
almost systematically ‘fail in their own terms’ but nonetheless have regular and 
standard effects that can be identified” (ibid., p. 18). Therefore, “important political 
effects may be realised almost invisibly alongside with [a] failure” (ibid., p.255). 
Following Foucault (1975), Ferguson even calls these side-effects “instrument- 
effects” because although they may be officially unintended, they seem to be 
“instruments of what turns out to be an exercise of power” (Ferguson, 1990, p.255). 
Thus, if one wants to study the final impacts of a global governance discourse in both 
its diversity and core coherence, the spectrum of case studies definitely needs 
broadening to include examples of recognised failures. Moreover, we also need to 
pay attention to differences between narratives in explaining failures. While the 
emancipatory narrative may argue that a failed CP scheme was improperly
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implemented, the critical outlook may point to more fundamental problems with CP 
at the outset, and make the case that “failure” was inbuilt from the start. In our case 
study selection, we thus need to include an example of an “unsuccessful” project 
which was nevertheless strongly built and carried out on the basis of the CP 
discourse.
Fourth, in each case study, social processes of participation should have developed 
and been in existence for a significant period. For this purpose, we have set a rather 
arbitrary but safe minimum of ten years. This precaution allows for better 
observation of the sustainability of CP institutions over time, their structural impacts 
on the community, social capital and connections to markets, as well as the local 
response to potential frustrations and changing contexts.
Fifth, each case study must relate to a set of natural resources of unquestionable 
importance for global biodiversity and the international community. This is to ensure 
that we deal with cases that embody important issues for global governance.
Sixth, the interactions between local stakeholders and the given natural resources 
should be strong, not weak. In other words, the local socio-economic context should 
carry significant risks for global biodiversity. This is to make sure that participation 
does actually relate, in our case studies, to relevant issues of global governance 
concern.
Last but not least, case studies must offer the practical possibility for an independent 
researcher to gather the necessary empirical data and to reasonably put into practice 
the analytical framework we devised -  which identifies nine dimensions of CP 
schemes and four different power forms. This means that we had to make sure 
beforehand that access to relevant informants and documents would be likely.
On this basis, and after reviewing more than 20 potentially qualifying CP schemes in 
biodiversity protection in eleven countries, two emerged as especially relevant and 
offered the prospect of high quality data.
Caring for the corals? CP in Soufriere, in St. Lucia
The first case study has to do with community participation in coral reef protection in 
a small coastal town called Soufriere, on the Caribbean island of Saint Lucia. The 
project at stake has often been hailed as a leading example of CP at its best, given its 
supposed ability to reduce conflicts and achieve good environmental impacts. The
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United Nations Environmental Programme, for instance, expects it “to continue to 
serve as a ‘best practice’ example for the region” (UNEP-CEP, 2000, p.5), while the 
International Coral Reef Action Network praises it as a key example of “success” in 
the Caribbean (ICRAN, 2003, p.4). It was awarded various international prizes and is 
widely presented as a “best practice” in environmental policy circles. In a standard 
practitioner handbook, for instance, the SMMA is unambiguously presented as a 
“success story” (Salm & Clark, 2000, p.282).
In Soufriere, a rise in tourism and a continuation of fishing activities had resulted, at 
the end of the 1980s, in a degradation of coral reefs and a series of conflicts over 
who has the right to use coastal waters; where, when and how. After some 
disappointing top-down state-led regulations, the CP discourses stepped in. A 
process of community consultation and participation started in 1991 and a first 
“participatory consensus” was produced in 1994. This was formalised in the creation 
of a participatory institution, the SMMA (Soufriere Maritime Management 
Association) and a zoning map dividing and allocating spaces to various economic 
actors. Since then, the SMMA is said to have had significant results in terms of both 
biodiversity protection and economic yield (e.g. FFEM, 2008).
Nevertheless, we shall argue that despite strong acclaims for its “community 
participation”, the origins, inclusiveness, scope, intensity and allocation of benefits 
of this participatory scheme all point to the small space left for its primary (and 
weakest) stakeholders: the coastal fishers. The SMMA has neither been set up by -  
nor connected to -  the wider local community. It rather embodies a “power 
formation” that handed over local influence to a set of interest groups at the national 
level, as well as foreign NGOs, experts and donors. Its divorce from coastal fishers -  
who are nevertheless its prime natural stakeholders -  has been fast and their 
“participation” has totally collapsed. It is not through the ad hoc “participatory 
institution” that was created (the SMMA) but rather through parallel political strife 
that the poorer fishers have been able, at some points in time, to make their critical 
interests heard. The myth of “ongoing institutional dialogue” has been maintained 
throughout but it does not fit what is observed on the ground and in local history. 
Nowadays, CP in Soufriere, while still receiving praise from international donors and 
environmental policy circles, has taken an absolute minimal form with almost no 
inputs from locals. Strong bursts of compulsory, institutional and productive power
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can be identified, which combined to disempower fishers from what was nonetheless 
labelled an “exemplary” CP scheme.
Thus in Soufriere, the empirical expectations of the critical narrative find themselves 
largely confirmed. In arguing so, we also take note of the SMMA’s impact on the 
social fabric of the local community. First, we look at changes in social control, 
namely the way certain people have seen their behaviour increasingly framed and 
contained, while others have been left unmonitored and unquestioned. Second, we 
claim that this new balance of social control has underpinned a continuous process of 
commodification that has helped transform local spaces -  and even people’s 
behaviour -  into more tradable assets on the international tourism market. Third, and 
finally, we investigate how the CP process has interacted with the social capital of 
the community. The inability of the lay people to engage -with institutions left the 
poorer parts of the community with little choice but political unrest or psychological 
withdrawal once “the system” (as many call it) had won and once things started to 
seem irreversible. Meanwhile, Soufriere’s low social capital also paved the way for 
the SMMA to be overtaken by non-community actors. In this process, local influence 
has been transferred to a mixed coalition made up of stronger economic actors, 
governmental authorities, foreign donors and some conservationists. This alliance, 
however, does not have the capacity to address current local environmental 
challenges.
Caring for the wetlands? CP in the Pantanal, Brazil
Our second field study relates to a vast participatory initiative that took place right in 
the heart of South America -  namely the Pantanal Regional Park (PRP or Parque 
Regional do Pantanal). This park was meant to create a large-scale environmental 
management scheme with highly inclusive governance based on CP principles. It 
was designed for the largest freshwater wetland in the world, the Pantanal, and 
managed by a participatory institution, the Pantanal Park Institute (IPP), which can 
be seen as the counterpart of the SMMA in our St. Lucian case study.
With technical and financial support from the French government, the European 
Union and the local Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul, the PRP was conceived as 
a voluntary association of local landowners (fazendeiros) pledging to follow a 
common environmental charter. In return, they were to receive the support of a range 
of partners to help reinforce their “traditional way of life” (based on extensive cattle-
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ranching) held to be “environmentally friendly”. Within a few years, however, the 
PRP experienced growing financial and management problems leading to the closure 
of all of its operations in the summer of 2005. Having managed large sums of money, 
the PRP had raised significant hopes and its collapse has left deep wounds.
What appears in the Pantanal experience is a more complex picture than in St. Lucia. 
Some features are shared, notably the fact that the PRP project was neither originated 
by nor connected to the wider local community, as it turns out, but rather to a limited 
set of active and self-interested people. Its origins were rather elite-centred, while the 
initiative was to a large extent financially supported and conceptually influenced 
“from outside”, by foreign expertise. However, while in Soufriere the CP discourse 
resulted in coherent containment dynamics, weighing upon the poorer coastal fishers 
so as to clear the ground for more modem economic activities, the PRP experience 
displays multiple and often contradictory processes of containment. It is thus a 
complex “mille feuilles containment”6 that needed to be dissected.
The first “layer” of containment stemmed from the will of the long-established local 
producers to counter the rising forces of environmental conservationists in the 
Pantanal, as well as incoming economic actors. These intentions were embodied in 
the discourse on traditions, exalting the “local community”, which permeated the 
whole initiative. While “greening” the landowners and making them appear more 
environment-friendly that they probably were, this rhetoric also reinforced their 
structural position by presenting them as forming the very core of the “traditional 
community” -  and thus enjoying most of its legitimacy. This provided the second 
layer of containment observable in this CP scheme, one that pushed other local actors 
well into the background and deprived them of any important voice: for example, the 
rural employees as well as the traditional fishers living in the Pantanal for 
generations.
But matters did not stop there. Still other processes of containment appeared in the 
course of implementation, this time affecting the landowners themselves. The will of 
the foreign donors to make civil society more “plural”, the consequent weakening 
and de-legitimisation of the only locally functioning community organisation, as well 
as the institutionalisation of CP into a formal organisation (the so-called IPP,
6 Mille feuilles (“a thousand leaves”) is a typical French cake composed of many layers of thin pastry 
dough. It is often used as a metaphor to depict a system composed of a great many different levels.
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managed by full-time staff members and several foreign experts) resulted in the 
estrangement of the vast majority of the fazendeiros from the whole scheme. 
Meanwhile, a full-fledged political capture developed under pressure from a few 
local politicians with unclear agendas but real destabilising effects on the governance 
of the PRP. This whole scramble resulted in the final collapse of the community 
project.
Yet, a complete understanding of these multi-layered containment processes requires 
going beyond the analysis of their power effects and mechanisms, to look for their 
“catalysts” -  in other words, what enabled such disempowering dynamics to play out 
so strongly. This is where social capital comes in. It is argued that the symbiotic 
paternalism in which the rural employees have been embedded for generations 
largely prevented their voice from being heard at any stage of the PRP process. At 
the same time, the landowners’ long-standing social preference for individualism and 
informalism in their social interactions laid the foundation for their inability to take 
control of the participatory organisation they were meant to lead.
What took place in the Pantanal, therefore, does surely not underpin the 
emancipatory narrative. While exemplifying the critical narrative, this experience at 
the same time challenges it. This narrative is indeed confirmed insofar as 
participation does turn out to be extremely weakened. Yet, the reasons for this do not 
particularly fit many potential critical expectations, especially those related to the 
concepts of dependency and governmentality. It is not because a set of hegemonic 
actors (such as international agencies or neoliberal forces) wrote the script and 
predefined what should happen -  such as the furthering o f “global capitalism”, which 
not observed in this context. What happened has more to do with the collision of 
primarily local forces, rent-seeking behaviours, a continuously reinterpreted CP 
discourse and other local factors (notably the social capital), and with the ensuing 
shifting balances of power, which are in no way easy to predict. Besides, outcomes 
are rendered even more dynamic over time by the fact that stakeholders can see their 
capacity for collective action further strengthened or weakened depending on their 
own iterative reactions to frustrations. They can either increasingly mobilise or “give 
up”.
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Organisation o f the study
This study raises concerns about the local power effects of global discourses. The 
first chapter thus focuses on this latter notion and argues that many such discourses 
are part and parcel of global governance - just as much as institutions, which have 
captured nevertheless most of the attention of IR scholars. It also characterises two 
basic narratives of power that are often used in relation to global governance and 
widespread discourses - one that emphasises domination and another emphasising 
the emancipation of affected people. While the critical narrative expects global 
governance discourses to foster mechanisms of social control and reinforce dominant 
power structures, the emancipatory narrative believes that they help empower the 
hitherto disempowered and call into question various power status quos. Various 
types of critical narratives are also explored, notably those based on concepts of 
dependency, governmentality and hegemony. .
The second chapter brings under scrutiny a specific global discourse, namely that on 
Community Participation (CP), as well as a specific issue area of global governance, 
namely the protection of biodiversity. It is argued that CP has now become a global 
discourse active in virtually all areas of international policy making. It also reviews 
its historical rise and shows that foreign policy concerns -  notably those of the 
United States -  were instrumental to its worldwide diffusion, as a way of engaging 
with the world’s rural masses in the Cold War context. The chapter further explores 
the mechanics of the CP discourse by pointing to its system of signification, the way 
it produces a shared and appealing “common sense”, as well as the concrete policy 
practices it fosters. Finally, it shows how and on the basis of what concerns and 
promises community participation entered the biodiversity protection policy 
discourse. The empirical expectations of power narratives about CP in this field are 
also presented.
The third chapter builds a detailed framework to assess participatory processes in the 
field of biodiversity protection in order to formulate the precise empirical 
expectations of the two power narratives under scrutiny -  expectations that are later 
to be compared to field observations. It also identifies various types of power 
phenomena that will be traced out in case studies.
The fourth chapter introduces our case study on the Soufriere Maritime Management 
Association (SMMA), based in St. Lucia. It provides background information on the
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Soufriere context to show how tensions around coral reefs had been developing for 
years. It then analyses the genesis of the SMMA participatory scheme, its originating 
agents and initial consultation process. It next scrutinises the way the SMMA has 
been implemented in practice as an institution, its inclusiveness, scope, participatory 
intensity and allocation of benefits over time.
The fifth chapter follows up the analysis of the SMMA by focusing on its impact on 
the social fabric of the local community. It first looks at changes in social control, 
namely the way certain people have seen their behaviour increasingly framed and 
contained, while others have been left unmonitored and unquestioned. Second, it 
argues that a continuous process of commodification has taken place, making local 
spaces and people more tradable assets in the international tourism market. Third, 
and finally, it investigates how the CP process has interacted with social capital of 
the community -  its fragmentation, the inability of the weaker locals to deal with 
institutions and their psychological withdrawal from “the system”. On this basis, the 
fact that the critical narrative finds itself largely confirmed in St. Lucia is 
acknowledged but some limitations are also pointed out.
The sixth introduces our case study on the Pantanal Regional Park (PRP), in Brazil. 
It first shows the evolving use of the CP discourse in the Pantanal region reflecting 
the ongoing tension between principles of conservation vs. economic use of the 
environment. It then explores the genesis of the PRP project and sheds light on its in­
built containment strategy against conservationist NGOs and new economic actors -  
and thus to attempt to give pre-eminence to long-established local producers. Finally, 
the chapter analyses the discourse of the PRP initiative itself, which magnifies the 
position of landowning cattle-ranchers as forming the core of the traditional 
community. This process took place to the detriment of lower social groups of the 
Pantanal, who were excluded from the design of the participatory park and, later, 
from its governance.
The last chapter looks at the implementation, the fate and the impact on the local 
community of the PRP project and shows that, ironically, CP helped to actually 
disempower the traditional landowners -  contrary to its original strategic intent. It 
first points to the detrimental effects of the forced “pluralisation” of the local civil 
society advocated by the foreign donors and experts; namely, it “fabricated 
pluralism” (in the form of a swift and artificial multiplication of small associations),
Introduction - 1 7
fragmented local voices and paved the way for capture of the CP scheme by other 
forces. The chapter then looks at the deployment of institutional power -  above all by 
local politicians -  in the governance of the PRP, which became “politically 
captured”. It also investigates how the multiple containment processes identified in 
the PRP project were not only facilitated by the social capital of locals, but also 
impacted this capital. Finally, we underline the fact that the failure of this 
participatory scheme stimulated local frustrations that may be feeding a collective 
learning process. The way in which the critical strand of narratives is both 
simultaneously underpinned and qualified is also analysed.
The conclusion brings together the insights gained from the analysis of the empirical 
data and stresses the high empirical relevance of the critical narrative. However, it 
refutes a monolithic and deterministic view of this narrative by insisting on 
contingency and undetermined outcomes of various competing interest groups with 
rent-seeking behaviour. It also makes the case that data favour a view of the exercise 
of power that fits Gramsci’s concept of hegemony rather than notions of dependency 
or governmentality. When put into practice at the ground level, global governance 
discourses can no longer be seen as singular and accepted, but rather as contested and 
even manipulated by various local actors. Such processes dramatically widen the 
range of their potential outcomes. Processes of social resistance to containment are 
also observed, but greatly weakened by the social capital levels of the weakest 
stakeholders. On this basis, questions are raised about the global democratic impact 
of the CP discourse and ways for future research are suggested in order to better 
understand how participation and representation need to be distinguished, bridged or 
assisted by new processes, yet to be conceived.
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Chapter 1 - The Local Power Effects of Global 
Discourses: a Neglected Research Agenda
This chapter makes the case that the study of global governance in IR currently 
suffers from a relative lack of emphasis on three significant research angles: power, 
discourses and micro-data. Power remains indeed a comparatively under-studied 
issue among global governance scholars, which is a paradoxical situation given the 
ubiquity of explicit or implicit power narratives in their work. Not only does power 
rarely constitute the upfront focus of research, but in cases where it does, the notion is 
rarely comprehensively conceptualised and therefore seldom fully addressed: only a 
limited set of forms of power are generally brought under scrutiny, leaving significant 
facts and trends in the dark. Second, when looking at global governance, IR scholars 
have tended to emphasise its institutional dynamics to the detriment of its discursive 
analysis: phenomena have been preferentially explored through the lens of 
institutions, although there is also great need for the lens of discourses. Third, the 
micro-level of global governance and how it impacts lay people remain relatively 
neglected in current research: the more macro-levels of global governance still attract 
most of the scholarly attention, through the analysis of big actors, big organisations, 
big negotiations and deals, big networks, etc.
We thus argue that a more balanced research agenda needs to be drawn up that puts 
stronger emphasis on power, discourses and micro-data in the study of global 
governance. Accordingly, this work’s research question is meant to contribute to 
addressing this call. By looking at the “local power effects of global discourses”, it 
brings together at the same time power concerns, discourses and micro-data. It thus 
hopes to make a useful contribution to redressing current research biases.
In the second half of the chapter, it is argued that, when it comes to global discourses, 
IR scholars often work and interpret data on the basis of large “power narratives” -  
which need far more empirical assessment than is currently provided. Narratives are 
popular syntheses of events that help to give a better understanding of complex
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phenomena within the unified framework of a moving “world order”. They bring 
coherence to observations but also run the risk of over-simplifying or failing to 
capture the reality of things. While the emancipatory narrative insists upon the 
empowerment dynamics at work within and inspired by many global discourses, the 
view of various critical narratives is that mainstream global discourses tend to 
reinforce a range of pre-existing power structures and foster the “collapse of social 
emancipation into social control” (Santos, 1999, p.35). Three types of critical 
narratives are identified -  centred on the concepts of dependency, governmentality 
and hegemony. In engaging with them, and testing their vision of current power 
dynamics, there is a need to bring in more data about what is actually happening “on 
the ground”, at the local level and impact point of global discourses. This is what this 
study aims at contributing to.
1.1. Studying Global Governance: Re-em phasising  
D iscourses, Power & Micro-Data
This section makes the case that discourses, power and micro-level data remain 
paradoxically under-analysed in the IR literature on “global governance”.7 The gap is 
both conceptual and empirical, as to date only a few works in this field have tried to 
grasp power in its many forms and even fewer are underpinned by detailed fieldwork. 
Studying the local power effects o f global governance discourse on the basis of 
micro-empirical data thus appears to be an essential path towards addressing these 
various gaps and furthering global governance studies. The last part of this section 
provides a preliminary approach to analysing global discourses with a view to 
understanding how they may impact local conditions.
1.1.1. The discursive gap
Most of the scholarship on global governance has been concerned with institutional 
design. Reflecting on two decades of academic writing on global governance, Hurrel 
(2005, p.33) notes that it mostly offers “sophisticated accounts of how institutions 
emerge and how they function; [as well as of] the strategic choices of liberal 
hegemons and how these choices may work to reinforce institutionalization”. Global
7 See Appendix 1 for a review of the current use of the concept in the literature.
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governance has thus been primarily analysed as a rising institutional system that deals 
with the management of international collective goods -  such as the environment, 
financial stability or international trade. An institutional diversity is indeed manifest 
in terms of the levels of publicness (nature of participants), delegation (functions 
performed by ad hoc organisations) and inclusiveness (level of shared decisional 
power) of the many governance arrangements in existence (Koenig-Archibuggi, 
2003). Scholars have been linking these variations to historical and political economy 
factors, as well as to the intrinsic characteristics of the collective goods at stake -  
such as the scope of their externalities (e.g. Kolliker, 2006). Such institutions have 
been further explored in terms of a dynamic interplay between institutional 
arrangements, be they “embedded, nested, clustered, overlapping or competing” 
(Young, 1999).
This strand of analysis -  institutional design -  is not only called upon to explain the 
shape of current global governance arrangements; it is also used in problem-solving 
contexts, as it logically leads to the search for the “optimal institution” in the face of a 
given issue of collective action. The institutional design approach typically tries to 
balance and cater for principles of accountability, effectiveness and legitimacy. This 
perspective is arguably the dominant paradigm of policy makers and scholars alike 
concerned with global governance, many of whom see their job as trying to 
“improve” institutions. Illustratively, this mode of thought permeates landmark 
publications of the United Nations Development Programme on the management of 
globalisation, which brought to the fore the concepts of “global public goods” or 
“global public finance” (e.g. Kaul, e ta l ,  1999, 2003, 2006).
In the study of global governance, however, the focus on governance arrangements 
through institutions needs to be complemented by an equally systematic study of 
global discourses -  such as Human Rights,8 Good Governance, Democracy, Gender, 
Development, or now Sustainable Development. At first, such discourses may be 
defined as “sets of concepts, categories, and ideas that provide ways to understand 
and act in the world, whether or not those who subscribe to them are aware of their 
existence” (Dryzek, 2006, preface, p.vi). Yet, they should not just be looked at as 
mere linguistic phenomena made of words, but as larger formations that encompass a
8 We use capital letters (e.g. Good Governance) when referring to well-established “global discourses”.
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whole range of macro and micro “practices”, and not limited to cognitive ones. In that 
sense, there are bridges between concepts and institutions. This approach entails 
looking beyond the large visible macro-institutions that are the most studied and 
discussed, and exploring those that may be stimulated by global discourses but are 
locally developed - and where a “micro-physics of power” is at work.
Michel Foucault is frequently referred to as the founder of “discourse analysis” but 
his legacy is too often summarised as a limited outlook on discourses as purely 
linguistic phenomenon.9 In his view, however, discourses do include theories, ideas 
and words but only as practices among many others, including very ordinary and 
concrete practices in micro-interactions. His message is very much that discourses are 
not primarily made of words but of practices, both formal and informal, related to 
both macro and micro phenomena. Their interconnections “create a story”, “make 
sense” (Selby, 2007) and carry “power-knowledge structures” framing what is 
thought of as legitimate, doable, etc. This approach, which we adopt, calls for an 
empirical analysis of discourses as “webs of related practices”.
Global discourses may be studied from a range of perspectives. Normative theorists 
may evaluate the strengths and merits of their explicit or embedded ethical claims, as 
well as the legitimacy of their procedural, regulatory and distributive outcomes. 
Rational choice scholars (such as realists or neoliberals) may look at what those 
discourses mean to individual or collective utility maximisers (such as states, interest 
groups or individuals): how they may constrain strategies or be used as tools to attain 
fixed goals, including the production of collective goods. Constructivists and 
cognitivists -  who emphasise knowledge, ideas, socialisation and identities -  may 
explore how actors become socialised into discourses, as well as how, over time, 
these discourses impact identities and institutional frameworks.
Institutional design and discourse analysis -  even the most cognitive type -  need not 
necessarily be opposed, although they need to be distinguished. To start with, 
attention to discourses is strongly grounded in the IR literature on institutions. One 
only needs to recall Krasner (1983) pointing to the cognitive nature of “international 
regimes” when defining them as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge”. Or as
9 This more restricted view would be closer to Derrida’s claim that “there is nothing outside the text” 
(Derrida, 1967, p. 163).
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Ruggie (1982) put it: “International regimes are akin to a language -  we may think of 
them as part of the language of state action....We know international regimes not 
simply by some descriptive inventory of their concrete elements, but by their 
generative grammar, [their] underlying principles of order and meaning” (p.380).
Thus, informal or cognitive elements that are part of a discourse can complement or 
provide the very flesh of an international regime. Such elements may interact with 
formal institutions, providing their inter-subjective foundations and favouring some 
types of institutions over others. Global discourses, for instance, may be studied in 
terms of the levels of the publicness, delegation and inclusiveness they tend to 
promote in related institutional arrangements, whether global or local. These 
discourses may not readily determine institutional outcomes, since so many other 
factors apply -  such as the nature of the collective good at stake, power relations 
among actors as well as contextual constraints. Still, cognitive and informal practices 
that are part of larger discourses can provide incentives towards specific institutional 
outcomes, based upon peer pressure, social identities or ideological congruence with 
larger principles or “regimes of truth”.10
Nevertheless, cognitive and informal practices of global discourses also have a life of 
their own within global governance, away from institutional arrangements. In their 
own fashion, they can influence myriads of centralised or decentralised actors, 
organisational and individual behaviours, at various levels of governance or private 
action. Discourses are multi-scale thanks to their “fluid” nature and thus strongly 
adapted to global governance understood as a dynamic process of multi-scale of 
coordination. This fluidity can be a great contribution to “hyper-collective action” 
(Chamoz & Severino, 2009) through which highly heterogeneous actors try to act 
along somewhat coherent lines. Without any central authority or formal structure, 
discourses can roughly (and sometimes precisely) co-ordinate behaviours of 
individuals, grassroots associations, local communities up to multinational 
companies, nation-states and international organisations. They can prove crucial for 
the decentralised production of some complex collective goods -  such as the
10 The global discourse on Community Participation that we study in this work is very much one such 
discourse, as it is geared towards the promotion of a very specific type of institutional arrangements: 
mixed participation (not limited to public stakeholders but inclusive of all stakeholders), high 
inclusiveness (a significant level of decisional power being shared) and low delegation (at least of 
legislative power, since ideal participation points towards the ideal of direct democracy).
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protection of biodiversity, the harnessing of global energy consumption or the 
management of transmissible diseases, areas that all need to involve countless actors 
and even modify individual behaviours.
In the same way that prices are central to the functioning of markets (contributing to 
the diffusion of information and co-ordination of economic decisions), discourses 
may be instrumental to global “synchronizations” as they may lower transaction costs 
more efficiently than formal institutions -  for instance, if  they manage to reshape 
identities and socialise people into common norms. Furthermore, just like its 
institutional dimension, the discursive dimension of global governance can also be 
studied in terms of a dynamic interplay between discursive elements, whether they 
are “embedded, nested, clustered, overlapping or competing” -  as Young (1999) put 
it regarding institutions. On these counts, scholars still have a long way to go to 
deepen our understanding of discourses as part of global governance -  and it is in this 
line of enquiry that the present research has developed.
1.1.2. The power g ap
Not only can a “discursive gap be seen in current IR research and policy analysis on 
global governance, but a significant “power gap” may also be identified. Indeed, 
much of this research has been and still is carried out as if power was a minor 
question. Hurrel (2005, p.33-34), for instance, finds that “much of the writing on 
governance and order over the past couples of decades has been rationalist in method 
and technocratic in character... [which leaves us with] a strikingly apolitical and far 
too cosy a view of institutions and of global governance”. Fuchs (2007, p.2) also 
finds it “problematic” that “a substantial share of contributions to the global 
governance debate, especially early on, failed to pay sufficient attention to the role of 
power, the ‘key concept’ in political science”. Drawing on this fact, Barnett and 
Duvall (2005) have recently refocused attention on the question of power in global 
governance with a landmark publication on the subject. As they argue: “Global 
governance without power looks very different from global governance with power... 
By using the optics of power, we transform the image of global governance. No 
longer is it solely concerned with the creation and maintenance of institutional 
arrangements through consensual relations and voluntary choices. It now becomes a 
question of how global life is organised, structured and regulated” (p.4-7).
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This “power gap” does not come from nowhere. The study of power has a long 
tradition in IR and has been largely associated with the realist school. However, even 
the strictest and most cynical realist approach is no guarantee of capturing the full 
range of power phenomena at work in the global society. This is because, in the 
realist view, “power” tends to be seen as “the ability of A to get B to do what it 
otherwise would not do”. The focus is placed on interactions and on who governs 
whom, based on material, ideational and institutional resources. Power can 
nevertheless take many other forms, including relations of constitution shaping 
identities. Such relations shed light on how actors are defined and formed as social 
beings, in relation to one another, with their respective interests and goals. The focus 
is less on who governs but rather on who is defined as governing. There is thus a need 
to rework power as a wider concept and adopt a broader approach to what it can 
mean, do and look like.
This conceptual gap has affected the analysis of power made by researchers in global 
governance studies. It has not been compensated -  in fact, much to the contrary -  by 
the outlook adopted by policy makers. Quite expectedly, the latter’s own approach to 
global governance is what Cox (1981) would call a “problem-solving approach”. It 
“takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and 
the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action” 
(p. 128). In contrast, Cox defines and calls for a “critical approach” that does “not take 
institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by 
concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process 
of changing” (p. 129).
The primary characteristic of each and every global governance discourse is very 
much to define and focus upon a “problem” -  such as the “lack” of Human Rights, 
development or good governance in the world. Meanwhile, as Cox has it, “problems” 
are symptomatic of the historical and political context which brings them about. The 
way they are constructed and talked about, as well as the practices they entail, should 
themselves be the object of an enquiry since, in his view, theories that identify 
“problems” are created “for someone and for some purpose” (p. 128). Critical analysis 
is about finding for whom and why, thus uncovering hidden power relations. As 
Foucault would put it, it is about uncovering the “political violence” contained in the 
working of discourses “which appear to be both neutral and independent” (quoted by
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Rabinow, 1984, p.5). It calls to identify the interests, power structures and social 
forces these discourses reveal, protect or undermine. In this light, global discourses 
may “define the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal, what counts 
as a problem” (Hayward, 2000, p.35). They may contribute to delineate “what needs 
to be governed, who is authorised to govern, what counts as legitimate knowledge 
and whose voices are marginalised” (Barnett & Duval, 2005, p.22).
A larger critical analysis of power is thus needed in global governance that goes 
beyond both the realist and the problem-solving approaches. To capture the diversity 
of power relations, sufficient attention needs to be paid to dominant discourses as 
well as to relations of constitution. Such a framework will be devised in chapter 3 
(section 3.2) drawing on Barnett and Duvall (2005).
1.1.3. The micro-data gap
A third manifest tendency in the current IR literature on global governance is its 
continuing emphasis upon “macro-levels”. Although vibrant and dynamic, this flow 
of research displays a focus on the study of large actors, large networks, large deals, 
large organisations and so on. Yet the more micro-level dynamics and the question of 
how local contexts and actors (including lay people) are impacted tend to be left out 
of the analysis when it comes to understanding what global governance is and does. 
There is no doubt, however, that much can be learnt about these two latter questions 
by looking at how local conditions are impacted by the components and dynamics of 
global governance, including global discourses. Studying this more micro-level 
should in fact be integral to most research agendas surrounding global governance.
This issue is what we suggest calling the “micro-data gap”. To make this term clearer, 
it is useful to distinguish two levels of reality in global governance, two “stages” 
where actions take place. The first stage is the “global stage”, the realm of 
international relations involving states, international organisations, international 
firms, international NGOs, etc. It is mostly populated by “global actors” working on 
“global issues” that are not strongly territorialised -  as they do not primarily relate to 
a specific sub-national space and can potentially impact many such spaces. 
Simultaneously, there is also a “local stage” of global governance, where “local 
scenes” of world governance are played out, interventions take place and local actors, 
such as local authorities, communities, civil society actors, etc., are involved or
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impacted. To illustrate this point, we may say for instance that G20 negotiations are 
part of the “global stage”, while setting up a protected nature reserve somewhere in 
the world -  involving global NGOs and donors -  is much more part of the “local 
stage”. These two stages, however, should be understood as the two extremities of a 
continuum, as they interact in many ways -  for instance, through global discourses.
Indeed, discourses form a primary channel through which global dynamics can 
impact local contexts. It would be unfair to say that there has been no or even little 
empirical work done on such global discourses. They have, in fact, attracted a good 
deal of attention, especially from constructivists IR scholars, who place a strong focus 
on norm diffusion, socialisation and internalisation processes. Yet, the study of the 
impacts of global discourses has mobilised far less attention than their diffusion, 
around which a significant theoretical and empirical literature has developed (e.g. 
Dobbin, et al., 2007).
Such global discourses relate in concreto to convergence phenomena of varying 
intensities involving public or civil society actors in countless contexts and countries. 
In the words of Pollitt (2001), rhetorical convergence takes place when “everybody” 
begins to talk and write about similar concepts in such a way that a particular idea 
becomes generalised subject matter. Decisional convergence is when analogous 
principles become enshrined across borders in laws, regulations, codes of conduct, 
organisational charters, etc. Practical convergence occurs when people and 
institutions start working in similar ways, adopting particular organisational forms, 
policy models, techniques, modes of action, etc. As for results convergence, this may 
emerge when changes in practice produce their intended and unintended effects but 
many other factors may influence outcomes. “Global discourses”, thus, primarily 
relate to convergences on words, rules and work methods affecting various policy 
fields. They are thus to be defined as sets of practices, not simply limited to linguistic 
ones. Yet, again, the study of their micro-impacts has mobilised far less attention than 
their diffusion, which is amply studied in the theoretical and empirical literature.11 
There is thus a need to re-emphasise the collection and analysis of micro-data to 
understand the end-nature of global discourses through their actual field-level impact.
11 See Appendix 2 for a review of this literature.
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1.1.4. A nalysing “global discourses”: a prelim inary approach
Looking at the micro-impacts of global discourses requires a preliminary analysis in 
order to divide them up into their core identifiable cognitive elements and concrete 
practices. Once this framework is in place, we are better prepared to systematically 
screen how discourses come to shape local realities. In this section, we present such a 
framework, which we then use in the next chapter.
Global discourses -  as any other discourse -  may be analysed on the basis of their 
primary concerns; how they define problems and issues; what solutions they advocate 
and implement; what assumptions they makes about desirable changes; and who 
supports them and how they relate to other discourses (Walters & Williams, 2003). It 
is critical, however, to realise that what happens in the implementation of a given 
discourse may be very different from what is intended: end results may be “only 
ironically or paradoxically related to it” {ibid., p.73). There may be huge variations as 
to how a global discourse impact local conditions in theory and practices as well as 
across time and places. Drawing on Milliken (1999), we may suggest the following 
four-tier framework.
A first level of analysis is to study discourse as a system o f significations constructing 
social realities. Drawing on de Saussure, emphasis is given to the relationships in 
which things are placed in a sign system -  and to relations by which objects are 
distinguished from one another (de Saussure, 1913). Drawing on Derrida, discourses 
are expected to be typically structured in terms of binary oppositions, such as 
educated/ignorant, modem/traditional, Western/Third World, etc. These oppositions, 
far from being neutral, establish a relation of power: one element in the pair is 
typically privileged (Derrida, 1972).
Another angle of discourse analysis addresses discourse productivity, namely the fact 
that discourses are productive (or reproductive) of things defined in the discourses. 
Beyond giving a language for speaking about phenomena, they privilege certain ways 
of being and acting while excluding others. As Dryzek (1997) or Benjaminsen and 
Svarstad (2008) emphasise, discourses are powerful in the way they delimit options 
for the interpretation of information: they may “facilitate action, while at the same 
time they can blind their proponents to seeing alternative interpretations and actions” 
(Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2008, p.51). Milliken identifies two fundamental levels of 
discourse productivity.
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First is the production o f common sense, namely how things are constructed as 
natural. Weldes (1999) identifies two basic techniques of common sense production: 
articulation (of the discourse with pre-existing cultural elements) and interpellation 
(of individuals, specific interest groups or the general public). Articulation means the 
construction of discursive objects and relationships out of “cultural raw materials” 
and “linguistic resources” that already make sense within a particular society (ibid., 
p. 154). In combining and recombining existing cultural materials, a discourse can 
look inherently connected to them and therefore look like a natural and accurate 
description of reality (ibid., p. 154-155). As for interpellation, it refers to how these 
representations work to “hail” individuals -  or support certain interest groups -  so 
that they become personally and emotionally involved and come to accept the 
representations as natural and accurate. To do so, discourses create subject positions 
or identities for individuals to identify with and to “speak from” (ibid., p. 163).
The production o f policy practices is the second issue in discourse productivity. 
Analysing how policies are implemented (and not just formulated) means studying 
the operationalisation of discursive categories -  for instance in the activities of 
governments, international organisations or local NGOs. Standard procedures, 
deployed in a variety of settings, may produce “standard effects” (Ferguson, 1990, 
p.260) that may be quite different from official discourses. For example, a 
decentralisation policy may consistently although paradoxically increase the 
influence of the central authorities upon local actors. This type of study is rarely taken 
up in mainstream International Relations and Milliken suggests that far more should 
be done. It is precisely within this line of enquiry that the present study is situated.
The last level of analysis is a study of the production and reproduction o f discourses. 
Even hegemonic global discourses are changeable and historically contingent. They 
need work to be produced and reproduced through a “play of practices” -  and such 
efforts are not necessarily successful. Various methods are used in IR to show the 
contingency of discourses and how they shape “reality” and neglect alternative views. 
In the deconstructive method, the contingent nature of a discourse is revealed through 
an internal textual analysis showing how “realities” that are presented as basic or 
evident can be actually reversed or displaced. The juxtapositional method points to 
events and issues that the discourse under analysis fails to acknowledge or address. 
The next method focuses on subjugated knowledges: it explores alternative discourses
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that contradict dominant ones. Finally, in the genealogical method, the contingency 
of discourses is underscored through an historical study of discursive practices.
On this analytical basis, it becomes possible to unfold seemingly unitary discourses 
into their various cognitive mechanisms and policy suggestions. This process 
provides us with a richer understanding of what global “mottos” may actually mean -  
and prepares us for the fieldwork level, in order to trace how these elements play out 
in practice. Table 1 summarises this proposed preliminary approach.
Table 1 -  Analysing global discourses: a preliminary approach
Level of analysis Key concern Instruments /  Methods
1. System of 
significations
How reality is shaped , how 
th ings are  defined, labelled 
and categorised.
. Analysis of language practices, 
categories and oppositions 
(notably binary ones)
. Predicate analysis
. M etaphor analysis
2. Production of 
common sense
How the  discourse is m ade 
"natural" and "self-evident".
. Interpellation -  of various 
individuals o r groups.
. Articulation -  with pre-existing 
and accepted discourses.
3. Production of 
policy practices
W hat are  the  empirical 
effects of the  discourse when 
m ade "operational" in 
policies?
. Analysis of "s tandard  effects" -  
both officially intentional or 
unintentional.
4. Discourse 
reproduction
How th e  discourse hides 
alternative views.
Contingency can be shown through:
. Internal deconstruction
. Juxtaposition of under-analysed 
facts
• Study of alternative discourses 
("subjugated knowledges")
. Genealogical analysis
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1.2. Global D iscourses and their Power Effects: 
Competing Narratives
The fact that discourses and power remain relatively under-analysed in global 
governance studies, in both theoretical and empirical terms, does not mean however 
that IR scholars say nothing about the power effects of global discourses. On the 
contrary, two strands of power narratives are commonly found in scholarly works, 
whether explicitly or otherwise. The first one is an emancipatory narrative that 
emphasises the empowering effects of global discourses on the people they affect. 
The second strand encompasses various critical narratives that underline the effects 
of domination. As the next section explains, a “narrative” is essentially a “story” that 
interprets and gives coherence to a set of observations. The notion must be 
distinguished from that of “discourse”, which refers to a broader set of “practices” 
that may or may not include cognitive ones such as narratives. In what follows, we 
reflect on the concept of narrative and then explore a variety of narratives regarding 
the power effects of global discourses. While the emancipatory narrative stresses the 
dynamics of empowerment at work thanks to various global discourses, a range of 
critical narratives emphasise domination phenomena -  either through the dominance 
of Western countries over the South (grounded in the concept of dependency), the 
self-surveillance of individuals that becomes effective once certain forms of 
“knowledge” have been internalised {governmentality) or the alliances of various 
social forces in perpetuating a world order {hegemony).
1.2.1. The concept o f ‘narrative’
Narrative is a general term for telling a story. Narrative poetry, for instance, is a kind 
of poetry that tells a story, while not all poems obviously do so. In recent decades, the 
concept of narrative has been increasingly used in ever more disciplines including 
literary analysis, psychology, psychiatry, ethnography, anthropology, socio-linguistic 
or research area such as the history of science. In the field of International Relations, 
the word “narrative” is nowadays commonly used to refer to an explanatory 
framework that applies to one or more aspects of international life. “IR narratives” 
resemble a “story” in the sense that they provide coherence and bind together a set of 
sequential, simultaneous or potential events (particular ones) and phenomena (regular
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occurrences). While the conventional view in literary analysis is not to include into 
the concept of narrative such elements as descriptions or argumentations, it is largely 
the case in IR narratives.
The IR concept of narrative is much narrower than that of discourse. While narratives 
are story lines, a cognitive practice of interpretation, discourses are sets of practices 
that potentially encompass many more and diverse practices. Some IR authors, such 
as Pochylczuk (2005), further suggest a distinction between “meta-narratives” and 
“mezzo-narratives”. While the former consist of a very large-scale explanatory grid 
and over-arching “big stories” recounting the state and evolution of world politics, the 
latter relate to more limited issues -  such as economic development, security or 
sovereignty. Both types of narratives are nevertheless connected, as meta-narratives 
set parameters for other narratives.
Among contemporary meta-narratives of the world order, one may surely mention the 
“end of history” framework put forward by Fukuyama (1989) who proclaimed the 
“total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism” -  principles 
such as the rule of law, representative democracy and the market economy (p.3). 
Another prominent meta-narrative is the one elaborated by Huntington (1993, 1996) 
regarding the “clash of civilisations”: it contends that the world’s ideological divides 
are being replaced by conflicts between major civilisations, notably the declining 
West, the rising Sinic world and the unstable Islamic one. A related meta-narrative is 
that designed by Barber (1996) picturing a struggle between “McWorld” 
(globalisation and the corporate control of political processes) and “Jihad” (traditional 
values, nationalisms, religious orthodoxy and theocracy). To date, meta-narratives of 
the world order largely concern themselves with providing a meaning to 
globalisation. They have given birth to a range of global perspectives that are not 
always clear about whether globalisation is something that explains or that needs 
explanation (Medovoi, 2002). Despite confusion, meta-narratives of globalisation are 
popular and in high demand in both the academic field and among public opinion, as 
people need to make sense of the world as it changes.
Although the concept of narrative is used in IR quite differently from the way it is 
used in literature or psychology, valuable insights can be drawn from the latter fields 
into what a narrative essentially is. As Cortazzi (1993) points out, the importance of 
the concept is evident from the range of emphatic epithets often used to describe it.
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Narrative is “a primary act of mind” (Hardy, 1987, p. 1); “the primary scheme by 
means of which human existence is rendered meaningful” (Polkinghome, 1988, p, 
11); or “a means by which human beings represent and restructure the world” 
(Mitchell, 1981, p.8). It is even “a specific cultural system” (Fawcett, et al, 1984, 
p.20), a principle by which “people organise their experience in, knowledge about, 
and transactions with the social world” (Bruner, 1990, p.35). Creating a narrative is 
“a perceptual activity that organises data into a special pattern which represents and 
explains experience” (Branigan, 1992, p.3). In short, narratives are overt and essential 
manifestations of the mind that bring order to human experience of the world.
In literary analysis, the standard definition of a narrative insists on a principle of 
chronology as its defining criteria (Jannidis, 2003). Prince (1982), for instance, 
defines it as “the representation of at least two real or fictive events in a time 
sequence”. Others have refuted the pre-eminence of this criterion, pointing to the 
importance of causality. Richardson (2000, p. 168) thus contends that a “narrative is a 
representation of a causally related series of events”. Arguably, however, almost 
every narrated story displays properties that extend beyond the simple presence of 
causal or chronological connections. As Adams (1991) underlines, within a narrative, 
it is rare that chronology and causality establish a sufficiently strong connection 
between events; the resultant gap is filled by the intentions o f characters involved in 
the story. He thus speaks of “intentional explanations”. Finally, authors such as 
Carroll (2001) have further enriched this analysis by pointing to the fact that some 
stories are led by a teleological dynamic, a forward-looking perspective pointing to a 
pre-determined end result. From this brief review one can identify four types of 
“narrative connections”, shown in Table 2.
Table 2 -  Four aspects of a narrative
Storyline dimensions Key concern
Chronology . tim e line /  sequence of events
Causality • causal s truc tu re  and m echanism s
Intentionality . will of individuals or groups
Teleology . role of fa te , providence or 
inevitability
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Going back to the IR field, it is important to underline the fact that that chronology, 
causality and intentionality may be potentially studied looking at empirical data. 
Meanwhile, teleological hypotheses are by definition non-testable as they rely on a 
view of causality that no empirical experience can capture.
1.2.2. Em ancipatory vs. critical narratives
Current forms of global governance, including global discourses, are widely analysed 
by both their critics and supporters as conveying liberal values and ideas, whether 
they are political, ethical or socio-economic in scope. Here we reflect on “liberalism” 
as part of the global governance “machine”. We further identify two opposing views 
regarding the impact of this liberal content. An emancipatory narrative takes an 
optimistic view of the supposed empowerment of countless actors, from individuals 
to entire nations; various critical narratives, on the other hand, contend that pre­
existing power structures are in fact reinforced.
Liberalism: the sp irit in the machine
Reflecting on the current dynamics of global governance, Barnet and Duvall (2005, 
p.5) put it straightforwardly: “liberalism is the spirit in the machine”. In the IR field, 
this point is underscored by a vast literature (e.g. Ruggie, 1982; Keohane, 1990; 
Doyle, 1995; Deudney & Ikenberry, 1999; Dillon & Reid, 2001; Dillon, 2004). Selby 
(2004), for instance, sees global governance as a definitively liberal project, carrying 
a pluralistic conception of the world, dispersing power away from hegemonic centres, 
especially states, fostering liberal democratic values and procedures, and ordering 
people and things through recourse to reason, knowledge and expertise. For Duffy 
(2005, p.309), global governance is “no less than a project for rationalising global 
social relations”. This project wages a war against traditions, including countless 
local ethical and political practices. One only has to think of Human Rights, Gender 
Equality, the Rule of Law, Good Governance, the quest for Development or the rising 
concepts of Humanitarian Duty to intervene to get a sense of the revolutionary nature 
of this global liberal project. The liberal outlook, emphasising the individual’s 
freedoms and rights, lies at the core of these discourses. Liberal values present 
themselves as universal principles of legitimate action and cooperation, both among 
and within countries. In global fora, they have nurtured a “political correctness” 
embedded in a range of discourses that is rarely publicly challenged.
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Although global governance discourses seem to share broad liberal ethics, there are 
many definition of liberalism and a “liberal school of thought” is hard to delineate. 
Most political theorists refer to a multiplicity of values such as individual freedom, 
toleration, the private sphere, property, equal rights and opportunities, a commitment 
to reason, reform, progress, etc. Gray (1996, pp.286-287) boils this list down to four 
core elements: they are the legacy of the Enlightenment, or what Gray ironically calls 
the “liberal syndrome”. First, is the value of Individualism. This is the belief “that 
only human beings and their forms of life have ultimate value”. Second, 
Universalism, holds that “there are weighty duties and/or rights that are owed to all 
human beings”. It leads to the belief that a liberal regime is “the best and uniquely 
right one for all mankind”. Third, is Meliorism, the view that “human institutions are 
open to indefinite improvement by the judicious use of critical reason”. As Gray 
recalls, “no liberalism can do without some idea of progress, however attenuated”. 
Finally, Egalitarianism denies “any natural or political hierarchy between human 
beings”. For liberals, “the human species is a single-status moral community”, and 
monarchy, hierarchy and subordination are practices that are not ethically founded.
Liberalism is by no means a fully coherent doctrine. In the literature, tensions among 
its values are widely acknowledged; between freedom and equality, toleration and 
universalism, property and equal rights, etc. These tensions have led to ever 
increasing attempts at re-defining liberalism and assessing its claim to universality 
(Raz, 1986; Richardson, 2001; Crowder, 2002; Tassin, 2003). They also explain the 
diversity of “liberalisms” throughout history (Richardson, 1997). These liberal 
“doubts” are reinforced by the philosophically convincing contention that liberalism, 
as an ethical and political ideal, cannot be ultimately grounded in any rational 
justification (Berlin, 1969; Berlin & Williams, 1994; Gray, 1995; Delsol, 2004). In 
the end, liberalism appears as an ethical choice grounded within one’s consciousness 
and can difficultly be assumed to be necessarily and universally followed.
Nevertheless, as a category of action and policy practice, global governance 
discourses have revolved around a rather standard normative consensus close to 
Gray’s description of the “liberal syndrome”: the belief that progress is taking place; 
that institutions can be established to help manage changes; that democracy is an 
objective in itself; and that states and individuals have a duty to protect individuals, 
promote universal values and create conditions to encourage political and economic
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freedoms. This normative outlook is omnipresent in official talks and discourses on 
global governance, on both ethical and pragmatic grounds. As Barnett and Duvall 
(2005, p.6) observe, “the language of interests is often married to the language of 
values of the ‘international community’, values such as democracy, human rights, the 
rule of law and markets” -  values that are seen desirable both in themselves and for 
the peace and prosperity they are assumed to foster.
A key question thus emerges -  namely whether such dynamics do in fact provide 
more emancipation to impacted societies or tend, on the contrary, to reinforce or 
create further structures of domination.
The optim istic view: the emancipatory narrative
The emancipatory narrative of global discourses underlines their capacity and actual 
tendency to “empower” people and call into question long-standing power-based 
status quos. Empowerment may be defined as “the process by which people, 
particularly the poor and the disadvantaged, gain and retain control over their lives 
and destinies through information, skills, resources, authority, co-operation and self­
esteem” (CANARI, 1999, p.28). Much of the scholarship on global governance takes 
a positive view on its key discourses, thus adopting the emancipatory narrative 
explicitly or implicitly. This was notably the case during the 1990s, as exemplified by 
the debate on the extension of the human rights doctrine. After the end of the Cold 
War, the global discourse on Human Rights was almost universally praised as a 
progressive force (e.g. Shaw, 1994) and seen as part of an emerging “cosmopolitan 
ethics” undermining state power and enhancing individual rights. The process was led 
by non-state actors, NGOs for the most part, sometimes described as “norm 
entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Few criticisms could be heard against 
this emerging global discourse. In the academic field, social constructivist 
frameworks were used to explain its emergence based upon the “power of ideas” and 
information networks (Risse, et a i, 1999). The same occurred with neoliberal 
economic principles that took hold of governments and international organisations.
We may schematise the emancipatory narrative into three key elements, drawing 
upon section 1.2.2. First, there is a “chronological scheme”: global governance 
discourses are developing over time, putting dominant power structures into question 
and fostering social emancipation. Second is a “causal scheme”: the promoted values, 
practices and institutions carry empowering effects that lead to an increase in the
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autonomy and capacity o f  action o f individuals, groups or nations. Finally there is an 
“intentionality scheme”: these processes are fuelled by the active will o f hitherto 
disempowered individuals, groups or nations, helped by either benevolent or self- 
interested actors -  including civil society actors but also states or international 
organisations; intentionality can thus be both “bottom-up” and “top-down”.
The pessim istic view: critical narratives
On the other hand, various critical narratives of global discourses offer a sharp 
contrast with the emancipatory one. They are driven by radical views on today’s 
world order as being essentially oppressive despite the advent of a supposedly 
“emancipatory” liberal framework. Positive outlooks of the “global liberal order” 
have indeed been tamed by observers who stress the relations of domination inherent 
to liberal discourses. Alternative readings of “universal claims” regained prominence 
at the turn of the century, taking up the claim of the well-known German legal 
theorist Carl Schmitt, according to whom “whoever invokes humanity wants to 
cheat” (Schmitt, 1996, p.54). In this light, current attempts at fostering a system of 
global governance are interpreted as a reinforcement of various structures of power 
playing out in globalisation and global capitalism.
Such narratives draw their core inspiration from critical theory and thus a few words 
should be said about this. The term “critical theory” was first coined by the Frankfurt 
Institute of Social Research in 1937. It brought together currents of thought such as 
German idealism, historical materialism, modernism and psychoanalysis, 
incorporating ideas from authors as diverse as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, 
Weber, Lucas and Gramsci. The school’s mission, as defined by one of its founders, 
Max Horkheimer (1939), was to explore the dialectics of modem reason (associated 
with the Enlightenment -  or Aufklarung) as both an instrument of emancipation and 
domination. Critical theorists thus developed a complex relationship with the 
Enlightenment project itself (which we may also call the “modernisation project” or 
perhaps, in today’s words, the “liberal project”) -  namely the project of rationalising 
society and emancipating people on the basis of values such as rationality, freedom or 
equality.
On the one hand, critical thought has been committed to such values, so much so that 
many authors see it as an emancipatory project in itself. On the other hand, critical 
thinking is infused with a deep-rooted scepticism about the project itself and the way
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modem science and ethical norms have been used to foster an economic, social and 
political “modernisation”. These analysts thus tend to focus on the “dark side” of 
universal values such as rationality, freedom, justice, equality, etc. They are inclined 
to denounce oppressive forces in the light of how such ideologies have played out in 
real life and human actions {praxis). They are concerned with hegemonic ideas, 
practice, discourses -  and they cast doubt on their emancipatory nature.
When applied to global discourses, we may schematise critical narratives into three 
basic and common elements. First, there is a “chronological scheme” providing the 
overall story: global discourses are developing over time, reinforcing dominant 
power structures and mechanisms o f social control. Second is a “causal scheme” 
according to which the practices and institutions that are promoted carry effects o f  
disempowerment that lead to a decreased autonomy and capacity o f action o f affected 
individuals, groups or nations. Finally, there is an “intentionality scheme”: these 
processes maybe fuelled by the active will o f  dominant and often external actors 
(external to the local context) -  and to this extent, they are top-down in nature. 
Another view emphasises the faceless, internalised and delocalised nature of power in 
processes of global govemmentality.
Table 3 contrasts, in general terms, the basic tenets of these two strands of narratives. 
The next sections explore in greater depth three distinct and significant “species” of 
critical narratives.
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Table 3 -  Power narratives of global discourses: 
contrasting components in general terms
Emancipatory narrative Critical narratives
Chronology
The growing diffusion of global 
aovernance discourses w eakens 
dom inant power structu res and 
increases the  autonom y and 
capacities of action of affected 
people and groups.
The growing diffusion of global 
aovernance discourses reinforces 
dom inant power structu res and 
d ecreases  th e  autonom y and 
capacities of action of affected 
people and groups.
Causality
Practices related to alobal 
governance discourses have 
emDowerina effects, th rouah  a 
variety of m echanism s.
Practices related to  alobal 
governance discourses have 
disemDOwerina effects, th rouah  a 
variety  of m echanism s.
Intentionality
Bottom -up an d /o r top-dow n.
Disempowered actors or som e 
powerful ones may be actively 
contributing to  em ancipatory 
processes.
Top-down or anonym ous.
Dom inant and often external 
actors a re  actively leading 
processes of social control. An 
a lternative view em phasises the ir 
face lessness and delocalised 
nature .
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1.2.3. “Dependency” as a critical narrative
A first important form of critical narrative applied to global discourses draws upon 
“dependency theory”. This body of literature famously argues that poor nations are 
impoverished and rich ones strengthened by the way in which the former are 
integrated into the “world system”. Resources flow from a “periphery” of 
underdeveloped states to a “core” of wealthy states. In pursuing their goal of global 
dominance, rich nations infiltrate developing countries through lay or religious 
“missionaries”, transnational corporations and global institutions (such as the IMF) to 
swallow them up into “their” global capitalist order. Cultural and ideological 
elements are thus studied as forms and means of this subjugation. Such theories have 
been especially popular in Latin America, concerned with the all-pervasive US 
influence. Significant dependency analysts include Frank (1967), Dos Santos 1971, 
Cardoso (2001) or Wallerstein (2004). The analysis that follows draws on the work of 
Sekhri (2009), who provides a useful update on the current stance of dependency 
theory.
With the end of the Cold War, the much commented process of globalisation has 
arguably tended to integrate rather than separate peripheries in the world. The 
dependency outlook has thus grown less fashionable and the number of studies 
drawing on this perspective has considerably reduced, with pro-dependency academic 
works becoming extremely rare.12 This does not mean, however, that the dependency 
approach has disappeared. In fact, many of its key terms and conceptual mechanisms 
remain widely used, notably outside of the academic field by journalists, politicians, 
policy makers, civil society organisations, etc. In fact, the popular concept of “world 
system” is largely infused with dependency views.
The core idea of the dependency approach is to emphasise a North-South framework 
for understanding the world, rather than a Cold War East-West division. Thinkers 
such as Dos Santos, Faletto, Sunkel, Cardoso, Furtado or Prebish have all underlined 
the skewed division of labour within the international system between these two 
poles. This leads to a “North” with high wages, investment rates and levels of 
industrialisation, and a “South” suffering from opposite trends. Latin America and
12 Ghosh’s book on dependency is one of the few that has recently focused on this approach (Ghosh, 
2001). As Sekhri (2009) points out, it nevertheless presents dependency as an outdated framework.
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Africa, in particular, have been analysed in this light, trapped in a pattern of exporting 
natural commodities and importing manufactured products. Andre Gunder Frank 
emerged as one of the key theorists of dependency. Pointing out the impact of foreign 
investment in the periphery by the centre, he looked at the failure of the import- 
substitution strategies in Brazil and Chile (Frank, 1967). His vision of the “North 
actively under-developing the South” has become a central feature of the approach. In 
Africa, Samir Amin reached similar conclusions: peripheries are regions where the 
external powers determine the extent and the orientation of the local accumulation 
processes (Amin, 1970). In his view, local and national powers act under the 
regulations of the structure of the capitalist world system. Thus, development and 
underdevelopment constitute a zero sum game and “opposite sides of the same coin” 
(Randall and Theobald, 1985).
As Dos Santos (1970, p.231) puts it, dependence is “a situation in which the economy 
of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another 
economy to which the former is subjected”. The fact that there may be a situation of 
interdependence between the North and South cannot hide the fact that the North is 
only weakly reliant and not severely constrained by this relation -  which is thus 
deeply asymmetrical. The standard dependency narrative sees these unequal relations 
as beginning with the colonial era, the impact of which is seen as both lasting and 
catastrophic for the South: increased misery, the devastation of social and cultural 
norms, the loss of lands to foreigners, the limitless exploitation of natural resources, 
etc. When the time of independence came, dependency persisted along the same 
economic lines. Meanwhile, the core countries of the world system have continued to 
reinforce their grip through foreign investment, technology transfer, cultural products 
and direct aid. The dependency narrative strongly focuses on the capitalist nature of 
the world order. It also emphasises the historical context of countries to explain their 
current situation.
Although dependency theory has been largely abandoned as a theory, Sekhri (2009) 
argues that it still stands today as an interesting approach for a number of reasons. To 
start with, several countries such as Cuba or Iran still make it their official worldview, 
which thus impacts both their foreign and domestic policies. In many more countries, 
moreover, local political parties still draw upon a dependency rhetoric. Another point 
is that many Southern countries have failed to turn into competitive producers in the
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world market -  and there is still much to say about the potential ability of weak 
countries to compete on a level playing field in the long run. Finally, the 2008 global 
financial crisis seems likely to deeply impact Southern countries, which may turn out 
to be the most affected victims of a crisis that originated in the North.
We may add to this that Development still stands out today as a hotly contested 
global discourse in terms of its “dependency” effects. As the argument goes, it is a 
radically ambiguous concept. On the one hand, it means an increase in economic and 
social well being; on the other hand it refers to the process of transition towards a 
capitalist industrial economy. This sleight of hand reveals development as an 
ideology, as it confuses a specific political program, namely capitalism, with a 
universal value -  the improvement of human wellbeing. In the early 1980s, a radical 
critique of the Development discourse emerged associated with the work of Escobar 
(1995), Ferguson (1990) and Crush (1995). They see development as a set of rational, 
managerial prescriptions through which industrialised nations impose their views and 
models onto the “beneficiaries” of their aid, forcing a deep change in their social, 
economic and political identities. In this light, development is essentially a 
knowledge/power regime underpinning the domination of industrial countries. 
Moreover, while many “neo-dependency” scholars are vocal about denouncing the 
United States as a “hegemonic” or “imperial power”, some have gone further in 
conceptualising modem imperialism: claiming (again) the legacy of Foucault, they 
have left behind any territorial reference and have devised a theory of a “global 
empire” without an emperor -  an approach that partly merges with the narrative based 
on govemmentality.
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1.2.4. “G ovem m entality” as a critical narrative
Foucault’s concept of “govemmentality” deeply influenced critical theorists in 
pointing to modem forms and practices of power. Here we review the roots and 
meaning of this concept and how it has been applied to the analysis of some key 
global discourses.
Foucault’s concepts
In Michel Foucault’s view, in the study of power, “we must eschew the model of 
Leviathan” (1980, p. 102). “Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or 
rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized 
here or there...Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization” 
(p.98). Foucault’s approach has arguably some of its roots in a line of thinking that 
emerged in the second part of the nineteenth century -  at a time when fresh critiques 
had arisen against modem civilisation. These critiques focused on the tensions 
between individuals and society.
In Nietzsche’s worldview (1887) for instance, contemporary “moral values” repress 
the “will to power” from which flows the creativity and greatness of the human race; 
egalitarian and democratic societies come with a loss of individual freedom and self- 
realisation. Freud (1930) later looked at how civilisation inhibits and frames the 
individuals’ dual instincts of libido (Eros) and aggressiveness (Thanatos, also referred 
to as the “death instinct”). This, in his view, is a necessary process that enables 
human civilisation to grow and live on, but which is nevertheless an unmistakable 
source of psychological stress and discontent for individuals. As for Max Weber 
(1921), his well known typology of social action (as instrumental-rational, value- 
rational, affectual or traditional) led him to suggest that modem science and 
capitalism are leading the world into a massive “disenchantment”. Rationalisation, 
bureaucratisation and other such trends of “modernisation” are chasing the gods away 
and limiting human capacities for acting on the basis of commitment, feeling, 
passion, charisma, values and even ethics. This, again, comes with great losses of 
individual freedom and creativity and limits the range of possible social actions. In 
Weber’s vision, mankind is thus imprisoning itself in an iron cage of its own making: 
“instrumental rationality”.
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Looking at processes through which individual behaviours are shaped in modem 
societies, Foucault famously developed the concept of “govemmentality” which he 
defines as the “art of government” but with an idea of government that goes beyond 
state politics to include a wide range of techniques of social control. As Ferguson and 
Gupta (2002) underline, he looks at processes through which the conduct of a 
population is governed: institutions, agencies and disciplinary institutions (schools, 
hospitals, psychiatric institutions, etc.); but also discourses, forms of knowledge, 
norms and identities, as well as self-regulation, techniques for the disciplining and 
care of the self. As Rutherford (2007, p.293) states, “governing becomes the 
construction of certain truths and their circulation via normalising and disciplining 
techniques, methods, discourses and practices that extend beyond the state”.
Foucault also introduced the concept of biopower that denotes the focus of power 
upon processes that expand a population’s life -  such as concerns over physical and 
mental health, housing, families, productive efficiency, living standards, etc. 
Consequently, biopolitics designates a type of exercise of power that encompasses the 
economic, social, cultural, environmental, territorial spheres -  potentially all 
dimensions of human lives.
Although govemmentality has to do with the discipline and regulation of actors, it 
cannot be reduced to a passive relationship to power. Foucault repeatedly emphasised 
the productive dimension of govemmentality -  the creative and voluntary 
contributions of individuals to bringing about se/^discipline and se^-regulation. 
Govemmentality thus relates to techniques, procedures, protocols, practices, idioms, 
mles, routines, etc., through which behaviours are governed partly through external 
impositions but first and foremost through changes in internal subjectivities. Lives 
become managed “at a distance” (Foucault, 1984). In this view, power is intentional 
but non-subjective: while there are goals behind its exercise, they cannot be ascribed 
to decisions or wishes of particular people. Govemmentality carries a vision of power 
that is faceless, headless, acting through a diverse and decentralised range of 
internalised practices but still having an overall unity and coherence -  or “standard 
effects” as Ferguson (1990, p.260) puts it. It is this coherence that Foucault refers to 
as a “discourse”.
Although govemmentality applies to various power regimes and historical periods, it 
is often used (by other scholars and by Foucault himself) when referring to
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“neoliberal govemmentality”, a type of govemmentality that characterises advanced 
liberal democracies based on the predominance of market principles and the 
limitation of state action. It refers to a situation where power is de-centred and its 
members play an active role in their own self-government; the produced knowledge 
allowing for the constitution of “auto-regulated” and “auto-correcting selves”. 
Discourses become internalised by individuals and “knowledge” is disseminated that 
leads individuals to govern themselves accordingly.
The literature drawing on govemmentality has surged in recent years (Rutherford, 
2007). Scholars have applied the concept to colonial rule (Scott, 1999; Howell, 2004), 
to census and statistics as biopolitics (Brown and Boyle, 2000; Hannah, 2001), to the 
agricultural sector and how it is controlled through statistics or communities 
(Murdoch and Ward, 1997; Murdoch, 1997), etc. Yet, recent studies by geographers 
point out that govemmentality can operate at a multiplicity of scales: the subject, 
territories, the nation, the population and the globe (e.g. Legg, 2005).
The govemmentality critique o f global discourses
Foucault’s arguments were developed within the context of domestic arenas of 
modem societies, but in recent years a number of IR scholars have argued that the 
world order progressively displays similar features. This view directly opposes the 
belief of IR realists that global governance arrangements, despite the emergence of 
non-state actors, still constitute a manifestation of states’ power (e.g. Waltz, 1999).
This strand of analysis has been notably exemplified by Hardt and Negri’s Empire 
(2001). These authors contend that the hitherto territorialised and centralised 
international order is being replaced by a decentralised and de-territorialised one, 
which they call “Empire”. Empire is a “globalised” (p.40) or “imperial biopolitical 
machine” (p.61), a global neoliberal governance superseding the state-based 
international system. In this light the United States, for instance, are no longer viewed 
in traditional terms of a state-based imperialist power but as a representative of the 
global power of “Empire”. In this framework, global governance is understood as a 
biopolitical phenomenon encompassing an ever wider range of human issues, even 
including human subjectivities.
Global discourses under critical analysis of their govemmentality effects have in 
particular included that on Development and on Human Rights -  notably since the
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2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the reaction of the US administration 
(Chandler, 2008). Human Rights have been analysed for instance as an expression of 
a global biopower, as illustrated by the work of Duffield (2007), Jabri (2007) or 
Douzinas (2007). New global governmental practices are highlighted which are 
legitimised through individual rights over principles of sovereignty or non­
intervention. For Duffield, in the discourse on “failed states” and the merging of 
“security” and “development”, Human Rights create a biopolitical “blank cheque” to 
override other principles. For Jabri, the recasting o f military intervention in terms of 
these rights undermines the state-based order, constituting a new global biopolitical 
order. For Douzinas, Human Rights discourses undermine territorial sovereignty and 
enable a new “super-sovereign” of global hegemonic power.
As for the critique of “Development”, the work of Ferguson (1990), who studied 
Lesotho, became central to this literature and was followed by many scholars, such as 
Kamat (2004) who analysed India. Famously, in Ferguson’s view, the “development 
machine” has as its key mechanism a process of “depoliticisation”. Through the work 
of experts and agencies, new concepts such as “less developed countries” are 
discursively created, through a re-construction of social, economic and cultural 
realities. These new objects call for “action” on the part of “developers”. Such 
countries thus enter an “international disciplining regime” in which political 
questions are rendered technical, thus taking away freedom of choice from these 
countries. Ferguson relies heavily on Foucault’s methodological approach, which 
stresses the authorless but intelligible consequences of dominant discourses. He wants 
to “locate the intelligibility of a series of events and transformations not in the 
intentions guiding the actions of one or more animating subjects, but in the systematic 
nature of the social reality which results from those actions” (p. 18). In his view, 
developers set up projects that almost systematically “fail in their own terms” but 
nonetheless have systematic standard effects, most notably the de-politicisation of 
political issues by using the mask of a technical discourse.
Ferguson also argues that development projects further the role of the state by 
increasing the grip of its bureaucracy. This does not seem to hold in the context of 
“structural adjustment programmes”, which are in fact designed to scale down state 
involvement in society. However, the depoliticising effect of “development” holds 
good in a neoliberal setting, as neoliberalism presents itself as a technical solution to
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technical issues. What is more, although the rise of neoliberalism is often understood 
as a “retreat” of the state, Barry et al. (1996) point out that it leads rather to a transfer 
of the operations of government (in Foucault’s extended sense) to non-state entities 
via “the fabrication of techniques that can produce a degree of ‘autonomisation’ of 
entities of government from the state” (pp. 11-12). Ferguson thus sees the “the 
outsourcing of the functions of the state to NGOs and other ostensibly non-state 
agencies [as a] key feature, not only of the operation of national states, but of an 
emerging system of transnational govemmentality” (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p.990)
In the critical narrative, the Development discourse is thus seen as a discursive 
formation whose instruments of control and “cognitive object production” are similar 
to colonialism. It is said to conceal politics and hide questions about rights, 
distribution of resources, about how one should live and who should decide, behind 
technical and expert-led questions of efficiency and sustainability. It is said to remove 
the agency of external interveners from sight, construct problems as internally 
generated rather than externally defined, present nature as acted upon by expertise 
while hiding “instrument effects”. This critical analysis of discourse has also tracked 
participation in development projects, such as indigenous or community-based 
management, to reveal domination and control effects where empowerment is 
nonetheless proclaimed (Escobar 1995, 2004; Kothari, 2001; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; 
Mosse 2005a, 2005b).
Govemmentality has also been applied to the global discourse on “nature”, which has 
widely been constructed as something in desperate need of governing (Luke, 1999; 
Rutherford, 2002). This discourse insists upon manageability: natural resources 
should be rationalized, indexed, measured, assessed and preserved through various 
technologies and regulations. The role of expert knowledge is particularly 
underscored. Meanwhile, others scholars look at how subjectivities are modified to 
create self-regulation and environmental consciousness (e.g. Agrawal, 2005).
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1.2.5. “Hegem ony” as a critical narrative m onitor
A third strand of critical approaches to global governance and its related discourses 
flows from Gramsci’s well-known concept of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). This notion 
points to “a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of 
political and ideological leadership” (Roger, 1991, p.22). In other words, hegemony 
is the “organisation of consent”, as we shall see, through a dynamic of alliances 
between various social forces
Hegemony and historic bloc
Gramsci wrote extensively during his imprisonment under the Mussolini regime. 
Refusing the historical determinism of orthodox Marxism, he was concerned with the 
nature of capitalist domination working, as he thought, through both force and 
consent upon the masses. Capitalism keeps the society under control not just through 
violence or economic and political coercion, but also by ideological means: through a 
“hegemonic culture” in which the values of the bourgeoisie become the “common 
sense”. A “consensus culture” develops in which people in the working-class identify 
their own interest with the interest of the bourgeoisie. Gramsci used the term 
“hegemony” to refer to this phenomenon, although the word was previously used by 
Lenin to refer to the political dominance of the working-class during a revolution. For 
Gramsci, the only path to the emancipation of the masses was for the working class 
develop a culture of its own. This new culture would overthrow the notion that 
bourgeois values represented “natural” or “normal” values. Whereas Lenin held that 
culture was secondary to political objectives, Gramsci thought that cultural hegemony 
was fundamental to the attainment and stability of power.
Another key idea of Gramsci is that a class wishing to dominate has to move beyond 
its narrow self interests, exert moral leadership, and make compromises and alliances 
with a variety of social forces. Gramsci calls this union a “historic bloc”, an 
expression taken from the French social philosopher Georges Sorel. This “bloc” 
provides the necessary basis of consent to a certain social order, which produces (and 
re-produces) the hegemony of the dominant class through a nexus of institutions, 
social relations and ideas. In this manner, Gramsci developed a theory that 
emphasised the importance of the superstructure (cultural and ethical factors) in both 
maintaining economic domination and fracturing the masses. Much of Gramsci’s
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attacks against bourgeois hegemonic culture were aimed at religious norms and 
values, as he was deeply impressed by the power that Roman Catholicism exerted 
over people’s minds. Quite dialectically, he also thought that hegemonic dominance 
ultimately relied on coercion, and in times of crisis, the “masks of consent” slip away, 
revealing the forces at work.
Drawing upon this line of thinking, a harsh critique of popular culture developed in 
the sixties. Adorno (1966), for instance, analysed how thought can be an instrument 
of social control, identifying as “real” only what fits dominant concepts, and 
regarding as “unreal” or “non-existent” things that do not. Adorno for instance 
developed a critique of popular music: imposed by the “culture industry” (media, 
advertisers, entertainment firms, etc.), this “culture” manipulates the tastes and 
aspirations of the masses; it underpins the “reification of political consciousness” and 
the constitution of a “totally administered society”. Individuality is ruined through the 
production of false identities and superficial cultural variations within a tightly 
controlled framework. Marcuse (1964) also denounced consumerism as killing the 
desire for action and social change, and enabling the “technological elite” (media, 
advertisers, militaries) to harness the libido of the masses to the reinforcement of 
capitalism.
The hegemony approach to international politics
Gramsci did not say much about the possibility of hegemony extending beyond 
nations, onto an international level. Authors such as Cox (1981), van der Pijl (1984), 
Gill (1993) or Murphy and Tooze (1991), however, moved Gramsci into IR, which 
brought about the so-called “neo-Gramscian turn” in this discipline. As Worth (2010, 
p.6) clearly explains, “international hegemony” has been thus referred to as “a form 
of class rule based on consent rather than coercion and on accommodation of 
subordinate interests rather than on their repression”. This line of work has been 
developed along two different lines -  one emphasising the notion of “world order” 
and the other focussing on its continuation through the emergence and consolidation 
of a “transnational capitalist class”. World order, probably Cox’s most influential 
concept, refers to a specific era led by an alliance of social forces, organised through 
a combination of ideology, institutions and production structures. The norms and laws 
they carry are transposed onto the international stage, especially within international 
institutions -  where, for instance, a neoliberal common sense has become
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constitutionalised. Cox uses the idea of a “historic bloc” to analyse the development 
of forms of states and their underlying dominant social forces: while hegemony is 
initially established by leading social forces within a state, it can project itself 
outwards on a world scale.
Hegemony is understood as an “opinion-moulding activity” rather than brute force. In 
Cox’ view, a hegemonic world order is based on values and forms of understandings 
that permeate its nature (Cox, 1992). Inter-subjective meanings and accepted wisdom 
about social relations frame reality thus have to be investigated. “Reality” is not only 
the material surrounding human action but also the ideological and institutional 
context that frame thoughts and actions (Cox, 1997). Hegemony as devised by Cox 
filters through structures of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class, 
ideology, etc. He thus makes up for the failure of orthodox Marxism to acknowledge 
forms of domination that are not reducible to class.
Neo-Gramscian analysis such as Cox’s opened the way for a fresh look at global 
discourses and governance, including concerns about the blurring of public and 
private authority (Cutler, 1999), the changing forms of sovereignty as a social 
construct (Rosenberg, 1990), the role of international institutions (Engel, 2006), or 
the interplay of global elites with counter-hegemonic blocs, including transnational 
networks of NGOs, women, peace, environment and social movements (Gill, 1995). 
Cox was particularly concerned with the global projection of the “liberal capitalist 
state”, a form of hegemony which he called Pax Americana. As its product, global 
institutions such as the World Bank serve to “absorb counter-hegemonic ideas” 
(Cox, 1996, p. 13 8).
1.2.6. Doubting grand narratives: the need for more fieldwork
Criticisms have developed against large meta-narratives in IR. One of their main 
themes is to point to the need for far more empirical studies -  a need addressed by the 
present study.
To start with, there has been a series of criticisms raised against grand dependency 
narratives (Sekhri, 2009). First, they arguably tend to treat South countries as a 
coherent monolithic unit, although such a view is increasingly untenable in today’s 
world. Moreover, even if elements of dependency may be found everywhere, its 
nature and level vary very considerably, as colonial, political, social and cultural
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history and structures are so diverse. As for the intellectual propensity of explaining 
problems of the South by accusing North countries, this is not always convincing and 
may often appear as attempting to hide various other realities. At a broader level, it 
seems difficult to argue that relations between centre and periphery are always zero- 
sum games. Quite evidently, the discourse on the “Western devil” has been used, and 
still is, as a domestic political tool by local elites to help justify and reinforce their 
power by drawing on feelings of nationalism and anti-imperialism (Neack et a l, 
1995) -  here, one only has to think of Algeria. Finally, when it comes to policy 
recommendations, the often suggested “separation from the North” has never been 
convincingly thought through -  regarding what it would mean in detail, who could 
lead such a change or what its key endeavours would be.
Turning to narratives around “govemmentality”, the portrayal of global governance 
as a global liberal order fostering oppressive mechanisms has also been criticised 
(Latham, 1999; Duffield, 2001; Duffy, 2005; Selby, 2007; Chandler, 2008). The idea 
of “global discourses” as coherent “knowledge/power regimes” of political or cultural 
domination may rely on claims about all-powerful external actors (such as donor 
agencies or NGOs) which are not necessarily empirically confirmed. It may also tend 
to assume a strong capacity of coordination on the part of external agents -  such as 
for instance the World Bank, the IMF and other international donors -  which is often 
questionable. Such narratives may also imply a stability and permanence in global 
discourses that do not fit well with the many policy changes that are regularly 
observed. The World Bank and the IMF, for instance, have deeply modified and 
adapted their key discourses over time (Miller-Adams, 1999).13
As Rutherford comments (2007, p.300), one of the more troubling aspects with the 
govemmentality literature is that “the programmes, policies, practices and techniques 
of mle interrogated by many scholars often appear as a completed project... There is 
a sense that govemmentality operates and circulates as it is intended to with veiy little 
deviation”. Moreover, this literature often limits its field of enquiry to the abstract 
working of political rationalities: as O ’Malley et al. (1997) contend, it has 
devalorised the empirical realities of how mle is implemented in practice -  and often 
limits its empirical work to the study of the state. Selby (2004, p.6) further argues that
13 It may be the case, however, that a changing discourse benefits unchanged interest groups.
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the “idea of govemmentality can be at once too precise about the effects and too 
vague about the location”; it offers little means for understanding variations in 
practices and implementation of global discourses. There is a lack of attention to 
differences.
Here one should recall that Foucault (1984, pp.259-73) warned against any “grand 
theory” and “the order imposed by functionalist or systematising thought”, which 
tries to explain vast chunks of social reality. This is precisely why Foucault distanced 
himself from Marxism. In his view, critical theory must avoid the temptation to create 
global theories, given the “inhibiting effects of global, totalitarian theories” and the 
“tyranny of global discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges”. Critical 
thought must not become one more all-encompassing discourse; it must face its own 
criticism. It thus needs to be “discontinuous, particular and local”. In Foucault’s view, 
the attempt to think in terms of a totality is “a hindrance to research”. He does not 
mean that critical researchers should turn to a “naive or primitive empiricism”, but 
rather argues that critical analysis should be a “decentralised kind of theoretical 
production”, whose validity should not be dependent on the approval of any 
established regime of thought, including the critical one itself. Grand theories and 
general conclusions about the “global liberal order”, its “global governance and 
discourses” should thus be treated with caution by a rigorous critical researcher.
As Duffy (2005, p.310) thoughtfully notes, “global governance as a project is 
rendered extremely complex when it is applied to specific cases”. An examination of 
what happens to ideas and policies associated with global governance schemes at the 
local level reveal how irregular implementation and impacts are. “Rather than being a 
powerful neoliberal project, able to create and fully enforce universal norms and 
practices, [global governance] needs to be reconceptualised as something more open, 
opaque or uneven” {ibid., p.323).
This call is underpinned by Latham (1999) who argues that global governance 
theorists tend to be so preoccupied with governance itself that the forces that might 
challenge or undermine order are ignored, treated implicitly as undesirable 
disruptions of their grand theory.
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1.3. Conclusion
The present chapter introduced this study’s fundamental concern: the local power 
effects of global discourses. It based the relevance of this research agenda on the 
paradoxical but patent lack of attention paid to discourses, power and micro-level 
empirical data in current global governance studies. This does not mean, however, 
that IR scholars make no assumption about the local power effects of global 
discourses. Narratives of power are indeed omnipresent in reflections on global 
governance, including on hegemonic discourses, although they are rarely put under 
direct scientific scrutiny. The chapter thus identified two key and opposing strands of 
power narratives. First, the emancipatory narrative that holds the view that active 
global discourses contribute to reordering human societies along socio-economic and 
political rights -  hence contributing to the emancipation of individuals and 
communities. Conversely, a range of critical narratives -  such as dependency, 
govemmentality and hegemony -  see global governance discourses as fostering 
hidden forms of social control and strengthening pre-existing power structures at 
various levels of society.
The dependency approach emphasises the all-pervasive influence of Western 
countries in enhancing a world capitalist system functioning for their own benefit; the 
govemmentality framework stresses the presence of internalised forms of knowledge 
that produce self-disciplines, auto-regulated and auto-correcting selves. On the other 
hand, an analysis in terms of hegemony looks at how a world order is produced by the 
institutionalisation of certain norms and practices favouring a leading transnational 
social class that nevertheless needs to strike alliances and compromises with various 
social forces. These three types of critical narratives thus agree that global discourses 
foster mechanisms of social control and reinforce dominant power structures, while 
the emancipatory narrative believes these discourses help empower the hitherto 
disempowered and put into question power status quos.
Critiques raised against the use of such “meta-narratives” were presented in order to 
point to the need for far more empirical work to assess the value of these frameworks 
as interpretative tools. In order to gain a deep qualitative grasp of the processes at 
work, this study adopts a case study approach, based on local examples and whose 
research question runs as follows: What are the local power effects o f global 
discourses?
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As our Introduction already justified, one global discourse has been selected for 
examination: the discourse on Community Participation. A specific issue area of 
global governance has also been chosen given that it is a relatively mature field in 
which this discourse is forcefully applied: the protection of global biodiversity. The 
next chapter makes the case that Community Participation is indeed to be regarded as 
a global discourse that is part and parcel of global governance -  an idea that has not 
yet emerged in the IR literature. It further analyses this discourse’s conceptual 
mechanics, related policy practices and historical emergence, particularly in the 
context of biodiversity protection.
Chapter 1 - 5 4
Chapter 2 - Community Participation as a Global 
Governance Discourse
Here, a specific global discourse is brought under scrutiny, namely that on 
Community Participation (CP), as well as a specific area of global governance -  the 
protection of biodiversity. These choices, the first two steps of our case study 
selection, were justified in the Introduction. They are specifically meant to provide a 
“hard test” for the critical narrative.
This chapter first makes the claim that CP has now become a global discourse part of 
global governance, active in virtually all areas of international policy making, 
although it is still rarely thought of and analysed in such terms. The historical rise of 
CP is reviewed to show that foreign policy concerns -  especially those of the United 
States -  have played an important role in its worldwide diffusion. CP was indeed 
promoted by the “free world” to engage with the world’s rural masses in a Cold War 
context, hoping to contain communist agrarian movements. Following this, the 
internal mechanics of the CP discourse is analysed on the basis of its system of 
signification, the way it produces a naturalised common sense, as well as the 
standard and tangible policy practices it fosters. Ambiguities revolving around 
emancipation vs. control are again identifiable: they echo those found in the 
historical emergence of the discourse
The chapter then moves on to show that up to the mid-1980s, the dominant approach 
to the preservation of nature was centred on protected areas designed to strictly 
exclude the human presence. Finally, it explains how and on the basis of what 
concerns and promises community participation nonetheless entered this field of 
global policy making. Drawing upon a comprehensive review of current critiques 
raised against CP, the expectations of power narratives are also identified.
Chapter 2 - 5 5
2.1. The Rise o f a Global D iscourse and its Ambiguous 
Roots
This section traces the rise of the modem call for Community Participation, paying 
special attention to its foreign policy content at the time of the Cold War. It then 
makes the case that CP now works as a global discourse, omnipresent in global 
rhetoric.
2.1.1. At the root: dem ocratic em ancipation or political control?
The concept of participation is based on a legacy of ideas and influences, among 
which Midgley (1986) identifies three early and salient sources: Western ideologies 
at large, the professional field of social work and the 1950s movement of 
“community development”. This last source, in turn, is strongly linked to British and 
US foreign policies of the time (Holdcroft, 1976; Hailey, 2001).
CP first draws upon Western concerns and political theories about democracy, as it 
argues that ordinary citizens have a right to share in decision-making. However, this 
inspiration is not based on classical notions of representative democracy but rather 
on a variant originally known as “neighbourhood democracy” (Dahl & Tufts, 1973; 
Yates, 1973). Many proponents of CP are indeed sceptical of representative 
democracy and its capacity to provide meaningful means for the masses to be 
involved in policy making. Hence the tendency of CP to advocate the creation of 
small-scale institutions -  at the village and urban neighbourhood levels -  both in the 
developed and developing world. The implicit claim is that political aspirations can 
only be truly realised at this scale. CP is further infused with diffuse notions such as 
the belief that virtue resides primarily in the “simple people” and that “ordinary 
folks” tend to be unfairly treated by the more powerful. In that sense, CP has a 
populist dimension (Midgley, 1986).
The field of social work is arguably a second historical source of the CP discourse. 
Since the early 20th century, a rising interest had been paid in the US to communities 
seeking to mobilise and organise their people to improve local amenities and offer 
various social services (e.g. Lindeman, 1921; Steiner, 1930; Lane, 1939). The notion 
of “community development” thus emerged in the 1930s to denote the non­
government complement to urban planning. Programmes in adult education,
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community services and social welfare were initiated in the same decade. These 
included components of state agricultural extension services, New Deal rural 
development efforts, as well as other university-related public service activities with 
the support of sociologists and anthropologists, notably from famous institutions 
such as the University of Chicago. Philanthropic foundations, like the Ford 
Foundation, joined the movement and contributed to the mushrooming of community 
development corporations (CDCs) -  local non-profit organisations to which state and 
municipal governments could channel funds. These ideas originated in the United 
States but raised interest in Europe too, where they took on a more Marxist flavour. 
They later gained an audience in the newly independent nations of the Third World. 
By the mid-1970s, many NGOs had adopted community work methods throughout 
the world, including radical ones based on an outright class struggle analysis 
(Marsden & Oakley, 1982).14
Finally, a third source of inspiration for the global CP discourse was the community 
development movement that appeared at the end of the 1940s and developed well 
into the 1960s, before losing its audience to the benefit of more top-down industry- 
led views of development. This early “rise and fall of community development”, as 
Holdcroft (1976) depicts it, deserves a careful analysis given its foreign policy 
meaning.
As Midgley (1986) recalls, among the first proponents of the community 
development movement were missionaries and colonial officers. The combined 
objectives to “civilise”, exploit resources and establish durable political structures 
encouraged early forms of community projects in the colonies. For instance, an 
official 1944 report on mass education led the British government to establish 
community programmes in many African countries.15 It is in 1948, however, that the 
term “community development” was first used officially by the British Colonial 
authorities in a conference in Cambridge where it was advocated to help the British 
African territories prepare for independence. Shortly thereafter the concept spread to 
many donor agencies and national governments. Modest community programmes 
were launched in British territories in Africa around 1950, but the first major one was 
initiated in India in 1952 with a massive support from the Ford Foundation and the
14 For instance, the Community Action Movement in Maharashtra, India.
15 Great Britain Colonial Office (1944).
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U.S. foreign aid agency. This was soon followed by programmes in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan (Holdcroft, 1976).
During the 1950s, the community development movement enjoyed “phenomenal 
international growth” (ibid., p. 3) thanks to its active promotion and financial support 
by the United States. This American promotion took place directly through the US 
foreign economic assistance agency but also indirectly through various United 
Nations agencies. A wave of reports was published at that time on community 
development by UN agencies, the US aid agency and other governments such as 
India. By 1960, over sixty developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America had 
launched community development programmes. About half of these were national in 
scope, while the others were more regional. The Alliance for Progress, initiated in 
1961 by President Kennedy, defined a ten-year plan for the American aid to Latin 
America, including through community approaches. The political rationale was clear:
Essentially, community development was seen by its free world advocates as the 
democratic response to totalitarianism. In the "Cold War" era of the 1950's, American 
leadership believed that the developing nations in the free world were under a two 
pronged threat from international communism: a) the potential of external military 
aggression and, b) the possibility of internal revolution growing out o f subversion via 
communist agrarian movements (Holdcroft, 1976, p. 12).
Advocates of community development thus maintained at the time that it was
carrying out the major objective of American foreign policy. Community
development embodied the promise to secure the collaboration of local populations,
and better connect rural communities to national government development plans
supported by Western donors. The hope was to build stable local participatory
institutions, counteracting any temptation towards more radical political action, but
also to bring about improvements in the material conditions of rural people without
revolutionary changes in the existing political and economic order (ibid., p.20). This
early form of CP thus appealed to the “free world” and developing nation leaders
looking for an ideology and technique to “combat the threat of dissident agrarian
movements” (ibid., p. 19). Thus, in the eyes of Holdcroft, the Community
Development discourse of the 1950s and 1960s was essentially an attempt at keeping
quiet the rural masses of the developing world, within the context of the Cold War.
In other words, while presented as a path of political and material emancipation, its
core objective was a form of social and political control -  although of a more
Foucauldian govemmentality type based on consent and self-involvement. Hailey
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(2001, p.99) thus wonders “how much participative development owes its genesis to 
attempts by Western governments ... to limit the power and influence of political 
dissidents, ffeedom-fighters or radical Marxists -  pointing to historical examples 
such as the villagification strategies adopted by the British in Malaya in the 1950s, 
the US “pacification” campaigns in Vietnam in the 1960s or the work of American 
agencies in India in the 1970s.
Contemporary CP advocates claim that these programmes failed because of their 
bureaucratic administration and superimposed direction, which ended up 
perpetuating power structures at both the local and national level: community 
development is thus said to have failed because of a lack of “true” community 
participation -  a story that is still heard again and again regarding current CP projects 
today. Following disappointments with their actual results, community programmes 
started regressing from 1960. By 1965, most had faltered and were thus terminated or 
severely reduced. Donors such as UN agencies and the United States redirected 
resources in support of new initiatives such as the “green revolution” and its 
technological developments.
During the 1970s, however, international interest in the community development 
movement re-emerged following a shift in development thinking towards social 
concerns and the need to directly improve the wellbeing of the world’s rural poor -  a 
move exemplified by the new themes adopted by the World Bank under the 
presidency of Robert McNamara, such as the focus on “basic needs”. During the 
1970s, an emphasis on popular participation formally emerged in UN thinking with 
the publication of two major documents (UN 1971, 1975a) followed by the creation 
of a dedicated research programme (UNRISD), still running to date. Resolutions 
adopted at the World Conference on International Women’s Year held in Mexico 
City (UN, 1975b) further reinforced the idea of CP in both political and development 
processes. The UN then convened a meeting in 1978 to refine its concept of “popular 
participation” but a more significant contribution came from UNICEF and the World 
Health Organisation in their common Declaration on Primary Health Care at the 
Alma Ata conference (UN, 1978). “Participation in health” featured prominently and 
has since become a major preoccupation in the field of global health. During the 
1970s, CP also attracted attention of the housing and urban development sector (e.g.
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Turner, 1968) and formally entered the World Bank’s policy agenda in 1975. Step by 
step, CP was becoming a global discourse.
2.1.2. The om nipresence o f CP in global policy discourses
Over the past two decades, Community Participation has imposed itself as a coherent 
and constant theme in the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and 
international agreements. This dynamic emerged most visibly in the fields of 
environment and development with the 1992 Rio Declaration, a document widely 
regarded as the founding charter of sustainable development. It contains a list of 27 
principles, 3 of which are dedicated to participation: Principle 10 emphasises that 
“environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens”; Principle 20 advocates the full participation of women -  while Principle 22 
refers to indigenous peoples and their communities (UN, 1992a).
The Rio conference also led to the approval of Agenda 21, a comprehensive 
blueprint of action “for the 21st century” to be taken globally, nationally and locally 
by UN organisations and the world’s governments. The text of Agenda 21, for which 
negotiations began in 1989, is a massive 351-page document loaded with references 
to participation and participatory approaches (UN, 1992b). While the notion of 
“democracy” is hardly referred to (only 5 occurrences), “participation” is present 195 
times.16 Not only does the Preamble advocate the “broadest public participation”, but 
this theme is also central in two out of three of the document’s main sections. Section 
2 concerns itself with “conservation and management of resources for development”, 
with a systematic emphasis on participatory principles. Section 3 focuses on 
“strengthening the role” of a wide range of groups, with an entire chapter devoted to 
each of the following: women, children and youth, indigenous people, non­
governmental organisations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, businesses 
and industries, and scientific communities. What is more, throughout the document 
numerous references are made to “user groups” and “stakeholders” in general and 
their need to “participate”. The intention to involve local communities is made very 
clear throughout, as for instance in forest, water, disaster and waste management, as 
well as in early warning systems of environmental crisis.
16 This comparison includes derivate words such as “democratic” and “participatory”.
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The United Nations Millennium Declaration, signed in 2000 and concerned with 
the fight against poverty, is another key document of the international community 
that places CP at the forefront of its message. Right from the start, participation 
appears in the section devoted to core “values and principles”, under the ambitious 
heading of “freedom”. Later on, in Section 5 on “democracy, human rights and good 
governance”, the commitment of signatory states is reaffirmed “to work collectively 
for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens 
in all countries”. Among the eight related Millennium Development Goals that the 
international community pledged to reach before 2015, two directly point to the 
principle of participation: Objective 2 refers to the empowerment of women while 
Objective 8 is a plea for a multilevel partnership involving all possible kinds of 
actors, including local communities.
In the field of education also, international discourses clearly emphasise the 
importance of CP (Singleton, 2005). Participatory approaches to education were first 
discussed at Jomtien, at the 1990 World Conference on Education for All (EFA), 
but since then, they have been increasingly emphasised, notably at the follow up 
conference in Dakar in 2000, bringing together 1,100 representatives from various 
governments and organisations. While the Jomtien Declaration briefly mentions 
possible arrangements involving “local communities” (UNESCO, 1990, p.4), the 
Dakar Declaration makes CP a fundamental principle, stating for instance that: “at all 
levels of decision-making, governments must put in place regular mechanisms for 
dialogue enabling citizens and civil society organizations to contribute to the 
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation” of educational systems 
(UNESCO, 2000, art. 53-54). Moreover, an analysis of EFA National Action Plans 
(UNESCO, 2007) further shows the strong commitment of domestic education policy 
rhetoric to the same principles. The most critical partners are often said to be those 
“directly affected by education policies” such as teachers, students, parents, and 
other members of the community.
Meanwhile, CP had also emerged as a significant principle of global health policies 
(WHO, 2004, p.44). The 1948 constitution of the WHO already stated that “informed 
opinion and active co-operation on the part of the public are of the utmost 
importance”, but it was in the early 1970s that the practical benefits of CP in health 
projects started to attract systematic attention. A range of projects in Guatemala,
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Niger and Tanzania suggested at that time that significant population health gains 
could be made as a result of increased community inputs in shaping programme 
priorities and by local health workers taking on various responsibilities (Newell, 
1975). In 1978, the full participation of the community became one of the pillars of 
the Health for All movement. In 1986, the Ottawa Charter, signed at the First 
International Conference on Health Promotion, identified CP as one of its five top 
priorities (WHO, 1986a). A similar path was followed in the connected field of water 
and sanitation, where CP became a standard recommendation from the mid-eighties 
onwards, promoted in the context of the International Drinking Water Supply and 
Sanitation Decade (UNICEF, 1999, p. 14).
Turning to international aid flows, the Monterrey Consensus signed in March 2002 
confirmed the pre-eminence of participation and placed it together with such 
fundamental values as justice, equity and democracy (UN, 2002a, section 1.9).
As a follow-up to the Rio Earth Summit, 191 governments gathered in September 
2002 in Johannesburg for the W orld Summit on Sustainable Development. The 
aim was to assess progress since 1992 and reinvigorate global commitment. The 
result was a 54-page agreement called the “Johannesburg Plan of Implementation” 
(UN, 2002b) which sets out new commitments and priorities in areas as diverse as 
poverty eradication, health, trade, education, global finance, debt reduction, 
technology transfer, scientific research or natural resource management. Again, 
while “democracy” is only mentioned 7 times, “human rights” 6 times and 
“empowerment” twice, “participation” is explicitly referred to 34 times -  especially 
regarding “communities”, which are mentioned 41 times.17 Thus, while the Plan of 
Implementation covers virtually all aspects of global governance, its cross-cutting 
theme is very much about participation and the “involvement of all stakeholders”, as 
is also manifested by the 53 occurrences of the word “partnership”.
Beyond international commitments and turning to a more operational level, CP also 
infuses the official values and work practices of most international organisations. 
The United Nations funds, programmes and agencies regularly re-commit to CP in 
their declarations of principles and methodologies, as do the UN Environmental 
Programme (UNEP), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the
17 We do not take into account occurrences of the “international community”.
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World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), 
or the Global Environment Facility (GEF). All GEF projects, for instance, are 
required to include baseline studies on community participation and institutional 
strengthening (Gerlak & Parisi, p.641). CP approaches have become so influential 
that some observers refer to it as the “new orthodoxy” (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001). By 
the early 1990s every major institution emphasised participatory principles, while the 
World Bank joined in by the middle of the decade. Its support for CP has translated 
into the implementation of community-based development (CBD) and community- 
driven development (CDD) projects -  the second type being even more participatory. 
The number of projects in the Bank’s portfolio that include CBD/CDD components 
grew from 2% in 1989 to 25% in 2003 (World Bank, 2005).
All these organisations devote resources to monitoring their CP methodologies, as 
well as making them known to the wider public. CP also seems part of a 
communication strategy designed to help counter claims that large international 
organisations are deaf to local voices and demands. Omnipresent UN efforts to 
promote “local partnerships” in all spheres of policy making also sustain this 
dynamic. Yet, in addition to applying CP requirements to themselves, such 
organisations often go much further and tend to impose them upon the governments 
or partners they support. Risley (2007) shows for instance that the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the World Bank, and a diverse array of international 
organisations have encouraged CP reforms in Latin America by financing 
programmes that stipulate citizens’ involvement in policy formulation, 
implementation and monitoring.
Participation is also a global discourse in the sense that it is widely supported and 
referred to by non-governmental organisations, large or small, international or 
local (O’Riordan & Voisey, 1997, 1998). The CP rhetoric is often intrinsic to 
discourses of local associations as it provides the basis for their inclusion in policy 
processes and access to financial resources. This can be seen in Africa, Asia or Latin 
America, where domestic NGOs rely heavily on CP discourses to attract attention 
from national policy makers as well as international donors. As for international 
NGOs, their charters and stated principles, as well as their policy recommendations, 
methodological guidelines and project proposals, increasingly reflect the CP rhetoric.
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This is especially the case in the environmental sphere, for instance in policy 
declarations and project presentations of large organisations such as the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) or the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN). As early as 1980, the IUCN and the WWF together with UNEP -  as well as 
with inputs from the FAO and UNESCO -  published a World Conservation Strategy, 
a milestone document for the whole professional field. It notably advocated “greater 
public participation in planning and decision making concerning living use” (IUCN, 
et al., 1980, p. 15) emphasising that this should “ideally [take place] at all stages from 
policy making to project formulation and review” (p.46). A decade later, the sequel 
to this strategy, entitled Caring fo r the Earth: A strategy fo r  sustainability was 
prepared by the same organisations (IUCN, et al., 1991). It confirmed the need to 
“[ensure] participation by affected communities in the design and implementation of 
projects and programmes” (p.84).
In a similar vein, eleven international NGOs (INGOs) involved in human rights, 
environmental and social development, decided to co-sign in 2006 a common “INGO 
Accountability Charter” emphasising participation. Amnesty International, 
Greenpeace, Oxfam, Save the Children and Transparency International were among 
the signatories. This was the first time that organisations of this kind outlined a 
common set of principles and commitments of accountability and transparency. In 
this document, a promise is made on participatory and multi-stakeholder engagement 
since signatories pledge to “seek to work in genuine partnership with local 
communities”.18 CP is indeed often explicitly mentioned in codes of conduct of large 
NGOs working in a wide variety of fields, up to conflict prevention (e.g. 
International Alert, 2009, Principle A .l; GPP AC, 2007, Guiding Principle no.2).
2.1.3. Conclusion
This section has argued that “community participation” is now a global discourse 
omnipresent in global governance rhetoric and many organisations. It has also shown 
that CP draws on political ideologies of democratic emancipation, while having been 
promoted early on by the United States as a foreign policy tool concerned with the 
political behaviour of the rural masses of the developing world -  contributing to the
http://www.ingoaccountabilitvcharter.org/cmsfiles/ingo-accountabilitv-charter-eng.pdf. p.3. 
Accessed 28 September 2009.
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containment of communism. This ambiguity between political emancipation and 
political control underlines the relevance of the two competing narratives under 
scrutiny in this study, namely the emancipatory and the critical ones. It also makes a 
critical appraisal of today’s global discourse on CP even more important.
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2.2. The M echanics of a Global D iscourse
In this section we explore the “mechanics” of the CP discourse from three angles 
previously defined in Chapter 1 (cf. section 1.1.4, Table 2). Its “system of meanings” 
is first analysed as a set of articulated concepts that reveals in-built ambiguities. 
Secondly, we study the paths through which the CP discourse produces a “shared 
common sense” appealing to a wide variety of actors and a great many interest 
groups. Third and finally, we look at the work practices it produces, looking at the 
operational guidelines associated with CP projects in various policy fields.
2.2.1. A system  of meanings: constructing freedom  in a restricted  
fram ework
As discussed earlier, a prime level of discourse analysis is to identify the network of 
meanings it puts into place. The discourse on “participation” is based on “system o f 
significations” by which objects are “distinguished from one another”, as de 
Saussure (1913) would have it. It constructs categories and relations among them, as 
well as action programmes implied as being “natural”.
First, let us look at the predicates that characterise participation in a range of 
international declarations and policy documents (UN 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 2002a, 
2002b; UNESCO, 1990, 2000, 2007). “Participation” is typically determined by epithets 
that carry three ranges of meanings. First comes effectiveness, with epithets such as 
“effective”, “active” or “adequate” participation. Second are the concerns over 
inclusiveness, as participation should be “increasing”, “full”, “broad-based”, 
“popular”, “of all stakeholders”, “decentralised” and “at all levels”. Third is 
legitimacy, as participation needs to be “equitable” and “transparent” . Participation is 
thus constructed as embodying the core ideals of modem social life, as effective, 
inclusive and politically legitimate.
Turning our attention to what areas are said to need “participation”, three ranges of 
issues emerge. First are “economic and social benefits”, which shows that 
participation presents itself as a concern about a wider distribution of social welfare. 
Second, are “planning”, “decision-making”, “implementation procedures”, 
“assessment” and “evaluation”, which reveals that participation is not only about
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benefits but also about the processes producing them. Finally, participation is said to 
be necessary in “discussions” and “debates”, pointing to an ethos of open discussion.
In statements of global policies, the word “participation” is in fact always used to 
stress the importance and urgency of promoting more of it and of a better quality. It 
is employed with reference to an array of actors of varying nature and sizes. It can be 
applied to entire countries that need more “say” in the global political economy for 
instance -  such as developing countries in the governance of the International 
Monetary Fund. But it is even more often used in relation to more limited entities, 
such as NGOs, local associations, community-based organisations, women’s groups, 
labour unions, private enterprises, indigenous groups and of course individual 
citizens. Although the list is virtually endless, it is strongly geared towards civil 
society organisations, especially local ones, and much less towards public authorities 
which are implicitly those that need to cede more power. Participation is thus 
essentially a call for including civil society (and local authorities to a lesser extent) in 
all types of governance schemes or, in other words, to foster a new “alliance between 
the state and civil society” (Risley, 2007).
Beyond text analysis, there is also a need for a conceptual analysis that helps identify 
implicit meanings. “Participation” is indeed at the crossroads of two binary 
combinations in which one term is systematically “preferred” to the other. The first 
opposition is inclusion vs. exclusion. While inclusion carries a positive connotation 
in the social realm, exclusion carries an immediately negative tone: it is always good 
to be “included” and whoever excludes is somehow suspect. The same goes for the 
second binary opposition of being active against being passive. The positive 
connotation of activeness is connected to notions such as being energetic and 
creative, as compared to being lethargic and apathetic. Overall, participation places 
itself on the right side of these two implicit value scales, which provide it in turn with 
an immediate positiveness -  as being “active and inclusive” rather than “passive and 
excluding”.
Participation creates at least two series of objects: a group of potential participants 
and something in which to participate. The former are implicitly and a priori 
constructed as non-participating or under-participating, which creates an immediate 
concern about the legitimacy or effectiveness of the processes under scrutiny. What 
is thus really intrinsic to the notion of participation is that something needs to be
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changed and fixed for the better, and that someone has a legitimate claim to it. This 
concern is often supported by the use made by the CP discourse of the concept of 
“stakeholders”, namely people and groups that are affected by what is being 
discussed. In the context of liberal Western societies, the stakeholders’ claim to 
involvement comes as a natural implication of their status of “impacted parties”. This 
flows, for instance, from the well-known “no harm” principle of John Stuart Mill 
(1859), who argued that the one fundamental limitation o f individual liberty is to not 
harm others.19 This calls for compensation, or involvement in decisions, if harm is 
being done or more generally if any impact is experienced. In a liberal outlook, 
“stakeholders” are essentially “rights-holders”.
The CP discourse further tends to picture social relations as a binary relation between 
“uppers”, who hold resources or power, and “lowers” who are left without. It follows 
that participation should be about reversing this situation so that “lowers” are 
“empowered” and “uppers” relatively “disempowered”. Moreover, Kothari (2001, 
p. 140) points to participation as a paradigm whereby “the micro is set against the 
macro, the margins against the centre, the local against the elite”. In her view, this 
“almost exclusive focus on the micro-level, on people who are considered powerless 
and marginal, [reproduces] the simplistic notion that the sites of social power and 
control are to be found solely at the macro and central levels”. This reading 
simplifies power relations and neglects them at the local level, notably within 
communities which are most often not homogeneous themselves.
Finally, turning to what it is that is to be “participated in”, it is interesting to note that 
in the notion of CP this “thing” stands as pre-existing, giving the feeling that people 
or groups are to be taken into something that is largely already there -  something that 
merely needs “more participation”. Here the internal ambiguity of the CP notion is 
manifest. Telling community groups that they deserve to participate sounds as if 
what they are to participate in is already known, allowing limited room for them to 
change or shape this thing according to their own preferences and needs. From this 
specific angle, participation seems partly self-contradictory or even self-defeating.
19 “The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. (...) The only part of the conduct of anyone 
for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others (Mill, 1859, reprinted 1974, p.69).
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Thus, the system of signification brought about by participation makes the latter 
concept naturally positive; it also simplifies potential relations and limits from the 
start what can be achieved through participation -  since what is to be participated in 
is already pre-defined. These conceptual ambiguities echoed those already found in 
the genealogy of the CP discourse, which already revolved around concerns over 
emancipation vs. political control.
2.2.2. The production o f a com m on sense: draw ing on ideals, interests  
and prom ises o f effectiveness
As a globally propelled discourse, CP has managed to produce a shared common 
sense among a vast range of actors and issues. As we saw in Chapter 1 (section 
1.1.4), two fundamental mechanisms may be used within a given discourse to do so 
(Weldes, 1999): interpellation and articulation. Participation uses both.
1/ With interpellation, a global discourse targets specific people or groups that thus 
feel involved, immersed, understood and potentially empowered. At a general social 
level, one may say that CP appeals to people by targeting and making promises to 
both individuals and social groups with a strong common identity. In doing so, the 
CP discourse takes advantage of two parallel social trends -  namely individualism 
and communitarianism. Talks about participation help to legitimise the interest and 
demands of minority groups, a long list of which parallels the list of potential 
stakeholders (women, indigenous groups, rural workers...) that may appear in any 
community-based initiative.
2/ Articulation is the second and fundamental mechanism that produces a common- 
sense vision. It refers to the capacity of a discourse to articulate itself around pre­
existing and unquestioned cognitive elements that already “make sense” within a 
society.
Articulation is a powerful feature of the participatory discourse. Among laypeople, it 
neatly meets concerns about social justice, democracy or human rights. Amstein 
(1969), in her classic article on policy planning, had already insisted that 
participation was “all about social and political equality”. This commitment is not 
anarchic or destructive of the social order, since there must remain something to 
“participate in”. It carries a reformist political outlook advocating increased inclusion 
of various voices in pre-existing social forms; and in a more radical version, CP
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points to new political forms -  essentially bottom-up, potentially close to a 
libertarian vision of direct democracy.20 It can further be argued that participation is 
a cornerstone of democratic theory. In fact, it may be looked as one approach among 
others to democratic decision making or as a deeper and inescapable ontological 
dimension of democracy.
Thanks to this fluidity, and its associated notion of “empowerment”, participation 
relates easily to a wide spectrum of Western ideologies, from classical liberalism to 
neo-Marxism, including social liberalism, social democracy or supporters of 
Harbemas’ deliberative democracy. This is reflected in the wide political spectrum of 
proponents of more participation, no matter what this may actually mean in practice. 
In today’s world, across Western and non-Westem democracies, as well as in some 
“strong regimes” such as Cuba, Venezuela or China, the concept of participation is 
taken up by virtually all political parties as a key way forward to modernise political 
life. This extreme diversity shows well enough that participation can carry widely 
different messages regarding the need, or not, to modify power structures.
Yet, articulation of the CP discourse also takes place within scientific and 
professional spheres -  epistemic communities -  concerned with global health, 
development or the environment among others. For these people, the efficiency, 
effectiveness and legitimacy of projects are key concerns around which CP 
articulates itself.
As Botterill (2002, p.3) explains, socio-economic or environmental programs 
focussed on CP are ascribed a number of intrinsic merits in the policy and 
professional literature: alternative top-down approaches have failed, with 
governments or experts identifying and imposing solutions; CP programs build the 
capacity of the community to tackle future problems autonomously; involving 
communities in deciding their future is a good thing in itself. An economic rationale, 
is also omnipresent -  as pointed out by Normann (2006, p.21). Efficient control, 
monitoring and surveillance systems are expensive and have generally been a 
governmental responsibility so that transferring some to local communities may 
decrease their costs to the state budget (e.g. Hersoug & Raanes, 1997; Narayan,
20 See for instance the Paulo Freire model of community participation and social learning through 
awakening and “conscientization” (Freire, 1968). See also Kane (2001) on Latin America.
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2002a). CP may be cost-efficient for the state if it leads local groups to do more with 
more of their own resources (cost-sharing): involving the community marshals more 
human resources than could be mobilised by the authorities alone. Furthermore, 
government agencies often lack knowledge of local resources, and the cost of 
gathering it is high. Local communities and organisations may have a better 
knowledge of problems and workable solutions, for instance regarding ecological 
conditions (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Jentoft, 2000).
In the field of global development, articulation of the CP discourse works 
particularly in comparison with previous development strategies. CP has indeed 
emerged as a key development discourse whose capacity to appear as “common 
sense” is readily comparable to previous development paradigms. As Mohan and 
Stokke (2000, p.252) put it, “[participatory] discourses present [themselves] as 
commonsensical given the failings of what has preceded [them]”. Paradigm shifts are 
always constructed as “natural” and CP is no exception. Lindauer and Pritchet (2002) 
show how this mechanism of “common sense production” has been working for 
decades -  how various development paradigms have been based upon “big facts and 
big ideas” that seemed to carry “obvious lessons from experience”. Deception with 
the strong state and top-down strategies were followed by a neoliberal wave 
advocating market deregulation; disillusions with the latter, led to a shift towards 
institutional reforms, social concerns in the form of decentralisation and a greater 
involvement of the civil society. CP is well articulated with the neoliberal attack 
against state centralisation while not endangering the tenets of free markets -  and 
even providing them with a social and local flavour. The work of Amartya Sen 
(1985, 1999) was also influential in moving the focus of development professionals 
from strict material wealth to a broader “capability” approach and strategies to 
“empower” poor people. This agenda was taken up by many donor organisations as 
part of their response to critiques of top-down development.
CP is also strongly articulated to key concerns of political scientists about the nature 
and possibility of collective action. As is well known, typical solutions to the “free 
rider problem”21 facing large groups (Olson, 1965) drew attention to involving 
institutional frameworks to provide an external authority that monitors and sanctions.
21 In the well-known “free rider problem”, obstacles to co-operation in large groups derive from 
difficulties that members face in assuring one another that they will not “free ride”.
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But Olson’s preferred solution was for the group to reorganise itself as a federated 
system -  that is, as a group of smaller groups where “small” means few enough 
members that remaining problems of trust become manageable and solutions can be 
found. Ostrom’s (1990) seminal book Governing the Commons followed this insight 
and proposed an approach to communities as particular social organisations able to 
address problems that cannot be managed by individuals acting alone, markets or 
governments. She observed that collective action problems faced by large groups 
may often be broken down into smaller problems that are surmountable given pre­
existing trust between some members. This perspective, focusing on the smaller scale 
rather than the larger scale, has inspired calls for further involvement of local 
stakeholders through participatory techniques in decision-making in a wide range of 
areas.
At a more macro level, the call for CP is also underpinned by the changing nature of 
the challenges faced by the international community -  such as climate change, the 
fight against transmissible diseases or the loss of global biodiversity. These stakes 
cannot be taken care of by merely harnessing a few key central actors. For instance, 
biodiversity cannot technically be preserved without simultaneously putting in 
motion states (international conventions, supporting green efforts of poor countries), 
private companies (offering or imposing new norms, supporting their upgrading, 
fostering responsible behaviours), countless local communities (often left to 
themselves, with no resources but natural ones, possessors of valuable local 
knowledge), civil society organisations (as agents of awareness-raising, catalysts of 
good will, a counter-weight to local political decisions), expert communities 
(producing knowledge, technical solutions, data) as well as individuals (as citizens 
who vote or consumers who influence market trends). Changing the course of the 
planet on such an issue requires putting in motion an almost unthinkably large 
constellation of actors. As argued previously (section 1.1.2), these forms of 
cooperation are so vast, complex and polycentric that, more than “collective action”, 
it is useful to refer to them as exercises in “hyper-collective action”, to emphasise 
their quantitative and qualitative difference, and whereby the involvement of local 
communities is increasingly critical.
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2.2.3. The production o f practices: a participatory ‘social technology’
Beyond the building of a common sense view, the CP discourse also produces a 
range of operational recommendations meant to shape project design in various fields 
of international attention. Here, we base our analysis of typical practices from a 
selection of more than twenty policy documents prepared and published by 
organisations such as international institutions, bilateral aid agencies, large NGOs or 
global networks and partnerships that facilitate the emergence of common work 
standards.22 All of these documents emphasise CP in their guiding principles for the 
preparation and implementation of schemes in the following sectors: general 
development (ADB, 2001; World Bank, 2002); infrastructures (DFID, 2003); water 
and sanitation (WHO, 1986b; UNICEF, 1999; DFID, 2002); healthcare (CARE, 
1999; WHO, 2002); education (USAID, 2001; INEE, 2004; UNESCO, 2001, 2007); 
the protection of the environment (CANARI, 1999; IUCN, 2004; UNEP-WCMC & 
KMTNC, 2005; IUCN, 2008); assistance to refugees (UNHCR, 2005; UNESCO, 
2006); conflict prevention and peace-building (International Alert, 1998; OECD, 
2001; World Bank, 2006; GPP AC, 2007). Although such policy guidelines show 
variations reflecting the diversity of their issue areas, they share a common discourse 
which translates into broad sets of “CP recommendations” -  or “best practices”. In 
particular, three emerge regarding the mobilisation of the community, the facilitation 
of CP and its institutionalisation. These are core practices that we argue are part and 
parcel of the global discourse.
The first set of practical recommendations relates to a social technology of 
information or action-oriented meetings that help “involve”, “engage with” and 
“mobilise” community members. CP is indeed about collaboration and 
communication amongst diverse stakeholders coming together “to agree on their 
expectations, share information, discuss ideas, plan, implement, monitor and 
evaluate” (ADB, 2001, p.27). Most of this collaborative work takes place in the 
context of meetings that, in turn, come in a variety of shapes and sizes, serving many 
different purposes. Large-scale public meetings include, for example, conferences, 
public consultations, town hall meetings and open seminars used for disseminating 
information and raising interest. Workshops are smaller scale, action-oriented events
22 Such as for instance the INEE (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies) or GPP AC 
(Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict).
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where diverse stakeholders come to address an issue together; they are used to 
establish and sustain collaboration with stakeholder groups, from pre-planning to 
evaluation stages. Focus groups are even smaller and often informal discussion 
groups. Participants are selected to represent either a cross-section or a specific 
category of stakeholders. Concerns and views are thus identified through guided 
discussions. Finally, standing bodies are almost always created to pull together 
diverse stakeholder representatives -  in the form, for example, of project boards, 
advisory groups, management or steering committees and various task forces (ADB, 
2001, p.27). It is generally agreed that such participatory meetings should be built 
into projects from the outset so that the community can share responsibilities in the 
assessment of the local situation, the definition of problems, the setting of priorities, 
decision-making, the planning of action programmes, project implementation, 
evaluation and potential modification (e.g. WHO, 1996, p.7; CANARI, 1999, p.22; 
INEE, 2004, p. 14). Most policy documents also emphasise the risk of imposing a 
pre-defined project upon a community, a bias that needs to be “carefully avoided”.
The second group of practical recommendations on CP is concerned with the concept 
of facilitation and the position of actors that are external to the “community”. 
Operational guidelines often insist that the mobilisation of the community needs 
some form of “external facilitator” to help shape the discussion, balance various 
viewpoints and make sure that all voices are taken into account (e.g. IUCN, 2004, 
p.80; UNICEF, 1999, p.14; GPPAC, 2008, p.12). In the context of the above- 
mentioned participatory meetings, facilitation applies “to how a person with no 
decision-making authority helps the group to be more efficient and effective in 
planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating” (DFID, 2002, p. 183). Ideally, 
“the facilitator does not engage in discussions and does not pass judgement. He/she 
facilitates discussions and has the prerogative to ask questions but does not intervene 
as an expert” (ADB, 2001, p.29). Facilitation is thus described as a neutral and 
“agendaless” function that does not influence outcomes. Facilitators are meant to be 
mere “catalysts” that help give birth to productive negotiations and leave the 
community in the “driving seat”. Facilitators should simply help people understand 
the opportunities they have; they thus should “try to avoid implementing activities 
themselves, but rather build the capacity of existing local and regional organisations
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to be able to plan and implement activities on their own in a sustainable manner” 
(Leijzer, 2002, p.3).
A third important set of operational advice relates to the way CP needs to be 
institutionalised. A CP scheme is generally “based on a set of rules and one or more 
organisations in charge of developing, interpreting and implementing such rules on 
an on-going basis, responding to varying circum stances and needs” (IUCN, 2004, 
p.47). Such organisations come in all shapes and sizes, with different mandates, 
regulations and characteristics but are all meant to be as “participatory” as possible. 
Operational guidelines all insist on the importance of creating well-balanced 
information, decision and evaluation mechanisms, through which all community 
voices are fairly represented. Representation “should be inclusive, with the 
participation of groups and institutions such as local NGOs, religious institutions, 
traditional leaders, marginalised groups, women, clans, tribes, age groups, etc.” 
(INEE, 2004, p. 16). Most handbooks, however, acknowledge that “there is no fixed 
formula” for such organisations and that “relationships among the partners may 
change and evolve as communities become better able to manage their own affairs” 
(UNICEF, 1999, p.20).
2.2.4. Conclusion
In this section, we have enquired into the mechanics of the global CP discourse: its 
articulated set of meanings within its ambiguities regarding social emancipation or 
control; its production of a shared common sense by interpellation of interest groups 
and articulation with cognitive elements that are widespread in Western culture and 
professional policy circles; its operational implications on projects and policies -  
notably its reliance on practices of participatory meetings, facilitators and 
institutionalised bodies. We now turn to the global field of “biodiversity protection” 
to show why and how CP as emerged as its dominant policy framework.
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2.3. Non-participation: the “fortress” approach to  
preserving nature
Biodiversity has become a major area of global governance, both de facto and de 
jure , given the global stakes it carries and the rising number of actors, netwoiks, 
treaties and funds that are endeavouring to support it worldwide. Since the mid- 
1980s, there has been a shift in nature conservation from protectionist and socially 
exclusionary forms (often referred to as the “glass bell” approach or “fortress 
conservation”) towards more inclusionary and people-oriented forms emphasising 
CP as well as “sustainable use”. These are variously known as Community-Based 
Natural Resources Management (CBNRM), community-based conservation (CBC), 
or integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs). The CP discourse can 
only be understood against the backdrop of and in relation to the “fortress 
conservation” discourse, which is its key counterweight and challenger. For this 
reason, “fortress conservation” will be the focus of this section.
From its origins at the end of the 19th century, the modem conservation movement 
has been pursuing the creation of “protected areas” that bar local people -  politically, 
economically and physically -  from natural areas. Whether this is in order to keep 
animals for the purpose of aristocratic hunting in colonial empires, to preserve 
landscapes in industrial America, to pursue romantic ideals of “pristine wilderness” 
or to tackle the global extinction currently taking place (cf. Appendix 3), “parks” (a 
congenial euphemism for “fenced areas”) have captured the attention of 
conservationists worldwide. Some argue today that, beyond national sovereignties, 
these areas even require international armed forces to police them (e.g. Terborgh, 
1999).
Here we first review the history of these protected areas. Although they are found 
across the globe throughout history, Western industrial economies were first to 
generalise large-scale national parks, the environmental impact of which was 
commensurate with their size. Under Western influences -  from colonial rulers to 
modem NGOs -  this “bell-jar model” was swiftly taken up worldwide, even in 
places where socio-economic systems were non-industrial. We then look at ihe 
critiques that developed against the socio-economic impacts and environmental 
rationale of these parks -  and which opened the way for the CP discourse to flourish.
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2.3.1. The global spread o f a W estern m isanthropic m odel
It is often suggested that the very concept of protected areas was first created by 
North countries at the end of the 19th century. Still, many prior examples can be 
found in the history of non-Westem states (e.g. Assyria, Babylon, China, Indonesia, 
Mongolia, Persia) as well as in smaller-scale societies based on rural communities 
(e.g. Africa, Alaska, India, New Zealand)23. Most societies throughout space and 
time have indeed developed one form or another of environmental protection. These 
are arguably learned behaviours, based on past mistakes and periods of over-use 
(Berkes, 1999). As Gadgil (1996) points out, the scale of conservation efforts of a 
given society is closely linked to the scale of its resource catchment -  and thus to the 
extent of its impact on nature. For instance, hunter-gatherer, shifting cultivator or 
horticultural societies developed conservation practices on typically small areas of 
between 1 and 10 hectares. They were embedded in a religious worship of nature and 
in sacred locations such as woods, ponds or rivers. Today, sacred groves are still in 
common use in countries such as India or Madagascar, where they support local 
communities while providing a safer habitat for local species. Protected areas have 
since expanded with the growing impact of human societies upon the natural 
environment. Agrarian societies developed hunting preserves extending over 
thousands of hectares that only aristocrats were allowed to use -  a social inequality 
that nevertheless limited anthropogenic environmental impact.
Later, industrial economies were the first to create large-scale national parks 
encompassing hundreds or even thousands of square kilometres. Yellowstone, in the 
United States, is widely referred to as the first park ever.24 It was created in 1872 at a 
time when much of North America had been devastated by white settlers, many of 
whom held the shared belief that God had given them a right to exploit the land to 
the full (Bernard & Young, 1997). Following this model, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand created a series of national parks towards the end of the 19th century.
In this setting, a Western conception of protected areas developed built upon a 
markedly misanthropic foundation. “It assumes that people are destructive of a
23 See for instance Milner-Gulland (2004) on Mongolia, Rangarajan (2001) on India, Xu and Melick 
(2007) on China, Mgumia and Oba (2003) on sacred groves in Tanzania and Kitson (2002) on New 
Zealand.
24 For instance, the World Database of Protected Areas (WDPA) takes Yellowstones as its starting 
point.
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pristine nature that needs to be protected against human depredation” (McNeely & 
Ness, 1997, p.l). “Wilderness”, defined as the total absence of humans, became 
central to the Western understanding of nature -  a notion romanticised as “the last 
preserves of places untouched by the outward expansion of European imperiurrT 
(Cosgrove, 1995, p.32). Brockington et al. (2008, p.49) insist at length on the power 
of “idea of wilderness” that excludes people “both physically and conceptually”. As 
they contend, parks “embody the ideal of pristine wilderness and seek to impose 
them on specific landscapes” (p.45).
Step by step, this misanthropic programme of large-scale protected areas became 
applied to the rest of the world, including non-industrialised nations. It is true that 
continental Europe and the UK only started creating national parks from the mid- 
20th century onwards, but their colonial governments (British, French, Dutch or 
German) developed them earlier in their administered territories in Africa and Asia. 
In Indonesia, the Dutch established a first rhino reserve in 1921. In 1925, the Parc 
National Albert was instated in the Belgian Congo. As for the British colonies, 
aristocratic hunters lobbied for game reserves to be created (Mackenzie, 1998). One 
of their early successes was the Kruger National Park established in 1926 in South 
Africa. In India, the first national park was founded in 1936.
This process did not stop with the retreat of colonial empires. Much to the contrary, it 
continued with post-independence interventionist governments. Parks thus developed 
all over the world, displaying the same structures based on the exclusion of locals 
and top-down, state-centred management. The “Western universal” was uniformly 
applied, setting boundaries around areas and keeping people out as much as possible 
with fences and fines. Brockington et al. (2008, p.2) underline that the most dramatic 
growth of protected areas worldwide took place between 1985 and 1995. In South 
and Central America, as well as in the Caribbean, they particularly flourished in 
1980s. Today, according to the World Conservation Monitoring Centre25, there are 
more than 100,000 delimited areas that benefit from some form of state protection, 
making up 12% of the world’ land surface, although actual levels of protection are 
highly variable.
25 http://www.wdpa.org/ Accessed 17 July 2010.
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The “park” approach has been adopted by developing countries either uncritically or 
following direct pressure from Western actors. Although protected areas were 
officially established by South governments, they were or still are often designed and 
run by Western NGOs. Schmidtz (1997) recalls for instance that environmentalist 
organisations in Europe, Canada and the United States strongly lobbied their own 
governments to use loan guarantees to pressure developing nations. Meanwhile, the 
World Bank and other multilateral organisations imposed environmental pre­
conditions for countries to access loans (Kolk, 1998). Large NGOs, mostly from the 
North, have also been extremely influential in propelling the concept of protected 
parks. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Conservation International (Cl) have 
been especially active in the Americas. In Gabon, the Wildlife Conversation Society 
(WCS) has been instrumental in the creation of thirteen new national parks 
encompassing 11% of the country in 2002. In Laos, the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) played a significant role in the emergence of a large 
number of reserves following the damning of the Mekong River. Moreover, such 
large green NGOs have led campaigns to build public support for global 
conservation, displaying striking images such as massive fires in the Amazon or 
other graphic catastrophes.
The misanthropic model was also enshrined, as McElwee (2001) argues, in the 
reference guidelines for park classification promoted by the IUCN. This system 
ranks parks on a l-to-6 scale depending on the degree of human disturbance (IUCN, 
1994). Parks allowing for extractive use and residence (category 4 through 6) are 
described by strict conservationists as less worthy than areas of stricter exclusion 
(category 1 through 3). Arguably, this classification “oversimplifies the range of 
landscapes found in diverse areas of the world.. .and demonises those landscapes that 
are human-affected” (McElwee, 2001, p.3).
Parks “are the centre of the ways in which most Westerners imagine nature”; yet, 
their concept also “conceals a great deal” (Brockington et al., 2008, p.45), notably 
the social changes that are needed for their creation. In fact, waves of critiques have 
formed against the “fortress approach” to conservation, putting into doubt its socio­
economic fairness as well as environmental necessity and opening the way for the 
emergence of the CP discourse.
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2.3.2. Iniquitous violences: the social critique
In Crimes against Nature, Karl Jacoby (2001) famously analysed the social injustices 
associated with the conservation of public lands in the United States, starting with 
Yellowstone Park. This process redefined the “public interest” by legitimising 
particular conceptions of nature and criminalising others, particularly those of rural 
communities. The latter had nevertheless “fashioned a variety of arrangements 
designed to safeguard the ecological basis of their way of life” (p. 193). As Jacoby 
puts it, the “hidden history of conservation” is one of metropolitan elites imposing 
their ideas about nature on rural people.
In the rest of the world, the creation of national parks has also led communities to be 
moved out and excluded from lands and denied access to wildlife resources (Adams 
& MacShane, 1992 ; Brockington, 2002). The effects have been largely described as 
“devastating for the traditional populations -  extractivists, fisherfolk, and indigenous 
peoples” (Diegues, 2000, p.3). Local resentments against parks and reserves, 
stemming from the restrictions on resources that communities had utilised for 
generations, have been well documented (Wells & Brandon, 1992). Since colonial 
times, violence has been a major aspect of state-directed wildlife conservation, 
notably through displacement, increased vulnerability to natural hazards, and person- 
to-person brutality (Neumann, 2001). In the post-colonial period, “all categories of 
violence have increased in frequency and intensity” - for instance with the issuing of 
shoot-on-sight directives {ibid, p.322). A recent book by Mark Dowe (2009) 
emphasises that this “hundred-year conflict between global conservation and native 
peoples” is far from over.
Brockington and Igoe (2006) have put together a massive review of 250 published 
articles on “conservation displacements” from the 1970s onwards, covering 184 
protected areas. They conclude that the available literature is not of high quality and 
that many gaps exist in the current state of knowledge. For instance, the number of 
displaced people worldwide is not known at all, as estimates range from less than 1 
million to over 14 million (Geisler & de Souza, 2001; Geisler, 2003). Similarly, the 
number of people living within protected areas today is also unknown, which limits 
the ability to predict the impact of further park creations. Studies in India, South 
America, Mongolia and Central Africa suggest nevertheless that there are 
communities living in 56 to 85% of protected areas. From this vast literature review,
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the authors also find that evictions have been most common in Africa, South and 
Southeast Asia and North America -  much less in other parts, such as Latin America, 
the Caribbean, Australia, Europe or the former Soviet Union.
Looking at the socio-economic impacts of parks upon the local populations, many of 
the 250 reports reviewed provide no details. But “unsurprisingly, where the 
consequences of eviction have been well studied they add to the weight of studies 
which have demonstrated that forced relocation inflicts considerable material and 
psychological harm” (Brockington & Igoe, p.449). Cemea (2005) has identified eight 
major impoverishment risks linked to displacement: 1) landlessness (expropriation of 
land assets and loss of access to land); 2) joblessness (even when the resettlement 
creates some temporary jobs); 3) homelessness (loss of physical houses, family 
homes and cultural space); 4) marginalisation (social, psychological and economic 
downward mobility); 5) food insecurity (malnourishment); 6) increased morbidity 
and mortality; 7) loss of access to common property (forests, water, wasteland, 
cultural sites); and 8) social disarticulation (disempowerment, disruption to social 
institutions).
Very few studies have tried to rigorously assess whether protected areas have a net 
cost or a net benefit for local communities. Coad et al. (2008) in another massive 
literature review “found no studies that had directly measured the impact of protected 
areas on poverty, wealth or other variables that might indicate an individual or 
community’s wellbeing” (p.27). The rare studies that have considered overall costs 
and benefits suggest a pattern of local costs and regional or global benefits26. Thus, 
although protected areas may provide macro benefits, they seem to often have a net 
cost at the local or national level, with poor countries and the rural poor bearing the 
larger share.
The negative impacts of coercive anti-poaching policies are also pointed out as they 
have criminalised practices of traditional hunting (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). 
Although such policies started in colonial times, they now often rely upon alliances 
between the state, donors and international green NGOs. In some instances, they also 
lead to human right abuses, as documented by Duffy (2000) in Zimbabwe. Neumann
26 At least six papers have quantified costs and benefits for forest protected areas: three case studies 
from Madagascar (Kremen et al., 2000; Ferraro, 2002; Carrett & Loyer., 2003), one from Kenya 
(Norton-Griffiths & Southey, 1995), one from Malaysia (Mohd Shahwahid et al., 1999) and one from 
Cameroon (Yaron, 2001).
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(2004) points out that, since the 1980s, several African governments have issued 
shoot-on-sight orders for “poachers” found within national parks. War has thus 
become “a common model and metaphor for conceptualizing and planning 
biodiversity protection in Africa” (p.813). The author contends that a moral 
justification for shoot-on-sight and wartime violence cannot be demonstrated within 
any strand of environmental ethics. Yet they have become taken for granted in 
Africa. He further shows how popular media have contributed to humanising wild 
animals while denigrating poachers, including poor peasants searching for small 
game or fish. Through these discursively reconstructed identities, human rights 
abuses and deadly violence against humans in the defence of “biodiversity” have 
become normalised within African national parks.
2.3.3. Doubting sustainability and necessity: the environm ental critique
The fortress approach to conservation has not only been criticised for its inbuilt 
violence, but also for its lack of sustainability as well as environmental necessity, as 
compared to other types of protection measures.
First, it has been pointed out that the emphasis on parks leads to the neglect of the 
natural environment that lay outside of the parks. This fragmented vision can be 
deeply harmful to conservation goals (Cronon, 1995). Looking the species-areas 
relationships, Rosenzweig (2003) argues that the loss of biodiversity cannot be 
stopped by “reserving small tracts of wild habitat” (p. 194). In his view, the real 
challenge is to “redesign anthropogenic habitats so that their use is compatible with 
use by a broad array of other species -  something he calls “reconciliation ecology”. 
In a similar move, Adams (1996, p. 170) argues that conservation should be designed 
to involve the whole landscape. Protected areas are just too small to provide adequate 
species or ecosystem conservation.
Second, there have been suggestions that parks do not function properly even within 
their boundaries because they cannot operate without local support. Excluding 
communities living near or within natural areas is said to prove politically and 
socially unsustainable -  and therefore ineffective (e.g. Lane, 2001; Western, 2001; 
Barrow & Fabricius, 2002) As Brockington (2004) points out, few observers now 
seem to doubt this “principal of local support”, as he names it, but this does always 
hold true. Brockington studied for instance the Mkomazi Game Reserve in Tanzania
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and concludes that “protected areas do not all have to have the backing of their 
neighbours in order to survive.. .Local groups can be ignored by protected areas with 
impunity; passing over local groups may make no long-term threats to a protected 
area's security” (Brockington , 2004, p.412). Opposing communities are often 
politically weak rural groups facing alliances of local to international actors. 
Moreover, key individuals or groups of the local elite are often well positioned to 
take advantage of conservation schemes. In other words, various local power 
relations may interact to contain resistances (Brockington et al., 2008, p84).
Despite this more cynical reality, the “fortress approach” is still constantly 
challenged for its ability to hold up itself in the face of local resistances. The 
literature on the environmental effectiveness of parks is actually not as vast and 
systematic as one could expect. Not many studies have used large samples of 
protected areas to gather insights into their actual contribution to biodiversity 
protection. A few may nevertheless be mentioned. Bruner et al. (2001a) for instance 
study a set of 93 tropical parks by collecting questionnaires from managers and 
experts. They found that 40% of the parks have witnessed improvements in 
vegetation cover, but their approach may be biased as the respondents have vested 
interests in claiming that parks are working. Naughton-Treves et a l (2005) reviewed 
49 studies and found that deforestation was slower inside than outside 32 of 36 
protected areas. Using satellite data, DeFries et al. (2005) analysed 198 protected 
tropical forests and showed that two thirds show significant deforestation within 50 
km of their borders but only a quarter are affected by this issue within their 
boundaries. More recently, Nagendra (2008) found deforestation was slower in parks 
compared with adjacent areas in 32 of 35 cases and reduced relative to the 
deforestation that had occurred before their establishment in 9 of 14 cases.
Despite many methodological issues, there is thus some suggestion in the literature 
that parks are able to minimise unwanted environmental changes (Brooks et al., 
2009, p. 1451; Brockington et al., 2008, p.65). However, there is a clearly recognised 
lack of studies on the relative effectiveness of parks as compared to others modes of 
protection. The few that exist tend to show in fact that parks do not perform 
especially better than other approaches to conservation and maybe worse. Nepstad et 
al. (2006) for instance used satellite data between 1997 and 2000 to find that both 
inhabited parks and indigenous reserves are effective against fire and deforestation in
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Brazil. Ostrom and Nagendra (2006) report poor performances in a sample of 
designated “parks” in South Asia that excluded local management, and better 
performances of nearby community forests. Hayes (2006), as well as Hayes and 
Ostrom (2005), compared the vegetation density in 76 legally protected parks with 
87 “non-park” forests -  and found no statistically significant differences. Rather than 
the official designation of “protected areas”, what seems to influence the state of 
forests are rather the rules acknowledged by local forest users (such as forest product 
rules). The ability of the users to contribute to rule-making is also positively 
correlated with vegetation density.
This type of evidence tends to indicate that what really matters are the local 
institutions in the broad sense -  and that the creation of designated “parks” is only 
one option, and not necessarily the most environmentally effective.
2.3.4. Conclusion: opening the way for CP
With its exclusionary approach, the “fortress model” of environmental protection has 
proved indubitably socially destructive while also being based on weak evidence of 
superiority over other approaches. As the critique goes, the “fences-and-fines” 
strategy has heightened tensions between park managers and local communities, 
threatening their livelihoods and causing frustrations and conflicts. Moreover, strict 
regulations without the means to enforce them have often led to “paper parks” that 
exist only on maps, leaving all stakeholders unhappy and leading communities to 
illegally extract resources they had legitimately used for centuries. This fortress 
model was also supported by a Western positivist scientific paradigm that devalued 
indigenous knowledge (Kapoor, 2001) and carried the implicit view that local 
communities are not likely to develop optimal or even rational environmental 
practices -  a view that later came to be hotly contested.
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2.4. The rise o f CP in biodiversity protection: 
prom ises and critiques
With the Rio conference (UN, 1992a), the Agenda 21 agreement on sustainable 
development (UN, 1992b), the Convention on Biological Diversity (UN, 1992c) as 
well as the “Aarhus Convention” on public participation and access to information 
(UNECE, 1998), more and more emphasis has been placed on CP in the 
environmental sphere. Clearly, community participation “has been on the ascendancy 
for several decades and plays [today] a leading role in conservation strategies 
worldwide” (Dressier et al., 2010, p.5). Yet, it has also been challenged by 
unconvinced scholars and practitioners, some of whom are even asking to go “back 
to the barriers”. The ability of the CP discourse to deliver on its promises of social 
justice, economic development and environmental effectiveness has been sharply put 
into question.
Here, we first review the basis of what hopes and promises CP set itself in the sphere 
of biodiversity protection. We then explore four strands of criticisms that have 
emerged and which put into doubt the emancipatory narrative of CP as a tool of local 
empowerment: 1) the often concomitant expansion of state control; 2) the typical and 
large influence of a range of international actors within CP schemes; 3) the frequent 
and increased fragmentation of local communities through heightened inequalities 
and local tensions; 4) CP’s apparent partnering with a range of capitalist and 
neoliberal agendas. Finally, we examine the more strictly environmentalist critique 
of CP that has led some organisations to partly turn away from CP.
2.4.1. The hopes and spread of com m unity approaches
The CP discourse in environmental matters has first benefited from developments in 
the theory of collective action. The key starting point of this literature is the 1968 
article by Garret Hardin, who describes the unavoidable degradation of natural 
resources in contexts where access is “open to all”. Hardin famously pictured a 
medieval pasture open to all livestock owners, who thus keep increasing their herd 
without having to pay for the depreciation of this natural capital. The end result is the 
so-called “tragedy of the commons” whereby degradation cannot be stopped unless 
the state takes control of the resource or the resource is privatised so that incentives
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emerge for producers to take care of it. Later authors, however, and most notably 
Noble prize winner Elinor Ostrom (1990), have since argued that a “third way” can 
be found between the state and the market in various “common property regimes”. 
These are regimes whereby local users commonly agree to follow certain rules and 
restrain their use of the resource in order to preserve it. In this view, “the drama of 
the commons does not always play out as a tragedy” (Ostrom et al., 2002, p.5). Much 
depends on how rules of access are designed. An abundant literature has been 
produced on this specific issue. It shows that robust regimes are typically 
characterised by clear rules of exclusion, clear social and spatial boundaries, as well 
as active enforcement mechanisms whereby use is monitored and infringements are 
punished (Brockington et al., 2008, p. 101). The social organisation, the nature of 
user groups and the wider social and political environment can also deeply impact 
outcomes.27
Accordingly, in the 1980s, research began to point to numerous examples of 
community practices and traditional techniques that had proved sustainable (e.g. 
Perry & Dixon, 1986; Shiva, 1991; Alcom, 1993). For instance, shifting cultivation-  
a practice involving the clearing, burning and cultivation of forested areas in rotation 
-  had been frequently banned by colonial and post-colonial governments. Yet, 
because it allows the plots left fallow to recover nutrients and vegetation, it has been 
shown to enhance biodiversity (Leach & Meams, 1996). Similarly, traditional 
forestry often entails community labour for planting and maintaining trees, and 
regulating access to resources with socio-religious rules. This has often proved more 
successful for reforestation than state or privately run schemes (Guha, 1989, p. 180). 
Reviewing twenty-three conservation and development programs worldwide, Wells 
and Brandon (1992) argued that the weaknesses of state-centric policy were, in any 
case, such that few options existed at this point other than a shift towards 
conservation schemes involving a far higher degree of “community participation”.
In economic development programmes, the mainstreaming of CP had started in the 
late 1970s, but it was only in the mid-1980s that it took off in environmental 
management. A new framework then emerged under the name of “Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects” (ICDPs). This tried to bridge the gap 
between conservation and socioeconomic concerns by providing local communities
27 See Agrawal (2003) for a review.
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with alternative income opportunities with a reduced impact on the environment 
(Wells & Brandon, 1992). ICDPs later included wider concerns about CP in project 
design, implementation and management. The CP approach was firmly stated at the 
1982 and 1992 World Congresses on National Parks and Protected Areas (McNeely, 
1992). CP was a key element of the concept of “biosphere reserve” promoted by the 
UNESCO from the late 1970s and many “people and park” projects flourished 
throughout the world in the late 1980s (Hannah, 1992). Conservationist practitioners 
re-styled themselves as working for conservation “by the people”, “with the people” 
or “for the people”, rather than “against the people” (Hutton et al., 2005, p.346). 
Launched in 1986 and developed in Zimbabwe, the CAMPFIRE community scheme 
(Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) is one of the 
first CP schemes ever set up in environmental management. It was used as a model 
in Africa and elsewhere (Hutton et a l, 2005, pp.345).
This participatory approach (also referred to as “collaborative management”, “co­
management”, “joint management”) has thus gained recognition in conservation 
endeavours in recent decades. Originating in local discontents about fenced areas, CP 
is now promoted on a wide scale by NGOs and governments alike. International 
organisations such as the World Bank, the World Wide Fund for Nature-International 
(WWF-Intemational), Conservation International (Cl), The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), the Africa Wildlife Foundation, 
the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation as well as a host of bilateral donor 
agencies (such as the American USAID, the Swedish SID A, the Canadian CIDA or 
the French AFD) have all largely adopted this approach.
CP in environmental management is based upon a range of tenets. It acknowledges 
the multiplicity of local stakeholders and calls for the decentralisation of decision­
making power from government authorities to local and inclusive governance 
structures. Whereas the fortress approach functions as if reality were objectively one 
and the same, the CP approach has a more constructivist slant (Kapoor, 2001). It 
claims to see reality more appropriately as socially created and culturally specific: 
“truth”, “facts”, “effects” and “causes” are no longer supposed to be revealed 
through the sole eye of external “experts” but constructed in an inter-subjective and 
collaborative fashion, bringing together multiple perspectives. Rather than outside 
managers and authorities imposing ready-made schemes, local stakeholders are
Chapter 2 - 8 7
meant to undertake a process of collective learning and consensus-building to design 
their own rules and programmes, such as the delineation of management zones and 
the composition of decision boards.
Expectations are high as participation is supposed to simultaneously reconcile nature 
conservation and social justice. It may also serve as a tool to promote stronger 
democracies (Wily, 2002 or at least make environmental projects more coherent with 
“new democracies” -  a constraint that conservationists began to feel from the late 
1970s (Hutton et al. 2005,p.343). CP is also expected to facilitate a more sustainable 
use of natural resources, a greater distribution of economic benefits and political 
power within and among communities and a respect for social and cultural concerns 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996). It does not eliminate concerns of environmental 
effectiveness -  which is the core focus of the fortress approach -  but the nature of the 
decision-making process is also considered a key issue. Efficiency “for whom” and 
“determined by whom” are meant to stand as key questions (Kapoor, 2001).
Still, environmental effectiveness is expected to be strengthened through several 
channels.28 First, participation is supposed to expand the information base plugged 
into programmes and help integrate local knowledge and experience. Second, as CP 
strives for the widest possible consensus, programmes are expected to accommodate 
the objectives of most if not all parties. This, in turn, may reduce conflicts, enhance 
mutual understanding, feelings of local ownership, commitment and accountability, 
and bring a spirit of team-building and joint problem-solving (Zazueta, 1995). Third, 
CP is meant to foster communication among groups and address dysfunctional (or 
undue) power relationships that may have an impact on the environment. Fourth, it is 
also said to facilitate greater iterative programming through increased feedback 
leading to reorientations if  necessary (Plein, et al., 1998). These various rationales 
for CP in environmental management are found both in academic works and in the 
policy documents of countless NGOs, international organisations and donors (e.g. 
CANARI, 1999, p.13-14; IUCN, 2004, p.12; UNEP-WCMC & KMTNC, 2005, 
p.14-15).
Yet, some harsh critiques of participation have emerged, notably in the development 
and environmental fields. Their significance has not been acknowledged in IR
28 See for instance Ribot (2006).
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studies and they remain rarely looked at in the context of global governance. Cooke 
and Kothari (2001) observe that there have been two levels of critique. The first 
critique is of a “problem-solving and internal” nature that seeks to overcome 
“technical limitations” in order to increase CP quality and effectiveness (e.g. Nelson 
& Wright, 1995; Guijt & Shah, 1998). In some ways, this perspective does not give 
up on the hopes of the emancipatory narrative of CP. The second level is a more 
fundamental critique that draws attention to the alienating power effects of 
participatory discourses -  and thus essentially relates to the critical narrative.
2.4.2. D isciplinary participation? From state control to self-surveillance
Looking at the United States, Jacoby (2001) showed how the expansion of strict 
conservation practices at the end of the 19th century contributed to the formation of 
the administrative state itself. Conservation also participated in the creation of the 
modem American countryside with the advent of market relations, wage labour, the 
precedence of law over custom and the positioning of the state as a powerful 
manager “standardising and simplifying what had been a dense thicket of 
particularistic, local approaches toward the natural world” (p. 197-198). In the rest of 
the world too, conservation practices and state-building have often been interlinked. 
There is evidence in the literature on CP schemes that in many contexts the latter 
constitutes a means for expanding state control. This can occur through various 
institutional mechanisms, incentives and social technologies.
Ribot (2006), for instance, argues that decentralisation processes in environmental 
management are often incomplete or denatured -  since the state and its related 
agencies are generally reluctant to reduce their power or command of revenues. Such 
was the case, according to Sundar (2000), with the massive Joint Forest Management 
programme that started in India in 1990 and led to the creation of more than 10,000 
local committees. Beyond appearances, this endeavour did not “represent a 
resurgence of civil society against the state... insofar as the basic agenda of the 
programme [was] pre-determined” (p.255). As for Risley (2007), she looks at how 
the global agenda of citizens’ participation has been implemented in the sphere of 
environmental policy making in Latin America, notably Chile and Argentina. She 
argues that government officials have re-shaped the participatory mandate to achieve 
a better fit with their own political objectives.
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On an even stronger note, Neuman (1997) argues that CP schemes resemble colonial 
conservation strategies as communities are being asked to actively demonstrate “a 
conservative, even curative, relationship with nature while risking the loss of their 
land rights should they fail” (p.566). This process is often implemented though an 
alliance of “first world conservationists (backed by the power of the state) [such as 
large NGOs] which determines whether land uses are compatible” (p.565). Looking 
at “buffer zones” in nine African countries,29 particularly Tanzania, Neumann 
contends that they represent a “tremendous territorial expansion of state power” 
(p.575), an extension of “state authority beyond the boundaries of protected areas 
and into rural communities” (p.564). They carry “new forms of state intervention and 
restriction of land use”, notably increasing the “policing capacity of the state” 
(p.565) -  through marked and patrolled boundaries, the monitoring of villages and 
the use of rewards and punishments that create “a climate of land tenure insecurity” 
(p.577). Similar results were found in CP programmes in Zimbabwe (Hill, 1996), 
Kalahari (Hitchcock, 1995) or Cameroon (Lance, 1995). Commenting on this 
literature, Duffy concludes that participatory schemes can make communities 
“become the eyes and ears of the state in remote locations” (Duffy, 2009, p.69).
This point has also been made about CP in the field of development. In this context, 
one of the most debated participatory practices has been Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA), initially formulated by Chambers (1983). This set of techniques is 
supposed to incorporate the knowledge and opinions of rural people into the project 
planning and management. PRA has nevertheless been described as a “practice of 
surveillance” in which the poor are subjected to the disciplinary eye of external 
donors without having any reciprocal right to examine or criticise them (Kothari, 
2001). It has also been said to wipe out “anything that is messy or does not fit the 
structured representations implied by participatory tools” while it controls the 
production of “the norm, the usual and the expected” (p. 147). Kapoor (2002) further 
suggests that there could even be a use of PRA by state organisations to co-opt or 
monitor groups and communities seen as threatening.
Participatory projects often lead to the creation of “co-management committees” 
dominated in practice by government officials. Tofa (2007), for instance, analyses
29 Buffer zones typically entail a 2-10 km wide strip around protected area boundaries -  and up to 
50km in Zaire.
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co-management in New Zealand at the Taranaki National Park. He concludes that the 
government managed to impose governance entities that it can negotiate with and 
influence more easily. “Contractual parks” in South Africa also illustrate this point. 
Developed since the 1980s, these entities are established on private lands with a 
board comprising representatives of both the landowners and the national 
conservation authority (SANParks, the South African National Parks). Roe et al. 
(2009, p.35) emphasise that these joint management boards have “been hampered by 
the power of SANParks representatives”.30 Looking more broadly across Africa, they 
further conclude: “overall, there remain relatively few cases of communities 
obtaining formal authority over lands and the natural resources found on those lands. 
Centralised control over natural resources persists despite the ubiquitous change in 
the rhetoric” (p.viii).
In many instances, joint boards seem to provide limited opportunities for local 
stakeholders to take a real hold of the decision making process. As Brockington et a l 
(2008, p. 106) put it:
It is all very well setting up a joint management board, but what matters is how 
well it junctions. These can be mixes of unequal capacity, with 
experienced...officials, for whom management boards are their natural habitat, 
and long-marginalised rural communities who lack the capacity and experience 
to flourish in these institutional environments.
Critiques point out that project activities are often already designed before any public 
meetings takes place to mobilise local people. Moreover, many stakeholder 
committees end up existing only on paper. In this light, while seemingly adopting an 
inclusionary ideal, CP works as still another means of pursuing top-down agendas 
through a sort of “reverse engineering” whereby outcomes are predefined and non- 
negotiable, the communities being merely asked to implement them.
There is still another path, less directly coercive, through which CP can increase state 
control over local communities. It is the process of creation of “environmental 
subjects” -  or, in other words, of people who care about the environment. Following 
a perspective inspired by Foucault, Darier (1996) for instance analyses Canada’s 
1990 Green Plan to show its attempt to discipline the population by instilling new 
norms of environmental conduct and, thus, construct a new subjectivity based on
30 See also Reid & Turner (2004).
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“environmental citizenship”. The recourse to CP schemes is interpreted in this light. 
The Canadian plan notably establishes a “community tree-planting program” whose 
real intention cannot be reforestation - since it is very expansive and only concerns 
an insignificant proportion of the country’s land mass (less than 0.01 per cent). The 
real motivation, Darier argues, is to “mobilise environmental groups and local 
communities into participating in a practical, hands-on environmental exercise 
designed to train individuals to adopt an environmental conduct. This programme is 
openly designed to offer to ‘all of us the opportunity to think globally, while acting 
locally’” (p.600).
In Tanzania, Neumann (2001) studies how voluntary community programmes are 
interlinked with continued threats of state violence to produce “disciplined peasants”. 
As he puts it, “the buffer zone plan serves as the ‘discipline-mechanism’ to create a 
different kind of peasant consciousness toward wildlife based on a schema of 
generalised surveillance” (p.326). Control over the population is achieved “not 
through force and coercion, but primarily through the ordering and partitioning of 
space” -  with full knowledge, however, “of the ever-present potential for state- 
violence” (p.327).
Another important scholar who pursued this line of analysis is Agrawal (2005). He 
documents in Kumanon, India, the passage from a “technology of domination” to a 
“technology of the self’ in the state policing of nature. The Forest Council Rules of 
1931 instated community-managed forests and over the next 60 years more than 
3,000 new local councils came into being to manage them. According to Agrawal, 
the local people who became involved in such participatory mechanisms (including 
monitoring and funding) deeply modified their subjective understanding of their own 
individual interests to incorporate stricter environmental norms. CP schemes, thus, 
can change people’s beliefs and subjectivity. Sometimes at the cost of significant 
“internal struggles” (p. 174), CP has them “work upon themselves to become 
environmental subjects” (p. 181). According to Agrawal, CP institutions are a 
“response of the state” (p. 169), a “particular technology of power that the colonial 
state implemented and the post-independence Indian state continued” (p. 187). The 
locals that became involved have internalised a rhetoric that “matches the objectives 
that the Forest Department began pursuing nearly 150 years ago” (p. 169).
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Agrawal uses the term “environmentality” to point to “technologies of self and 
power... involved in the creation of new subjects concerned about the environment” 
(p. 166). He also puts forward the concept of “intimate government” which, contrary 
to constant oversight and external expertise, works by “dispersing rule, scattering 
involvement in government more widely and encouraging careful reckoning of 
environmental practices and their consequences among [local] residents” (p. 178). 
People started pursuing “goals that they imagine are their own and in which they 
often construct state officials as inefficient, unsupportive or corrupt” (p. 179). This 
“imagined autonomy” hides the leading role of the state in the process but is 
“crucial” to its success.
2.4.3. Global partners, global netw orks... local disem powerm ent?
Another important strand of criticism raised against CP schemes involves their 
counter-intuitive tendency to render a range o f international actors extremely 
powerful locally. In the development field, Kapoor (2002), Mohan (2001) and others 
have pulled together a landmark volume called Participation: The New Tyranny? 
(Cooke & Kothari, 2001). As the title grimly suggests, the emancipatory claims of 
participation are called seriously into question. Rather than empowering local 
community members, critiques argue that participation provides alternative methods 
for incorporating local stakeholders into the ready-made projects of big international 
actors, who remain unaccountable to those they are supposed to empower. Looking 
at external agencies, Mose (2001) explains how “local knowledge” is restructured by 
their bureaucratic goals. Francis (2001, p.80) stigmatises participatory “experts” 
exorcising like “shamans” the “phantoms of conventional development practice” 
while retaining the real authority. Mohan (2001) criticises the pervading 
Eurocentrism of development workers that conceals the power of the Western world 
under a technical discourse. Hildyard et a l (2001, p.60) explain that CP maintains 
the commercial exploitation of local resources -  and is used as the “the human 
software through which investments can be made with least local opposition”.
Illustratively, a review of eighty-four World Bank projects approved between 1989 
and 2003 and labelled as “community-driven” argued that this qualification was 
rather emphatic and grandiose when compared to what was actually happening on 
the ground (Uphoff, 2005). These projects were hardly “community-driven”: the
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project design, what kinds of things could be done, within what time-frame and on 
what financial terms were all decided unilaterally by Bank staff. The projects 
themselves were not open to local participatory inputs, only “sub-projects”. The main 
decisions left to communities were whether or not they would make a proposal to 
gain access to Bank funds for something they wanted to do (within a non-negotiable 
framework set by Bank or government personnel) and how they would carry out the 
work once it was approved. For sure, the projects had in common an aspiration for 
delegating to communities or their representatives some responsibility for taking the 
initiative to plan and implement improvements in community services. But, here, 
“community-driven” only meant community-initiated, implemented or managed 
within fully externally set parameters.
Such a dominant position of international actors, often partnering with the local state, 
have led observers to criticise CP projects as mere “participation-washing” that do 
not do much “beyond engaging in rhetoric on participatory development and 
developing ‘partnerships’” (Duffy, 2009, p.60; see also Swatuk, 2005). Participatory 
projects have thus been criticised as typically undergoing a “Weberian process of 
routinisation” (Mosse, 2001, p.25), a mechanistic transformation that makes them 
essentially symbolic while fostering traditional top-down management structures. 
Moreover, and despite the disaffection of the locals, such projects can continue to 
exist primarily owing to the will of project staff themselves, often in their own 
interest (Hildyard, et al., 2001).
Mosse (2001; 2004, p.654) further points out that even CP projects are developed 
within a heavy institutional setting involving national and local governments as well 
as international aid bureaucracies. All these forces put pressure on project 
management and personnel to produce timetabled and quantifiable outputs that big 
organisations can identify as measures of “progress”. They include spending targets 
and the timely delivery of quantifiable objectives. The whole monitoring structure is 
often set out within a “logical framework”, which is a management tool that tries to 
make the key causal chains and goals of a given project explicit. Complex 
participation is thus contradicted by the need for vertical control and quantifiable 
indicators. Participation is thus translated into a managerial exercise based on 
“toolboxes” of procedures and techniques, less concerned with empowerment than 
“efficiency” (Cleaver, 2001).
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One of the most recent trends in the use of CP in natural resource management is the 
development of Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs). They are supposed to 
manage entire ecosystems across borders while still closely involving local 
communities. Looking at a range of experiences in Southern Africa, Duffy (2006, 
p. 101) concludes that TFCAs are best analysed as “a means by which global actors 
can recentralise control over resources and people from the global level and 
concentrate power in the hands of a narrow network of international NGOs, 
international financial institutions, global consultants on tourism and community 
conservation and bilateral donors”. She further agrees with Wolmer (2003, p.7) that 
TFCAs are the latest in a line of top-down environmental interventions by 
international environmental organisations and aid bureaucracies.
2.4.4. Fragm enting com m unities further: corporatism  and inequ ities
Since the early 1990s, assessments of CP schemes in biodiversity management have 
started to report issues relating to inequalities of power and social conflict, not only 
between communities and external agencies but also within communities (West & 
Brechin, 1991; Wells & Brandon, 1992; Western & Wright, 1994). Participatory 
management is by its very nature a process that can become politicised and carries a 
risk of further fragmenting communities that are typically already divided into 
interest groups and stratified by class, age or gender.
Accordingly, a range of case studies have confirmed how CP schemes can favour 
one section of a community over another (Sharpe, 1998; Brown & Rosendo, 2000). 
Brockington et al. (2008, p.73-74, p.98) thus argue it is difficult to judge their net 
impact, as these schemes “distribute fortunes and misfortunes at the same time”. 
Calculating a “net” cost or benefit is difficult, as “the groups benefiting and those 
suffering are [generally] different”. Moreover, gains and costs are often “not 
commensurable”: “quite often, costs are experienced in terms of access to natural 
resources, while benefits usually come in the form of training, technical development 
projects, and opportunities in the market economies”.
As local groups become embroiled with a range of non-local actors (state agencies, 
NGOs or donors), there are also dangers of corporatist agreements between self­
selected alliances. Private negotiations may emerge between a few interest groups 
and lead to excluding such or such a group. This risk is a very real one as some form
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of “exclusion” is usually present in any environmental scheme, including CP ones. 
Brockington et al. (2008, p. 104) usefully recall that common property regimes that 
prove sustainable do make an active use of rules of exclusion. As they underline:
Successful regimes are characterised by high levels o f surveillance and 
monitoring, o f people checking up on others and disciplining 
themselves ...These are not necessarily pleasant places to live an work. They 
can deliver effective resource management but they do so by managing and 
mitigating conflict, not by removing it.
If not properly designed, rules of exclusion may disproportionately affect the poorest 
as prerogatives may be captured by local or national elites, none of whom are 
properly accountable to locals. In such cases, CP may resemble a process of “one 
step forward, two steps backward” (Oyono, 2004) that “masks the application of 
power” (Neuman, 2001, p.327). Klooster (2000) shows for instance, in the context of 
community forestry in Mexico, how timber control has been captured by elites and 
benefits only a few villagers. Lane (2003) demonstrates how decentralisation in 
Australia can in fact amount to privatising environmental governance and a further 
exclusion of the poorest. Power may also be passed onto customary authorities that 
remain largely unaccountable (Igoes & Kelsall, 2005). As for the “stakeholder 
committees” created in the context of CP schemes, they may be prone to domination 
by the more powerful components of local communities -  and typically by men.
2.4.5. Partnering w ith neoliberal capitalism
A growing number of critical analysts make the case that capitalist policies, 
especially neoliberal ones, are steeped in and expanded by current conservation 
practices. Brockington et al. (2008) underline that the period of most dramatic 
growth of protected areas worldwide was between 1985 and 1995, which coincides 
with the dominance of neoliberal policies. In their view, this is no hazard as 
capitalism and conservation as increasingly “reshaping the world in partnership”. So 
much so that it becomes “difficult to determine if we are describing conservation 
with capitalism as its instrument or capitalism with conservation as its instruments”
(p.6).
These authors further draw upon Sklair (2001), who argued that corporations and 
conservationists have colluded worldwide to form a “sustainable development
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historical bloc” (p.8). This voluntary coalition also gathers elites from international 
regulatory bodies and state institutions. As Rutheford (2006, p. 84) puts it, the 
primary aspiration of this bloc is to devise and coordinate policy approaches that help 
to “ecologically modernise” capitalist institutions so as to preserve them. It aims to 
offer a solution to the environmental crisis inherent to global consumer capitalism 
while at the same time strengthening this economic model.
Romero and Andrade (2004), for instance, point out deals between NGOs and timber 
companies whereby logging concessions are turned into conservation lands after 
exploitation, both land uses excluding local groups. Chapin (2004, p. 17) deems that 
“as corporate and government money flow into the three big international 
organizations that dominate the world’s conservation agenda [Cl, WWF and TNC], 
their programs have been marked by growing conflicts of interest—and by a 
disturbing neglect of the indigenous peoples whose land they are in business to 
protect”. Accordingly, Duffy (2009, p.62) speaks of a “counter-intuitive 
relationship”: while NGOs might be expected to contest many World Bank policies, 
they have in fact developed a very close relationship, “working to achieve common 
(often neoliberal) goals in the form of economic liberalisation alongside 
environmental protection”. Looking at the environmental discourse of global 
businesses, Rutheford (2006) similarly identifies an increasing willingness to partner 
with environmental non-governmental organisations and a proactive approach to 
shaping the international environmental agenda.
This rapprochement of environmentalist and capitalists lays emphasis on policies that 
promote market- and trade-oriented approaches. As Duffy (2009, p.61) notes, much 
of the environmental discussion is now tied up with the idea that conservation will 
eventually “have to pay its own way” (p.4) as well as with the claim that “developing 
the market value of nature will ‘save it’ and equally will provide a pathway out of 
poverty”.
This “eco-capitalist” dynamics is not merely exemplified in the creation of strictly 
protected parks as forms of “compensation” for large destructive infrastructure 
projects, but also in the development of CP programmes. As Hutton et a l (2005, 
p.345) put it, “communities, and rural individuals and households, [are expected to] 
become micro-entrepreneurs, using the economic values of conservation resources 
(for tourism, trophy-hunting, medicines, meat and other products) to deliver both
Chapter 2 - 9 7
sustainable livelihoods and conservation”. The expansion of ecotourism is 
particularly studied in this light, as being embedded in a neoliberal framework that 
precludes real respect for community empowerment (Cater, 2006). Duffy (2002, 
p. 10) similarly contends that ecotourism is “locked into notions of green capitalism” 
so that concerns for profit can only outweigh those for conservation or participation.
Through ecotourism, people see the environment in simplified terms that hide the 
social, economic and cultural cost of producing the experience they enjoy 
(Brockington et al., p. 145). The “eco-certification” of various products can also be 
subject to the same critique (p. 180-181). A form of “commodity fetishism” is thus 
affecting environments, landscapes and their related products. It helps integrate them 
into capitalist consumption while leading eco-consumers to believe that they “do 
their part” in preserving nature -  precisely through consumption. This process of 
fetishisation is described as the “green box of consumptive nature” (p. 189) in 
reference to Marx’s analysis of “nature” as a “black box” within the capitalist order 
that helps hide the socio-political relationships involved in production processes.
2.4.6. “Back to barriers”: the new environm ental critique
Over the past few years, there has been a resurgence of concerns about whether strict 
conservation is not, in the end, the best form of environmental protection. New calls 
to scientific rationality have been heard, notably from biologists, that want to 
relegate CP backstage -  forming what Hutton et al. (2005) call the “back-to-the- 
barriers-movement”. For instance, Locke and Dearden (2005, p .l) complain that the 
“new paradigm...devalues conservation biology, undermines the creation of more 
strictly protected reserves, inflates the amount of area in reserves and places people 
at the centre of the protected area agenda at the expense of wild biodiversity”. They 
argue that only the stricter “IUCN categories I-IV  should be recognised as protected 
areas. In doing so, they reactivate a well-established literature that had only favoured 
strictly protected areas (e.g. Oates, 1995; Redford, 1991; Terborgh, 1999; Brandon et 
al., 1998).
One important argument is that CP approaches are based on unrealistic ideas. A 
romanticised view of “indigenous harmony” had indeed developed long ago with the 
writing of evolution theorists such as Wynne-Edwards (1962), Rappaport (1983) or 
Meggers (1971). They argued that cultures or populations were the units of natural
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selection: groups that devised stable population control mechanisms were thus able 
to outcompete those who did not. Other studies had pointed out high levels of 
biodiversity associated with the presence of native peoples (e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder 
& Coppolillo, 2005). However, there followed a growing disbelief in this view 
among anthropologists. With Rambo’s Primitive Polluters (1985), Diamond’s 
critique of the “environmentalist myth” (1986) or Redford’s work denouncing the 
fable of The Ecologically Noble Savage (1991), the scientific consensus turned 
around and, today, vast reviews of the ethnographic literature conclude that 
“conservation by native peoples is uncommon” (Hames, 2007, p. 186; see also Smith 
& Wishnie 2000).
Building on these findings, the “back-to-barriers” narrative emphasises that 
conservation may not be important to community members, especially the poorer 
ones, who are more concerned with improving their livelihoods and feeding their 
families. Rural communities, the argument goes, often face challenges of poverty, 
population growth, weak public policies and lack of marketable skills and resources, 
which makes biodiversity conservation the least of their priorities. Participation may 
thus lead communities to define goals that work against conservation (Wells & 
Brandon, 1992/ Empowering local groups, therefore, may not always help local 
authorities achieve domestic or international biodiversity objectives.
Accordingly, various organisations have started to modify their policies, notably the 
World Bank, the USAID, the DFID, the GEF, the WCS as well as Cl (Hutton et al., 
2005, p.349-350; Duffy, 2009). New venues for conservation interventions are being 
explored that leave little room for CP, amongst which are Trans-frontier 
Conservation Areas, direct payments to communities for conservation results as well 
as public-private partnerships for strict conservation (e.g. creation of private 
protected areas, management under contract for state-owned parks, private hunting 
reserves, etc.). In this context, Duffy (2009, p.61) contends that “commitment 
to CBNRM is being increasingly downplayed from being an approach to 
conservation to becoming a component'' -  a means simply to legitimise new 
protected areas.
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2.4.7. Conclusion: the em pirical expectations o f power narratives
As we saw in the first chapter, the power effects of global discourses are often 
examined within two contrasting narratives. The emancipatory narrative claims that 
such discourses carry ethical, technical and political principles that help to free 
people from various constraints. Conversely, a range of critical narrative see these 
global discourses as fostering various forms of social control and pre-existing power 
structures. If we are to test such narratives with field data, we need to deduce 
logically and in detail their empirical expectations -  in other words, what they expect 
to find on the ground when CP principles are applied.
The empirical expectations of the emancipatory narrative regarding the CP discourse 
are congruent with the promises of the discourse itself -  namely increased 
substantive participatory empowerment. As we emphasised in our Introduction, the 
global discourse on CP is a priori a hard case for the critical narrative, since it is 
built entirely around promises of emancipation. Still, the critical narrative has been 
fostered by a lengthening string of publications that we reviewed here and that shed a 
more pessimistic light on CP. Rather than empowering communities, CP is expected, 
in the critical eye, to incorporate local actors into ready-made and externally defined 
schemes dominated by the state or other non-community actors. Within the 
community, CP is also expected to favour the interests of the most powerful. Finally, 
CP is likely to work in “partnership” with neoliberal capitalist forces, at the expense 
various other goals.
2.5. Conclusion
This chapter first argued that participation is nowadays a key global discourse that is 
part and parcel of global governance. Analysing its early sources, it underscored the 
foreign policy dimension of its promotion in the less developed countries under the 
influence of the United States from the 1950s onwards. In the Cold War context, the 
United States was concerned with ensuring that the world’s rural masses stay under 
the guidance of their national governments and adopt the vision of “progress” backed 
by the “free world”. Later on, the CP discourse slowly but surely spilled over into 
most areas of global policy, which caused its rhetoric to spread even faster than its
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methods. Second, the mechanics of the global CP discourse were analysed to show 
that its system of meanings simplifies social reality while limiting alternatives to the 
proposals of what “to participate in”. The common sense perspective it produces 
draws on pre-existing ethical ideals already widespread in the Western world, on 
technical-rational promises of increased “effectiveness” while also appealing to self- 
interested groups that claim their “right to be heard”. As for the policy practices it 
entails, these revolve around a social technology based on meetings, facilitators and 
the social engineering of collaborative institutions.
Third, this section has analysed the orthodox Western “fortress” approach to the 
protection of biodiversity, which is largely exclusionary of local populations. It has 
underscored the consequent observed social and environmental costs in developing 
countries. Against this backdrop, it has exposed how the CP discourse flourished 
within the environmental policy sphere, pointing out its many promises but also 
critiques. From there, the empirical expectations of the power narratives of global 
discourses were formulated. While the emancipatory narrative expects that the 
promises of CP will materialise, the critical view expects CP to foster a range of 
power dynamics that limit local empowerment.
The next chapter provides the tools for addressing the core methodological challenge 
of this research: juxtaposing broad IR macro-narratives with micro-data drawn from 
fieldwork. It builds an analytical framework that conceptualises “participatory 
processes” along nine distinct dimensions. This enables us to formulate the empirical 
expectations of each power narrative in very precise terms. It also renders possible a 
systematic analysis and classification of empirical data, and thus their comparisons to 
theoretical expectations.
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Chapter 3 -Confronting Narratives with Data: an 
Analytical Framework
To enable a comparison between broad narratives of power and local empirical facts, 
a bridge needs to be built: detailed empirical expectations need to be compared with 
field data. This is the purpose of this chapter.
In order to formulate the field expectations of the two power narratives under 
scrutiny -  the critical and the emancipatory ones -  we first need a precise 
understanding of what CP schemes may look like in real life: what their components 
and levels of analysis are, what the possible configurations of these elements are and 
what variations may be observed. This chapter’s first section thus develops a nine- 
step grid that breaks CP schemes down into nine fundamental dimensions. It also 
discusses how each dimension may vary towards more social control or more 
emancipation. This framework allows testable implications to be derived from 
otherwise somewhat vague narratives. It also facilitates the interpretation and 
classification of empirical data.
As for the study of power, all too often this latter concept is thought of as a relatively 
homogeneous type of social interaction. In fact, it can take extremely different forms. 
The second section of the chapter thus identifies various types of power phenomena, 
to be traced out in case studies. It offers a typology that will help to gain a more in- 
depth view of what is taking place within CP schemes.
Finally, the last section provides a discussion of the research methods used, including 
their advantages and limits. During our field stays, the interaction between these 
methods led to an increasing volume of material being accumulated: documents led 
to informants, observations to more focus groups, and interviews to more documents, 
etc. To deal with such a mass of information, the data analysis has proved to be a 
long and iterative process in which we continually reviewed material throughout the 
course of the study.
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3.1. A nalysing CP Schem es and Narrative 
Expectations: a Nine-Step Grid
This section devises a nine-step analytical framework to assess the genesis, 
implementation and impact of environmental projects based on “community 
participation”. A systematic grid is indeed necessary to deduce the precise empirical 
expectations of the power narratives regarding CP schemes and compare them with 
field data. This framework will thus help us identify how close actual CP schemes 
are to the emancipatory and critical narratives. Forms of CP may be questioned in 
terms of who originated them, who participates (narrow or broad sections of the 
community), in what they are participating (from project identification to 
evaluation), how active the participation is (from more passive to more active forms), 
and how costs and benefits are allocated. Looking at their impact, they can be further 
questioned on how they re-allocate local influence, what modifications of social 
control mechanisms they entail, how they connect to market phenomena, and how 
they interact with a community’s social capital. We thus develop here a range of 
concepts and typologies.
3.1.1. CP origins: who in itiates, designs, supports?
To start with, CP schemes may be classified, as Goulet (1989) points out, according 
to their originating agents. However, this concept seems to us even more useful if we 
divide it into three sub-categories: Initiators, Supporters and Designers.
- Initiators are the originating agents who had the initial impulse for change and 
the creation of some sort of community project. They are usually direct or 
indirect stakeholders unsatisfied with the status quo. Their initial idea is not 
necessarily the one that is eventually implemented, although without their first 
move nothing would have happened.
- Supporters are actors who join initiators at an early stage and support their desire 
for change with their networks and political, technical or financial resources. 
They have their own views and motivations, which may differ from the initiators.
- Designers are individuals, groups or organisations that took a role in the detailed 
design of the actual project to be implemented. They are often drawn from
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among the initiators and supporters, but can also come from further afield -  as in 
the case of foreign experts called upon to help conceive a participatory scheme.
The identification of these various originating agents is an important step in any 
critical analysis of a CP scheme. The next question is to identify who -  if  anyone -  
secured the greatest influence on the project and with what agenda. Once the 
dominant actors are detected, the CP scheme may be further labelled into one o f the 
four following categories, as characterised by: CP from within, from above, from 
outside (of the community) or from multiple sources?1
(1) CP originated from within. These are cases where initiators, supporters and 
designers are largely drawn from the local community. The latter mobilises 
on its own initiative to deal with a given issue or oppose an external policy. 
Examples are numerous in times of emergency crises, when community 
solidarity networks can emerge or re-emerge. Such home-grown bottom-up 
initiatives are often praised in the development literature (e.g. Easterly, 2006, 
Chap. 10). Self-initiated mobilisation may nevertheless be facilitated by an 
enabling framework of support provided by government or NGOs.
(2) CP originated from above. In this configuration, initiators, supporters and 
designers are largely drawn from public authorities. Participatory schemes at 
a local level are sometimes decided and designed from above, by the State or 
by political parties who want to reshape certain public policies. This has been 
the case, for instance, in Brazil where the federal government under President 
Lula fostered participatory reforms such as municipal health councils or 
water councils. The Indian state of Kerala is also famous for having 
implemented strong decentralisation with a direct involvement of rural 
communities. Central governments are indeed in a good position to shape (or 
veto) new local governance arrangements: they have in their hands the 
legislative instruments that make the legal and policy frameworks; they can 
also support (or not) local schemes with training, enforcement systems, 
economic incentives, expertise, etc.
31 Here, we draw upon a vocabulary suggested by Goulet (1989) but we partly change its form and 
meaning. Goulet, for instance, has a category called “participation from below”, which suggests a 
contrast to “elites” that are located “above”. However, we label it “participation from within” to 
underline that originating agents are part of the community itself.
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(3) CP originated from outside. In such cases, the mix of initiators, supporters 
and designers shows the predominance of external agents -  such as non-local 
NGOs, foreign donors or experts, international organisations, etc. As we have 
seen, (cf. section 2.2.3), in an ideal CP scheme, outside actors, whether 
domestic or international, are not supposed to impose their views on any 
stakeholder: they are solely meant to “facilitate” the inclusion of all affected 
parties in the process and remain strict catalysts. They should also leave the 
stage when community stakeholders create their own process. Many 
observers, however, believe that this ideal often remains theoretical. First, CP 
principles themselves (starting with decentralisation) are increasingly 
imposed by foreign donors upon receiving countries through conditionalities 
linked to financial support for development or environmental policies 
(Smoke, 2003). In this case, outside influences take on the mask of state-led 
participation from above. But external influence can be even more direct, as 
is the case in Latin America, where international NGOs and foundations have 
often taken a lead in initiating local participatory projects and implementing 
them on the ground. Although their agents o f  change (field workers, 
community organisers...) are selected from within local communities, these 
foreign NGOs impact local processes through their “expert knowledge”, 
technical assistants and conditional financial support.
(4) CP originated from balanced sources. Most CP schemes are initiated by a 
mix of internal, external and state-related agents, either as initiators, 
supporters or designers -  but they can still be classified in one of the three 
preceding categories depending on which type of actor is dominant. 
However, there may be cases where influences on the final shape of the 
project are relatively balanced between multiples sources. In such cases, it is 
interesting to wonder what configuration of interests underpinned the 
consensus -  or the battle.
The emancipatory narrative harbours the expectation that the from-within scenario 
prevails. Even though CP may be externally initiated or supported, the dominant 
inputs shaping the project are supposed to come from within the community. Goulet 
(1989, p. 171), for instance, insists that CP should be essentially about “non-elite 
participation” as opposed to “elites”, which are often external to the community,
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such as public officials or development experts. Conversely, the critical narrative 
expects that the origins of the CP scheme will in fact be external to the community, 
in other words originated from above or outside (e.g. Motsse, 2001; Kothari, 2001; 
Kapoor 2002; Uphoff, 2005).
3.1.2. CP inclusiveness: who participates?
Another range of issues to consider when analysing a CP scheme is to trace who 
actually participates. The answer may seem straightforward by definition: the 
community. But what does this term mean? This seemingly simple notion is far from 
clear. The coherence, harmony and homogeneity of so-called “communities” are 
often largely overestimated. Each community is more likely to be “a community of 
communities”, themselves patterned into subgroups with varying or contradictory 
interests, status, political affiliations, assets, sometimes religions, etc. Due to its 
internal diversity, the social preferences of a community may be inconsistent and 
possibly lead to conflict (Steelman & Ascher, 1997). Moreover, communities also 
include individuals with self-centred strategies. People do not necessarily experience 
a shared feeling of “community” as a result of sharing the same human and natural 
environment. Individuals may (and often do) see one another as a threat to their 
livelihoods (McCay & Jentoft, 1998, p.23). Social stratification is everywhere. 
Specific sub-groups, such as fishers or landowners, may tlhemselves be analysed in 
terms of their elite or non-elite components. This fact has been increasingly 
acknowledged in recent times within environmentalist circles, starting with Agrawal 
and Gibson’s (1999) seminal work which points out that communities are 
heterogeneous and often riddled with conflict.
Based on this understanding of what a community is, one can analyse the 
inclusiveness of community participation along two different axes: 1) the first one 
has to do with the wide or narrow range of community sub-groups that are 
significantly involved in the scheme; 2) the second looks across sub-groups and 
whether participation is directed towards their elite component, their non-elite 
component or both (socially mixed). In other words, the first axis assesses the 
diversity of community sub-groups present in the scheme; the second measures the 
extent to which CP includes or excludes non-elite people across sub-groups.
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Table 4 - Assessing CP inclusiveness
Range of community 
sub-groups involved
Participation 
within community 
sub-groups
Wide Narrow
Socially mixed
1. Wide and 
socially mixed CP
4. Narrow but 
socially mixed CP
Centred on non-elites
2. Wide CP 
centred on non-elites
5. Narrow CP 
centred on non-elites
Centred on elites
3. Wide CP 
and elite-centred
6. Narrow CP 
and elite-centred
Table 4 thus shows six possible configurations of CP inclusiveness. It ranges from 
box 1 (a wide and socially mixed CP, the most inclusive configuration, closest to the 
emancipatory narrative) to box 6 (narrow and elite-centred CP, the least inclusive of 
all and closest to the critical narrative).
3.1.3. CP scope: participation in w hat and when?
Another import angle when questioning a CP scheme is to identify where and when 
community groups insert themselves into its various processes. Drawing on Goulet 
(1989), seven potential entry points may be identified.
(a) Need assessment and initial diagnosis. This is the time when opinions about 
problems, ideas of improvements and potential goals are expressed.
(b) Listing and formulation of possible solutions. This is the moment when 
possible plans are discussed.
(c) Selection of a course of action. Planning ends here and key decisions are 
taken at this stage.
(d) Preparing for implementation. This can take the form of social mobilisation 
(raising awareness, establishing community organisations, etc.) or training 
(formal or informal, to enhance important skills for the project).
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(e) Implementation. Community participants may engage in management 
activities; contribute with cash, labour or materials to construction, operation, 
maintenance or monitoring; pay membership or service fees.
(f) Evaluation and ongoing correction. This is about contributing to the 
appraisal of work done during implementation, as well as identifying 
evolving needs and possible improvements.
(g) Envisioning the future. This refers to the ongoing space where the future 
can be discussed and envisioned -  where the merits of further action and 
change are considered.
Entry points (a), (b), (c) and (d) define an upstream scope, while a downstream scope 
refers to (e), (f) and (g). In both policy and academic documents promoting the CP 
discourse, it is generally argued that participation should start as early as possible for 
ethical reasons (letting people express their agency) as well as on instrumental 
grounds (better design). Upstream participation is thus presented as “critical” in 
producing better outcomes with respect to both effectiveness and social justice (e.g. 
Hampton, 1999; Petrova, et al., 2002) -  and is the general expectation of the 
emancipatory narrative, since it provides stronger empowerment. Conversely, the 
critical narrative expects participation to be much narrower and comes (if at all) 
much further downstream. Crocker (2007), however, insists that the entry point of 
CP does not automatically determine its quality and reality. In each of these seven 
participatory channels, various modes of participation may be observed - some more 
active than others. We review them now.
3.1.4. CP intensity: how active is participation?
Identifying how passive or active CP actually is (in any of its potential entry 
channels) should be a central concern when analysing a participatory scheme. 
Accordingly, the literature on environmental management pays particular attention to 
this issue (e.g. Hall, 1997). A close study of the tangible functioning of institutions 
(stakeholder meetings, board meetings, lines of responsibility, division of labour...) 
is key, including questions such as: who sets the agenda or how are issues or options 
defined, etc. The degree of passivity or involvement of community members depends 
on formal and informal practices (including simple discussions) that are nevertheless 
not easy to observe. The “devil” (e.g. elite or external influence) lies in the details (of
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social interactions). Building on the work of Goulet (1989), as well as of Gaventa 
(1998), Pretty (1995), Agarwal (2001), Drydyk (2005) and Crocker (2007), we 
identify here six levels of participation intensity applicable to any community group 
and any of the above-mentioned channels of participation.
(i) Nominal participation. In this scenario, group members are formally part of 
decision-making mechanisms, but they do not attend meetings. This may be 
because they are unable to come (as is the case with remote and difficult 
environments); or they can also be unwilling to do so -  if they are for instance 
harassed, unwelcome or do not feel at ease with people they are supposed to 
meet with. The social capital32 of a community sub-group may also be such that 
people have trouble interacting with any formal organisation.
(ii) Passive participation. Here, group members attend the decision-making 
meetings, but passively listen to reports about decisions others have made 
elsewhere. Typically, various types of elites tell community members what is 
going to be done; at best, the latter ask questions. This may be due to power 
relations, threats of retaliation, or lack of vision or technical skills on the part of 
non-elite groups. Passive participation occurs, for instance, when public 
agencies come into a community to provide information about something that 
is going to happen or has already started.
(iii) Consultative participation. Group members participate by giving information 
and their opinions (inputs, preferences, proposals). They neither deliberate 
among themselves nor make decisions. It is others who are the deciders and, 
while they may listen, they have no obligation to do so. This happens for 
instance when outside environmental organisations collect local information 
(desires, opinions, and needs of the people) and a ready-made proposal is then 
put forward.
(iv) Bargaining participation. Group members are part of the decision-making 
process. They bargain with others using whatever power they have. Self- 
interest is the primary motivation for each side. Influence on the final “deal” 
depends on what each party is willing to give up and what concessions they are 
able to obtain. Some losses may be accepted in die present if  future gains are
32 See section 3.1.7. on social capital.
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anticipated. The greater the power of one group, the less influence the others 
have on the outcome.
(v) Deliberative participation. Here, contrary to the preceding situation, 
bargainers are more partners than adversaries. Group members are involved in 
a consensus-seeking process where stakeholders review proposals and forge 
agreements that at least a majority can accept.
As can be seen, this list moves down from passive towards more intensive forms of 
CP33 - or in other words from the expectations of the critical narrative to those of the 
emancipatory one.
3.1.5. CP allocation o f costs and benefits
Through rules, institutions, accompanying economic projects or other components, 
CP schemes in natural resource management entail allocating incentives and 
disincentives aimed at participation, as well as costs and benefits that may be 
unavoidable for locals even though they do not actively participate. Understanding 
these processes is central to assessing the political economy of “what is going on” 
and the final impact of CP schemes.
People may be willing to participate in various components of a CP scheme because 
they expect short- or long-term benefits, individually or collectively, or direct 
remuneration or business contracts. Participatory schemes usually try to encourage 
CP through incentive packages, including compensation for the most affected group. 
This may take the form of direct cash or kind payments, as for instance, to elderly 
farmers who are asked to stop using traditional techniques but are unable to train on 
new ones. Another way of compensating affected people is to identify alternative 
activities open to them (Leikam, et al., 2004). Economic Demonstration Project 
(EDP) is the usual expression for such endeavours. These pilot projects are officially 
meant to encourage locals to move to more sustainable activities or to help
33 In the literature, there are typologies that may seem more comprehensive than the one we offer 
since they provide even more categories -  such as “petitionary participation”, “implementing 
participation” (Goulet, 1989) or “independent participation” (Pretty, 1995). However, these further 
categories do not exactly focus on “participation intensity” as we defined it and their insights are 
covered in other parts of the analytical framework we develop.
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individuals negatively impacted by new regulations to regain lost income through 
new productive practices, by learning new skills or receiving a starting capital.
However, although EDPs may promise a good living, they do not necessarily interest 
everyone (Barzetti, 1993). For example, working with visitors in ecotourism may not 
appeal to everyone and traditional activities may still be preferred for a range of 
reasons. Setting up a small number of EDPs is generally not enough to satisfy 
everybody. Such projects seldom solve all of the problems resulting from the loss of 
rights over natural resources. EDPs may also contradict the local culture, for 
instance, by bringing tourists into sacred woods. They may disrupt family structures, 
as new activities often bring about a change of primary income generator, which 
often prompts reluctance. Smaller and targeted projects for specific families are 
sometimes developed, for instance through funds enabling each family to seek a 
grant or loan to start its chosen activity. Environmental sustainability, however, is 
much less assured using these mechanisms. Finally, with the building of roads, 
schools, freshwater supplies or other facilities, projects with a broader reach may 
increase the provision of public services and try to compensate the community as a 
whole (Gurung, 1995); but they are no guarantee that final benefits will be fairly 
shared.
Poorer people often fear that the supposed “participatory project” means reduced 
access to natural resources -  which is often the case. The immediate costs of creating 
new environmental regulations are obvious to them, while the potential benefits are 
much less apparent: they may take time to appear or never materialise for a given 
individual, although they may be real for the local or global community as a whole. 
In practice, protecting biodiversity rarely meets the everyday concerns of the poorer 
community members, such as feeding the family. Hence, the typical reluctance to 
give credit to or support something that is seen as undesirable, despite any supposed 
compensatory measures. When the participatory scheme does bring about some 
direct, short-term and visible benefits to individuals, the perception of an unfair 
distribution of work or benefits can also block the involvement of many community 
members. In fact, people do seem to act as if they have a preference for social 
fairness, especially when they feel that relative inequalities are increased to their 
detriment. Issues about equality can lead well beyond a lack of participation, right to 
boycotts, open conflicts and political strife.
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Coming back to the expectations of the power narratives of the CP discourse, the 
emancipatory one assumes naturally that costs and benefits are fairly allocated 
overall, including through compensatory schemes if required: this is always the 
official purpose of such CP schemes. Conversely, the critical narrative expects far 
more unequal social results and a strong tendency for the more powerful actors to 
seize the bulk of the benefits.
3.1.6. CP effects on power form ations
CP in environmental management rarely means that the public authorities leave the 
picture. There is a range of possible governance arrangements in which the balance 
of power varies between them and the community. The notion of “co-management” 
captures this diversity with a continuum of scenarios (ICLARM & IFM, 1998; 
Leikam, et al, 2004). At the lower end, public authorities may hold all the decision­
making power while community members are merely meant to comply (top-down 
model). At the upper end, all decisions and responsibilities are in the hands of 
community members (bottom-up model). Between these extremes there is the space 
of “co-management” proper -  which is the space typically occupied by CP schemes 
in biodiversity protection.
Still, no matter how important the public authorities and the local community are, a 
participatory scheme usually entails the active involvement of a range of non-local 
organisations and experts -  such as NGOs, foreign experts or funds, which are there 
to “help” but which may also exert some form of power. In the local implementation 
of the CP discourse, a pattern may thus emerge whereby the exercise of power 
becomes more collective and international than before. In this regard, it is 
particularly interesting to question the distinction between local and non-local actors. 
Global discourses can indeed cause power positions, authority, and influence to be 
closely shared by a nexus of domestic and non-domestic actors.
Callaghy et al. (2001) worked out the notion of “trans-boundary formations” to 
depict such situations, while Duffy (2004) calls them “global formations”. In 
analysing sub-Saharan Africa, Callaghy et al. (2001) argue that these phenomena 
play a major role in creating, transforming and destroying forms of order and 
authority. One example of this “trans-boundary production of order” is the 
proliferation of networks that create global-local links through humanitarian
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interventions, international economic processes, military incursions and development 
work. The role of such transnational networks are also pointed out by Duffy (2006a) 
in conservation policy making in Madagascar, and the developing world at large. She 
refers to Harrison’s concept of “governance states” to point up situations where 
governments are subject to forms of external management through a politics of “post 
conditionality” (Harrison, 2004, p.71). As Duffy puts it (2006a, p.740), in such 
situations, governments “become one partner among a complex array of other actors 
who operate together to provide specific policy outcomes”.
There is thus a proliferation of sites of authority, with a shift away from a state-based 
model to one where authority is held by various international and domestic actors. In 
this context, local authorities rely on external forces to produce order and rule. They 
share their national territories with other actors ranging from NGOs, transnational 
corporations, international organisations, etc. This change in the location of authority 
is also supported, as Duffy (2004, p.306) argues, by a “technisation of problems” that 
legitimises increased governance from outside the continent.34
Here, we shall define the notion of power formation, as the spatial configuration of 
actors wielding a significant share of local influence. Such spatial configurations 
may include local, domestic, regional and global actors. A case in point is the 
possibility of local-global formations, or in other words, situations in which local 
influence is shared by interdependent domestic and non-domestic actors. But other 
configurations may include domestic-regional formations, or local-regional 
formations.
The emancipatory narrative, just as the CP discourse itself, would expect the power 
formation accompanying CP to be centred on the community itself, notably in the 
form of a co-management scheme whereby decisions are largely shared with public 
authorities. Conversely, the critical narrative would expect a much larger power 
formation to emerge -  a local-global one -  that encompasses many more actors such 
as large NGOs, foreign donors, regional think tanks, foundations, international 
bodies, etc. According to the emancipatory narrative, these latter actors are supposed 
to be no more than facilitators providing their support, while in the critical 
hypothesis they retain a share of real power. The implementation of CP may, in the
34 This “technisation” of problems shares similarities with the anti-political effects of productive 
discourses pointed out in section 3.3.4.
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end, entail the emergence of far wider power formations than just “co-management”, 
given the host of actors that accompany participatory projects. To some extent, CP 
may work as an “entry gate” for a range of non-local actors to step into the local 
picture. This is what we may call the “rebound effect of CP”: while CP provides the 
local community with more influence, it also diffuses this influence to totally new 
actors based further away. Beyond this displacement of authority, the critical 
narrative may also expect such local-global power formations to work against the 
objective interests of the weakest local groups.
3.1.7. CP effects on social control
According to the emancipatory narrative of the CP discourse, congruent with its 
official version, CP is expected to empower local actors regarding the rules, 
decisions or projects that affect them; it is supposed to carry a “dynamics of 
liberation” that may go as far as reshaping intra-community social relations, far 
beyond relations with external actors. However, depending on the design and 
implementation of CP, its effects on social structures may be substantially different 
from this ideal picture. The supposed emancipatory dynamics may turn into one of 
social control -  which is, as we have seen, the core expectation of the critical 
narrative (cf. section 1.2.3). Here, social control refers to the active domination of 
certain social groups as well as the reinforcement of certain privileged groups or 
hierarchical social categories. In any case, social control reinforces the position of 
certain people (both within and outside the community) over others (within the 
community).
For instance, participatory mechanisms may focus attention on certain environmental 
issues and leave out others, thus enabling certain stakeholders to remain out of reach 
or avoid taking on duties. Moreover, formal participatory institutions may turn into 
efficient mechanisms for some stakeholders to gain command of weaker ones, 
keeping them away from specific spatial, natural, political or financial resources. A 
majority group may find it easy, for instance, to overwhelm an under-privileged 
minority in the context of a local “democratic” decision-making process. Similarly, 
people who are better connected socially, economically and politically may make 
better use of formal institutions.
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Discourses used in CP schemes may also reinforce the apparent legitimacy of 
unequal social structures, using a variety of cultural, social and environmental 
rationales. Hierarchical categories that structure the community (e.g. owners vs. 
employees) may see their authority reinforced rather than challenged. One can easily 
imagine, for instance, a situation in which the legal owners of large tracks of tropical 
forest receive international funds for conservation efforts while the rural employees 
or poorer populations -  who rely on these resources for their livelihood -  are 
squeezed out of the financial and managerial picture. Another possible consequence 
is that the typical reliance of CP biodiversity protection schemes on “scientific” and 
“expert” knowledge may prevent alternative views from being heard or take into 
account only “washed-out” versions of local knowledge. All of these dynamics, 
under the heading of CP, may mean that outright disciplinary instruments o f control 
(including fines, patrols, fences, or more subtle incentives) are put together to control 
the behaviours of certain groups to the benefit of others.
A critical analysis of CP schemes thus requires a particular attention to the evolution 
of hierarchies and forms of social control. For this purpose, we suggest using the 
concept of containment which we define as follows, drawing on Few (2003, p.23, 
P-32):
Containment is the management o f  community participation so as to maintain 
control over certain target groups and avoid, block or minimise their disruption o f
other goals.
Although we rely heavily here on Few, we do not share his view that containment is 
essentially about “producing and completing protected area plans fundamentally 
oriented towards biodiversity protection” (p.32). We rather believe that there may be 
a diversity of other underlying goals targeted by diverse actors: marketisation, 
commodification or the preservation of various status quos - as we shall see later.35 
Containment, in turn, may be carried out using a variety of modes or tactics. Table 5 
provides a comprehensive but inexhaustive list. It includes three modes analysed by 
Few (p.30-31): persuasion, alliance and compromise. But we also identify eight 
others: biased project design, biased implementation, encirclement, epistemic
35 The notions of marketisation and commodification are explained in the following section.
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exclusion, institutionalisation, selective oblivion, misrepresentation and de- 
legitimisation.
Table 5 -  Possible modes of containment and their definitions
Alliance Some stakeholder groups with shared interests may form an alliance to increase their legitimacy and bargaining power over target groups.
Biased design Participatory schemes may focus attention on certain issues and leave out others, thus enabling certain stakeholders to stay beyond any reach or duty.
Biased
implementation
Monitoring and sanction mechanisms part of the CP scheme may, in practice, 
function preferentially against defined target groups.
Compromise Strategic trade-off of interests meant to provide leverage on target groups on other issues.
Delegitimisation The mechanism through which the target group is represented is discredited as non­legitimate.
Encirclement Participatory mechanisms may be flooded with interest groups “encircling” target groups.
Epistemic exclusion Exclusion of target-groups from the production of legitimate knowledge, views and norms. Dominant discourses reinforce the legitimacy of pre-existing social structures.
Institutionalisation
(formalisation)
Target groups are brought into an institutional / formal framework which, in itself, 
constitutes an obstacle for them to participate - as they may not be used to 
institutional / formal / lengthy negotiations.
Misrepresentation Target groups are said to be correctly represented in CP mechanisms while in fact they are not.
Persuasion Positive affirmation of the benefits of a CP scheme, invoking the interests of the target groups.
Selective oblivion Target groups are not even mentioned and thus not brought into any part of the CP process.
Source: the author, drawing on Few (2003)
The critical narrative of the CP discourse will expect some of these containment 
modes to be operating within in CP schemes, while the emancipatory narrative will 
expect participatory institutions to precisely prevent the occurrence of active forms 
of containment. Here again, empirical expectations could not be further apart.
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3.1.8. CP effects through m arketisation and com m odification
A participatory scheme in environmental protection may also be assessed in terms of 
the extent to which it has increased a community’s dependence on non-community 
markets, consumers, producers and investors -  or in other words, its integration into 
global capitalism. This process may take two simultaneous forms: marketisation and 
commodification.
By marketisation, we refer to a process of greater connectedness and thus 
dependence upon outward-looking markets -  including external producers and 
consumers, whether domestic or international. Global market dependence may be a 
feature of long-term historical dynamics, as is the case of the Caribbean islands, for 
instance, where dependence started with sugar during the colonial period, turning 
later to coconuts, bananas and now international tourism. This dependence may also, 
however, be strengthened by various policy initiatives. Participatory schemes may 
have specific economic components -  such as Economic Demonstration Projects or 
other pilot projects -  initially designed to compensate certain stakeholders, but which 
eventually deepen the wider dependence of the local economy. Rather than 
constituting outcomes of the participatory process, these projects may have inbuilt 
features promoted from the outset by various originating agents (initiators, designers 
or supporters).
The dynamics of marketisation are generally sustained by various processes of 
commodification. An important structural category in any society is the one opposing- 
things that can be sold (in the form of goods and services) to those that are not or 
cannot be sold, because they are considered to be “sacred”, “natural” or excluded 
from economic interactions for traditional, familial or ethical reasons. Global 
discourses -  for instance, on the environment, gender relations or human rights -  
may impact these categories and redefine their scopes. Changes in these dividing 
lines may have important social, economic or cultural consequences. The notion of 
commodification36 precisely describes the process by which things that did not have 
an economic value are now assigned a value and hence become tradable. Through
36 Commodification needs to be distinguished from “commoditisation”. The latter is a neologism that 
refers to the process by which goods that used to be perceived by consumers as distinguishable (brand 
or uniqueness) become simple commodities with little or no difference between brands or versions.
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commodification, market values replace other social values and a greater number of 
relationships turn into commercial ones.37 This process can be readily associated 
with the logical expectations of the critical narrative.
Marx (1867) has famously identified and criticised processes of commodification, 
pointing to the phenomenon of “commodity fetishism”. This refers to both a belief 
and a process. The belief is that value lies in commodities rather than in the human 
labour they embody: in the capitalist mode of production and consumption, objects 
are “de-humanised” and seen as mere objects with an intrinsic value. As for the 
process of commodity fetishism, this obscures and hides social relationships. The 
worker only sees his relation to the object he produces, being separated from the 
people who use it. Similarly, the consumer only sees his relation to the object he 
uses, unaware of the people who produced it. Commodity fetishism ensures that 
neither side is fully conscious of the social and political positions they occupy.
Commodification does not just involve material objects. Skills, knowledge, cultural 
behaviours can also be commodified and marketed - as is the case, for instance, with 
women’s traditional skills in Central America through the development of tourism 
(Ferguson, 2008). It can also happen to a political idea, as in the example of a call for 
social change that is subsequently integrated into logos that are themselves marketed, 
thus reducing a political message to a fashion object. Commodification is generally 
criticised on the grounds that certain things should not be for sale or treated as if they 
were tradable. Yet, the emancipatory dimension of commodification should not be 
underestimated. For example, women are more easily able to free themselves from 
domestic chores when these are partly commodified. In environmental policy too, 
when no social norm protects natural resources, attributing an economic value to 
them may foster their conservation and recognition: commodification is actually 
central to the notion of “environmental services”, which is gaining recognition in 
global environmental policies.
As we have seen, CP schemes in environmental protection often come with 
accompanying economic projects, intended to make productive practices more 
sustainable. In this sense, some processes of marketisation and commodification are 
logically expected to take place and it is not on this point that the power narratives of
37 Slavery is an extreme case of commodification.
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CP schemes would disagree most. However, the emancipatory narrative will tend to 
expect these processes to benefit the whole community, providing people with new 
market opportunities so as to raise their living standards. On the other hand, the 
critical narrative will expect marketisation and commodification processes to operate 
at the expense of the weaker community members. This opposition mirrors long­
standing debate on the social impact of liberal economic policies and the increasing 
openness to global markets.
As is well known, neoliberal advocates of open trade believe that such dynamics 
improve everyone’s living standards in the long run. Although they concede that 
there are short-term losers and a need for some temporary regulation, they insist that 
the rising global tide of open markets will eventually lift all national and individual 
gains. In a best selling book, The World is Flat, Friedman (2005) thus argues that the 
hierarchical North-South divide is being rapidly replaced by a “flat” global 
entrepreneurial order, a “level playing field” with new “global rules of the game”. 
The poorest communities need more globalisation, not less, the question being how 
to ensure that they fully join it. As Bhagwati (2002, p.6) argues, globalisation does 
not need to be given a “human face” -  it already has one. Here, marketisation is seen 
as an emancipatory dynamic bringing increased inclusiveness of sidelined actors in 
global markets. Participation in markets is seen as a key source of opportunities for 
local communities. Conversely, many other authors closer to the critical narrative do 
not believe that the world is becoming “flat” (e.g. Birdsall, 2006) and that all 
communities should be exposed to global markets to the same extent. The critical 
expectation, once again, is about the strongest actors draining off most of the 
benefits.
3.1.9. CP two-way interactions w ith social capital
In both the policy and academic literature, participatory schemes are largely defined 
by both their reliance and expected impact on a community’s social capital (SC). 
One of the most common arguments in favour of CP is that social capital guarantees 
social cohesion and improves trust among members of the community, thus reducing 
transaction costs (Isham, 2002). Participatory projects usually expect communities to 
use their SC to organise themselves and further build this capital as a key collective 
asset. Here, we briefly introduce the SC concept and how it may be integrated into a
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critical analysis of CP. The first sub-section looks at how various forms of social 
capital can impact participatory schemes. Conversely, the following section looks at 
how CP may impact SC. In doing so, we do not propose an exhaustive review of the 
concept of social capital but merely show how it will be used to shed light on our
-JQ
case studies.
Social Capital im pact on CP
The first theory of “social capital” was developed by the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu (1980)39. He defined it as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources 
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition -  or in other words, to 
membership in a group” (Bourdieu, 1986, p.244). In the same decade, the sociologist 
James Coleman (1988) famously proposed his own definitions of the social 
structures -  such as norms, social obligations, information channels, etc. -  that 
facilitate various actions of agents within the structure. Drawing on these two 
insights (networks and norms), Robert Putnam introduced the concept of social 
capital into economic literature, defining it as referring to the “the features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167).
Much of the scholarship on social capital has argued along the same lines, 
contending that collective bonds are beneficial for society as a whole: where people 
share trust, interactions are expected to be easier and more efficient. For example, 
dense social networks make free-riding difficult because people know each other and 
interact on a basis of reciprocity of efforts: it may be more difficult to default when 
everybody knows everybody else, unlike in individualistic societies (Putnam, 2000). 
Social capital is thus generally said to reduce transaction costs and facilitate 
information-sharing, decision-making, collective action, etc. This in turn is supposed 
to lead to higher returns to individual or collective efforts. For instance, the 
motivation to work together based on a feeling of collective purpose, as well as 
social, religious or traditional obligations for mutual help and action, may facilitate a 
participatory process. Conversely, social norms about gender roles provide classical
38 The literature on social capital is huge. For a review, see Grootaert and Bastelaer (2002).
39 Bourdieu’s concept has often been translated in English as “cultural capital”.
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examples of hindrances to CP.40 Moreover, an individualistic society in which there 
is little or no sense of community may be an impediment to participation
However, it has been increasingly acknowledged that in some circumstances, social 
capital may stimulate free-riding and hold back productive co-operation within a 
given group. Rubio (1997) for instance calls “perverse social capital” the criminal 
organisations that promote opportunistic behaviours. Several authors have identified 
potential counterproductive effects associated with social capital and thus 
acknowledged its “downside” (Portes & Landholt, 1996) or even “dark side” 
(Ostrom, 1999). In the same line, as Hawe (2007) points out, although it has become 
commonplace in development and environmental spheres to believe that 
strengthening social capital will improve the lot of the poorest segments of society, 
social capital may equally well drive inequalities -  a reading famously put forward 
by Bourdieu (1980). Members of the elite can access more (information, assistance, 
advice, connections, etc) and gain further advantages for themselves. Thus, while 
there is no automatic relationship between social capital and free-riding behaviour, 
the same holds true for the impact of social capital upon inequalities. The history and 
norms of collective action within a community are thus crucial to understanding its 
response to a participatory scheme.
A useful distinction has developed in the literature between bonding social capital, 
i.e. ties within a group where people have similar main socio-economic 
characteristics (e.g. family members, neighbours, close friends and work colleagues) 
-  and bridging social capital, i.e. ties to people who do not share the same 
characteristics (Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Narayan, 2002b). A third category has also 
been suggested: linking social capital (Woolcock, 1999). This refers to ties with 
people in positions of authority, such as representatives of public institutions (e.g. 
police, political parties) and private institutions (e.g. banks). While bonding SC is 
essentially horizontal (connecting people with roughly equal social standing), 
bridging and linking SC are more vertical41
40 Agarwal (2001), for instance, identifies gender factors underpinning the exclusion of women from 
community forestry groups in India and Nepal.
41 Krishna and Uphoff (1999) dichotomised Putnam’s concept into two dimensions: structural social 
capital relates to the various social organisations making up society (e.g. families, social networks, 
associations, etc.); cultural social capital refers to shared norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs. 
However, both of these forms are encompassed in each of three categories: bonding, bridging and 
linking SC.
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The emancipatory narrative of the CP discourse tends to insist on the likely positive 
contribution of SC to CP schemes; it also tends to underline, for instance, that “rural 
communities may be seen to have high stocks of social capital” (Strasser, et al., 
1999, p.7). It thus harbours expectations akin to the standard CP discourse, namely 
that CP schemes draw upon SC to build fair and equitable participation. Conversely, 
the critical narrative is more likely to expect SC to run counter to social justice and 
pave the way for various forms of power to be exercised upon the weaker community 
stakeholders.
CP effects on social capital
Participatory schemes are not merely meant to build upon a community’s social 
capital but also to increase its quality and quantity so as to enable more and better 
collective action in the long run (e.g. Strasser, et al., 1999; Campbell & McLean, 
2003). This presupposes that the CP project triggers off a long lasting social 
reorganisation. However, even the successful ignition of a new type of collective 
action may not bring about lasting changes. Community members may revert to old 
habits, hierarchies and networks so that in the end the local capacity for collective 
action has not been structurally enhanced. Moreover, a participatory project may also 
produce social discontent among actors who are supposed to be “involved” but feel 
they are not and thus reduce their willingness to work together even more. As 
Amstein underlines:
Participation without redistribution o f power is an empty and frustrating process for 
the powerless. It allows the power holders to claim that all sides were considered, 
but makes it possible for only some o f those sides to benefit. It maintains the status 
quo. (Amstein, 1969, p.216).
In such cases, participation does not seem to contribute to social capital formation 
but rather to its destruction, reducing the level of trust among actors and creating 
long-lasting frustrations. Positive effects of CP schemes upon the local SC are thus 
far from being definitively secured and beneficial. It is important that these effects be 
studied because they are an integral part of the CP discourse, which hopes and 
expects to strengthen the local social capital with participatory initiatives. However, 
to obtain a comprehensive view of these effects, it is critical to adopt a long-term 
perspective.
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In reality, even frustrations with unsuccessful CP schemes may well nourish new 
responses and endeavours that, in the end, strengthen social capital. A failed 
participatory scheme may, in the long run, open news venues for collective action. 
Local discontents may bring about new political developments, de-legitimise some 
elites, allow new leaders emerge and ’’redistribute the cards” in favour of new actors. 
In other words, it may renovate the local social capital. Reacting to disappointments 
and perceived injustices, local community members or groups may mobilise 
themselves for re-defined objectives, claim increased “ownership” of externally 
driven initiatives, try to re-capture or quit them, or develop parallel projects away 
from the initial participatory mechanism.
Reactions to frustrations may take the form of political action -  something that might 
be considered the most “participatory” result possible for a CP project. Far from de- 
politicising actors, which is often observed in expert-led projects, a frustrating CP 
may lead to a local re-politicisation -  and thus to renewed participation from within, 
which is less elite-centred or involves a challenge by new elites to the more 
established ones. Social frustrations triggered by unsatisfactory CP initiatives may 
thus be a key channel through which CP eventually delivers -  in the long run -  what 
it was supposed to deliver in the first place, in a consensual and institutionalised 
fashion: more autonomous, self-organised and empowered community members.
To capture the effects on SC, it is thus essential to analyse the dynamics of the 
frustrations that CP may entail. In the case of an unsatisfactory participatory process, 
frustrations may be dealt with in a passive and resigned manner or in a more active 
and constructive spirit. Drawing on well-known concepts designed by Hirschman 
(1970), the “EXIT, VOICE and LOYALTY” framework may be usefully called upon 
to analyse “response strategies” and their political outcomes.
Hirschman developed these notions while studying the strategic options of members 
of organisations in decline, be it a private firm, an association, a nation or any other 
collective endeavour. First, members can EXIT the organisation. This can take 
different forms: actual withdrawal or a more psychological exit, which does not 
imply actually leaving the organisation but merely ceasing to contribute in any 
meaningful way. Second, members can VOICE their discontent from within the 
organisation, or from outside, and try to reform and revamp it with active complaints 
and proposals. Finally, they can show LOYALTY, abandoning the idea of changing
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the organisation while still remaining there, in the name of higher principles such as 
a common identity, the unity of a community, etc.
EXIT is the classic option in market-based relations where buyers and sellers are free 
to constantly start or end business relations. However, in other social circumstances, 
people may not be able to physically exit the organisation but may still wish to exit 
the system: they thus reduce their participation to the strict minimum. As already 
suggested, EXIT need not be physical but can be mental or emotional. LOYALTY, 
on the other hand, is rarely the choice made in market situations, unless the cost of 
finding a new supplier is far too high. In the context of a CP scheme, LOYALTY has 
different motives, such as a willingness not to show disunity inside the community. 
As for VOICE, this option is of a more political nature as it can challenge the status 
quo and be openly confrontational. In market terms, instead of walking out of the 
shop, it would mean calling the manager and negotiating a different price or service. 
In other contexts, it can mean street demonstrations and an eventual re-negotiation of 
the social contract.
In the end, the strongest effects of a CP scheme on the local social capital may not 
come to light in the traditional construct and expectations of the participatory 
narrative. New social forces and actors may well not emerge or fresh social capital 
built through institutional and project involvement. When CP mechanisms are 
captured by local elites or the central state, participation may still prove 
emancipatory if the gap it creates with social expectations triggers social reactions. If 
this view is correct, VOICE is likely to be the best option for producing new social 
capital, even though a rather long time-span is necessary in order to assess its effects. 
If VOICE is chosen, the end result may differ widely from what was expected by the 
initial CP scheme. However, the dynamics of people voicing their interests and 
mobilising to reach self-defined goals can only be approved by the global CP 
discourse, even if communities might not place the environment at the top of their 
priority list. However, marginalised people are prone to choose EXIT or LOYALTY 
responses as they often lack the self-confidence and objective means to influence the 
course of action.
When anticipating the outcome of a frustrating CP scheme, it is wise to take into 
account the culture and history of the various groups involved, as well as their 
existing social capital. Much of what participatory schemes will change in the
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community depends on the degree of inertia in social and political habits -  as well as 
on the presence of specific individuals who are able to act as fresh leaders. The 
choice of EXIT, VOICE or LOYALTY is thus likely to mirror long-standing 
political trends and social relations. A history of social struggle may stimulate 
VOICE, while a history of customary elite paternalism may foster LOYALTY or a 
search for a psychological EXIT. Figure 1 synthesises these various dynamics.
The emancipatory narrative of the CP discourse expects CP to reinforce the local 
social capital through increased bonding, bridging and linking SC. On the other hand, 
the critical narrative expects CP to have a neutral or negative impact: a positive 
effect may take place on the local SC in the long run only, if VOICE is chosen as the 
response to frustrations (rather than EXIT or LOYALTY).
Figure 1 -  The dynamics of discontent: CP effects on SC according to the
critical narrative
CP felt as unsatisfactory
e.g. elite-centred participation, 
from above and outside, unequal 
allocation of benefits, etc.
Social frustrations
+ Increased self-consciousness 
of various community actors
J
Factors influencing the response strategy:
History and political habits, pre-existing SC, perceived opportunities and resources
R esponse 1
VOICE
Frustrated community actors 
voice their discontent; 
increase their mobilisation 
within or outside new 
institutions (e.g. political 
action)
R esponse 2 
LOYALTY
Frustrated community actors 
maintain their loyalty to the 
status quo, refrain from open 
criticism -  e.g. for the sake of 
community unity.
Response 3 
EXIT
Frustrated stakeholders 
reduce their involvement to 
the minimum, leave the 
participatory schem e or 
withdraw psychologically.
_______ i __________ £  _____ .........1 ....................
Likely outcome 1
RENEWED  
SOCIAL CAPITAL
New forms and channels of 
collective action may appear.
Some elites may be de­
legitimised and new actors 
emerge. Environmental 
priority is not guaranteed.
Likely outcome 2
UNCHANGED  
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social capital rigidities, no 
collective learning or new 
capacity for collective action 
is built. The CP schem e 
formally works as envisioned 
but frustrations exist.
Likely outcome 3
WEAKENED  
SOCIAL CAPITAL
The participatory schem e 
slowly loses its substance. 
Social capital w eakens along 
with capacities for collective 
action.
Source: the author
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3.1.10. The em pirical expectations o f the power narratives
Chapter 2 concluded that the critical narrative of global governance expects the CP 
discourse to incorporate community members into ready-made schemes favouring 
powerful stakeholders and pre-existing power structures. The grid we have just 
presented enables us to assess this hypothesis in more detail and look at how the 
various dimensions of a CP scheme may be geared towards domination and 
emancipation. Based on the above concepts and discussions, Table 6 details the 
empirical expectations of the two power narratives along nine dimensions.
Appendix 4 provides a table that summarises the concepts and typologies developed 
in this chapter’s first section in order to help keep track of all the potential 
configurations of CP schemes observed in field data.
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Table 6 -  Empirical expectations of power narratives on CP schemes
Expectations of the Expectations of the
Level of analysis EMANCIPATORY CRITICAL
NARRATIVE NARRATIVE
GENE­
SIS
1. CP ORIGINS CP from within. CP from outside or above.
I
2. CP
INCLUSIVENESS Wide and socially-mixed CP. Narrow and elite-centred CP.
M
P
L
E
3. CP SCOPE Broad scope (both upstream 
and downstream)
Restricted scope (mainly 
downstream), despite rhetoric.
M
E
N ■
4. CP INTENSITY Intensive CP (bargaining and 
deliberations).
Nominal, passive or (at most) 
consultative CP.
T
A
T
I
O
N
5. CP ALLOCATION 
OF COSTS & 
BENEFITS
Fairly even allocation of costs 
and benefits, compensated if 
need be through social schemes 
and economic projects.
Uneven allocation of benefits 
not corrected (or even 
reinforced) by compensatory 
schemes. Powerful actors 
concentrate most benefits.
6. CP EFFECTS ON 
POWER 
FORMATIONS
CP entails a limited power 
formation: namely co­
management with public 
authorities, with a strong 
influence of the community.
CP entails a much larger power 
formation, in which a range of 
non-local actors wield 
significant local influence. 
Increased governance from 
outside
7. CP EFFECTS ON 
SOCIAL CONTROL
The CP scheme prevents the 
emergence of containment 
processes.
Emancipatory rhetoric turns 
into a practice of social control: 
various forms of containment 
take place.
I
M
P
A
C
T
S
8. CP EFFECTS 
THROUGH 
MARKETISATION & 
COMMODIFICATION
The weaker local actors benefit 
from increased market 
opportunities.
Marketisation and 
commodification operate at the 
expense of the weaker local 
actors.
9. CP TWO-WAY 
INTERACTIONS 
WITH SOCIAL 
CAPITAL
- The local SC helps CP to 
develop.
- CP has positive effects on 
the local SC (increased 
bonding, reaching and linking 
capital).
- The weaknesses of SC lay 
the ground for various forms 
of power to be exercised on 
the weaker actors.
- CP has neutral or negative 
effects on CP. Positive effects 
can take place in the long run 
if VOICE is chosen as the 
response to frustrations (rather 
than EXIT or LOYALTY).
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3.2. Searching for Power M echanism s
We have now identified in precise terms the empirical expectations of the power 
narratives under scrutiny; but we still need to understand through what power- 
mechanisms the CP discourse produces its outcomes. In the study of power relations, 
access to data is extremely difficult given the often subtle nature of social 
interactions. There is also a fundamental conceptual challenge: power comes in 
various forms and expressions that cannot be captured by a single formulation. Most 
commonly, the social science literature describes “power” in terms of an actor A 
directly controlling an actor B. Focusing exclusively on this definition, however, 
creates analytical blind spots and black holes. Addressing this problem in a landmark 
work, Lukes (1975) identified “three dimensions of power”. The first defines power 
as being expressed in observable relationships, such as verbal or physical fights 
between antagonists. The second dimension involves the influence of intentions per 
se in power relations. In its third dimension, power proves even more “insidious”: 
actors’ own interests are shaped by power structures thus creating a gap between 
their subjective and objective interests. Building on Lukes and Foucault, Barnett and 
Duvall (2005) have devised a large and coherent grid that pulls together 
complementary conceptions of power. The typology they build is based on a 
comprehensive definition of power as “the production of effects that shape the 
actions or conditions of existence of actors” (p. 18). Based on this understanding, they 
identify four forms of power relations: compulsory, institutional, structural and 
productive. Each requires to be examined when exploring case studies.
The power narratives of global discourses do not inherently reveal what power 
mechanism need to be at work, empirically speaking, to produce a given outcome. It 
is nonetheless important to explore this question to gain a better understanding of 
how outcomes are produced.
3.2.1. Compulsory power: the direct use of coercive resources
The first concept of power, compulsory power, refers to relations where an actor 
directly shapes the situation or actions of another actor. Typical definitions of power 
fall under this concept. Dahl (1957, p.202), for instance, defined power as “the 
ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do”. Dahl’s concept has
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several key characteristics. First, there is intentionality: A wants B to alter its actions 
in a particular direction. Second, there is a conflict of desires: A and B want different 
outcomes, and B loses. Third, A is successful because it has the material and 
ideational resources that lead B to modify its actions. Here, at the core of the analysis 
of power, we find the issue of what resources are controlled and intentionally 
deployed by an actor A. Barnett and Duval argue, however, that compulsory power 
does not necessarily need to be connected to intentionality. Compulsory power is 
present whenever the actions of A control the actions or situation of B, even if 
unintentionally. As Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argue, power still exists even when 
those who dominate are not conscious of how their actions produce unintended 
effects. Gruber (2000), for instance, contends that the powerful may influence the 
weak even if it is not their intention to do so: he thus defines “go-it alone power” as 
the ability to influence unilaterally the policy choice of an actor by altering the nature 
of the status quo that it faces.
Compulsory power is not limited to material resources and can also involve symbolic 
and normative resources. NGOs, for instance, sometimes manage to mobilise norma­
tive resources to force states to alter their policies through a strategy of public 
shaming. As for international organisations, they are often able to use their authority 
(moral, technical, expert-led or delegated by other actors) as a resource to compel 
other actors to adopt certain policies. In the global development discourse, for 
instance, compulsory power may take the form of policy conditionalities that govern 
the release of international aid, or of the influence of the frequently foreign technical 
expertise that shapes projects in specific ways. Thus, an analysis of compulsory 
power means identifying the range of practices that make one actor able to directly 
control the conditions of behaviour of another actor -  and the way a global discourse 
contributes to such practices.
3.2.2. Institutional power: influencing through m ediating institutions
While compulsory power refers to the direct control of one actor over another, 
institutional power means the control of one actor over another in indirect ways. This 
is done through formal and informal institutions that mediate the interaction between 
the two. In institutional power, actor A frames the conditions of existence and actions 
of actor B through the rules and procedures enforced by given institutions. While
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compulsory power rests on resources owned and deployed by A, institutional power 
does not rest on A “owning” the institution that shapes the behaviour of B. 
Institutions that are entirely dominated by a single actor are few and far between. 
However, the ability to use a given institution is unevenly distributed among actors. 
Institutions established to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes create (absolute or 
relative) “winners” and “losers” and institutional power relations may be inferred 
from there.
In institutional power, the presence of mediating institutions highlights the fact that 
A and B are socially separated from one another and that they are only indirectly 
related. This distance can be spatial: central authorities located in a faraway capital 
city may constrain local communities through various institutions. But distance can 
also be temporal, or even generational; institutions established at one point in time 
can subsequently have expected or unintended effects. Long-standing institutions 
may embody frozen configurations of interests, privileges and biases that continue to 
impact the situation and choices of actors. In this type of analysis, power is no longer 
a matter of A’s direct effect upon B, but a matter of extended and diffuse relations 
through mediating institutions.
Also of relevance to institutional power are the various forms of material dependence 
between spatially or socially distant actors: market forces, systems of exchange and 
interdependences create relationships that may limit available choices, especially 
those of weaker actors. More specifically, one important form of institutional power 
fostered by a global discourse may be the increased dependence of socially weak 
groups upon non-community markets. The implementation of a global discourse may 
lead to certain policies and projects that increase this dependence. Which new 
stakeholders -  whether distinctly identifiable (e.g. a company) or more anonymous 
and faceless (e.g. a type of industry or consumers) -  have gained practical influence 
over the local context? What mediating mechanisms (e.g. market prices, commercial 
intermediaries, investment funds) are being used? How have inflows of capital, 
goods, managerial techniques, norms and standards evolved over time and to the 
greater benefit of whom?
As we saw in Chapter 1 (cf. section 1.2.3), global discourses may favour some types 
of institutions over others -  and markets are institutions. When it comes to 
governance arrangements, global discourses may also influence formal or informal
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organisations: their level of publicness (nature of participants), delegation (functions 
performed by ad hoc organisations) or inclusiveness (level of shared decisional 
power). Thus, a power analysis of a global discourse must look at what type of 
institutions are created and how power works through them.
3.2.3. Structural power: strengthening long-standing identities
In the two preceding forms of power, compulsory and institutional, power relates to 
actions of pre-defined and pre-constituted actors towards one another. The identities 
of A and B are not at stake or even discussed. They are pre-supposed as stable and 
independent from one another. In these conceptions, power is almost an attribute that 
an actor owns and that he may use to shape the actions or situation of the others. The 
focus is placed on interactions and on who governs whom, based on material, 
ideational and institutional resources.
Another angle on power may be adopted however, namely a focus on relations of 
constitution (i.e. related to identities) as opposed to relations of interactions (Barnett 
& Duvall, 2005, p.9). Relations of constitution shed light on how actors are defined 
and formed as social beings, in relation to one another, with their respective 
identities, capacities, interests and goals. The focus is less on who governs but rather 
on who is defined as governing. Studying this constitution means examining the 
production of particular kinds of actors and refusing the view that they are defined ex 
ante. As Wendt (1998, p .105) puts it: “Constitutive theories...account for the 
properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist”. 
Because these social relations generate different social kinds and self- 
understandings, they have real impacts on an actor’s ability to shape its existence. 
Constitutive processes may be themselves controlled by specific actors, but tend to 
be structurally beneficial to some. Constitutive forms of power come in two forms: 
structural power (that we now explore) and productive power (see next section).
Structural power refers to structural positions, social structures and categories 
deeply entrenched in society, whereby A exists as such given its relation to B. 
Classic examples include “masters vs. slaves” in slave societies, “capital vs. labour” 
in capitalist societies, “landowner vs. agricultural employees” in rural societies, or 
more generally “local notables vs. the rest of a community”. Such structural roles
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contain functional differentiations that come with varying privileges, subjectivities 
and interests to the occupants of these roles (Wendt & Duvall, 1989).
Structural power typically underlines hierarchical and binary relations of domination 
that work to the advantage of those structurally empowered, and to the disadvantage 
of the socially weak. Its analysis can follow at least two paths. First, social structures 
allocate differential capacities and advantages to different positions: capital-labour 
and master-slave relations are obvious producers of unequal privileges. Second, not 
only does the social structure comprise actors, but it also shapes their self- 
understanding and subjective interests. This sometimes makes the under-privileged 
willing to accept their role in the existing order contrary to their objective interests 
(Benton, 1981). This is, for instance, the case in paternalist communities where the 
lower social class is “fed and protected” by the upper class.
Structural power can thus prevent some actors from recognising their own 
domination. This helps reproduce rather than resist the status quo. In this way, 
structural power operates even when there are no instances of A acting to exercise 
control over B. Barnett and Duval appropriately quote Lukes (1975, p.24) on this 
point: “Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, 
to whatever degree, from having grievances shaping their perceptions, cognitions, 
and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of 
things?”.
Marxist analyses typically rely on arguments close to this understanding of structural 
power. Following the Italian social philosopher Gramsci, Gill and Law (1989) argue 
that while power exists in coercion and institutional arrangements, the relations of 
production in global capitalism determine the capacities and resources of actors, 
shape the ideology through which they interpret their own fate, interests and desires. 
The capitalist and consumerist ideology is seen as hegemonic in the sense that it 
serves the objective interests of the higher social classes -  at the direct expense of the 
objective interests of the world’s producing classes. This view is also translated to 
the level of entire nations by world-systems theorists (e.g. Wallerstein, 1996). The 
claim, then, is that global structures of production generate particular kinds of states, 
such as core, semi-peripheral and peripheral ones. Positions in this system produce 
varying sets of interests, capacities and constraints. Countries in the subordinate 
positions often adopt ideological conceptions that underpin their own domination.
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A global discourse may either strengthen or contradict forms of structural power. It is 
not always easy to identify in what direction situations are evolving. For instance, the 
discourse on gender equality is openly challenging long-standing social categories, 
but once integrated into policies, it may turn out to work against its own stated goals 
(Hakim, 2008). As for the global discourse on decentralisation, its operationalisation 
may in the end reinforce the grip of central authorities over local operations. These 
are the type of tortuous expectations that the critical narrative of global governance 
typically harbours, given its pervasive intuition on the reinforcement of pre-existing 
power structures.
3.2.4. Productive power: anti-politics, governm entality and the use of 
“traditions”
Productive power, like structural power, focuses on processes that produce the 
identities and interests of actors. However, while structural power emphasises long­
standing binary social structures and categories, productive power looks at other 
configurations, newer categories in the making or ones that are not necessarily 
constituted in binary or hierarchical modes. It is concerned with the re-defining the 
legitimate body of values, knowledge and social categories.
While structural power is re-productive of long-standing categories and divisions, 
and of positions of domination and subordination, productive power is more 
productive of new kinds of norms and identities. These productive categories may 
constrain both the elite and non-elite alike. They do not automatically mirror social 
hierarchies: they may challenge them and inspire new social forces. Analysing 
productive power requires a focus on new discourses that produce new kinds of 
subjects, meanings and categories, terms of action to shape what is taken for granted.
Productive power works via systems of knowledge through which meaning is 
transformed (Macdonell, 1986). Discourses are understood here not as dialogues 
among actors or in terms of Habermas’ notion of “communicative action”. Instead, 
the concept refers to how everyday interactions redefine the body of values and 
knowledge that can be legitimately referred to. It looks at how “the (impossible, the 
(im)probable, the natural, the normal” are defined and “what counts as a problem” 
(Hayward, 2000, p.35).
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In the field of International Relations, productive power has been very largely 
studied. There have been discussions, for instance, on classificatory concepts such as 
“civilised”, “rogue”, “unstable”, “Western” or “democratic” states. The theme of the 
“Other” -  how it is defined and linked to permissible and desirable policies -  has 
also been looked at (Neumann & Welsh, 1991). As for the global discourse on 
Human Rights, this has constructed a world populated by human rights “victims”, 
“monitors”, “violators” or “prosecutors”. In humanitarian law, the definition of the 
categories of “civilian” and “combatant” bears consequences for those on the ground 
-  the former deserving help and the latter being legitimate targets for the armed 
forces. As for the development discourse, it has been widely analysed as a form of 
knowledge/power regime (e.g. Ferguson, 1990; Crush, 1995).
Through a redefinition of the legitimate values, categories and knowledge, the 
exercise of productive power by a global discourse may strengthen new or re- 
emerging categories and actors. Boli and Thomas (1999) argue for instance that 
global democratic and rational-legal principles are reinforcing the voices of NGOs as 
legitimate actors of world politics. In local contexts, foreign donors and experts, and 
national or international NGOs may thus see their influence increase following the 
diffusion of a given global discourse. Emerging actors, however, may either 
challenge or reinforce long-standing local structural power positions: thus, 
productive and structural power may work either hand in hand or against one 
another.
Productive power can work at least through three forms that are well identified in the 
political science literature: 1) anti-politics -  a process that renders certain political 
choices ostensibly “technical” so as to avoid debates; 2) govemmentality (in 
Foucault’s sense) -  a process that fosters self-regulation and internalised constraints, 
as people redefine their identities on the basis of new norms; 3) the redefinition o f  
what is traditional and thus legitimate or in need of extra-care.
Anti-politics and the weight of “expertise”
Drawing on Ferguson (1990) who worked on the development discourse, anti­
politics can be defined as the transformation of contested political issues into 
technical issues, so that the power of experts and specialised authorities is 
significantly increased, while debate considerably restricted or constrained. Nearly
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all global discourses actually come with a parallel discourse on the modernisation 
and rationalisation of human societies that has the potential to legitimate even more 
expertise. The question is, therefore, whether the use of this “modem knowledge” 
obscures rather than sheds light on social or political issues that demand political 
debate and societal choices. The expertise that comes with various global discourses 
may indeed frame discussions in specific ways, within externally defined parameters, 
while leaving out contested issues and implicitly reinforcing certain power position -  
which is a typical expectation of the critical narrative.
Anti-politics and de-politicisation may also have positive sides that should not be 
overlooked when analysing global discourses and their implementation. An inflow of 
external expertise may help move forward blocked situations and relieve complex 
local tensions. When stakeholders’ interests are directly and irremediably opposed, 
technical discourses may bring a useful perspective, acting as a third party in a 
confrontation that is leading nowhere. In the field of international security, for 
instance, this may happen in conflict prevention projects where NGOs working with 
certain global discourses are able to reinstate a dialogue between parties that have 
stopped talking to one another, through the deployment of new expertise and ideas. 
Nevertheless, looking at anti-politics requires making a judgement on whether 
legitimate options were suppressed from the discussions and the extent to which 
technical expertise acted as a “neutral” third party -  something that some critiques 
would say is never possible.
Governmentality as self-regulation
Certain forms of knowledge can make individuals govern themselves in certain 
ways. Discourses can become internalised and frame subjectivities and behaviours, 
while individuals feel autonomous and subjectively free. To describe this power 
phenomenon, Foucault developed the concept of “neoliberal governmentality”42 -  a 
situation in which power is de-centred so that subjects play an active role in their 
own governance. The production of knowledge and the “normalisation of conducts” 
stimulate the constitution of “self-regulated” and “self-correcting selves”.
The concept of “governmentality” was coined by Foucault to refer to government 
structures that are not limited to state politics and policies but include a range of
42 See Foucault (1991) on his 1977-1978 lectures at the College de France.
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techniques of social control and forms of knowledge that bridge the gap between the 
macro and the micro levels of power. It points to procedures, protocols, practices, 
idioms, rules and routines through which lives are governed, managed and regulated 
“at a distance”, as seen in section 1.2.4. It carries a vision of power that is faceless, 
headless, acting through decentralised practices, but where power still retains an 
overall unity. This coherence is referred to as a “discourse” with systematic effects. 
Although Foucault applies “governmentality” to various power regimes and 
historical periods, he uses the term particularly with reference to “neoliberal 
governmentality”. This characterises regimes based on democratic and market 
principles, the limitation of state action, the entrustment of individuals with self- 
regulating duties and functions, and the dissemination of risks and responsibilities.
Global discourses often manifest this ideal of self-regulation and neoliberal 
governmentality: people are meant to “freely behave better”. As the critical narrative 
would expect, their implementation through policies and projects is likely to exhibit a 
degree of schizophrenia with a vibrant pledge to unconstrained autonomy while at 
the same time stating expected and pre-defined results -  which may even be 
monitored by quantified indicators. There is, here, an intrinsic contradiction between 
the stated goals of enhanced self-regulation and the attainment of standard norms - a 
tension that is core to neoliberal governmentality and that may characterise many 
global discourses.
Defining the “community”, “success” and “traditions”
Productive power is about shaping identities. Looking at “communities”, Agrawal 
and Gibson (1999) make the point that “the local and the external...are linked 
together in ways that it might be difficult to identify the precise [dividing] line” 
(p.640). “Communities” thus are not a priori clearly defined entities: defining them 
is a process in itself that may be influenced by external actors. Brockington et al. 
(2008, p.90) thus argue that “rural groups engaged in community conservation are 
increasingly incorporated into new networks of actors, including NGOs, International 
Financial Institutions, international organisations, bilateral donors and private 
companies”. All of these actors influence what groups become defined as “the 
community”, as they are often in a position to “handpick groups of local people to 
represent the communities with whom they ‘partner’” (p.90). In this line of enquiry, 
Mosse (2004, p.654) evokes the concept of “interpretative community”. This refers
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to a group of people spanning local to international levels, whose role is to make a 
specific intervention appear as a “success”. People that are co-opted at the local level 
are chosen for their ability to mobilise support. Who exactly is seeking to define a 
community and “success” and for what purpose thus become important questions.
Another important aspect of productive power is the definition of “traditions”. 
Global discourses may carry widely varying perspectives of traditions, and can 
impact these in different ways. These effects range from pro- to anti-traditional- 
providing one acquiesces that there is such a thing as fixed and defined traditions. A 
global discourse may respect or even be based upon long-standing cultural factors; 
but it may equally often come with the in-built idea that some established social 
relations or practices need to be radically changed -  such as gender relations, for 
instance. A discourse can also impact traditions in an even deeper and productive 
way, by re-delineating what is or is not traditional. Defining traditions is indeed an 
important stake in local communities, or even in entire nations, as traditions provide 
unity and legitimacy. English Marxist historians such as Hobsbawn (1983) and 
Ranger (1983) have long conceived of traditions as something invented and actively 
created. In the same line of analysis, Anderson (1983) famously devised the notion of 
“imagined communities”, emphasising the on-going re-creation of a collective past.
Appendix 5 synthesises this discussion on forms of power providing their definitions 
and related research questions.
3.2.5. The conditional expectations of power narratives
The empirical expectations of the power narratives are concerned with the level of 
emancipation or control to be found in CP schemes. While the emancipatory 
narrative expects to find emancipatory versions o f CP, the critical narrative expects 
to observe alienating versions. In the previous section (3.1), these two accounts were 
expressed and translated in terms of detailed empirical expectations along 9 
dimensions. Which power mechanisms are actually at work (compulsory, 
institutional, etc.) in producing a given version of CP, in a given dimension of CP, is 
for empirical analysis to determine. Power narratives have no definite a priori 
expectation regarding what power mechanism may be found to be operating.
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However, power narratives do have broad views about how various forms of power, 
if  present, should logically impact the functioning of CP schemes. In this sense, we 
may deduce further empirical expectations, but this does not mean that their actual 
existence is expected. We can thus define a range of conditional expectations -  
conditional to the empirical confirmation of the presence of given forms of power.
First are conditional expectations regarding compulsory power. According to the 
critical narrative, the key strength of a global discourse lies in its capacity to 
influence actors without open forms of violence, through hidden devices of power. 
Its logical expectations regarding mechanisms of compulsory power are thus centred 
on subtle and non-confrontational forms. Compulsory power devices, if found to be 
present, are thus preferentially expected to come through incentives rather than 
outright constraints. At first sight, instruments of control may thus look like 
instruments of emancipation. Conversely, the emancipatory narrative would expect 
compulsory forms of power to help keep in check the strongest stakeholders from 
ruling in a business-as-usual scenario.
Second is institutional power. The conditional expectation of the critical narrative is 
that powerful interest groups and pre-existing social relations will tend to take over 
newly created institutions and reinforce their position. Institutions that are officially 
created to emancipate certain categories of actors may thus turn out to work, once 
again, as mechanisms of social control in the interest of dominant groups. In 
opposition, the emancipatory narrative would expect institutions -  as well as markets 
recently connected to the community -  to empower the hitherto disempowered, 
providing them with new opportunities to make their voice heard and to develop 
economically.
Third is structural power. Here, the critical narrative essentially expects the 
legitimisation and fortification of deep-seated social categories. A global discourse 
implemented in a local context may well allocate even more resources, benefits, 
responsibilities and channels of influence to dominant social categories. And even 
when all parties have gained net benefits, the relative distribution may still have 
worsened and hardened social divides. On the contrary, the emancipatory narrative 
will expect such power forms to be little present, given the weakening of 
inegalitarian social categories and relations.
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Finally is productive power -  the reworking of identities through new discourses. 
While the critical narrative will expect such power forms to benefit the most 
powerful groups, the emancipatory narrative will expect them to benefit the most 
disempowered.
Table 7 synthesises the conditional expectations of power narratives regarding power 
forms. Again, this summary table is nothing more than a range of potential 
observations, all of which are not expected to be present on the ground. The point of 
the table is to illustrate the diversity of power mechanisms that may be working to 
produce various outcomes in terms of overall emancipation or social control.
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Table 7 -  Conditional expectations about the effects of various forms of power
Forms of power Conditional expectations of the 
EMANCIPATORY narrative
Conditional expectations of the 
CRITICAL narrative
1. Compulsory 
Power
• Compulsory power forms help 
keep in check the strongest 
stakeholders.
• Use of compulsory power 
preferentially through non- 
conffontational forms.
• Use of incentives rather than 
outright constraints.
2. Institutional 
Power
• Institutions enable weaker 
stakeholders to exercise significant 
power.
• Weaker stakeholders enjoy new 
market opportunities.
• Institutions are taken over by 
already empowered groups and 
turn into mechanisms of social 
control over others.
• Increased local dependence on 
global markets to the detriment of 
the weaker stakeholders.
3. Structural Power
• Limited presence of such power 
forms, given the weakening of 
inegalitarian social categories and 
relations.
• Legitimisation and fortification of 
deep-seated social relations and 
categories (e.g. hierarchical/binary 
positions).
4. Productive Power
• Productive power forms benefit the 
less powerful groups, for instance 
through anti-political processes, 
self-regulation or a redefinition of 
traditions.
• Productive power forms benefit the 
more powerful groups, for instance 
through anti-political processes, 
self-regulation or a redefinition of 
traditions.
Yet, it is possible to go one step further in anticipating what power forms and effects 
might be observed in empirical data, according to the two narratives of CP schemes. 
Appendix 6, focusing on the critical narrative, crosses four forms of power with the 
9 dimensions of CP schemes in order to envision a large range of potential empirical 
observations. The point of this exercise is to give a foretaste of the diversity of power 
mechanisms that might be found to produce disempowerment in the field. In other 
words, the statements in the very large table in Appendix 6 do not constitute 
empirical expectations, but rather potential observations of power at work.
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3.3. Research m ethods
This study adopts a qualitative case study approach based upon four months of 
fieldwork. Data were collected using face-to-face interviews, participant observation, 
focus groups and a range of written documents. Here we provide a brief discussion of 
collection techniques and sample selection. Research methods are further discussed 
in Appendix 7.
3.3.1. Data collection
Interviews were chosen as the primary data collection technique because they make 
it possible to gain an understanding of an individual’s inner experiences, an 
understanding which is critical when analysing issues such as participation, socio­
political dynamics and power relations. Interviews also provide access to the context 
and meaning of actors’ behaviour (Seidman, 1998). A total of 110 formal interviews 
were undertaken for this study, half in Brazil and half in St. Lucia. This number does 
not include informal conversations and meetings without note-taking. They were 
conducted in person in the participant’s home or workplace at a time convenient to 
them. Administering interviews in the participants’ own surroundings enabled the 
researcher to gain a better sense of their life perspective. Interviews typically lasted 
between 60 to 90 minutes, with occasional interviews being cut short after 30 
minutes (due to the lack of relevant material or good will on the part of the 
participant) and others lasting several hours (such as with a very charismatic Rasta 
lady in St. Lucia who gave a detailed account of her incredible life). Interview length 
very much depended on the responsiveness of the participant, the relevance of the 
material being provided and the number of new thematic paths that appeared during 
the discussion.
Participant observation was conducted both in everyday contexts and on special 
occasions, such as important meetings or social gatherings, and these were 
transcribed into field notes. Some of them resulted from a spontaneous invitation to 
join in, such as for instance accompanying horse tours in the Pantanal, patrolling the 
coast with the marine rangers in St Lucia, attending public outreach and community 
meetings in the town of Soufriere, or joining the annual Fisher feast on St Peter’s 
day. Other observations resulted from an explicit demand I formulated: for instance
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in Campo Grande, to attend the board meeting of APPAN, an association of 
landowners involved in ecotourism, or to join rural employees in their work with 
cattle. In St Lucia, I further spent a lot of time in the offices of the participatory 
structure I studied, the so-called Soufriere Maritime Management Association 
(SMMA). This allowed me to observe the comings and goings of community 
members interacting with the institution. I also regularly attended evenings in local 
bars where quasi-ritual daily meetings take place among a broad section of 
Soufriere’s population, including businessmen and community leaders.
Focus groups were held in St. Lucia in six specific settings and several times in 
each: with fishers along the shoreline; with fishers again after public events; with 
marine rangers before, during or after their boat patrols; with project staff members 
at the office, where I spent a lot of time; and with a group of young locals I often 
met. In Brazil, however, focus groups were more difficult to arrange, due to both 
spatial and cultural constraints. The huge territory under scrutiny, the Pantanal, has a 
very low human density and the fazendas I visited are very isolated from one 
another, making any meeting virtually impossible to organise -  this constraint was 
also felt by the participatory scheme I studied. I managed nevertheless to arrange 
informal focus groups within some fazendas among rural employers (peons), but the 
results were disappointing. It turned out that group discussions between peons in the 
presence of a foreigner led to fewer exchanges rather than more, a fact that has to do, 
in my view, with their strong community culture and their shy disposition compared 
to Western standards.
A wide range of written documents was also collected. These provided background, 
complementary or inside information that helped to identify critical issues, 
triangulate conclusions and increase their reliability, as well as identify important 
informants. First, project-related documentation was gathered from international 
donors and local project managers. Second, a range of newspapers and magazine 
articles relating to the projects or regions under consideration were collected. Third, 
a host of public policy documentation was pulled together from both the local and 
national authorities in the two countries. Fourth, written documentation was gathered 
through direct contact with NGOs, both on their own projects and regional 
environmental issues. Finally, local academic literature and scientific studies were 
systemically sought.
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3.3.2. Sam ple selection
The term “participants” refers to individuals that participated who willingly took part 
in the study by allowing me to interview them either face-to-face or within a focus 
group. The selection of participants followed a “purposive sampling” process, 
meaning that they were selected because they met certain characteristics as well as 
the specific purpose I had in mind. This approach is popular with qualitative research 
and when building samples of a limited size (Robson, 1993). Attaining a statistically 
robust sample of participants was not the intention of this study. Rather, the focus 
was to achieve a sample that would provide sufficiently diverse and give deep 
insights into ongoing social and political processes.
My primary concern in building the sample was to obtain a good view of what was 
typically happening among key “stakeholders”. Stakeholders are individuals, groups 
or organisations (public or private) who have an interest in or an impact on the 
environmental schemes under study. Stakeholders with the highest impact and 
interest formed the core of the sample, while those with high interest and little 
influence, or high influence and little interest were also integrated. Groups with low 
interest and low impact were naturally of little relevant to the research. Examples of 
groups falling into the high interest-low impact category were the poorest fisher 
groups of Soufriere, or the rural employees in Pantanal, with a high degree of 
dependence on natural resources for their livelihood but little influence or power 
over decisions.
For Brazil and St. Lucia, the sampling process started long before the actual 
fieldwork, based on preliminary research that helped identify likely stakeholders and 
some specific persons that I contacted beforehand. As for fieldwork, it invariably 
started by undertaking a review of my stakeholder analysis and purposive sample. In 
St. Lucia, once I had refined this analysis, I contacted a few key individuals that 
could act as “gatekeepers” to stakeholders, who could help me devise a first 
nominative list of people to be interviewed and who could grant me access to them 
(giving email addresses, phone contacts and above all a recommendation). Such 
“gatekeepers” notably included the head manager of the SMMA who proved 
extremely helpful at all stages. In Brazil however, it was not possible for me to 
identify right at the beginning a central “gatekeeper”, although several appeared 
along the way.
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Once interviews started, I looked for more respondents on an on-going basis. Patton 
(1990) distinguishes at least sixteen different approaches to purposive sampling of 
which I combined four in the process of fieldwork to further expand my sample. First 
is “snowball sampling”: at the end of interviews with most participants, especially 
enthusiastic ones, I would ask them to suggest other individuals that I should and 
could contact. This technique identifies cases of interest from people who know 
people who know people, etc. In many instance it provided for good interview 
participants. Second is “opportunistic sampling”. By remaining receptive and 
observant during daily activities as well as interacting with a variety of individuals, I 
identified and gained access to new participants. For example, while using public 
transportations I would usually talk either with the driver or some other passenger, 
sometimes leading to later interviews. In St Lucia, notably, I had to drive my car 
regularly from Soufriere to Castries and back. This provided many opportunities to 
pick up hitchhikers along the road, people from all walks of life, age and professional 
types. These encounters provided access to a diversity of individuals with 
complementary perspectives. Third is “maximum variation sampling”. It 
purposefully led me to pick participants at both ends of the socio-economic 
spectrum, including beggars living in the street up to prominent businessmen at the 
regional or national level. Fourth is “stratified purposeful sampling”. This led me to 
identify participants that could illustrate characteristics of particular subgroups of 
interest or, in other words, that seemed typical of particular social groups, whether 
they were direct stakeholders or from the larger public (such as young people). 
Finally, I also enriched my sample with “politically important” participants, notably 
local politicians. This did carry the risk of attracting unwanted attention to the study 
but led, notably in St. Lucia, to discovering hot political issues directly linked to the 
environmental scheme under study.
Figure 2 and 3 provide information regrinding the composition of the interviewee 
samples in Brazil (53 interviews) and in St. Lucia (57 interviews). They underscore 
the comprehensive and relatively balanced distribution of interviews among various 
stakeholder groups.
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Figure 2 -  St. Lucia: composition of the interview sample
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3.4. Conclusion
In this chapter we have built a comprehensive analytical framework of CP schemes 
and power forms - summarised in Appendix 4 and 5. This has enabled us to 
formulate the specific expectations of the power narratives regarding the CP 
discourse when implemented through participatory projects. These expectations, in 
turn, are the bridge that allows a precise comparison of large power narratives with 
empirical data drawn from local level case studies. The empirical expectations 
summarised in Table 6 are those that best reflect the emancipatory and critical 
narratives and help us test them. The conditional expectations (presented in Table 7 
and in more detail in Appendix 6) basically invite us to pay careful attention to the 
diversity of power mechanisms that may be at work in producing more 
“emancipation” or more “social control”.
In the four next chapters, we turn to the empirical fieldwork and findings of our two 
case studies. As we saw in the Introduction, the first concerns CP in coral reef 
protection in Soufriere, Saint Lucia often hailed as a model project. The second case 
study relates to CP in the preservation of the Brazilian Pantanal, the world’s largest 
wetland.
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Chapter 4 - CP in Soufriere: Origins, Implementation, 
Melting Down
The “Soufriere Maritime Management Association” (SMMA), based in the town of 
Soufriere, St. Lucia, is “one of the most prestigious examples of participatory 
environmental management to have taken place in the Caribbean, if not the wider 
southern hemisphere” (Pugh, 2005, p.308). Among professional environmentalists, 
the SMMA has largely been deemed a “success story” given its “ability to pacify 
local conflicts, reach significant environmental results and ensure its own financial 
sustainability”, as an observer explains [interview 56]. It was created in 1994 after 
two years of “stakeholder consultation and negotiation” involving resource users and 
various organisations. Having received many awards and wide international 
recognition, it is still entrusted to date with the management of eleven kilometres of 
the most valuable coasts of St. Lucia -  a small island whose economy is increasingly 
dependent on tourism.
This chapter first provides background information on the Soufriere context, to show 
how tensions around coral reefs had been developing over the years. Then, it 
analyses the genesis of the SMMA participatory scheme, its originating agents and 
initial consultation process, reviewing the 1992-1994 period on the basis of archives, 
interviews and accounts by policy makers, observers and various stakeholders. It 
next scrutinises the way the SMMA has been implemented in practice as an 
institution, its inclusiveness, scope, participatory intensity and allocation of benefits 
over time. This is done in two chronological phases: a) the early functioning of the 
newly created institution and the ensuing political upheaval on the part of the local 
fishers (1994-1997); b) the revamping of the SMMA into a supposedly “new 
SMMA” and its functioning since then. In doing so, we draw on the analytical tools 
introduced in the preceding chapters.
As we shall see, the empirical and conditional expectations of the critical narrative 
are largely confirmed in the case of Soufriere project, despite the latter being widely 
presented as an exemplary case of CP. The origins, inclusiveness, scope, intensity 
and allocation of benefits of the scheme all underline the small role or space left to
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the fishers, who are its primary stakeholders. Mechanisms of compulsory, 
institutional and productive power combined together to produce this result.
4.1. F ighting for Coral Reefs: the Soufriere Context
Background information on St. Lucia and Soufriere is provided here to underline a 
context of mounting human pressure upon natural resources. The rise of open 
conflicts among resource users is then presented, as well as early governmental 
attempts at enforcing some rules. From there, we look into the origins of CP ideas in 
Soufriere and at the nature of the public consultation process that took place over 24 
months before the instatement of the SMMA, as a participatory institution in charge 
of coastal management.
4.1.1. Growing pressures on the coastal environm ent
St. Lucia is located in the heart of the Caribbean, with Martinique to the north and St. 
Vincent to the South (cf. Map 1). The island is 43km long and 22km wide -  and with 
617 square kilometres of valleys and hills, it is the second-largest of the Windward 
Islands after Dominica. The population is about 160,000, a third of whom live in 
Castries, the capital on the north-western coast. Nearly 85% of the people are of 
African ancestry, 10% are mixed (with British and French blood) and 4% of pure 
European or East Indian descent, making the island highly multicultural (2001 
census)43. The socio-economic context is marked by deep problems such as high 
unemployment, a high birth-rate among teenagers, a rising drug trade and a declining 
banana industry -  which used to provide the whole country with a livelihood. 
Meanwhile, St. Lucia boasts a rich and scenic natural environment that makes it a 
valuable tourist destination. The centre of the island is dominated by mountainous 
landscapes covered with dense vegetation, with large areas of primary rainforest. 
Bathed by the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, St. Lucia has a varied marine 
life, including 90 square kilometres of coral reefs (cf. Map 2).
In recent years, however, these marine resources have been under rising pressure 
from natural disturbances, such as tropical storms and hurricanes (Burke & Maidens, 
2004). Those of 1994 (“Debbie”) and 1999 caused landslides and erosion resulting in
43 http://www.stats.gov.lc/ [Accessed 5 October 2009].
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heavy siltation44 from runoff. In the meantime, water temperature rose in the 
Caribbean leading to massive and adverse coral bleaching. Beyond these challenges, 
the corals are also endangered by the growing coastal population. Related threats 
include over-fishing, overuse by the tourism industry (yachts, divers, tour operators) 
as well as pollution and sedimentation from land-based activities: constructions, 
wastewater discharges from towns and hotels, pollutions from agricultural fertilisers, 
etc. Map 2 shows that most of the remaining corals are located on the east coast, 
which is traditionally less populated and economically used. The west coast thus 
concentrates the bulk of the ecological concerns.
The vicinity of the town called “Soufriere” has been particularly problem-prone, with 
a high concentration of activities in competition for the use of the coast. Centrally 
located on the western coast of the island, Soufriere is a picturesque rural town of 
about 6,000 people, totalling 8,000 when rural communities of the district are taken 
into account.45 Photo 1 provides an overview of this site. Although St. Lucia’s capital 
is Castries, most nationals acknowledge that the soul of the island is based in 
Soufriere, the former capital during times of French rule. The town is indeed known 
for its rich natural, cultural and historical heritage. It boasts most of St. Lucia’s key 
tourism attractions - including the famous Pitons, the twin volcanic peaks that are a 
national pride, the Diamond waterfall that has attracted famous film directors, one of 
the world’s rare drive-in volcanoes with open “sulphur springs” (a geothermal field 
with sulphurous fumaroles), historic mineral baths, an old growth rain forest and a 
remarkable belt of coral reefs. Coupled with its crystal-clear coastal waters, Soufriere 
offers an incredible display of natural beauty. Modernisation has been slowed by the 
town’s physical isolation, recently alleviated by an improved west coast road that has 
nevertheless reinforced economic concentration on Castries. At the beginning of the 
1990s, an explosive situation had emerged.
4.1.2. The social significance o f near-shore fishing in Soufriere
The Soufriere district has an estimated population of 8,200 with around 150 
registered fishers. Sixty per cent (i.e. 90) of the fisher are full-time, while the rest fish
44 “Siltation” refers to the accumulation on the coral reefs of various particles (sand, clay, etc.) coming 
from the land.
45 Estimated mid-year population by district. See http://www.stats.gov.lc/main7.htm [Accessed 5 
October 2009].
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on a part-time or seasonal basis (FAO, 2006). Moreover, many locals revert to 
fishing although not formally registered and owning no boat, so that the fisher 
community is far larger than these numbers. Slightly over 100 fishing vessels operate 
from the town, including canoes, pirogues and chaloops,46 but many owners rent 
their boat to people according to demand. Moreover, when one takes into account the 
size of families mainly dependent on fishing for their livelihood, it seems more 
realistic to assume that the fisher community form at least 10% of the local 
population -  an estimate supported by most interviewees during fieldwork [e.g. 
interviews 24, 29, 45].
Even this figure, however, does not do justice to the significance of fishing for the 
local community. Not only is fishing at the core of Soufriere’s traditional identity, 
but most families in the district have relatives involved in this activity. In addition, 
the fragile socio-economic level of most of the population makes fishing an 
important fall-back solution in case of unemployment. So much so that despite being 
a relatively small community, “fishing” very much governs a large part of 
Soufriere’s psyche and self-hood.
Approximately eighty tonnes of fish are produced annually,47 most of which is sold 
on local markets, the rest going into family-consumption. In Soufriere, the fishing 
sector has been slow to modernise and follow the trends of the island. Its fishers have 
indeed remained particularly dependent on near-shore resources, unlike other 
communities to the east, south, and north of the island, which have gone much more 
into off-shore fisheries. A key reason for this is Soufriere’s location, which puts it at 
a disadvantage as it is further than other communities from the migratory routes of 
valuable ocean species such as tuna, dolphin-fish and kingfish. This greater distance 
increases operational costs and discourages fishers from investing in gears and 
vessels required for this type of fishery. Thus, the majority of Soufriere fishers have 
not made the transition into offshore fishing (George, 1996; Pierre, 2000). Soufriere 
therefore relies heavily on passing schools of coastal pelagics -  such as balaoos, 
jacks, and sardines -  which they catch using “seine nets” on sandy areas. Photo 2 
shows the small, open vessels from which the fishers operate, reflecting an artisanal- 
type of fishing. Seine nets (same photo) are large fishing nets that hang vertically in
46 FAO (2006) and the author’s estimates based on interviews [28, 43].
47 Pierre-Nathoniel (2003) and the author’s estimates, based on interviews at the fishers’ cooperative.
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the water with weights along the bottom edge and floats along the top: they are used 
as a fence to encircle a school of fish, with the boat driving around in a circle.
Seine-net fishing, however, can only be practised from December to July. Therefore, 
fishes are also captured directly in coral reefs, were they are numerous throughout 
the year. This is done using devices such as fish traps (known as “pots” or tombe 
leve, see Photo 3) or bottom nets.48 Reef fishing is important for many individuals in 
the community because it is cheap, easy to practice and always available. It very 
much functions as an insurance against unemployment or losses of revenues, “when 
a man has nothing left to feed his family” [interview 33]. Accordingly, several full­
time fishers engage in more than one type of fishing activity while most of the part- 
time fishers specialise in pot fishing.
4.1.3. R ising conflicts: traditional fishing vs. tourism
In the second half of the 1980s, traditional fishing began to be combined with rising 
activities in tourism requiring access to marine spaces. By the early 1990s, this had 
led to complex conflicts between coastal users. Competition was becoming intense 
for limited space and resources and a various discontents emerged. These tensions 
have been described by various ministerial observers and local actors (George, 1996; 
SMMA, 1998; Pierre, 2000; Pierre-Nathoniel, 2003).
Conflicts first arose between seine-net fishers and overnight vachters who 
increasingly depended on the same deep, protected sandy bays that had become 
important sites for yachts on their way through the Caribbean. Fishers of coastal 
pelagics were especially affected. This type of fishing is difficult but can be 
highly lucrative and thus extremely important for the community. It involves 
chasing and encircling large groups of fish as they progress through the bay. 
However, yachters were hardly willing to pull up anchor during dawn or dusk 
hours to make space for this activity.
- Additional tension crystallised over a new iettv constructed right in the centre of 
Soufriere Bay (cf. Photo 4) to accommodate inflows of tourist boats coming 
down from the capital Castries or abroad. This construction further obstructed
48 Bottom nets (or “gillnets”) were banned in September 1998 due to their impacts on corals.
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seining and deepened the conflict between fishers, yachts and tour operators 
bringing in visitors from Castries.
Clashes emerged as pot and bottom net fishers accused visiting divers of 
deliberately damaging fishing devices found during dive expeditions, “freeing the 
fish” and negatively impacting coral reefs.
- Fishers accused researchers of taking too many fish and coral reef samples, 
causing environmental degradation.
Local laypeonle had conflicts over access to beach areas for fishing activity and 
recreation with local hoteliers, who felt that the presence of “noisy” locals did not 
suit the taste of foreign tourists who had come here to “look for peace and calm”.
- Tourist boats were also accused by fishers of disturbing fish and damaging 
fishing gear by passing too close to fishers at work or in the path of fishing nets.
There were also countless reports of “visitor harassment” by disorganised water 
taxis trying to sell services to visitors, who were annoying tourists and ruining 
their overall tourist experience in Soufriere.
- Indiscriminate anchoring on coral reefs by yachtsmen was also often reported, to 
the dismay of both fishers and environmentalists.
- Entry of boats, divers and snorkelers into this fragile coastal habitat was 
unregulated, including entry of unauthorised or uncoordinated scientific 
researchers.
- Solid waste accumulation, such as plastic, as well as incoming untreated 
wastewater from both the city and hotels were also commonplace.
In the end, the decrease in nearshore fisheries, in water quality, in coastal landscapes 
and in the general health of marine resources was becoming apparent to all users, 
each group accusing the other [interviews 12, 20, 21]. Coastal conflicts became thus 
a structural feature of life in Soufriere and their rising intensity had serious negative 
impacts on both the tourism and the fishing industries. The unwritten rule of “open 
access” to marine resources traditionally enjoyed by fishers and increasingly by 
tourism-related activities was proving no longer sustainable.
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4.1.4. From top-down regulation to Community Participation
As early as 1986, the government tried to relieve pressure on coastal resources and 
alleviate the conflict. The Department of Fisheries, under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, introduced “Fishing Priority Areas” in key seining locations as well as 
several Marine Reserves for reef protection. It also tried to bring about a range of 
regulations to combat coral collection, gear and pot tampering by divers as well as 
marine pollution [interview 7].
These “solutions”, however, proved short-lived and ill-accepted by locals. Funds 
were lacking for a proper demarcation and enforcement of priority zone boundaries. 
Moreover, the design of marine reserves was based on the geographical distribution 
of resources, setting aside the richest areas for conservation, with little attention paid 
to the socio-economic consequences upon fishers. Some meetings took place 
between public agencies and some locals but decisions eventually came from the 
capital a few days later and did not gain local acceptance. As a fisher recalls:
Some harsh zoning decisions came from Castries after some people sent by ministries 
came around for a few hours...The government did not want to hear us. Why should 
we have obeyed? ... This was going nowhere, [interview 23]
The situation in Soufriere deteriorated as people opposed governmental schemes.
The feeling thus emerged that a different approach was needed, one that left more
room for local collaboration to secure more commitment from locals. At the
beginning of the 1990s, in Soufriere as in the rest of the world, the discourse on
“community participation” was beginning to burgeon, fed by the disappointments of
top-down attempts [interview 15]. The voluntary participation of local stakeholders
was thus to be sought in order to design a commonly agreed management plan,
including a zoning system defining what activities could be performed and where.
After two years of “public negotiations”, the resulting institutional form, the 
Soufriere Maritime Management Area, was formally created in 1994. Better known 
in professional circles as the “SMMA”, it was endorsed by the St. Lucian 
government as a new kind of not-for-profit organisation led by a multi-stakeholder 
board, bringing together a range of private and public actors. To date, the SMMA is 
still responsible for the surveillance, enforcement and potential evolution of the 
“zoning agreement” that regulates the use of 11 km of coastline between two coves: 
from Anse Jambon in the north to Anse L’lvrogne in the south (Map 3).
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The SMMA has now been functioning for over fifteen years. It has attracted 
international acclaim and received a battery o f prizes for its CP approach to 
“pacifying conflicts” . As early as 1997, it won the first World Conservation Union / 
British Airways Tourism for Tomorrow award for national parks and protected areas, 
handed over by the well-known environmentalist David Bellamy. The SMMA was 
later chosen as “demonstration site” by the International Coral Reef Action Network 
(ICRAN) -  a scientific network dedicated to coral conservation and supported by the 
United Nations Environmental Programme. It has also been subject to regular 
evaluations by international donors, leading to largely positive appraisals, including a 
recent assessment commissioned by a key French donor (FFEM, 2008). In what 
follows, however, we shall go deeper into the origins and institutional practice o f the 
SMMA to provide a more refined analysis of this “success story”.
Map 1 -  St. Lucia: an island-state in the heart of the Caribbean
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Map 2 -  St. Lucia, its coral reefs and the location of the SMMA
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Photo 1 -  Soufriere town and its famous “Pitons”
Photo 2 -  A traditional fisher boat and its seine nets
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Photo 3 -  Trapping fish with “pots” in Soufriere’s coral reefs
Photo 4 -  The jetty: built in the middle of Soufriere Bay
In 1987, to accom m odate  
tourist  boats, a jetty w as  
construc ted  right in the  
middle of a bay traditionally 
used  by coasta l se ine  
fishers.
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4.2. The G enesis o f a CP Scheme: Elite-Led, Socially  
Split, Externally-Influenced
Standard accounts of the SMMA found in public or project documents present it as a 
process “initiated by the local community”, with often little more explanation. This 
section argues, however, that its origin is to be found in the will and “vision” of the 
local business elite concerned with promoting Soufriere as a tourism destination. 
From the start, this business community also partnered with the government (who 
had been unable to manage the worsening situation in Soufriere), and a regional 
think tank (with practical experience throughout the Caribbean and donor 
connections worldwide).
On the basis of this threefold alliance, a “consultation and negotiation process” was 
indeed launched in Soufriere town. However, after a period of “intense public 
participation” -  with relatively high inclusion, scope and intensity -  the process grew 
more complex: difficult to follow for non-institutional actors, socially split (with a 
pre-eminence of elites) and heavily influenced by non-community actors. It is this 
secondary and more opaque process that made decisions on the truly conflictual 
issues. Despite this, an idealized story of “democratic conflict resolution” was spread 
by the elites and “experts” involved and speedily “bought” by international donors.
4.2.1. The origins: an alliance w ith no fishers, influenced by foreign  
donors
Who made the initial move towards the creation of a “participatory” management 
institution? Who designed it conceptually and institutionally? Who brought the first 
money in? Who made the subsequent financial and scientific contributions? Such 
questions on the origins of the SMMA and the nexus of actors behind the move shed 
light upon what is really at stake.
The typical account of the creation of the SMMA found in most project and policy 
documents is brief and elusive. For instance, FFEM (2008, p.5) states that:
In 1992, a local NGO, the 'Soufriere Regional Development Foundation ’, supported 
by several funding agencies - particularly the French funds FAC and FFEM and the 
USAID - started an independent and participatory planning process.
Such a succinct wording easily makes the SMMA look like a bottom-up process
exemplifying “participation from within” the community: here comes a local NGO
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that simply calls upon external donors to help a community set up its "independent ” 
planning process. More specifically, the epithet “independent” gives the impression 
that the state is far in the background - or even absent from the proceedings.
What actually happened was rather different. The initial idea of the SMMA, as a 
participatory management institution, came indeed from the so-called “Soufriere 
Regional Development Foundation” (SRDF) [interviews 11, 17, 26, 38, 41, 48, 50, 
52]. But what kind of “NGO” is that? Certainly not one characterised by a 
community-wide leadership. It was created in 1986 through the personal initiative 
and involvement of three high-profile local business people.49 Since then, the SRDF 
has focused on the promotion of Soufriere as a tourism destination. To finance its 
activities, and thanks to its founders’ personal connection to the Prime Minister, the 
SRDF obtained from the government the right to manage Soufriere’s “sulphur 
springs”, which is a natural site of prime tourist interest, and the responsibility of 
reinvesting these revenues for the benefit of the local community -  hence the name 
“foundation” taken on by the NGO [interviews 40, 51]. This organisation thus bears 
little comparison with a typical NGO, given its revenue base and elite leadership.
The first significant project carried out by the SRDF was the creation of the 
previously mentioned “jetty” [interview 11], So, to say the least, the SRDF did not 
enjoy a good relation with local fishers. At the beginning of the 1990s, the SRDF 
was still led by people with direct stakes in tourism and with a vision of the future 
centred on this industry. Its Board was disconcerted by the continuing tensions 
between the tourism and fishing sectors, as well as by the lack of positive results 
from state intervention. It thus looked for a new approach. A protagonist of the time 
recalls:
Who had a vision for the whole Soufriere area, in the absence o f any serious local 
authority? Who had the administrative and political networks to start a process? Who 
had interests at stake and money to make it happen? The answer is always the same: 
the business people, those who created the SRDF. The SMMA was their 
idea, [interview 14]
Although the SRDF was the “initiator” of the SMMA process, it immediately sought 
help from two other actors to form an initial alliance and share the role of 
“facilitator”. First, the Department of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture was
49 Two owned large land properties and businesses in tourism: Soufriere’s well known luxury hotel 
(Anse Chastenet) and the Diamond Botanical Gardens.
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happy to find a resolute partner and a possible way forward after years plagued by 
“paper regulations” that were not enforced [interview 9]. The prospect of sharing the 
costs of environmental monitoring was appealing to this administration, which thus 
offered to defend the scheme before the government. Secondly, through personal 
connections of both the SRDF and the Ministry, a regional think tank working in the 
Caribbean region and with “expertise” acknowledged by several international 
donors, was also brought into the picture. The “Caribbean Natural Resources 
Institute” -  better known as CANARI -  was certainly instrumental in designing, 
setting up and running the CP process [interviews 1, 49, 53].
Soufriere’s CP scheme was thus a joint initiative of three partners who formed a 
mixed “public-private-scientific” alliance, rather than the individual effort of a “local 
NGO”, as it is often presented. As initiator, the SRDF provided the initial impulse, 
the local “community” dimension (that would attract donors), high level political 
linkages and a proved ability to run projects. The Department of Fisheries came in 
with its authority, legal mandate and ability to lobby the government: it was the main 
supporter of the scheme at the beginning. Meanwhile, CANARI added to the 
endeavour its perceived “independence”, “scientific expertise” and “experience”: it 
later acted as the key designer of the SMMA as an institution, through technical 
support and responsibility for “facilitating and synthesising” public consultations 
[interview 1].
In other words, following the typology we built (cf. section 3.1.1), CP in Soufriere 
originated from “balanced sources” mixing an initiator from within, a supporter from  
above and a designer from outside. The remarkable characteristic of this process was 
the total absence of initial will on the part of the fisher community, who was 
nevertheless a key actor on Soufriere’s coasts. As an informant put it:
The fishers were to be brought into a new process, to obtain their consent.
[Participation] was a way to bend this inflexible community, [interview 53]
Still, the analysis of the origins of CP in Soufriere cannot stop there, as the 
originating alliance worked hard to mobilise funds from international donors -  and 
this complexifies the picture. The upstream influence of money coming from abroad 
cannot be overstated, as the CP scheme was entirely designed to be eligible to such 
funds [interviews 7, 55]. The consultation and negotiation process leading to the 
SMMA was financed by the American government through USAID, its international 
aid agency. Since 1991, USAID had developed an “Environmental and Coastal
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Resources” project (known in the Caribbean as the ENCORE project), whose main 
stated objective was to diffuse and legitimise the CP discourse -  or in official words:
To demonstrate that the collaboration between public, private and community interests 
can conserve the natural resource base and enhance biodiversity while promoting 
economic development (CEHI, 1997, p.7).
The ENCORE project had two components: a regional component in all OECS
countries and a “local site” component implemented specifically in St. Lucia. The
idea was to allocate grants to local projects fitting the CP philosophy. According to
interviewees, there is little doubt that the financial incentive provided by this
American scheme was of central importance in choosing CP as the operational mode
in Soufriere. Had the SRDF and the central government simply asked for more
money to enforce regulations on Soufriere, USAID would not have helped
[interviews 1,9]. The originating alliance was well aware of what kind of scheme
would be able to secure support -  and CANARI also had experience with donors
promoting CP. After a two-year consultation process (analysed in the next section),
the French government also joined the scheme, paying for most of SMMA’s set-up
costs.50 French eagerness to participate was also solely motivated by the CP
component. They based their funding on the reassurance that:
A local NGO, associating the local population and representatives from various 
ministries, has already carried out a large public consultation. (French Republic, 
1994, p.24)
In other words, the use of the CP discourse proved critical in securing international 
funding. Similar conditions were required for subsequent funds from the United 
Nations Environment Programme/Caribbean Environmental Programme 
(UNEP/CEP) and the Saint Lucia National Commission for UNESCO. The role of 
CANARI was critical in that respect as this organisation had the hands-on experience 
of putting into practice the CP “social technology” expected by donors. Thus, as 
envisioned by the critical narrative (cf. Appendix 6), and although the scheme was 
locally initiated, external donors were instrumental in rooting the CP discourse 
locally through the soft compulsory power of their financial incentives and 
conditionalities.
50 USAID provided €50,000, the French “Fonds d’Aide et de Cooperation” (FAC) €120,000 and the 
French Fund for the Global Environment (FFEM) €240,000. A French technical assistant was also 
provided for 46 months.
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4.2.2. From popular consultation to elite negotiation: institutional and 
productive power
Supported by American funds, a public “consultation and negotiation process” was 
launched in 1992. It started as a highly inclusive and intense CP process, with a wide 
upstream scope, but soon changed in nature. As the toughest issues were being 
identified, this broad-based public consultation slowly turned into a more formal and 
lengthy process, giving a de facto pre-eminence to organised interest groups 
[interviews 23, 24, 36, 53]. As the discussion left the informal and public sphere, 
“institutional power” stepped in and a less transparent elite-centred negotiation took 
over, driving out weaker groups such as the poorer fishers. The resulting SMMA 
agreement, in the form of a zoning plan, was indeed a “consensus” as is claimed in 
most documents, but a consensus among the strongest actors and interest groups. To 
recall the facts of this period, we relied on various interviews [notably interviews 1, 
9, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 25, 27, 37, 51, 57], a set of archives, as well as a detailed 
account provided a few years later by Renard (1996). The divorce we point out 
between a broad-based process and an institutional / elite-based one was to deepen 
even further in the early years of the functioning of the SMMA -  as we shall see the 
next section.
At the beginning of the consultation process, state-of-the-art “best practices” of CP 
were implemented under the technical guidance of CANARI in order to stimulate a 
“genuine dialogue” within the community and with other stakeholders. The first step 
took place on August 27, 1992, when a three-day-long “community consultation 
meeting” was convened. It brought together more than sixty persons from twenty- 
five different sectors or institutions, according to recollections. Each interest group 
was supposed to be represented by several people. Fishers, divers, hotels, restaurants, 
small and large businesses, diving operators, parent associations and school teachers, 
taxis, construction companies, etc: every possible group seemed to have attended in 
one way or another. According to all interviewees, the inclusiveness of the initial CP 
scheme was thus wide and socially mixed, including people with modest socio­
economic backgrounds.51 People had been invited by the SRDF, the Department of 
Fisheries and CANARI. They were told that “all previous decisions and management
51 We found no archive documents stating who exactly participated to this first meeting, but 
interviewees confirmed that attendance was high and socially broad-based.
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arrangements were reopened for discussion” (Renard, 1996, p.3). Not only was CP 
being strongly inclusive, but the scope was also upstream as the diagnosis of 
problems and any potential solution were opened to debates. During these days, a 
range of typical CP methods were used to foster group discussion, including the 
drawing of large coloured maps and multiple workshop sessions. Participants were 
also taken on boats trips in several groups to map resources, their uses and the 
location of conflicts [interviews 9, 25].
One may note, however, that during these first days, the originating alliance (the 
SRDF, the government and CANARI) had its leadership acknowledged and 
approved right from the start. The SRDF was indeed formally instated as the “lead 
institution”, while the Department of Fisheries and CANARI were to act as “joint 
facilitators”. The originating agents thus transformed their initial advantage of being 
the first movers into an institutional advantage that would last for the rest of the 
negotiation process.
In November 1992, a second large meeting was convened. Participants were asked to 
confirm the information on resources and conflict locations established during the 
first session. The point was to “reach agreement on all areas and issues for which 
agreement appeared relatively easy to reach”. Meanwhile, the most severe conflicts 
were identified “with the understanding that they would be addressed after the 
meeting” (Renard, 1996, p.4). These important issues included the location of marine 
reserves (around Gros Piton and Anse Chastenet), as well as regulations for land- 
based activities impacting the coast. Here started, arguably, a splitting process 
whereby decisions on tough conflicts were postponed and “discussed later” in a 
completely different setting -  which was far more opaque [interviews 28, 53, 56]. 
This displacement o f participation occurred gradually throughout the whole of 1993, 
after the heat of the initial 1992 “participatory consultations” had cooled off.
The main outcome of the November 1992 meeting had been the idea of a new zoning 
system specifying the various coastal uses and demarcating their exact boundaries. 
But how to define this zoning scheme in detail was another matter. Negotiations on 
conflictual places were transferred to another sphere that was much less public and 
transparent, through an accumulation of small practical changes and a more technical 
discourse.
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First, decisions were postponed to “other meetings and further discussions”. Various 
“working groups” were created with a more restricted membership and supposedly 
technical legitimacy. Time also proved an important factor in taming public 
involvement: the passing months eventually diverted most of the laypeople away 
from the negotiation, about which they would hear less and less and from an 
increasing distance [interview 28]. The frequency and attendance of public meetings 
sharply diminished and the space widened for well-organised interest groups to 
negotiate directly with the three leading organisations in charge. Unlike what 
happened with local fishers, the major hotels, dive operators and Anbaglo (St. 
Lucia’s diving association) held direct talks with the Department of Fisheries. 
Meanwhile, “key players in the community”, notably “business interests with major 
stakes in the outcomes of the negotiation process” held numerous discussions with 
the SRDF (Renard, 1996, p.4).
Another defining characteristic o f the 1993 “negotiations”, was the used of written 
“draft proposals” sent to stakeholders and to which they could only answer in written 
form. This formalisation of the discussion did not help the fishers contribute and 
make their voice heard -  as these men are often illiterate or do not have a good 
command of English. Moreover, few fishers can afford to invest their energy in a 
lengthy and formal dialogue. A form of “institutional power” was thus arguably 
exercised upon them by the fact that the CP process evolved into an institutional one. 
The intensity of their participation was thus radically weakened.
In the following extract, Renard (1996) recalls this second phase of the negotiation 
process. We underline noticeable techniques of formalisation and institutionalisation:
In a meeting o f March 1993 the Department o f Fisheries presented draft 
recommendations on zoning and regulations, which were discussed, modified and 
approved, [save for two decisions]. In conclusion, the meeting mandated a small 
working sroup to examine in more detail the outstanding matters, to conduct 
negotiation and to formulate recommendations. It was further agreed that all 
recommendations would be contained in an agreement, which would be drafted bv 
one of the facilitators and submitted for final review. [A new draft agreement was 
thus prepared and circulated]. Several institutions provided written comments, 
which were integrated in the subsequent versions o f the document”. (...) Then the 
SRDF convened a meeting with a small number of institutions to examine in greater 
detail the legal and institutional arrangements for the implementation o f that 
agreement. On [this basis], a final section o f the agreement was drafted. 
(Renard, 1996, p.4, underlining ours).
Renard only talks here about “institutions” responding to “proposals”, prepared by
other institutions, etc. By this point, laypeople had completely disappeared from the
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picture. Meanwhile, “working groups” and proposals drafted by the originating 
agents led the rest of the “discussion”. The use of working groups deserves special 
attention as it arguably muted the demands from fishers and thereby enabled potent 
polluters to avoid being inconvenienced by the SMMA.
The working group on “land-based pollution”, for instance, initially raised concerns 
about deforestation in the Soufriere district due to construction works (impacting 
costal zones through sedimentation), pesticide run-off from large agricultural 
properties, oil discharge from the gas station near the jetty, caustic waste from the 
copra factory and sewage and solid waste from yachts and the city of Soufriere itself. 
These issues, however, were never taken further as the working group did not offer 
any practical conclusion [interview 19]. Thus, nothing was done to include land- 
based polluters in the overall SMMA regulatory scheme, although this had been a 
clear initial demand from fishers. As for the working group on marine reserves, it 
was soon dominated in practice by environmentalist voices suggesting that the 
healthiest coral reefs should be set aside for conservation. This view suited divers 
and large hotels whose snorkelling clients would have access to these resources for a 
small fee [interview 57].
The need for these working groups was based on the notion that technical 
negotiations had to involve fewer and more expert people -  a discourse that emerged 
in the middle of the CP process and which gave a “privileged position” to certain 
actors. This is a telling instance of “productive power” through the use of technical 
and anti-political discourse, as defined in section 3.2.4.
In conclusion, the initial CP process soon lost its inclusiveness, scope and intensity. 
It essentially became an elite-centred deliberation with shared objectives among 
environmentalists and tourism businesses. The everyday fishers were confined to a 
purely consultative process, mostly held in 1992, the main outcome of which had 
been the identification of a set of “really difficult issues” -  settled through a vastly 
different process. This shift occurred due to forms of both institutional and 
productive power.
4.2.3. The “agreem ent”: excluding fishers from 60% o f the coast
After this deployment of “community participation”, a final “agreement” was 
reached in February 1994 (SRDF, 1994) and submitted to the government for
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approval in March by the Minister of Tourism. Its content clearly shows what stakes 
and interests were primarily taken into account. The Cabinet Conclusion 253/1994 
authorised demarcation of the proposed fishing priority areas and marine reserves. It 
also allowed the collection of fees from yachts and divers to finance the SMMA. The 
latter was thus created as a multiple-use marine protected area over 11 kilometres of 
coastline, from the shore to a depth of 75 meters, divided into the following zones:
. Marine Reserves are earmarked for the protection of their natural resources. They 
do not allow any extractive activity to take place. Entry is for a fee and by permit 
only -  whether it is for diving, snorkelling or research.
Fishing Priority Areas are dedicated to fishing activities, taking precedence over 
any other use.
Yacht Mooring Sites are designated for yachts and pleasure boats, without 
damaging sea-grass beds and coral reefs. A fee is charged for the use of the 
moorings that enable boats to stay overnight with minimal impact on the seabed.
Recreational Areas are terrestrial and marine areas, including beaches, reserved 
for public access and recreation such as swimming and snorkelling. Public access 
had to be maintained.
Multiple-Use Areas allow fishing, diving, snorkelling and other recreational uses.
Map 3 details this zoning. With its cheerful colours and beach umbrella icon, it 
nevertheless defines a strict distribution of costal spaces. As Chart 1 shows, in the 
SMMA scheme, fishers are barred from accessing 60% of the coastal space, whereas 
previously they had enjoyed use of most of this area. On the other hand, almost half 
of the coast is set aside for conservation, which allows divers and snorkelers free 
access, for a small fee. Only 24% of the space theoretically prohibits tourist activity. 
Map 3 shows that “recreational areas” open to tourists are dovetailed with almost all 
fishing priority areas.
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Map 3 -  Allocating user rights: the SMMA zoning map
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In the 1994 agreement, this unbalanced allocation of benefits and access rights to 
marine resources was not covered by any compensatory schemes -  such as Economic 
Demonstration Project, cash or kind payment or any other type of compensation for 
the fishers. The overall reaction of the fisher community to this agreement was one 
of utter shock, given the scale of their exclusion and the size of the marine reserves, 
but their concerns had been slightly tamed by a discourse that attempted to persuade 
them that the “reserves will make the fish” -  and that more reserves would mean 
more fish in the end, through a “spill over effect” [interview 29].
4.2.4. Conclusion
This section has shown that neither the origins of the SMMA nor its initial 
consultation process had a broad community base. The creation of a new coastal 
management scheme was advocated by an alliance of three actors with little 
connection to Soufriere’s fishers, but with strong interests in the development o f the 
tourism industry. Meanwhile, the choice of CP as the mode of action was favoured 
by the financial incentives offered by international donors. As for the preparatory 
process leading to the SMMA zoning map, this rapidly moved from a broad-based 
public consultation to an elite-centred negotiation, subject to the influence of several
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forms of institutional and productive power. This drove fishers out and protected 
land-based polluters from any involvement in the SMMA set of “rights and duties”. 
The resulting “agreement” was a “deal” concluded in the virtual absence of most of 
the fisher community and imposing no constraints on polluters. It basically prevented 
Soufriere fishers from accessing 60% of the coast. Under such a process, asserting 
the legitimacy of the SMMA as a community-based, democratic organisation was to 
prove impossible, as the 1997 events were to demonstrate.
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4.3. Early Implementation: the Dem ise o f the CP 
Ideal, R esistance and Politics
This section demonstrates that the newly created SMMA did not apply its proclaimed 
participatory philosophy to its practical functioning. First, the implementation of the 
original “agreement” within a precise “management plan” and institutional design 
was conceived outside of any real participatory context. Second, the first years of 
SMMA operations confirmed the limited inclusion of the poorer fishers in key 
decisions, leading to a growing discontent. Third, failing to institutionalise an 
ongoing participatory dialogue, the SMMA faced an increasingly politicised 
resistance: outright politics was eventually chosen as a VOICE strategy against a 
frustrating CP scheme, a game into which all stakeholders eventually entered in an 
attempt to gain the upper hand. What was then observed was a refusal of institutional 
participation -  considered as biased by fishers -  and recourse to political 
participation to force a renegotiation of the rules. This process of re-appropriation by 
the lower end of the community was opposed by waves of “scientific expertise” and 
lobbying from interest groups with influence in political circles. To support our 
claim, and re-examine the early years of the SMMA, we gathered and interpreted 
archives, a range of interviews [9, 13, 18, 19, 25, 27, 37, 48, 53], as well as accounts 
and analyses provided by Brown (1997), Sanderson and Koester (2000), Pierre- 
Nathoniel (2003) and Trist (2003).
4.3.1. Institutional design: CP for “experts”, authorities and tourism  
in terests
The February 1994 “agreement” was followed on September 21-23, 1994, by a three- 
day “implementation workshop” held at a luxury hotel in Soufriere. It led to the 
adoption of a “Management Plan for the Soufriere Marine Management Area”. This 
critical meeting was attended by 12 people, but these did not include one single 
fisher. There were 3 people from the government, 3 French co-operation 
representatives, 1 American donor, 1 from the SRDF, 1 from CANARI, 1 from the 
WWF as well as 2 scientists -  a marine biologist consultant and a university 
researcher (SMMA, 1994, Appendix 7). The decisions that followed were thus taken 
by a group made up of non-community actors, with a strong foreign component -
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even though experts, donors and NGOs. This is clear example of “domestic-global 
power formation”, as defined in section 3.1.6.
The first decision of the resulting management plan was to entrust the SRDF 
(essentially related to tourism interests as we showed) with the day-to-day running of 
the SMMA: the latter was even to be “a distinct programme of the Soufriere 
Foundation” (SMMA, 1994, p.4). The SRDF thus had responsibility to recruit and 
supervise all staff. Meanwhile, it had to report and work “under the guidance” of a 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). This committee was the mechanism 
supposed to ensure an inclusive and active participation of the community in 
decision-making, since it was meant to comprise “representatives from all major 
resource users and monitoring groups” (SMMA, 1994, p.24).
On the TAC, however, fishers were not only weakly represented, but also encircled 
by a large representation of tourism-related interest groups as well as public 
authorities, which also gave a strong backing to “modernisation through tourism” 
[interview 22]. The TAC thus included eleven people who directly represented 
private interests in the tourism sector, notably large hotel resorts, the St. Lucia 
Tourist Board, the St. Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association or the Day Charter Boat 
Association. A representative from the French donor also sat on the Committee, as 
well as environmental NGOs such as the St. Lucia National Trust and CANARI.
The only way fishers were ever represented on the TAC was through two people 
from the Soufriere Fishermen’s Cooperative, namely its president and (sometimes) 
its vice-president. This co-operative, however, grossly misrepresents the fisher 
community, which is far more socially diverse [interviews 16, 23, 29]. Its current 
president, whom we interviewed, was open about this fact explaining that less that 
30% of fishers in Soufriere own their boat, while 70% do not and have to rent them 
[interview 26]. On the other hand, members of the cooperative are all boat owners. 
“This is not a requirement, but just the situation”, as the president put it. It is 
however interesting to note that the primary goal o f the cooperative is to buy 
equipment and gas at a cheaper price, which mostly benefits off-shore fishers who 
own larger boats, compared to near-shore (and poorer) fishers. Moreover, not all boat 
owners are part of this cooperative and the involvement of the younger generations 
of fishers is particularly low. This organisation thus brings together a small group of
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relatively wealthier fishers, involved in deep-sea fishing and who are not dependent 
upon near-shore reef resources, unlike the rest of their community. In other words, 
the larger and poorer fraction of the fisher community had no say whatsoever on the 
TAC. From the start, institutional power was at work, through two modes of 
containment: encirclement and misrepresentation, as defined in section 3.1.7, Table 
5.
In May 1998, at a ceremony during which the SMMA was awarded an international 
prize for its “participatory work”, its manager gave a speech to thank “all important 
parties”. After the authorities, donors, scientist and other “facilitators” had been 
acknowledged, the very last person to be thanked was the president of the Soufriere 
Fishermen’s Cooperative. Here is what the SMMA manager said about him:
Last but not least, the person who always makes a very special effort... is Mr. Edward 
Mongroo, president o f the Soufriere Fishermen’s Cooperative. Not only has Mr. 
Mongroo proved to be a very engaged and vibrant TAC member, but he was also 
expected to fulfil a very difficult task, namely to “sell” the idea o f the SMMA to the 
Soufriere fishermen, [emphasis added]
These latter words are worth repeating: the president was expected to sell the idea to
the fishermen. Such a wording acknowledges that the SMMA was surely not an idea
of the fishermen, but also that the president of the Cooperative had been enrolled into
a specific and crucial job.
The SMMA staff also had to report once a month to a “Technical Working Group” 
(TWG) established by the TAC to “provide technical advice and guidance to the day- 
to-day implementation of activities” (SMMA, 1994, p.4). The composition of the 
TWG was even more restricted, comprising the manager of the SMMA, a CANARI 
representative, one from the Department of Fisheries and “other experts as required” 
{ibid., p. 14.). In these conditions, the CP process was further distanced from the 
community by a concentrated power formation of conservationist, governmental and 
tourism interests.
4.3.2. V anishing trust: the first year o f operation
In June 1995, the SMMA was formally inaugurated. For 18 months, a volunteer from 
the French cooperation52 took on the role of SMMA manager, until a permanent 
appointment was made. The influence of this key donor was thus guaranteed on an
52 French Mission for Technical Cooperation.
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everyday basis [interview 1]. Four marine rangers were hired, trained and assigned 
the responsibility of fee collection and surveillance through daily boat patrols. 
Marine reserve dive passes (for divers) and coral conservation fee (for the use of 
yacht moorings) were established and expected to bring in most of the operating 
budget.
Barred from 60% of the coast, and embroiled in an institutional process they did not 
in any way control, many fishers already felt that the “SMMA agreement” was 
sharply biased towards conservation and tourism. Moreover, soon after its inception, 
doubts about the collaborative spirit claimed by the SMMA started to grow in the 
community. It was felt that the Technical Advisory Committee was not properly 
representing the fishers’ interests. On top of this, more and more decisions began to 
be made outside the TAC itself, by small groups of people with even less 
transparency [interviews 24, 25, 32, 36].
To begin with, it was decided, with no apparent discussion, that part of a priority area 
dedicated to seine fishers was to be shared with yachtsmen, who thus gained the right 
to anchor in the sandy area on the grounds that access to an adjacent waterfront 
restaurant needed to be facilitated. This “arrangement” imposed a rotation allowing 
fishing activities only at certain hours, while permitting yachtsmen to anchor. Not 
only was this decision made behind closed doors, but rotations are hardly compatible 
with seine fishing. As one fisherman explained:
The fish has no watch! Who knows what time it is best for seine fishing? Only the fish!
[interview 23]
Fishers manifested their discontent but interviews confirmed that rotation still holds 
to date [interviews 23, 28]. This early disagreement was and still is deeply resented 
by fishers as a breach of the word given. They hoped that the few fishing areas left to 
them (less than a quarter of the coast) would be at least “sancturised”.
A comparable lack of negotiation characterised another important issue. As fishers 
were manifesting a growing discontent towards “so many marine reserves”, the 
SMMA tried to regain the trust of the community by acknowledging the losses of 
displaced fishers -  but only of the elderly ones. The latter’s lack of willingness or 
inability to take up alternative livelihoods was declared legitimate by the TAC, 
whereas this was not recognised as such for others. The Technical Working Group 
thus selected a small number of “old” fishers and gave them access to some sections
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of two marine reserves. Four “pots” (reef fish traps, cf. Photo 3) were tagged for each 
of twelve pot fishers, and one bottom gillnet for each of three gillnet fishers, with a 
plan to review the arrangement after three months. This selection process, however, 
did not prove transparent and no discussion was held with the wider fisher 
community. The selection of “old” fishers was resented as being inaccurate and 
unfair, and again led to open criticisms [interviews 4, 8].
Meanwhile, the “not so old” fishers were supposed to move to deep-sea rather than 
near-shore fishing but the capital needed for such a shift far exceeded (a different 
boat, a good engine, nets and fuel) what most fishers could afford. Moreover, moving 
to deep-sea fishing meant turning professional, while a large fraction of the Soufriere 
community had always relied on part-time reef fishing as a complementary source of 
revenue for their families, especially in difficult times.
In this context, the fishers were feeling increasingly threatened by the marine 
reserves, which had brought about a sharp and direct decline in fish catches. 
Proponents of the SMMA zoning had justified reserve areas on the grounds that they 
would increase fish stocks by allowing regeneration and repopulation -  from 
breeding to fishing grounds. But this spill-over effect was not being observed and 
fishers blamed the SMMA for unkept promises and betrayal.53 Disenchantment was 
high. In the fishers’ opinion, their livelihoods were directly compromised with the 
result that increasing numbers began to violate SMMA regulations, by using fishing 
gear in reserve areas.
Communication between the TAC and the fishing community had become almost 
inexistent [interviews 1, 8, 9], Contrary to what was agreed, those fishers affected 
were not present when decisions were taken. Poorer fishermen felt confused by the 
recurrent changes in access rights resulting from meetings they had not attended. 
Later on, non-attendance and misunderstanding “eventually became effective forms 
of resistance” (Trist, 2003, p.60).
53 It was probably unrealistic to have expected an increase in fish stocks within the first few years of 
establishing marine reserves. Moreover, reef destruction and sedimentation also occurred as a result of 
heavy rains in 1995 and 1996.
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4.3.3. R esistance and politicisation: fishers’ VOICE strategy in the second  
year
Feeling their livelihoods and identity endangered, the poorer fishers (i.e. the 
overwhelming majority) embarked on a process of active contestation. This emerged 
through active politics, outside of the SMMA and its governance structure. Faced 
with a frustrating participatory process, VOICE was chosen as their response 
strategy.
The widespread feeling that the SMMA had been created for the tourism industry 
and conservationist policies was backed by the apparent contradiction between the 
claims that marine reserves were meant to increase fish stocks, and the expectation 
that reef fishers should find other jobs. Finding new jobs in Soufriere, however, was 
not a viable option for most given the low levels of education, high unemployment 
and a lack of economic opportunities [interview 57].
In a spirit of compromise, the SMMA delivered some temporary access permits and 
interim agreements for short periods to access marine reserves. But these partial 
responses did not keep discontent under control. Zoning regulations were 
increasingly violated and non-compliance slowly became the rule. As for the SMMA 
manager, although he was getting his instructions from the TAC, he was directly held 
responsible by the locals and subjected to verbal and physical threats [interviews 1, 
8]. Marine rangers hired locally by the SMMA found themselves in a similar 
situation. As a fisher recalls:
This was unfair, as the [SMMA manager and marine rangers] were not the ones taking 
decisions, but these guys were the only incarnations of the SMMA people could see 
walking in the street and talk to. [interview 32]
An atmosphere of overt war began to develop among coastal stakeholders. 
Responding to fishers’ breach of marine reserves, divers reverted to their long­
standing habit of destroying fishing gear and pot traps found under water. As for 
yachtsmen, in this rising state of anarchy, they also began to dishonour previous 
arrangements and to anchor on fishing areas. In what seemed like a retaliation, 
robberies on yachts became increasingly frequent, so much so that Soufriere became 
known in the yachting sector as a place to be avoided for safety reasons. The 
pressure was also raised by the pervasive perception by lay locals that the “rich white 
tourists” -  and their service providers -  were the ones who benefited most from the 
zoning system in practice. It was noted, particularly, that divers and yachtsmen were
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inconsistently controlled and even less fined, while fishers were closely monitored. 
Rare cases of scuba diving gear being confiscated did little to change opinions on 
this “preferential treatment” [interview 32].
The situation was getting out of control. Initially, some policing efforts were made to 
enforce rules on fishers but they were soon abandoned, as matters became 
politicised. This recourse to politics was first started by fishers, who felt this was 
their last option. They managed to secure strong and open support from an important 
political figure, who was the representative of the Soufriere District at the St. Lucian 
Parliament. As national elections were approaching, the perceived injustices 
experienced by local fishermen turned into an acute national political issue. The 
SMMA and the Department of Fisheries became increasingly reluctant to confiscate 
the fishers’ equipment given this politicisation and the attention this was attracting at 
the national level. The legitimacy and credibility of the SMMA were directly 
challenged and, by the end of its second year, this unrest had almost destroyed the 
SMMA [interview 45].
4.3.4. Leaving the CP discourse behind: outright political fights
One of the most contentious issues was the use of the northern part of Soufriere 
Bay. The SMMA’s original agreement stipulated -  as a key concession to fishers -  
the relocation of an important yacht mooring site from the northern to the southern 
part of the Bay, near Malgretoute beach (cf. Map 3). However, this transfer 
unexpectedly resulted in a sharp decline in the number of yachts visiting Soufriere. 
The new anchorage space was less convenient for yachters and also seemed to leave 
boats more vulnerable to robberies. The pressure to restore Soufriere as a central 
yachting destination was mounting up across the whole island. The fishermen, 
meanwhile, were claiming that this Fishing Priority Area was critical to their 
continued existence and that any further negotiation on its enforcement was out of 
the question. The issue became a symbol of their livelihood, the cornerstone of their 
demands and embodied a last front of resistance “against the inexorable intrusion of 
tourism” [interview 56].
Nevertheless, the power game was unequal. Following intense lobbying of the 
yachting industry in the capital Castries, the Prime Minister of St. Lucia personally 
asked in December 1996 for the cooperation of fishermen, who were subsequently
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obliged to abandon their demand. In compensation they obtained a slight 
modification of some marine reserve boundaries. But the message was clear: high- 
level political intervention could circumvent “participatory agreements” made within 
the SMMA. This display of strength on the part of national business interests, as well 
as the parade of political and administrative connections, further upset local balances 
of power and put and end to the claim that zoning was being run according to 
community-consensus.
The fishermen, however, thought they would have their revenge as their situation had 
been largely debated and publicised during the 1997 general election campaign. 
While campaigning in Soufriere, the St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) candidate used the 
fishermen’s discontent to build up sizeable support and promised to bring them back 
lost fishing grounds. In May, following a landslide victory, the SLP returned to 
power after decades of national leadership under the United Workers' Party (UWP). 
The new government, personified in Soufriere by the parliamentary representative, 
became directly involved in SMMA matters. Since “their” party was now heading 
the country, fishermen felt that they no longer had to compromise with the SMMA 
and reverted to fishing in areas they had formerly used. They felt “strong enough to 
throw out the whole thing” [interview 51].
Matters, however, were not to end here. The new government’s position on 
Soufriere’s issues remained unclear for several months, as it was intensely lobbied by 
the same interest groups. To reinstate a working mechanism, several meetings took 
place over the summer, but the tension had still not reached its peak. The government 
was showing signs of internal strife. Influenced by the fishers’ view, the Department 
of Fisheries submitted a proposal to the prime minister to reinstate important sections 
of two marine reserves as fishing spaces (Gros Piton and Grand Caille ). It also 
pressed for the creation of a “total reserve” where no use whatsoever would be 
allowed: this was to appease the feeling that only fishers were bearing the cost of 
marine reserves and that these were “playgrounds for tourism businesses” 
[interview 31].
The backlash to this proposal, though, was swift and strong. Diving operators 
announced that they would stop paying entry fees [interview 20]. The French donor 
warned that it would suspend its financial backing. Pressure from “experts” also 
intervened, with the emergence of a strict environmentalist discourse in the media
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claiming that fishers had to be kept out. The national press seized on this debate. A 
furious article published in The Star on August 2 accused the Soufriere parliamentary 
representative of denying “a tide of scientific opinion”. The SMMA manager was 
removed and this organisation appeared to be “dead at last”. As Trist (2003, p.63) 
explains however, this was not the end of the matter. A few months later, after an 
outpouring of support from a coalition of businesses, environmentalists and 
researchers, the very same manager was re-appointed. In December 1997, the new 
government reinstated part of the Grand Caille marine reserve as a fishing area for 
pot fishing only. It left the Gros Piton reserve intact and agreed to pay financial 
compensation of EC $400 per month54 for one year to twenty older fishermen 
considered to have suffered the most from the loss of fishing space. As for the 
French donor, it agreed to support a range of initiatives to “modernise” the fishing 
sector.
Who was the ultimate winner of this political fight? The fishers had secured the 
modification of some reserve boundaries, one year of financial help for twenty of 
them and promises of new economic projects. But they had to accept yachts on 
spaces dedicated to fishing in the original “agreement”.
4.3.5. Conclusion
This section has shown how the implementation of the 1994 agreement had for the 
most part kept fishers out of decision-making processes. It also pointed up that tmst 
was further lost in the practical running of the SMMA. As a consequence, overt 
politics was the chosen option of frustrated stakeholders as an active VOICE 
strategy. As a supposedly “participatory institution”, the SMMA had failed to 
institutionalise dialogue, negotiation and consensus-building on an ongoing basis. So 
far the expectations of the critical narratives find themselves largely confirmed, 
regarding the origins, inclusiveness, scope, intensity and allocation of benefits of the 
CP scheme. At the beginning of 1998, however, having secured some compensation 
and promises through political strife, the fishermen seemed ready for a fresh start, 
while the SMMA renewed its commitment to “community participation”. Would this 
expectation be realised and politics be unnecessary thereafter?
54 Approximately 150 US dollars. There were also conditions attached to the stipend to discourage 
fishers from engaging in fishing activities in the marine reserves.
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4.4. The Second Phase: the “New SMMA”, a Change 
for the Same
Here we show that after intense political strife, the SMMA apparently reached 
calmer waters, but this was merely on the surface. Although stakeholder “clashes” 
have not, since then, been on the same scale as the 1997 crisis, the SMMA has not 
become any more participatory than before, and probably even less. From 1998 to 
2001, a lengthy “institutional review” was held to “fix problems identified during the 
crisis”, which led to the inception of a “new SMMA” -  as it called itself. This move, 
however, turned out to be no more than a “change for the same”, as one informant 
put it, as no attempt was made to address the frustrations or the institutional and 
productive power effects of the scheme. Since 2001, the distance between the “new 
SMMA” and the fishers has been growing, their concerns being rarely mentioned 
during board meetings.
4.4.1. A new power form ation w ith less rather than more CP
Given the political conflagration that had erupted in the space of a few years, a 
“comprehensive review” of the SMMA was carried out from November 1997 
following a formal request from the TAC in July. The Caribbean Natural Resources 
Institute (CANARI) was chosen once again as “facilitator” to lead its “renewal”, 
despite the failure of the “first version” of the SMMA, which it had largely designed. 
The ensuing institutional reworking took almost three years to be completed and 
approved by the government. This long drawn-out renewal is no proof of a dense 
participatory process, but rather of the “temporal sinking” of the negotiation process, 
much like the one that had already led up to the initial “agreement”. A series of 
stakeholder meetings probably took place over these years (although we found no 
archive to prove this), but what is certain is that the form they took was not as 
manifestly participatory as the initial 1992 process. In any case, an observer of the 
time acknowledged that, basically, “the new Agreement was negotiated among the 
members of the TAC” (Pierre-Nathaniel, 2003, p.35).
It was only in January 2001 that a “New Agreement to Manage the SMMA” was 
officially signed by the TAC members. What did this change? Instead of the 
“Technical Advisory Committee” (TAC), a more compact “Board of Directors” 
(BoD) was created, reduced from thirteen to eleven members. Second-rank public
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agencies were removed55 leaving governmental authority in the hands of the four 
ministries already present,56 to which was added the National Conservation 
Authority, primarily concerned with strict conservation. The representative of local 
businesses was removed and replaced by a representative of the Saint Lucia Hotel 
and Tourism Association -  the national lobby of the tourism sector.
Moreover, although it had been acknowledged during the “institutional review” that 
fishermen had not been properly represented on the TAC, no change was introduced 
to address this issue. Just as in the TAC, fishermen were to have one representative 
on the Board and this function continued to be occupied by the president of the 
Fishermen’s cooperative, who, as we have seen, had few connections with the mass 
of Soufriere’s fishers. Neither the TAC nor the Board has ever envisioned, for 
instance, working with a representative from the area of Soufriere town that 
concentrates most of the poorer fishers -  the so-called “Baron’s drive” area. Finally, 
it turned out that in practice even the president of the cooperative did not attend a 
number of board meetings, leaving this community totally un-represented 
[interview 24].
The new arrangement also allowed no room for the local business community to be 
on the board, as their representative was removed. Local owners of small hotels 
complained to the SMMA manager about this fact [interviews 12, 15]. Yet, there 
were outstanding issues to be resolved: tensions were appearing between the small 
hotel owners and cruise ships from the northern part of the island: the ships were 
disembarking large groups of sunbathers and snorkelers on beaches in the vicinity of 
hotels, leading to congestion and overuse of the near-shore. However, this lack of 
representation was never corrected and no proposal was put forward by the Board to 
address the matter. On the other hand, in 2006, the Board of Directors considered 
that the yachting industry had become so important that it needed to be brought in. 
This was done swiftly by adding a representative of the Marine Industry Association 
of St. Lucia (MIASL).
55 The Parks and Beaches Commission, the Marine Police Force Division and the Customs and Excise 
Department.
56 The ministries of Planning, Tourism, Agriculture (department of fisheries) and the St. Lucia Air and 
Sea Ports Authority.
57 Most of the SMMA revenues came from yachts.
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Thus, with the “new SMMA”, fewer rather than more representatives from the local 
community were invited to take part in decisions. However, although the directing 
mechanism was becoming smaller, this was to be offset by another provision of the 
new “agreement”: the creation of a “Stakeholder Committee” in the form of a broad- 
based advisory body with a large membership to ensure representation of all parties. 
It was meant to provide an ongoing forum for everyone to express their needs, views 
and concerns. According to the new institutional arrangement:
All major proposals for management and development...related to the SMMA, must be 
presented to the Stakeholder Committee for advice. Issues raised by the Stakeholder 
Committee must be considered by the Board of Directors. (SMMA, 2001, p.5)
This committee was meant to meet at least once per quarter but in fact only met three
times over the next eight years. In practice, thus, the Stakeholder Committee was non
existent. Moreover, an analysis of archived agendas of these three meetings shows
that they were precisely framed, pre-defined, and primarily made up of speeches by
the SMMA management and external scientists from various centers and universities
that approved of the marine reserves.
A 2008 evaluation of the SMMA carried out by a specialised consultancy firm on 
behalf of the FFEM, a French donor, did point out the irregular frequency of the 
“stakeholder meetings”. Strangely enough, however, this raises little concern in the 
eyes of evaluators:
The cooperation among resource users, institutional collaboration, active and 
enlightened local participation and equitable sharing o f benefits and responsibilities 
among stakeholders is shown by the existence of the SMMA in itself...Even if the 
stakeholder committee has never been really set up, the board of directors comprises 
the main stakeholders groups o f the area (FFEM, 2008, p.36).
Arguably, with the revamped SMMA, participation was not so much opened up to
the local community as to interest group at the national level or even beyond.
Excluding local fishers and local tourism businesses, CP in Soufriere served as a
means of re-nationalising local issues within a public/private co-management
scheme, while claiming to work with the local community. What took place may
have been a form of “co-management” but not between the national authorities and
the local community -  rather between authorities and economic interest groups that
needed to “fix” Soufriere in the “national interest”. Although this may not be
necessarily illegitimate, it surely does not fit the narrative of an inclusive community
participation, structured around bottom-up initiatives, wide and intense participation
and a balanced allocation of benefits. Co-management involving potent public and
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private domestic interests was also mixed with the on-going influence of 
international donors as well as environmental scientists and organisations.
The “power formation” that was becoming consolidated through the “new SMMA” 
thus seemed to include almost everybody, except the local community.
4.4.2. Re-allocating benefits w ith com pensations? H elping ... the  
w ealth iest
The political struggle of Soufriere’s fishermen had led to promises of 
“compensation”. The government and the SMMA thus developed socio-economic 
schemes with the financial support of the French donor (Pierre, 2000; Sanderson and 
Koester, 2000; Pierre-Nathoniel, 2003). The central idea was to provide incentives 
for fishers to move away from the near-shore areas, in an effort to modernise the 
sector into “deep-sea fishing”. However, as we show, in practice these schemes 
mostly benefited fishers who had already engaged in deep-sea fishing, instead of 
helping traditional fishers change their activity. On the whole, they did not provide 
substantial compensation for the fishers most affected by the SMMA zoning.
First, some training was offered to interested fishers to help them switch to deep-sea 
fishing, notably on how to construct and operate tuna long-lines. This was primarily 
aimed at young fishers who were willing and able to engage in a different technique. 
Sample gear for this type of fishing was made available and a short-term project ran 
for a few months. A less intensive training also ran for another year. However, 
capital remained the main constraint on fishers as deep-sea fishing requires buying a 
new boat and nets, a more powerful engine and regular fuel refills, all of which most 
people in this community cannot afford [interviews 35, 56].
To make some capital available to fishers, it was decided to buy back gillnets used in 
reef fishing, in the hope that funds from the sale would be used to invest in 
equipments for deep-sea fishing. A Board decision was made to prohibit the use of 
such gillnets from August 1998, while compensating fishers for their equipment. 
Nineteen gillnets were consequently purchased by the SMMA. Meanwhile, with the 
support of French money, an investment fund was established in 1999 to assist 
fishers in obtaining loans to start up deep sea fishing - or tourism activities. Under 
the project, fishers could be provided with a grant, but this could only cover 20% of
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the required funds.58 A number of fishers submitted projects but the scheme did not 
prove successful: long delays in the receipt of funds led to a loss of interest 
[interview 28].
Finally, to encourage near-shore fishers to divert their activity offshore, Fish 
Aggregating Devices (FADs) were built and deployed off the Soufriere’s coast. 
FADs are floating mechanisms that act as fixed shelters for migrating pelagic fish: 
small fish congregate around the FADs in search of food which then attracts larger 
predatory fish, thus reducing the time and cost of hunting for fish offshore. These 
structures have been used in many places around the world to encourage traditional 
near-shore fishers to move offshore. The point was also to provide a viable fishing 
site during the second half of the year when the migratory pelagics are scarce and 
fishers tend to focus on near-shore areas. However, the initial deployment of FADs 
in Soufriere was unsuccessful as individuals from outside the community reportedly 
stole parts of the equipment.
In a nutshell, the financial barrier of the initial start-up capital was never really lifted 
for fishers, so the goal of moving the community towards deep-sea fishing remained 
elusive. Meanwhile, the FADs proved useful for the wealthiest fishers, such as the 
members of the cooperative already engaged in deep-sea fishing [interview 21]. The 
same can be said of further projects financed by the French cooperation that mostly 
served the interest of the higher end of the fisher community. This included the 
construction of a small jetty completed in 1998 near a gasoline station to facilitate 
fuelling prior to offshore fishing expeditions. The jetty also facilitated off-loading on 
return from these trips. An ice machine was also provided to the Fishermen’s 
Cooperative, to ease situations where catches were unpredictably large and avoid 
unnecessary wastage. Yet, all of these initiatives did nothing to change the lives of 
the poorer fishers.
4.4.3. Fisherm en’s issues: the growing lack o f Board interest
Board minutes show that during the years 2001-2008, there were relatively few 
discussions among SMMA directors about fishermen’s issues. This is striking 
compared with the central place this community had taken in the early and stormy
58 The grant could not exceed EC$ 6,000 (approximately USD 2,000).
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life of the SMMA. However, this does not mean that things were going smoothly for 
fishers or that they were getting efficient help from the SMMA in adapting to the 
zoning scheme. Our interpretation is rather that the fishers were no longer able to 
influence the Board agenda. The only issues they briefly managed to raise were 
never dealt with in any depth.
The most notable issue was the recurring concern over the functioning of the Fishing 
Aggregating Devices, which were supposed to divert pressure away from near-shore 
resources. Vandalism, strong currents and heavy boat traffic gave them a relatively 
short lifespan. The Board held rare discussions about how to help the fisher 
community to renew these devices, but a sustainable financing mechanism has never 
been put into place, so that at the time of fieldwork (summer 2008), no FAD was 
actually functioning. The fact is that the SMMA Board never envisaged that its 
revenues (drawn from yacht, diver and snorkeler fees) could be used to invest in the 
renewal of the FADs.
Second, it was suggested at a 2001 board meeting that the SMMA set up a pension 
fund for the Soufriere fishermen and that contact with the National Insurance 
Scheme (St. Lucia’s social security) should be established to discuss possibilities and 
technicalities. But the proposal was soon dropped and did not reappear on the board 
agenda in later years.
Finally, a brief tension in 2005 proved that the balance of power had definitely 
shifted away from the fishers and that politicisation was no longer a winning 
strategy, even regarding the issues of the marine reserves. During the autumn of that 
year, a fisherman was reproved by SMMA rangers for setting more than three fish 
traps in the Grand Caille Marine Reserve -  an area that had been reopened to pot 
fishing since 1997. The fisher alerted the District representative, who questioned the 
legality of restricting the number of fish traps being set in any area. He noted that no 
such stipulations had been laid down in the Cabinet conclusion of 1997 granting 
access to the Grand Caille reserve. Despite this, the Board, and particularly the 
Department of Fisheries, insisted that the re-opening of the marine reserve for fishing 
was supposed to accommodate only “a selected group of fishers”, but this 
specification came in fact “out of the blue”. The Board thus rejected the plea of the 
cautioned pot fisher and District representative. It was further decided that the Grand 
Caille Marine Reserve was to “stay clear from pot fishing as far as possible”. This
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radical re-writing of the 1997 agreement showed quite clearly where power now was. 
The notion of a “selected group of fishers” had only been used to set up a financial 
scheme to compensate the older displaced fishers -  something which has thus 
nothing to do with the reopening of marine reserves. Yet, the Board got away with 
this shift and the fisher community increasingly lost its will to oppose such 
manoeuvres [interviews 53, 57].
The fishers’ estrangement from the SMMA was confirmed by direct observation 
during a “community event” prepared and advertised by the organisation to celebrate 
both the SMMA’s anniversary and the “International Year of the Coral Reefs”. A 
half-day meeting to which the whole community was invited was thus set up, 
boasting a local music group and free food and drinks. As it turned out, however, not 
one single local attended beyond the SMMA staff, a few board members and some 
officials from Castries. Witnessing this event, gave us a keen sense of the 
organisation’s isolation within the community.
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4.5. Conclusion
This chapter has shown that despite much talk and celebration of “community 
participation”, the SMMA was neither originated by -  nor connected to -  a wide 
section of the local community. It is more the embodiment of a power formation that 
brings together a set of interest groups at the national level as well as foreign experts, 
NGOs and donors. Its divorce from the coastal fishers -  who are nevertheless its 
natural and primary stakeholders -  has been fast, and the inclusiveness, scope and 
intensity of their participation has totally collapsed. It was not through a participatory 
institution but rather through political strife and a VOICE strategy that the poorer 
fishers were able, at one point in time, to make their critical interests heard. The 
myth of “ongoing institutional dialogue” has been maintained throughout in project 
documents, donor evaluations and policy statements, but this does not fit what is 
observed on the ground and in the project’s history. Nowadays, although CP in 
Soufriere is still praised by international donors and environmental circles, it has 
taken on a totally minimal form with almost no input from locals, as is evidenced by 
the fact that no “stakeholder meetings” are held despite clear written rules.
The SMMA experience thus widely confirms the empirical expectations of the 
critical narrative of the CP discourse, as summarised in Table 6 of the previous 
chapter. Not only were the participatory scheme’s origins essentially based “above 
and outside” the local community, but its inclusiveness was narrow and elite- 
centered, its scope restricted, its intensity at most “consultative” and the allocation of 
benefits objectively unbalanced and never significantly compensated.
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Chapter 5 - The Effect of CP in Soufriere: Social 
Control, Commodification and Weaker Social Capital
The previous chapter analysed the origins, inclusiveness, scope, intensity and the 
allocation of benefits of the SMMA’s participatory process. In doing so, it largely 
confirmed the empirical expectations of the critical narrative on the global CP 
discourse. To further compare expectations to observations, we now focus on the 
SMMA’s impact on the social fabrics of the local community. First, we look at 
changes in social control, namely the way certain people have seen their behaviours 
increasingly framed and contained, while others have been left unmonitored and 
unquestioned. Second, we argue that this new balance of social control has 
underpinned a continuous process of commodification making Soufriere’s spaces and 
people more tradable assets on the international tourism market. Third, and finally, 
we investigate how the CP process has interacted with the social capital of the 
community -  its fragmentation, the inability of the weaker locals to deal with 
institutions and their psychological withdrawal from “the system” -  or “Babylon”, 
the “unfair modem world”. We show that although the critical narrative is once more 
largely corroborated when it comes to expected effects, the mechanisms at work are 
far more local and less pre-determined than this narrative typically expects.
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5.1. D ifferentiating Social Control: Containing a 
Group, Sparing Others
In a formal presentation delivered in December 2008, a consultant commissioned by 
the French donor to evaluate the SMMA somewhat jokingly stated with a smile that 
“the basic problem of the SMMA was to get the fishers out”. When asked to 
comment on what he had just said, the man was visibly ill at ease. This slip of the 
tongue provides, we shall argue, an important insight into what the SMMA is 
essentially about: clearing the ground of fishers and accommodating more “modem” 
activities. The primary impact of the SMMA has indeed been a change in the balance 
of social control weighing upon coastal user groups. The pattern that emerged is one 
of active containment of the poorer fishers and of selective oblivion benefiting 
tourism-related actors. In section 3.1.7, we defined containment as the management 
o f CP so as to maintain control over certain target groups and avoid, block or 
minimise their disruption o f  other goals.59 As for selective oblivion, we may define 
it, in a mirror fashion, as a type of management o f CP that leaves certain groups out 
o f reach o f regulatory practices and concerns. Containment does not necessarily 
refer to the conscious will of given actors, but the observable effects of practices at 
work. The same can be said of selective oblivion. As we shall see, the challenges 
faced by the SMMA staff over the years have all manifested the effectiveness of this 
CP scheme in framing spaces and people for tourism development but much less so 
in securing environmental commitments from large tourism businesses -  which seem 
to operate with impunity.
Here, we first look at the practice of spatial zoning enforced by the SMMA, to point 
to its imbalances and relentless action to “bring the fishers to order” while paying 
much less attention to other coastal users. Then we show that the use of both hard 
and social sciences has underpinned an epistemic exclusion of the poorer fishers from 
legitimate discourses: “expert views” constantly de-legitimised the fishers’ 
perceptions through the exercise of anti-political productive power. Third and 
finally, we argue that some interest groups have been exempted de facto from any 
regulation although they do in fact have a powerful impact the coral reefs. Some
59 This definition draws on Few (2003, p.23, p.32).
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have even been able to operate while not complying with their financial duties 
towards the SMMA.
5.1.1. Compulsory power: the increased spatial control o f fishers
The containment of fishers has a strong spatial dimension linked to the use of 
compulsory power -  through constraints and incentives.
To start with, the central clause of the SMMA agreement was its zoning map, which 
defines what actors and activities may access what part of the coast (cf. Map 3, 
Chapter 4). To use the words of Pugh (2005, p.315), this type of map is a “way of 
visualising a field to be governed”: not only what is to be considered normal or 
abnormal, but what is to be improved, monitored, surveyed, etc. It is about setting up 
barriers and procedures of control, splitting up spaces legally, functionally and 
symbolically, bringing people into dedicated zones and making sure that “bodies”, as 
Foucault would have it, are in their correct places. The SMMA is an obvious 
example of this. As Pugh also formulates, the zoning map “signifies and places 
bodies in particular positions, partitions, isolates and distributes them, whilst defining 
the instrumental modes of intervention that they are to be subjected to” (p.315).
The first and most visible sign of containment lies in the fact that the SMMA zoning 
has been very strictly and consistently enforced upon the fishers, through various 
material and procedural means, whereas this is much less the case for other actors 
[interview 19]. In its everyday functioning, the balance of control is tilted towards a 
greater freedom given to the tourism industry -  notably divers, yachts and snorkelers. 
There are several daily boat patrols whose main task is to check that fishers keep out 
of the marine reserves and respect the rules of other zones. On the other hand, in 
what seems to be a case of selective oblivion, the SMMA management plan contains 
no formal procedures for checking the number of divers in authorised areas -  notably 
in marine reserves (Pugh, 2005). As for yachts, while patrols do collect their entrance 
fees in the SMMA zone, problems continually arise over their mooring location, 
leading to ongoing tensions with fishers. This situation was confirmed during 
fieldwork by many interviewees including the president of the co-operative who 
acknowledged that the “yachts, divers and tourists are violating the law” 
[interview 26]. Tourist boats, for instance, still station in fishing priority areas and 
divers still cut authorised iron pots to let the fish out.
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Mechanisms of spatial exclusion are thus resented as deeply unbalanced. A 
fisherman explains:
The marine reserves? They are just against us [fishers]. Just to prevent me from doing 
what my parents did before me [fishing]... In the SMMA, there is always room for 
yachts and divers. They do what they want. Have you heard of a boat, a diver or a 
hotel that was fined? Have you a heard of a tourist or a researcher that could not go in 
the marine reserves? Me, no. [interview 25]
The spatial containment of fishers was also observable in the construction of a
“fisher market” by the SMMA in 1998. Although it may seem curious at first, this
initiative was not supported by the fishers [interview 43]. Traditionally, the latter sell
their fish from push-carts, around the town, on spots chosen on the waterfront or on
the roadside. For fishers, a static location means much greater competition with one
another. It also means that people wishing to purchase have to go to a specific place,
rather than being served at their convenience -  which had been the traditional way in
Soufriere. This imposed process of spatial concentration led to a great deal of
resistance, but the market was built nonetheless. As one fisherman put it:
[The market] was not done with the fishers, but against them... They did not want to 
see fishers wandering around selling fishes. It does not look clean to them. They 
wanted to "clean ” the town. The deal was: we build a "clean area ”, but we do not 
want you elsewhere, [interview 23]
What calls attention in this statement is the repetition of this anonymous “they”.
When asked to expand on it, the interviewee referred to a mix of:
Government and businesses [that] want to fix the town, to make it look like the tourists 
want! [interview 23]
To date, the spatial control of fishers seems to be an unfinished but ongoing process. 
At the time of the fieldwork, the government had just sold eight hectares of the 
Malgre Tout beach (cf. Map 3, Chapter 4) to an international group, specialised in 
the construction and running of vast luxury resorts. Not only had a public beach been 
sold without any local consultation, but as part of the project, the dismantling of the 
town’s fisher area (Baron’s Drive) had been discussed: this area, with its prime 
waterfront location, is now meant to be “cleaned up” and transferred to a new in-land 
development, north of Soufriere, out of the tourists’ view. Fisher families are 
extremely upset about this prospect. Beyond their attachment to “their” traditional 
area, they ask simple questions such as: “where are we going to put our boats?” 
[interview 32], Just as with the fisher market, the “deal” that is being imposed upon 
fishers seems to be “cleaner, safer facilities” in exchange for “fewer fishers in the
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streets and on the coast”, as an interviewee bluntly put it. When we left Soufriere, a 
Northern American consultant had started to work on this urban transfer, causing 
much emotion in the Baron’s drive community.
5.1.2. Productive power: scientific discourses, anti-politics and epistem ic  
exclusion
Epistemic exclusion was defined in section 3.1.7 (Table 5) as a mode of social 
control through which a certain group is excluded from the production of legitimate 
knowledge. As for anti-politics, this refers to the suppression of legitimate options 
through the recourse to “expertise” -  a form or productive power (cf. 3.2.4). In the 
SMMA process, the management of knowledge proved an important tool of 
containment, drawing on both hard and social sciences to de-legitimise claims by 
poorer fishers: in these discourses, fishing needed to be drastically reduced on social 
and scientific grounds, whereas tourism did not.
The use of “hard science”
As Trist (2003) explains, behind the disputes between tourism and fishing interests 
were unresolved questions regarding the causes of degradation in the marine 
environment. Historical data on Soufriere’s fisheries is limited, which means that the 
interrelation between ecological factors is still not well understood.
At the time of the SMMA preparatory process, and even today, few fishermen 
accepted that fishing practices were responsible for declining catches or that their 
traditional gear posed a serious threat to coral reefs. Many think that yacht anchors 
have done much more damage to coral than fish-pots or gillnets ever have. Many 
fishermen still consider pot fishing to be relatively benign because of its simple 
technology and intermittent use [interviews 2, 23]. Trist (2003, p.58) quotes a long­
term observer of Soufriere’s fishing industry working for the Organisation of 
American States, who shares the fishers’ view:
Pot fishing can't destroy a fishing bank, not the way [fishers] practice it....It has been 
done the same way for ages.
Although there was no shortage of scientific evidence pointing to the strong need to 
control the impact of coastal constructions, as well as of divers and snorkelers on the 
coral reefs (e.g. Barker & Roberts, 2004), these findings have been much less 
publicised that those in favour a restriction of fishing activities.
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In 1995, a heavy scientific apparatus began to gain a footing in the SMMA with the 
support of several foreign universities and research groups. One of them was directed 
by Pr. Callum Roberts, an internationally known biologist and a vocal supporter of 
marine protected areas. From the start, Roberts wanted to focus on the impact of 
overfishing in Soufriere. His team claimed that the system of marine reserves could 
be expected to show benefits to the fishers within two to five years, if “illegal 
fishing” was kept to a minimum, through a spill-over effect upon fish catches. This 
scientific take-over of the SMMA was furthered in 2001 when Roberts’ team found a 
“significant increase in reef catches” (Roberts, et al., 2001). They based their 
analysis on a comparison between catches in 1995-1996, when the SMMA was just 
established, with catches five years later. This study was much publicised by the 
SMMA staff. It notably contends that “interviews with local fishers showed that most 
felt better off with reserves than without”. However, a careful look at their data 
(p. 1922) shows that out of seventy-one fishers interviewed, only a third positively 
declared that “fisheries improved”, while two-thirds did not. Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that neither the scientific article, nor the opinion piece published 
by the SMMA manager in a national newspaper,60 factually quoted any fisher as 
being happy with the change. Although increases in catches between 1995 and 2001 
may be a scientific fact, it could be attributed to many causes, especially as the reefs 
were recovering from hurricane damage and yachts had stopped anchoring over 
corals [interview 45].
The use of “social sciences”
Epistemic exclusion can also be observed with the launch of a social survey meant to 
assess perceptions of the SMMA by “the local community” (SMMA, 2007)61. This 
study, based on 186 interviews carried out in Soufriere in 2005 provides a largely 
favourable picture. However, although its stated objectives include the analysis of 
“differences of stakeholder perceptions”, little was done to bring to the fore the view 
of the people most concerned by the SMMA. In fact, the study averages out local 
perceptions with a large volume of opinions from people who are only distantly 
concerned with coastal resources. The survey uses few means to assess the socio­
economic impact of the SMMA on the poorer part of the fisher population, whose
60 The Voice, 11 October 2001.
61 Although interviews for the study were carried out in 2005, the report was published in 2007.
Chapter 5 -1 9 2
voice is diluted and quasi-invisible in the study. Out of 186 interviewees, only 37 
were fishers. More importantly, there is no way in the raw data of knowing whether 
they are boat owners, deep-sea fishers or simple pot fishers. In other words, it is 
impossible to ascertain exactly who, within the fisher community, is represented in 
these interviews. The archives we had access to show that the original survey 
questionnaire had envisioned a full section with details on fishers. However, for 
unknown reasons, these questions were not asked during data collection 
[interview 3].
Nevertheless, a look at the raw data reveals the deep gap that still exists in 2005 
between the SMMA and the fisher community. Only 54% of fishers declared their 
familiarity with the SMMA and almost none was able to state the basic functions of 
its board, providing at best comments such as: “I heard about them but I don’t know 
them or what they do”. Further comments include: “the SMMA should contribute 
more to the lives of the fishermen”; “they give the sea to the tourists”; “the SMMA 
makes too much money and does not spend it in the community”. As far as can be 
inferred from board minutes, these findings were not discussed in the following 
board meetings.
Even more disturbing is the direct contradiction between the survey’s raw data and 
Robert’s 2001 findings on the biological effectiveness of SMMA reserves in 
improving fish stocks. The data in fact show that the fishers feel that the health of 
fish has sharply decreased over the previous ten years.62 How can this perception by 
primary marine resource users be reconciled with Robert’s scientific findings?
Finally, when it comes to identifying the main threats to marine resources, the survey 
shows that fishers overwhelmingly believe that the principal causes are the 
unregulated littering and untreated sewage, as well as the impact of yacht anchors. 
The result is the same in the whole survey sample, showing that the general 
population does not even place “overfishing” among the five most important threats 
to the coral reefs.
All of this shows the strong discrepancy between the “scientific discourse” 
(developed about and by the SMMA) and the perceptions of both the fishers and the 
wider Soufriere community. This should have raised questions about the relevance of
62 On a scale from 3 (excellent) to 0 (poor), they evaluate this change from 2,5 to 0,9. A pure collapse, 
in other words.
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making fishers the primary target of Soufriere’s conservation strategy. The fishers 
we met during fieldwork in 2008 often spoke out against foreigners who “come with 
their knowledge” and “disregard fishers’ views” [interview 28]. One even had this 
strikingly philosophical sentence: “knowledge cannot come from one side only” 
[interview 27].
5.1.3. Structural power: financial and environm ental im punity
Most actors related to the tourism industry -  hotel resorts, dive operators, boat tour 
and construction companies -  have tried to escape their financial and environmental 
duties implied by the creation of the SMMA, and often successfully. This has led to 
much frustration on the part of the SMMA staff, which feels fooled by people who 
strongly benefited from its work [interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10]. It is not easy, at first, to 
understand why the actors who stand to benefit from the SMMA’s control of fishers 
would not play their part to support its operations. But a deeper analysis suggests at 
least three sets of reasons: 1) a tactic of maintaining pressure and a means of 
influence on the SMMA due to the latter’s financial dependency; 2) their business 
identity as profit-makers with tough management practices in which no savings are 
unimportant; 3) the desire to assert a structurally strong position whereby significant 
economic players on the island do not have to deal with any form of local authority. 
All of this, arguably, displays features of structural power whereby economic 
hierarchies are actively re-affirmed.
Here, we first explore the SMMA’s financial dependency on the tourism industry to 
show how it has been amplified by a low compliance with the agreed payments. We 
then argue that despite dedicated efforts, the SMMA staff has never had any impact 
on the behaviour of land-based polluters.
The financial impunity of tourism businesses
Since its inception in 1994, the SMMA has pursed an objective of financial self- 
sufficiency but has never firmly reached it [interview 2]. The revenue base of the 
organisation is made of fees taken from yachts (through a coral conservation fee for 
the use of special mooring buoys) as well as divers (in the form of daily or yearly 
permits). From 2001, permits for snorkelers were also created. SMMA income thus 
closely depends on the number of tourists entering in the SMMA zone -  and more
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precisely, on tourism businesses (hotels, boat tours...) complying with the 
compulsory purchase of these permits for their clients
Since its creation, the SMMA has run a net operational deficit for about half of the 
time, depending on the year. From 1997 to 2007, available data show an average 
annual increase of 2% for yachts entering the SMMA and 7% for divers. But these 
figures hide significant fluctuations, following global trends in the tourism industry 
and rises in oil prices, making St. Lucia a more expansive destination. To date, 
financial concerns are still a permanent focus of board discussion, not only because 
the SMMA has had to live with the ups and down of the tourism industry, but also 
because it has encountered a constant reluctance on the part of key hotel resorts and 
diving and snorkelling operators to pay the agreed fees on time [interviews 2, 4]. The 
SMMA was supposed to operate on a pre-payment fee-system for all-inclusive 
hotels, as well as on permit books provided up-front to dive operators, with payment 
to be collected at a later date. As it turned out, this system was never properly 
implemented.
First, lengthy delays in payments (relating to diving and snorkelling permits) have 
been experienced with two large hotel resorts. Although a compensation deal was 
reached some years ago with one of them, the other still was in 2008 far from willing 
to pay what it owed. Meetings with the resort owner have been regularly delayed or 
cancelled, despite numerous letters. As the SMMA accountant explains:
Some hotel resorts have huge sums o f money overdue for a long time, with this type of 
excuses: “call next week and the cheque will be ready”; “oh sorry, the accountant is 
not in today, call next week”, etc. An important part of my job is to call these resorts 
and try to get them to pay. I t’s exhausting and not effective, [interview 2]
The situation has not proved any better with divers and snorkelers arriving on day
charters and boat tours from Castries. Marine rangers have been encountering
tremendous problems with the collection of snorkelling fees [interviews 5, 6, 10]. It
appears that unless rangers actually check up on boats, the required tickets are
generally not issued. The same behaviour is observed among diving operators, which
tend to save tickets to re-use for other dives when there are no patrols around. Letters
were sent to operators in Castries reminding them about regulations, but these efforts
have only led so far to temporary results.
The SMMA staff works hard to ensure tourism is not disrupted in the zone. They 
thus resent this permanent financial stress as an “unfair humiliation” [interview 8].
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Its manager often reported the situation to the Board stating that there is “very little 
support from the various recreational user groups” in the implementation of 
regulations [interview 1], But this has never led to any change. No system of fines 
was ever adopted to increase pressure on hotels or dive operators. Moreover, no help 
was ever provided by the board member organisation in this power game.
The environmental impunity of land-based polluters
Land-based pollution is an important issue in the Soufriere coastal area. Siltation into 
the sea is clearly visible after each downpour of rain as tons of coloured sediments 
enter the bay. This sedimentation, which causes corals to die, is caused by activities 
that increase natural erosion, such as the construction of hotels and private houses 
near the shores, sand-mining and deforestation. Moreover, agricultural pollutants and 
unmanaged liquid wastes from the town, hotels, yachts and a coconut factory also 
result in ongoing water pollution and in the development of algae that kill corals 
[interview 1].
This situation had been acknowledged in the SMMA 1992 participatory process from 
the outset. Early consultation had indeed led to the conclusion that “zoning was not 
the only [needed] management instrument, [so] much broader measures and solutions 
[were to be sought]” (Renard, 1996, p.5). Nevertheless, no serious procedure for 
controlling and acting against land-based pollution was ever designed. As an 
informant explains:
This responsibility stayed ‘‘up in the air”, or more precisely lay with the central
ministries, which proved to be about the same, [interview 40]
Zoning was thus the only real SMMA instrument, but one that does little for land- 
based issues. A space for environmental impunity was thus inherent in the initial 
SMMA design. Meanwhile, constructions around Soufriere for hotel development 
increased sharply over the years. For instance, the Anse Chastanet resort undertook 
works in the Trou Diable area (cf. Map 3, Chapter 4), which has critical 
sedimentation problems impacting coral reefs. Sediment traps and a drainage system 
were eventually put into place but they appeared inadequate during heavy rainfalls. 
Moreover, hills and slopes were being cleared and soil erosion was becoming 
intense. Concerns also emerged about another large resort, the Jalousie Hilton, which 
started refurbishment after a hurricane: although strong rains were expected, the 
contractor did not consider installing siltation mitigation devices. In 2004 and 2005,
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there were also reports of a suspected discharge of sewage by Jalousie into the 
adjacent bay. Another issue that emerged was that of sand mining at beaches and 
river areas [interview 18]. Rivers play an important role in supplying sand to beaches 
and the near shore and the removal of sand from river mouths is not thus a 
sustainable practice. It also impacts seine-net fishermen who consequently sent 
complaints to the SMMA. Photos were circulated showing mining activities at the 
Soufriere river mouth and the ravine at a northern beach.
On all these issues, the SMMA has been largely left on its own [interview 1]. It never 
managed to mobilise effective support from central authorities, such as the National 
Conservation Authority (NCA). The latter’s extension officer in Soufriere had even 
granted various permissions to mine sand from beaches and rivers in the area... Left 
to its own devices, the SMMA tried to negotiate with hotels and construction 
companies -  but more issues were constantly appearing, such as the building on 
protected lands of private homes by foreigners, who proved almost impossible to 
contact. The SMMA manager became actively and personally involved in monitoring 
construction projects around Soufriere, trying to raise awareness and commitment 
through frequent meetings and warning letters. Marine rangers were also asked to 
monitor such actions as illegal deforestation between the two Pitons, a UNESCO 
world heritage site [interview 10].
The SMMA’s powerlessness shows to what extent the structure lacks the political 
and administrative weight to be heard by economic actors. Several informants also 
pointed to ongoing corruption issues at higher levels of the state, as well as “friendly 
connections” between politicians and businessmen. For this reason, and to denounce 
environmental scandals, the SMMA manager now often reverts to unofficial means 
of advocacy, such as the circulation of anonymous emails and telling photographs, 
rather than relying simply of the SMMA’s means and authority [interview 1].
Some people believe that market forces may do the job better than regulations. In 
August 2006, for instance, after years of infringement of sewage laws, the Jalousie 
resort installed two 20,000-gallon tanks so that used water could be collected and 
pumped for irrigation purposes. However, interviews suggested that this outcome 
was merely due to growing demand of the international market of luxury holidays 
[interview 22]. Jalousie could no longer run the risk of an environmental scandal,
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especially in the UNESCO world heritage site, in which it operates and which is the 
keystone of its marketing strategy.
5.1.4. Conclusion: m ultiple m odes o f containm ent at work
“Participatory processes are reworked to suit the ends of industry and other powerful 
groupings -  notably that of increasing control over local people”. This comment 
made by Hidlyard et al. (2001, p.60) regarding CP in forest management in India 
largely mirrors our analysis of the SMMA. The increased social control over fishers 
in Soufriere has relied upon very diverse modes of containment which Table 8 
summarises drawing on the typology defined in section 3.1.7 (Table 5).
Table 8 -  Modes of containment in Soufriere
Modes Examples in section
Alliance Interest groups related to tourism partnered with public authorities and environmentalists to set up the SMMA.
4.2.1
Biased
implementation
The zoning system and monitoring and sanction mechanisms 
preferentially worked against a target group (fishers) while 
sparing others.
5.1.1
Compromise Several modifications of the fishing priority areas and of the marine reserves show a capacity for temporary compromise.
4.3.3
Encirclement
Analysis of the TAC and the Board has shown that fishers are 
“encircled” by a variety of other interest groups related to 
economic development through tourism.
4.3.1
Epistemic
exclusion
During the initial consultation, certain scientific views rather 
than others were put forward. More pressure was placed on 
fishers than on land- based polluters, yachters and divers.
5.1.2
Institutionalisation 
andformalisation
The creation of the SMMA per se was a way of 
institutionalising conflicts. Use of written drafts. “Temporal 
sinking” through lengthy negotiation processes.
4.2.2
Skewed
representation
Over 14 years of SMMA operations, the fishermen were 
represented on the TAC and the Board only by the president of 
the Soufriere Fishermen’s Association -  to which the 
overwhelming majority of the fishermen do not belong.
4.3.1
Selective oblivion The SMMA management plan contains no procedure for controlling water-polluters or divers.
5.1.1
Persuasion A huge effort was deployed to diffuse the view that the marine reserves increase fish stocks.
4.2.3
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5.2. M arketisation and the Commodification o f the 
Community
In this section we argue that containment takes place because of something -  
marketisation -  and to accommodate something else -  commodification. Both 
concepts were discussed in section 3.1.8. In the St. Lucian context, marketisation 
refers to the renewed dependency of the island upon global markets -  shifting from 
the agricultural to the tourism sector. Containment is an adaptive response to this, 
fostering the commodification of local spaces and behaviours into tradable goods 
more likely to meet client expectations. Here, we first review the tourism-based 
marketisation of St. Lucia, its neoliberal and neo-colonial overtones and the 
concomitant resentment felt by many locals in Soufriere towards this industry. We 
then review how the SMMA has contributed to reframing and commodifying 
community spaces and behaviours to better suit the observed wishes of foreign 
clients. Finally, we look at “participatory initiatives” in Soufriere other than the 
SMMA and show how that they also worked in the same direction -  a fact that gives 
further strength to the interpretation of the SMMA as a commodification apparatus 
led by a range of local actors forming an alliance.
5.2.1. Tourism dependency and ‘neoliberal neo-colonialism ’
Over its history, St. Lucia has been dependent on series of mono-activities starting 
with sugar-cane in colonial times. After the collapse of sugar prices in the mid- 
1950s, the banana-growing swiftly took hold of the entire island: it accounted for 
85% of the island’s total exports in value in the mid-1960s and still represented 60% 
in the early 1990s (Reynolds, 2006, p. 19). Since 1993, however, the banana sector 
has gone through a sharp decline following a reduced preferential access to the EU 
markets63 and the rising competition of larger producers, notably from Latin 
America.64 This cleared the field for another major economic turn, whereby tourism 
was to become the next “king of St. Lucia” (ibid., p. 155). This latter industry 
provides to date about 10.000 direct and indirect jobs (Renard, 2001; CTO, 2002)
63 Related to EU-ACP agreements. See Josling & Taylor (2003).
64 Banana exports fell from its peak of 132,000 tons in 1992 to only 30,000 tons in 2005 (FSF, 2009, 
p.3).
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and a third of the island’s GDP (FSF, 2009). To date, “development” in St. Lucia, as 
in many other Caribbean societies, has largely come to be equated with tourism 
development.
It is at the end of the 1960s that this industry slowly took off, with jet charter tours 
from the United States, Great Britain, Canada and the rest of Western Europe. As 
Duval and Wilkinson (2004) explain, the government’s strategy to promote this 
sector has been a “hands-off approach” that opened the island to all possible foreign 
investments with generous tax breaks. This policy started as early as 1959, with the 
Hotel Aids Ordinance (25/1959), and has consistently been applied since then. It was 
strongly reaffirmed in 1991 through the Tourism Incentives Act offering fifteen years 
of income-tax holidays for a range of new constructions, ten years for renovation 
works as well as exemption from customs duties on building materials. In 1996, a 
new Act widened these benefits to any “approved tourism project”, a notion that was 
further extended in 2002 to include projects such as villas, time-share properties, 
restaurants, etc.
The inflow of foreign investors, however, has resulted in a widespread feeling among 
lay people of an “island for sale”, especially to foreigners [interviews 42, 45, 56, 57]. 
The tourism sector is indeed almost entirely controlled by non-domestic actors, 
notably those who own and operate the large hotel resorts and the cruise boats that 
capture most of the tourism business. The bulk of the profit is channelled out of the 
island by pre-paid package tours and the domination of “all-inclusive” hotels, where 
even foodstuffs are largely imported. Very little money leaks out to local 
communities (World Bank, 1990). Most clients have a very limited experience of the 
island, moving directly from the airport to hotels, where they have little incentive to 
travel further afield -  thus avoiding the uncomfortable feeling of seeing scenes of 
poverty while relaxing in comfortable resorts. The same holds true of cruise 
passengers, whose number rose from 70,000 in the mid-1970s to over 600,000 in 
2008 and who consume imported goods on their “floating palaces” -  as an advert 
puts it. In fact, as Erisman (1983, p.342) points out, foreign companies providing 
specialised tourist services -  including airlines, tour operators, hotel chains and 
cruise lines -  have developed working relationships of formal or informal 
integration, “the goal being to structure one’s trip so that most of the money spent 
ends up in [these companies’] pockets”.
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Despite some improvement, economic diversification in St. Lucia has been hindered 
by potent structural factors.65 As a result, its economy is as dependent today on 
tourism as it used to be on bananas or sugar cane. What a local economist argued 
twenty years ago still holds: “The all round development of the economy has lagged 
as it is still structurally unbalanced and not capable of self sustaining growth. To put 
it in the jargon of the economist it is open, vulnerable and dependent” (Venner, 1989,
p.81).
Since the 1970s, hostility against externally controlled tourism is an important theme 
of Caribbean nationalisms (Duval & Wilkinson, 2004, p.62). Influenced by 
dependency theorists such as Cardoso (1972), Dos Santos (1972) or Frank (1966), 
they see their islands subservient to the expansion of other economies, notably that of 
the United States. Although tourism comes with jobs and hard currency earnings and 
eases the trade deficit, it has been equated in many intellectual works with neo­
colonialism (notably Perez, 1975) and more specifically with the “plantation model” 
(e.g. Hall, 1994; Weaver, 1988; Bianchi, 2002). Popular talk even adds comparisons 
with “prostitution” or “whorism”. Neo-colonialism, as Crick (1989, p.322) argues, 
has taken a “hedonistic face” with the happy faces of smiling tourists enjoying sunny 
playgrounds. Beyond economic subserviency, also lies a fear that the entire social 
fabric may be affected by norms, ideas and lifestyle arriving from outside, leading 
some observers to talk about a cultural dependency well beyond the economic one 
(e.g. Erisman, 1983).
The fact that Soufriere is visibly one the island’s poorest communities, while its local 
space is the jewel of the country’s tourism industry seems to illustrate the 
dependency theory. The growth of tourism has certainly not been accompanied by a 
concomitant and visible enrichment of the lay locals. The blatant paradox of a tourist 
capital sunk in poverty is often pointed out by St. Lucian intellectuals (e.g. Wulf, 
2003, p.32-33). To ordinary people in Soufriere, tourism does carry a strong taste of 
neo-colonialism. Some jobs are indeed provided by hotels resorts but wages are low 
and none of the profit made goes to the local community as a whole [interview 30]. 
Hotels pay their taxes but they flow to the central government and nothing comes
65 The small size of domestic markets, the high cost of imported inputs, a limited access to regional 
and international markets, a limited pool of managerial and entrepreneurial skills, credit constraints, 
etc.
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back to Soufriere.66 Although some resorts sporadically contribute to this or that 
local event, they have no policy of contributing to the development of local 
infrastructures. As for the incoming flows of tourists dropping off their boat tours for 
a few hours in Soufriere, their input to the local economy benefits a handful of local 
businessmen who have the right networks to sign contracts with tour companies. 
Most tourists are taken directly from their boats by buses to outlying restaurants and 
brought back without having spent any money in local shops [interview 13].
The feeling is strong among fishers that they have been marginalised to 
accommodate “rich, white tourists” who, moreover, do not have a keen interest in the 
livelihood of locals, as manifested by divers releasing fish found in underwater gear 
[interview 2], As for people working in hotels, as well as their families, they often 
feel they are “subservient to foreign people and badly paid, exactly like in the 
colonial time”.67
Two informal focus groups held in Soufriere with people from various walks of life68 
led to an outpouring of criticisms against local hotels. Participants had much to say 
about how this industry does not provide decent salaries and “trap[s] people into low 
paid jobs”. Several described the high turnover of tourism employees, as people get 
fired on various “pretexts”, especially “when they start complaining or wanting to 
unionise”. One participant mentioned her mother who works as a cleaning lady in a 
big resort nearby and who complains about how badly white people treat employees, 
“although things are getting a bit better now”. Another insisted that these resorts “do 
not give locals the opportunity to prove and advance themselves by giving them a 
chance to hold a managing position”. As one person put it, “ninety per cent of 
interesting positions are held by white people from foreign countries”. Another 
participant recalled his experience as a steward (kitchen cleaner) for six months in 
one of these resorts. While around EC$ 1,000 a month in Soufriere makes for a very 
basic living, he would be paid EC$250 per two weeks (8 hours a day, 6 days a week). 
He admitted that longer term employees earn more -  with extra money based on
66 The Town Council is fully appointed by the central government. As an interviewee put it, it is given 
“pocket money to play with” and cannot go to a bank and raise a loan, since it has no revenue 
[interview 43].
67 Quotation from a cleaning lady working in a local hotel resort.
68 Two focus groups were held respectively with 7 and 6 participants. They would last for one hour 
approximately. Participants included people like an accountant, employees from local hotel resorts, a 
shop keeper, a taxi driver, a hair dresser often working with tourists, as well as unemployed persons 
regularly involved in reef fishing.
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performance -  but in his view they would still be low paid while “the bosses are 
making millions”. The general feeling was expressed by a participant who insisted 
that:
These people use Soufriere’s poverty and turn it into gold for themselves. They are 
smart!
Statistics on wages provided by the government (GSL, 2003, p. 28-30) tend to 
confirm that people in the tourism are relatively low paid when compared to their 
long work hours. As Jules (2005, p.22) comments, “the data show tourism is among 
the top sectors with the longest average hours of work, while earnings fall just below 
mid-range for all sectors reviewed.”
Beyond these criticisms, there is also the disturbing feeling for locals that the “island 
is for sale” and that foreign investors and clients are left a clear field to act as they 
please, often in collusion with “corrupted politicians”. As one fisher put it:
The SMMA and the government are taking the sea and selling it to foreigners. 
[interview 31]
Another added:
This is a Chechen country. Everything is run by money. Politicians are bought off by 
foreigners, [interview 32]
An apparent illustration of this was recently provided with the construction of a vast
new resort on the east coast of the island, in an area supposed to be a strictly
protected natural site. This led to an intense political controversy at the national
level, but construction nevertheless went ahead, with suspicions of corruption. As a
young and articulate fisherman put it:
Here, people enter in politics poor; and they get out rich, [interview 34]
Whether corruption is involved or not, the fact is that the tourism industry is taking 
hold of the St. Lucian environment and that Soufriere seems no exception, as shown 
by the process of commodification we now explore.
5.2.2. Turning spaces and behaviours into tradable goods
When a tourist comes to St. Lucia, expectations are high. Caribbean tourism is 
indeed “vested in the branding and marketing of Paradise” (Sheller, 2004, p.24), 
“[conjuring] up the idea of 'heaven on earth' or 'a little bit of paradise' in the 
collective European imagination” (Pattullo, 1996, p. 141). This notion dates back a 
long way. As Grove (1995, p.3) argues, from the seventeenth century onwards, “the
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tropical environment was increasingly utilised as the symbolic location for the 
idealised landscapes and aspirations of the Western imagination”. In Soufriere, the 
market mainly comprises couples: honeymoons are a key “industry” and some 
resorts even provide a free wedding service. What is expected, thus, is a “romantic 
desert island”. This fantasy is abundantly sold on websites that bear photos with no 
trace of local populations, “building on the impression of nothing but sand, sea and 
sun” (Pattullo, 1996, p. 145). To deliver this tourist experience and meet the ideal of a 
“Garden of Eden before the Fall” -  of empty sunny beaches -  a good number of local 
realities must be “fixed” or “hidden”.
The potential for building more hotels in Soufriere is vast but the tourism industry 
feels the local population as a hindrance. This was the case of a foreign tourism 
consultant who declared to us:
There are currently 300 hotels rooms available here, but more than 1,000 could be 
operated....A big drawback is the community: people here lack education and culture, 
and quite a few are lazy. They don’t know how to interact with foreigners. Tourists 
don’t like coming to town and are annoyed on beaches or even on the sea. 
[interview 22]
Local spaces and behaviours need to be refined, modified and in the end 
“commodified” to be more attractive to tourists -  a process in which many locals feel 
the SMMA plays a part.
First, the SMMA became involved in clearing beaches from an “invasion of water 
taxis”, as a hotel manager recalls [interview 12]. Water-taxis refer to people who 
own or rent a boat, offering to transport tourists from one bay to the other or to more 
distant areas of the island. Many of them are former or part-time fishers, often young 
and from a very modest social background. Given the restrictions on fishing and the 
lack of job opportunities in town, numerous fisher families started reverting to this 
activity after the inception of the zoning system [interview 19]. Competing with one 
another, water taxis came into the vicinity of two important local resorts. Complaints 
were received by the SMMA from the Jalousie and Anse Chastanet hotels arguing 
that the situation was “not acceptable anymore” and that “strict measures” were 
needed “to regain order” [interview 5]. St. Lucia’s laws stipulate that all beaches are 
public and that free access must be guaranteed, so that hotels are not legally able to 
bar people from accessing “their” beach. In response, the SMMA instated a system 
whereby water taxis are assigned extremely limited locations on beaches with no 
right to walk along to offer services -  as “it disturbs tourist tranquillity”. It also
Chapter 5 -  204
includes a rotation scheme through which people are allocated restricted work hours. 
In 2002, formal licenses were issued to water taxi operators for the transportation of 
passengers in the form of a “Soufriere Water Craft Permit”. The process gave 
satisfaction to hotels but many fisher families regret that, after being ousted from the 
“marine reserves”, they are now barred from accessing the “tourist reserves”.
Another important contribution of the SMMA to “beach commodification” has been 
its passivity in enforcing St. Lucia’s law requiring that all beaches be public and 
freely accessible. The SMMA has proved rather submissive towards large resorts that 
have all but privatised these spaces de facto [interviews 35, 54]. Hotels and 
restaurants often complain about the locals’ behaviour (too “noisy” or “agitated”), 
which is contrary to the “peace” expected by foreigners. Various tactics are thus used 
to keep locals away, despite their right. One is to ensure that there is no public 
transportation available from the town to hotel beaches, which makes it difficult for 
locals to reach them. Anse Chastanet, a large hotel resort with one of the most 
spectacular bays of the SMMA zone, has not refurbished the access road “because it 
would enable more cars to get there”, as an employee acknowledged [interview 30]. 
Another tactic is to make the space look like private property. To get to the beaches 
of both the Anse Chastanet and the Jalousie resorts, one has to pass through a formal 
barrier with private uniformed security guards, walk along several administrative 
buildings to finally arrive at a coastal space taken over by various constructions and 
rows of fixed and large wooden sunshades. This setting seems entirely controlled and 
privately run and would impress anybody not aware that this space is public by law. 
An unwritten agreement seems to have been reached whereby motivated locals can 
have access to hotel beaches but on specific and limited parts, the bulk of the nicer 
areas being reserved for tourists. Reportedly, several locals complained over time to 
the SMMA that access is in practice quite difficult, but little has ever been done to 
better the situation beyond the exchange of a few letters [interview 4].
Thirdly, the SMMA has also engaged into improving safety, but selectively -  namely 
“tourist safety”, without touching larger safety issues affecting the community, such 
as the theft of fisher equipment. A feeling thus emerged that the concern of the 
SMMA within its marine jurisdiction was the protection of tourists, not o f the 
general population. Since 2000, concerns had arisen within the board regarding 
“yacht break-ins”. Lights were thus set up in the Rachette Point area and the dinghy
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jetty to discourage criminals. The SMMA contracted with a security company to 
provide intervention patrols and emergency services. It also scheduled regular night 
patrols and proposed the police use its boats to do the same. Safety workshops and 
training for water taxis were carried out to raise awareness about police procedures. 
Finally, a strengthened identification system was instated with stickers for licensed 
boats, official t-shirts and ID cards for water taxis with prior checking by the police 
of an applicant’s criminal record. After 2005, the SMMA reverted to a new security 
company and tried to work more closely with the St. Lucia Air and Sea Ports 
Authority. Although the “tourist safety” issue has not been entirely solved in 
practice, the fact is that the SMMA proved very responsive on this issue, unlike their 
reactivity to fisher issues. Commenting on this fact, a bar tender remarked: “You 
know, it is the yachts’ money that allows the SMMA to live” [interview 36].
Finally, the SMMA has also engaged in fighting the “harassment problem”. 
Harassment is a negative term used to describe a recurrent behaviours observed in 
town and on the sea, to “make a quick buck” by pushing petty services or products 
on tourists. Such behaviour is obvious in the Soufriere area and in St. Lucia in 
general; it is perceived by the authorities as a significant hindrance to the 
development of tourism. As a Castries official explained: “to sell St. Lucia to the 
world, our people need to be educated into understanding certain things” 
[interview 37], The SMMA does not have many means of acting on this issue, but 
nevertheless undertook public information campaigns, including radio spots aired on 
national media. One such message ran as follows:
There is a right and wrong way to promote your ware. Act responsibly. Provide a
positive impression!
In campaigns such as these, people in Soufriere and surrounding communities have 
been asked to conduct themselves “in an appropriate manner” and bear in mind that 
the impression provided to visitors is “not one of the individuals encountered, but of 
the whole island”. In fighting “harassment” thus, direct appeals to patriotism are 
made but little attention is paid to another side of the problem: some observers 
regularly contend that harassment is in fact a form of resistance against a mode of 
tourism development that has excluded the lay people from the benefits of 
foreigners’ money; more should thus be done to connect locals and foreigners, 
instead of segregating them.
In a nutshell, foreigners come to St. Lucia to experience a “quiet paradise” and the
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SMMA has done all it can, actively and passively, to make the beaches a more 
tradable good; it has also worked to make locals behave more “properly”. All of this 
reflects a form of productive power whereby spaces and behaviours are reshaped 
under the pressure of an anonymous mass of tourists and world markets.
5.2.3. Working for commodification: the other CP schem es in Soufriere
The SMMA is not the only scheme in Soufriere based on a strong discourse of 
community participation. Two others are of particular interest: the Soufriere 
Regional Development Foundation (SRDF) and the Piton Management Area (PMA). 
Here, we show how these three CP schemes are interlinked and have all been 
working to foster the commodification of the community in line with the 
requirements of international tourism markets. Not only do they share their apparent 
goals, but there are also similarities in their internal functioning: low levels of CP 
inclusiveness, scope and intensity, an estrangement from the local people, as well as 
a dominance of economic interest groups with political connections.
Beautifying Soufriere through “community p a r t ic ip a t io n th e  SRDF 
As we have seen (cf. section 4.2.1), the SRDF was created in 1986 by three local 
notables as a non-governmental organisation intended to promote tourism, intially 
under the name of the “Soufriere Development Programme” (SDP). Their core 
objective, shared with the prime minister of the time, was to make Soufriere “a better 
place for tourists”. As a former president of the SMMA board acknowledges:
The founding idea was to help increase the attractiveness o f Soufriere for tourists and
the acceptability of tourism among the people here, [interview 9]
Tellingly, the founding blueprint of the SDP was a vast architectural plan for a 
complete revamping of the city’s appearance, to make it eye-catching. Although this 
plan has never been implemented as such, it is still revered by the local elite as an 
almost legendary vision of what Soufriere should be like [interview 48]. The SDP 
eventually engaged into more modest activities, including the employment of “beach 
boys” (to rid the water front of garbage); an aesthetic upgrade of the waterfront with 
trees, benches, lampposts; and the construction of jetty in the middle of the bay to 
welcome tour boats. Later projects have also focused on beautifying the town 
(repairs to sidewalks and drains, garbage collection, public toilets, taxi stands, etc.), 
as well as supported events such as the annual carnival and a jazz festival. Work was
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also carried out to promote “tourist safety and tranquillity” by hiring six “tourist 
wardens” to “better manage the residents interaction with foreigners and minimise 
harassment” [interview 1].
In 1993, the SPD officially became the “Soufriere Regional Development 
Foundation” (SRDF) with a governance structure mixing the government, national 
interest groups and more local ones.69 In practice, however, the SRDF was and still is 
led by local businessmen involved in tourism and with high political connections. 
Interviews and focus groups revealed clear feelings in the community that the 
“Foundation” is barely connected to locals. A shop owner declared for instance:
This is not a community owned organisation. Most o f the people on the board are not 
from Soufriere. And the Foundation could do much more for the people here with the 
money it makes, [interview 16]
A young lady, working as an accountant, added:
I  do not really know what the foundation does. It seems to concentrate on superficial 
things like lights for Christmas, carnival, the waterfront, etc. I  do not see any project 
to alleviate poverty. I  even asked to work there three days at one point, just to 
understand it, but it did not work out.
Other comments included:
- I t’s just a bunch ofpolitically connected people there, [interview 36]
- They are playing with our money, with Soufriere’s money, from the Sulphur Springs. 
[interview 33]
Since 1995, the SRDF has been entrusted with the management of the Sulphur 
Spring (a natural volcanic attraction of the area) and the use of its revenue “for the 
benefit of die community”. But among locals the general feeling seems to be that:
The foundation raises a lot of money but is not transparent or accountable....It is not 
clear to anybody how it is used, [interview 44]
In fact, the government takes 5% on the revenue and is given a yearly report on the
use of the money. So, according to a former SRDF board member:
There is total accountability on the use o f money and the government approves of it. 
[interview 11]
69 Five organisations were originally represented on the SRDF board: the SDP (three representatives), 
the Soufriere Town Council (a rather hollow structure appointed by the central government), the 
Ministry of Planning (a powerful ministry), St. Lucia Tourist Board (representing the tourism 
industry), the National Trust (a large NGO concerned with conservation) and the Mother and Father 
League (a local NGO that stopped functioning a few years later). It is only in 1997 that more local 
representatives were included from: the Fishermen’s Co-operative, the Taxi Association and the 
Fonds St Jacques Development Committee (a development initiative from a nearby rural community).
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What is clear, however, is that the Foundation has no accountability to the local 
community. It has no policy, for instance, of making a yearly public and accessible 
report on its activity in any form. During fieldwork, the strongest feelings of mistrust 
against the SRDF management were found in the fisher area, Baron’s Drive, as well 
as among ordinary trades people (shopkeepers, bar tenders, etc.). Suspicions were 
expressed about a self-interested management and obvious conflicts of interests. 
Several interviewees recalled, for instance, that the jetty built by the SDP was 
insured by a company held by a board member -  and when the insurance needed to 
be activated, after damage by storm activity, the contract was not honoured. A 
British woman, living in Soufriere for 15 years and running a large shop commented:
The Foundation is managed in the private interest of these [board] people....They are 
the ones who get the major contracts when the [Foundation] does some construction 
work or organises something - for instance the visit of Prince Charles and Camilla [in 
March 2008]. [interview 13]
In the end, there is little doubt that locals do not feel that the SRDF is their “own
thing”. In the available documentation, the SRDF is nevertheless presented as a
community organisation with a strong local membership, created by “the concerted
efforts of a cross-section of community leaders in Soufriere” (Theodore, 1998, p.69).
But even a member of the Taxi Association, which is represented on the SRDF
board, declared:
People in the Foundation want to appear like they give power to the local people, but 
this is not happening. Who takes final decisions there? A few businessmen. 
[interview 21]
The local community and the Foundation grew even further apart when the 
government decided to take it over without further ceremony. In February 2007, the 
prime minister sent a letter appointing a whole new board, a move that was contrary 
to the Foundation’s articles of association. Not only did he appoint people as 
individuals, not as representatives of any organisation, but he also personally 
appointed the chairman and deputy chairman, which made elections impossible. The 
previous board retreated, finding it difficult to defy a prime minister, but some 
members brought the matter into court. The High Court eventually ruled against the 
government but the latter still won in its own way: under political pressures, board 
member organisations of the SRDF regularised the appointments that were made. 
The “new board” has now amended the articles of associations so that the prime 
minister can now appoint and revoke people more easily. As a staff member of the
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Foundation bitterly commented: “In St. Lucia, the government can get away with 
such things” [interview 48].
The PMA: safeguarding a World Heritage site... selectively 
The Piton Management Area is the third (and newest) significant participatory 
mechanism set up in Soufriere. It is responsible for the protection of a World 
Heritage site nominated by UNESCO in 2004. The area comprises 3,000 volcanic 
hectares including the world-famous Pitons rising from the sea (cf. Photo 1, Chapter 
4). Governmental efforts to convince UNESCO started in the early 1990s but were 
delayed by a controversy over the construction of a hotel resort -  Jalousie -  right in 
the middle of the “most sacred site” of the island. Protesters such as the St. Lucian 
Nobel prize winner Derek Walcott were vocal against an endeavour that compared in 
their eyes with building “a casino in the Vatican...or a take-away concession inside 
Stonehenge”.70 The government nevertheless gave permission in the name of 
employment and foreign exchange - so the Jalousie resort opened in 1992. From 
there, it took time to convince UNESCO that the area could nonetheless be given the 
status of a World Heritage site.
Once nominated, the site had to comply with a key requirement: develop a strict land 
management plan, notably to control construction activities since large parts of the 
area are under private ownership. In 2007, the government entrusted a foreign 
consulting company with designing the plan, following a “large participatory 
process”. Stakes are high for local landowners, as half a hectare is worth more than 
1,5 million dollars at 2008 market prices. The much awaited report was released in 
2008 and suggested a zoning system, with seven distinct policy areas, from “no­
build” zones to zones where new constructions are allowed.
The proposal, however, sparked an intense controversy in Soufriere [interviews 1, 
47, 49]. Small and medium landowners from local families felt they were being 
sacrificed to the “no-build” policies, while large hotel resorts were granted the right 
to extend their constructions, notably Jalousie. Harsh criticisms were levelled at the 
supposed “participatory process”, which was apparently conducted in haste and with 
very few public meetings. Several locals even found their names mentioned in the 
list of people interviewed by the consultants, which they denied. Thus, while more
70 Quoted by McCannell (1992, p.2-3).
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than 1,800 families are affected by the zoning scheme, the PMA is resented as “a 
club of a few”. Discussions with small landowners produced comments such as:
- The consultation was fake ...forged [or] flawed.
- Those guys [the consultants] were very selective in carrying out their mandate.
- In the end, it’s all about foreigners helping foreigners.
- Big businesses do not want us to develop alternative hotel options in the area. And 
they even want to keep the villa business for themselves.
Countering critiques during the public presentation of the plan, the consultants
insisted that they had had only a “limited time to carry out consultations”. One
participant reportedly gave this applause-winning answer:
These decisions will affect Soufriere’s families for generations to come. And you tell us 
that time was a constraint? What are we going to say to our children? That we cannot 
do anything of our land, because you had not enough time? [interview 18]
At the time of the fieldwork, the matter was still being debated locally but was in the
hands of the government, which was due to make its decision public -  and most
likely approve the report.
This discussion shows that SMMA, the SRDF and the PMA show strong similarities 
in their goals and functioning, as well as in feelings they aroused in the local 
community -  from the poorer fishers to potentially rich landowners. Moreover, as 
seen in Section 4.2.1., the SRDF was an initiator of the SMMA, while the PMA 
includes both organisations on its advisory committee (called PMAAC). There are 
now plans to create a single building to host all three organisations [interview 1]. All 
these linkages are highly obvious to locals. Many fishers for instance, when 
complaining about the SMMA, refer in their talks to the SRDF indiscriminately 
[interviews 23, 24]. These three CP organisations are thus largely thought o f as a 
single entity, which is clearly indicated by the language used by lay locals when they 
refer to an indistinct “they” -  pointing to a world of “organisations” separate from 
the people and connected to businesses and government.
5.2.4. Conclusion: m ultiple sources o f com m odification in Soufriere
Many St. Lucians feel that their government’s emphasis on the tourist industry has 
led to the neglect of domestic problems and turned numbers of people into “second- 
class citizens” in their own country [interview 6]. In a context where this industry is 
widely resented as a form of “neoliberal neo-colonialism”, the active
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commodification of Soufriere spaces and behaviours has been fostered by three 
interconnected CP schemes, among which the SMMA has played an important role. 
The situation has been managed as if “keeping troublesome locals in check” were the 
guiding motto, whether ’’troublesome” refers to fishers reluctant to clear the coast, 
locals reluctant to clear the beaches or small landowners reluctant to leave a 
profitable business to larger economic investors. The use of the CP discourse in 
Soufriere does seem to be congruent with the expectations of the critical narrative, 
according to which marketisation and commodification operate at the relative 
expense of the weaker local actors. In all cases, it seems clear that the entire 
community does not equally benefit from the increased “market opportunities”.
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5.3. W eaker Social Capital: the Catalysts and Effects 
of Containment
The ninth step of our analytical framework (defined in Chapter 3) calls for a two-way 
analysis of the interactions between CP and the local community’s social capital. 
This is critical because CP schemes are typically meant to build upon and reinforce 
this social capital. The expectations of the emancipatory narrative are clear: SC is 
supposed to help CP develop in the first place, while CP is expected to strengthen SC
-  and thus the community’s capacities for collective action and institutional 
engagement. Here, however, we show that field data demonstrate the exact opposite.
This section first argues that a low bridging and bonding social capital have 
undermined the ability of community groups to appropriate the SMMA participatory 
process. This helps explain why containment and commodification were so 
successful in Soufriere: social fragmentation within and among groups left locals 
fully exposed to external power effects.
In a second sub-section we show that the impact of CP on SC, through the dynamics 
of social frustrations, was not positive after all. For some months in 1997, the fishers’ 
response strategy was VOICE (cf. section 4.3.3) but, after losing their political 
support, they reverted to a more silent and psychological EXIT that failed to engage 
them with institutions or to change them from within. A temporal analysis shows that 
resistance to outside influences by the Soufriere community has historically taken 
two radically opposed forms: one of active rebellion and one of complete withdrawal
-  two models that were both activated by the SMMA experience. A third course of 
action, one of ongoing involvement, has never come about, reflecting the deep-seated 
local estrangement from any sort of formal institutions. On the whole, little 
experience or capacity to engage with institutions has been built through the CP 
scheme.
5.3.1. Enabling containm ent and power effects: low bridging and bonding  
SC
Low levels of bridging SC, trust and solidarity have hindered the emergence of 
collective action across groups, while a low bonding SC has even prevented some 
groups from organising themselves and gaining effective representation in various
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CP schemes. On the other hand, strong linking SC on the part on some individuals 
has enabled them to passively resist the SMMA in some instances or actively shape 
its line of action.
A low bridging SC
Field interviews provided a blunt account of how Soufriere is perceived as divided in 
the eyes of the locals. A female informant [interview 43], working as a local civil 
servant, seemed to echo this general feeling by describing a “three-tier society”: 1) 
the “people who have a lot or who have already achieved something, usually because 
the family already had capital”; 2) those who “want to make it and try hard”; 3) and 
those who have very little -  some of whom “sit and do nothing” while others “work 
hard but cannot make a proper living”. It is in this last category that the poorer 
fishermen as well people with petty jobs related to tourism see themselves; these 
people are often illiterate (although they had some schooling) and feel estranged 
from the rest of the society.
Levels of trust and solidarity among groups are extremely low. Interviews in the 
higher strata of the community (with businessmen, large shop owners, hotel 
managers, etc.) showed that most expressed a strong distrust of poorer groups - and 
very often of their own employees [interviews 11, 12, 15, 17]. There seems to be 
widespread distrust among the wealthier regarding the “laziness of most of 
Soufriere”, as one shopkeeper put it. Meanwhile, people from poorer groups, such as 
fishers, waiters, hotel cleaners, modest tourist guides, or beggars express no less 
mistrust of the higher social classes, describing them as “greedy”, “interested only in 
their own belly”, and with “little respect for the common people” [interview 35]. 
Another interviewee added that “to achieve anything in Soufriere, [one] needs to get 
acquainted with the right people”, which implies “ignoring certain parts of society 
and keeping a distance” [interview 2],
In Soufriere’s there is no set place or time for communication between various social 
groups. The culture of “patronage and paternalism” that is typical of many small 
communities has not developed here. The wealthy people do feel an obligation to 
help the poor in difficult times, or the community through the construction of public 
utilities, for example. Some traditional families who own large portions of 
Soufriere’s land do practice a form of paternalism but only with some of their long­
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standing employees: this does not extend to the wider community and is often 
discontinued by the younger generations [interviews 1, 14].
Each “tier group” follows “its own life and deals with its own problems pretty much 
alone”, in the words of several interviewees, who insisted on the “rising 
individualism affecting Soufriere” [interview 6]. This is especially felt at the lowest 
level of the community, among beggars for instance. One interviewee, John, aged 28, 
is a street wanderer who takes up small construction or transport jobs whenever 
possible. Often, he simply opens doors to people entering supermarkets trying to 
attract their goodwill. When talking about change in the community, he said what 
most struck him was the increasing privatisation of space:
People close off their properties more than before. It is more and more difficult to find 
shelter when my parents want me out. [interview 35]
In John’s eyes, there is less and less solidarity:
In the old days, windows were left open, people would stand around chatting and one 
could always ask for a little food at different places. Nowadays, people are locking 
themselves in and they don’t want to talk to you.
Furthermore, social groups do not have their sights set in same direction. The
wealthiest aspire to the capital Castries, to which they are closely connected,
sometimes living there full time and only going to Soufriere for business
[interview 18]. The small but emerging middle class looks up to the wealthy, while
the poor strive to make a living and reject the society in which they find themselves.
Illustratively, the annual carnival that takes place in August is supposed to be a
moment of “unity” in Soufriere; but interviews and observations showed that it
provides more opportunities for conflicts than cohesion, notably among businessmen
or urban areas trying to capture revenues.
This lack of bridging social capital has long hindered collective endeavours in the 
community. One of the rare counter-initiatives was the “Mother and Father’s Group” 
that was created the Catholic Church to pull people together on educational and other 
issues, but it eventually dissolved [interview 53]. Low bridging SC has also affected 
the functioning of the SMMA, as only one or two staff members share some social 
background with fishers -  a disconnect reinforced by the spatial location of the 
SMMA office, situated far from the fishers’ districts.
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Weak bonding SC
Soufriere is not only characterised by a low level of bridging but also bonding social 
capital -  meaning that groups are themselves fragmented. This has further 
undermined, time and again, the emergence of self-sustaining collective endeavours. 
Meanwhile, the narrow and higher end of the local economic elite enjoys a high level 
of linking social capital, providing them with open access to the highest political 
spheres of the country. This combination is the catalyst that enabled power 
phenomena to develop so strongly in SMMA CP scheme.
Although they are the very soul of the town, Soufriere’s fishers form a fragmented 
community with deep feelings of competition, mistrust and conflict. Interviews with 
fishers revealed strong dividing lines and tense feelings among them: the young vs. 
the old, deep water vs. reef fishers, the main socio-economic gap being between 
people who own a boat and those who do not [interviews 23, 24, 26, 27, 32]. 
Certainly, the Soufriere Fishermen’s Co-operative is an achievement for this 
community as the longest-standing community organisation in town. Registered in 
January 1977, the “co-op” has grown from 40 to over 100 members. Its activities 
developed from selling only fuel to providing fishing equipment including baits, 
seine, fillets, thread, line, rope, cooking gas and ice. It is also responsible for 
distributing a small government fuel subsidy to fishers and can grant small loans to 
its members. As we have seen (cf. 5.3.1), however, less than 30% of fishers in 
Soufriere are boat owners and even less are co-operative members, the involvement 
of younger fishers being particularly low. Even within the co-operative’s current 
membership, the capacity for simple coordination is very low. For instance, constant 
fights occur at sea around the Fishing Aggregating Devices set up with the support of 
French money71 to buttress deep-sea fishing. What’s more, when it comes to 
renewing the FADs, which are critical collective goods, there is little capacity for co­
operation: the president of the co-operative has often suggested to the fishermen that 
they make some pooled savings to fund new FADS but no such collective effort has 
ever materialised [interview 26].
The lack of capacity for collective action was also illustrated with the aborted project 
for a “water taxi association” aimed at regulating the increasing number of fishermen 
offering transport services to tourists [interviews 19, 21]. The Water Taxi
71 As mentioned earlier (cf. 4.4.3), these devices were no longer working at the time of the fieldwork.
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Association was formally part of the SMMA board from the start but never actually 
came into existence due to disagreement over its potential members. This issue was 
frequently discussed by the SMMA board, which suspected that certain attempts 
were under way to monopolise the business and make it difficult for new people to 
obtain a license. At one point, two competing associations even existed: the Soufriere 
Water Craft Association and the Soufriere Water Taxi Association. In order to 
resolve this issue, meetings were held with the two associations but a merger proved 
impossible.
The local business community is also deeply fragmented. First and foremost, there is 
the divide between expatriates and locals [interviews 15, 18]. Expatriates are by 
definition not from Soufriere and are usually “white people who own big things” 
such as large hotel resorts. Some of them have been there for so long that they are 
now part of the landscape, although still not identified as “locals”. As for the locals, 
“there are no more than ten important business people”72 and, importantly, “there is a 
lot of competition among them” for business opportunities: for instance, who will 
catch the daily flow of tourists that arrives for lunch or visits. We interviewed several 
people from this group and they all acknowledged that “what is lacking is a sense of 
coming together to make the most of business opportunities” [interview 11]. There 
were attempts to set up a “Soufriere Business Association”, but in the face of too 
much disagreement it repeatedly collapsed. Even two brothers who were nominated 
as at the head of the association fought against each another.
On the other hand, Soufriere’s bonding social capital is acutely affected by the 
polarisation of the island’s political life between its two main parties: the Saint 
Lucian Labour Party (SLP) and the United Workers’ Party (UWP).73 This divide runs 
through all strata of society and leads to high tensions in inter-personal relations, 
further undermining Soufriere’s poor capacity for collective endeavours. 
“Politicisation” or “partisan politics” creates mistrust between people based upon
72 They include: 1) the owner of the gas station (Cool Breeze); 2) the owner of the Excelsior Plaza, 
the main commercial centre; 3) a couple that owns the La Haut Plantation, an hotel in the hills; 4) the 
owner of Fonds Doux Estate and of a supermarket; 5) the traditional family (Du Boulay) that owns the 
Estate Plantation and Du Boulay Construction Supplies; 6) the owner of the Hummingbird resort; 7) 
the owner of Plantation Estate and the Stonefield Resort; 8) the traditional Devaux family that owns 
the botanical Gardens and much of the land around Soufriere ; 9) the owner of the Beacon Hotel/ 
Restaurant and the Torry Waterfall.
73 For background information on the St. Lucian political system, see Appendix 8.
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political affiliations or supposed preferences. It also leads to systematic criticism of 
whatever proposal is made by the other side. Although the entire island is affected by 
this type of politics, Soufriere is particularly well-known for this way of managing 
affairs. Numerous interviewees noted that “it is very black and white here” and 
“people would not even shake hands with people from the other party” [interviews 
41, 46, 51]. Many interviewees were bitter about this situation:
- What we usually find in our politics is that opposition parties criticise just to oppose, 
so nothing can be done in a collaborative spirit, [interview 43]
- Political witch-hunting is ongoing and everywhere, [interview 52]
- Whenever a new administration arrives in Castries, it destroys all the previous work 
done, so everything always has to start from scratch. And in Soufriere, it is even worse. 
[interview 1]
One interviewee added:
Half o f the people tend to be quiet, because when their party is in power, they do not 
dare criticise, [interview 36]
This type of partisan politics has plagued the functioning of the rare community
organisations, since their board members criticise proposals on the basis of political
subtexts. This often happened, for instance, with the Soufriere business association
and with SRDF.
5.3.2. From VOICE to EXIT: institutional avoidance and psychological 
withdrawal
Since 2001, the absence of visible political upheaval by the poorer fishers of 
Soufriere has largely been interpreted by donor-financed project evaluators as a sign 
of “success” for the SMMA as an “effective” participatory mechanism (e.g. FFEM, 
2008). In our view, however, this kind of silence cannot be taken as a proof of 
community participation -  in fact, in the St. Lucian context it mean quite the 
opposite. Here we make the four following points: 1) the social anger against the 
SMMA has not disappeared although it has turned more inward and “underground”; 
2) the popular culture of resistance in St. Lucia is not used to formally engaging with 
institutions; it rather takes the form of violent resistance or psychological withdrawal 
and resignation; 3) a mix of violent talks and political passivity also characterises the 
Rasta culture that is developing fast among the younger and poorer part of the 
Soufriere community; 4) all in all, these modes of popular resistances to the SMMA
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do not appear to have contributed to the strengthening of Soufriere social capital -  
much the contrary.
The continuing anger of the poorer fishers
No large-scale conflict has broken out between the SMMA and the fishermen for a 
long time, especially when compared to the scale of the 1997 upheaval. However, we 
needed to find out if this meant acceptance of the SMMA. To this end, we undertook 
a series of highly informative interviews and informal focus groups in the fisher area, 
Baron’s Drive, which brought to light the continuing social anger felt against the 
SMMA experience.
Baron’s Drive is without sanitation, plagued by bad smells and busy with small girls 
carrying water buckets back home. The first time we walked into it, a man in his 
thirties started asking us inquisitive and relevant questions on our work, as we 
seemed to be “another white expert”. The man did not want to give his real name and 
asked us to call him “Spencer”. We were joined by several fishers of varying ages 
who nodded in agreement and added their own comments. This experience was 
followed by similar ones in the following weeks, involving other people from the 
area. All pointed in the same direction: a deep dissatisfaction with the SMMA.
The central critique is that the fishers have been “pushed out from the good fishing 
spots” and their living conditions are made “much worse for the benefit o f the rich 
white tourists”. When faced with the fact that the SMMA board has a fisher 
representative, participants made it clear that the person in charge in no way 
represents them. As they put it, “such people are brainwashed”, “sucked into the 
system” and “bought off to comply and to pretend we want to comply”. Focus groups 
further revealed the feeling that, in its efforts to speak to the fishers, the SMMA 
“only turns to the older generation and not to the younger ones” who generally “have 
no boat but a lot to say”. People offered further comments such as “we are not 
happy”, “we feel too alone” or “we cannot take it any longer”.
Another strong feeling is that “nothing is done to help [them]”. Fishers mentioned 
the tragic case of a 38-year-old man who had been missing for almost 30 days and 
who had probably drowned because of rusty equipment. There is also resentment 
against local commercial banks: they do not grant fishers credit, as they require 
collateral in the form of land, property, stable income, etc. No micro-finance option
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is available locally, no loan guarantee from the government either. In their 
experience, “nothing is done for [them]”. This feeling of unfairness, of “being 
pushed into a comer” with “no option to make a living”, focuses all the blame onto 
the SMMA and the SRDF. This is reinforced by the contrasting perception that the 
latter “has a lot of money” from the Sulphur Springs that “goes nobody knows 
where”.
Reverting to violence towards institutions: a culture of popular resistance 
One of the most striking results of our interviews with poorer social groups in 
Soufriere (fishers, beggars, seasonal construction workers, etc.) was that they 
systematically reject formal institutions, which they identify with the “rich and the 
powerful”. In the face of problems, there seems to be a form of popular resistance 
and discontent, but those concerned seem unable to institutionalise this or work with 
institutions. An interviewee explained as much saying that, “poor fishers have no 
time to attend participatory workshops” [interview 50]; but in our understanding, it is 
not merely a question of time: it is rather a matter of disconnected mental worlds 
opposing a “white/ institutional/ English-speaking/ formal/ literate/ modem” 
framework to another based on French patois, limited literacy, black culture and a 
deeply ingrained feeling of being the “sons of slaves”.
The SMMA is very much perceived within the lower social classes as part of this 
“first world”. This organisation has little connection with the lower social classes: it 
is therefore “not worth investing yourself in it”, as a man in his thirties explained, 
since it has been “bought off like the rest” [interview 31]. As a civil servant 
explained to us in Castries:
Throughout the island, there is a rejection o f all institutions by the popular classes; but 
there are also social demands and expectations which are not met and which can turn 
into violence any time, [interview 38]
There is no need to go far back in the history of St. Lucia to see that this eventuality
is real. The quasi-insurrection of the banana farmers in late 1993 is still present is all
memories. At the time, the issue was the programmed collapsed of the banana sector
following the revision of the ACP agreements with the European Union. The EU left
St. Lucian producers with a more difficult access to its markets and in an open
competition with cheaper bananas from Central and South America. The fear was
intense and degenerated into active strikes and confrontations with the police: fires
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were set alight and barricades erected, leaving some farmers dead and policemen 
injured.
This culture of fierce resistance runs deep in local history and self-identities, 
especially in Soufriere. Its clearest and most celebrated example of “patriotic 
violence” is the slave rebellion against British rule at the time of the French 
Revolution. This took the form of an armed conflict between the British and the 
rebels, most of whom were hiding in the Soufriere area, and is a source of pride for 
the local community. Using guerrilla tactics, burning farms, attacking British 
strongholds and causing as much chaos as possible before hiding in the mountains, 
these negres marrons (also know as “brigands”) managed to hold the island for a 
year, forcing many owners of colonial plantations out of the country.
In the West Indies, there is certainly an “incredible culture of resistance”, as a local 
university professor put it [interview 56]. People know how to “rise up” and contest 
the legitimacy of formal institutions. One may wonder whether the current take over 
of the island by the tourism industry might not also spark off some violent reactions. 
One could say that the SMMA successfully avoided and neutralised this possibility 
in Soufriere, but several of our interviewees in the fishers’ area made frequent 
reference to an upcoming “revolution” or “social struggle” that could erupt at any 
time -  because “this is too much”. They also implied threats of violence, possibly 
towards hotel resorts or the SMMA manager who is often depicted as being 
“responsible of everything”. We were also often told to “tell him that we [the fishers] 
don’t like him”. As two fishermen put it:
One day, we will join together and break the SMMA....If one o f us is found guilty, then
we are all guilty, [interview 23]
W ithdrawal with “talks of fire”: the second face of popular resistance 
Despite this tough talk, it is not easy to predict where the tension might lead in 
Soufriere. Not only has the SMMA been able to neutralise (rather than raise) the 
voices of these fishers, but popular Caribbean culture is also characterised by a 
tradition of “violent speeches followed by little action”, as one observer put it 
[interview 53], Such strong speeches are sometimes called “talks of fire” by locals 
who acknowledge that these often lead nowhere. They rather turn into a form of
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psychological withdrawal from politics and institutions denounced as “part of the 
system”.74
This type of psychological withdrawal is particularly apparent in the way the “Rasta 
culture” has been developing in Soufriere. Rastafarianism has attracted an increasing 
number of young locals, notably from fisher families, with little or no work. They 
grow their hair long, smoke marijuana, often squat rundown buildings, etc. They 
have a bad reputation among most people in Soufriere, who see them as potential or 
actual criminals. Locals often fear that their own children will turn Rasta because, as 
one informant summarised, “when you are a Rasta, you don’t get a job” 
[interview 8]. Rastas are largely associated with people sitting and living in the 
street, drinking, smoking drugs, etc. and employers indeed try to avoid them. At the 
time of the fieldwork, one of the SMMA marine rangers had recently adopted a Rasta 
style, but he started to grow his hair only after being recruited. Some of his 
colleagues were feeling uneasy about it: one declared during an interview that if his 
son were “to do this”, he would be “asked to leave home immediately”.
To narrow down what being a Rasta means to people in Soufriere, we conducted a 
range of interviews with people who consider themselves as such. One informant had 
a large marijuana leaf tattooed on his chest; he used to sell drugs but had stopped 
because of “too many problems with the police”. Nevertheless, he insisted that 
Rastas are not criminals. As he explained: “a Rasta is always cool and the basic idea 
is to not worry”; at the same time, he “cares deeply about social justice”. Another 
Rasta explained: “we [Rastas] fight for the people, for the poor” -  as reflected in the 
music they continuously listen too: a type of politically engaged Jamaican music. In 
a striking summary, one informant declared:
Being a Rasta means like 'you don’t care but in fact you care'. [interview 23]
This peculiar statement seems to embody the spirit of “discontent with no action”, 
which is increasingly taking hold of the younger members of the Soufriere 
community. An analysis of several life stories seems to confirm that people turn to 
Rastafarianism with a social and political awareness often following years of 
unemployment. This is what happened, for instance, to a well-known local figure75
74 The word system is often used by locals. It seems to concentrate feelings of frustration and 
disempowerment.
75 Mrs. Selunya Charles.
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who now runs a professional training programme in Soufriere for children with no 
education.76 Her explanation of Rastafarianism proved particularly illuminating 
[interview 53]: Rastas like to “bum fire” -  or in other words, to “talk against 
vehemently with anger and aggressive speeches”. They “like to speak out for equal 
rights, love and justice”. In her view Rastafarian culture was originally a rebellion 
“against cults that are not right, like baptism at a young age”, and everything that 
prevents freedom of choice. She also explained that the Rastafarian refers to the 
world as “Babylon”, as the “system”, meaning the larger society and the “modem 
world, a corrupted one”. This type of reaction, however, is essentially “inward” and 
does not lead to actually challenging the social order.
5.3.3. Conclusion: no SC gain and a relocation o f power
As expected by the critical narrative of the CP discourse, low levels of SC in 
Soufriere have paved the ground for the exercise of various forms of power upon 
community stakeholders. Social fragmentation in the form of a low bridging and 
bonding SC is partly responsible for preventing stakeholders from joining together to 
collectively demand a greater say in SMMA CP processes. Disillusioned by their 
active VOICE strategy, which had led them to use political unrest to attack this 
organisation, the fisher community increasingly reverted to an EXIT response. This 
takes the form of a psychological withdrawal, partly illustrated by Rastafarianism, 
which parallels their continued epistemic exclusion and skewed representation in 
decision-making mechanisms of marine resources management.
All of this evidences and underpins the inability of the lower social classes to involve 
themselves in institutional processes. Such people feel deeply uncomfortable when 
faced with formal structures and are essentially unable to engage with them. Their 
discontent thus shifts from one extreme to the other: from action bordering on 
violence to psychological withdrawal, with “talks of fire”. In any case, “institutional 
implication” is never chosen as the VOICE strategy. The line of action consistently 
followed, either through VOICE or EXIT, is to bypass the institutions that are 
bypassing them. This behaviour pattern is not conducive to either social and 
institutional learning or reinforcement of the local SC. With the SMMA experience,
76 With the support of CARE, an international NGO.
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the latter has arguably remained, at best, unchanged as the level of communication 
and trust among community groups has become no stronger. The containment tactics 
of formalising and institutionalising disagreements -  through the constitution of the 
SMMA -  seems to have successfully neutralised this community.
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5.4. Conclusion
Our analysis of the SMMA experience has confirmed essentially all the empirical 
expectations of the critical narrative. However, it has also provided a view of why all 
this happened that is not so readily anticipated by this narrative. Here, we would like 
to emphasise the following findings.
First, although attempts to promote CP inclusion were significant at some early 
stages of the SMMA process, its participatory content largely disappeared due to a 
dual phenomenon: 1) die capture of the emerging organisation by non-local, stronger 
private or public actors; and 2) the inability of the poorer end of the community to 
engage with formal institutions. The institutionalisation and formalisation of CP have 
led the weakest groups towards the exit of the decision-making process, while 
allowing others to take precedence or avoid the effects of the regulatory scheme.
Second, the SMMA’s environmental effectiveness has been hampered by this power 
configuration. The CP organisation has not been able to engage with the tourism 
industry, including its construction component and other land-based polluters that 
have a critical impact on the coastal resources. It has also failed to obtain the 
enforcement domestic environmental laws from central ministries and other public 
agencies. In other words, it has proved unable to address and modify the local power 
relations that are most critical for the site’s environmental sustainability.
Third, the institutionalisation of CP has fostered an objective process of 
“containment of locals” that has helped to commodify natural assets and local 
behaviours to suit the taste of the foreign tourists. In parallel, CP processes operating 
in Soufriere, other than the SMMA, have all driven this same commodification 
dynamic, for the sake of a “modernisation” led by the tourism industry.
Fourth, the inability of the lay people to engage with institutions seems to be a long­
standing trait of St. Lucian social history. It leaves the poorer parts of the local 
community with little choice but to resort to political unrest or psychological 
withdrawal once “the system” wins and things seem irreversible to them. Meanwhile, 
Soufriere’s low bonding and bridging social capital has paved the way for a takeover 
of the SMMA by non-community actors.
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Fifth, we are not contending that the SMMA staff deliberately sought to favour some 
actors over others, but rather that a combination of practices, donor expectations and 
other forms of compulsory, institutional and productive power have set into motion a 
“containment mode” to the benefit of commodification fo r  tourism. In the process, 
local influence has been transferred to a mixed “domestic-global power formation” 
comprising economic actors of national importance, governmental authorities, 
foreign donors and conservationists. This alliance, however, may prove 
unsustainable in the future, given Soufriere’s ongoing environmental degradation.
Finally, it was shown that disempowerment came about not solely or even primarily 
through the influence of external forces or actors, but largely through the active will 
of determined local actors. A local-global “power formation” thus came about, 
bringing together domestic public and private actors, international donors and a 
regional NGO. Just like Duffy (2008) showed in the case of ecotourism in 
Madagascar, a commodification process can receive support from a complex range 
of interest groups, including part of the local community, international NGOs, the 
local state, etc. In St. Lucia, commodification through CP cannot be reduced to an 
externally-led, top-down dynamic. As Brockington et a l (2008) would put it 
conservation and capitalism did work here in “partnership”.
This was further facilitated by local factors, such as the low level of social capital of 
some key stakeholders. This is not to say, however, that no resistance was put up, as 
both the fishers and the tourism industry battled hard to seize the CP discourse and 
secure the economic rent— namely access to coastal resources. As a result, although 
the processes at work ultimately produced the outcomes predicted by the critical 
narrative, they seem less unilaterally global and predetermined than this narrative 
assumes.
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Chapter 6 - CP in Pantanal: A Containment Tool in 
Changing Hands
In the last two chapters we analysed one of the world’s most famous and supposedly 
successful CP schemes in environmental management. A close enquiry into its 
origins, implementation, social impacts and power effects has nevertheless largely 
confirmed the expectations of the critical narrative of the global CP discourse -  
namely the transformation of participatory processes into mechanisms of social 
control and containment. Still, as previously argued, drawing a more complete 
picture of what a global discourse “is and does” also requires looking at concrete 
examples deemed “less successful”, “unsuccessful” or outright “failures” by the 
professional community. Analysis may show, for instance, that both so-called 
“failures” and “successes” produce similar standard effects, such as power effects, 
that may be core to the inner nature of this discourse.
For this and other reasons explained in the Introduction, our second case study 
relates to community participation in the preservation of the Brazilian Pantanal, the 
world’s largest wetland. The Pantanal covers 3% of the planet’s total wetlands and 
still boasts a relatively well preserved environment of global significance. For a long 
time, initiatives in biodiversity conservation in the area by both NGOs and public 
authorities had relied on an approach excluding local producers. By the mid-1990s, 
however, the CP discourse had gained momentum in the region. In what was seen as 
a pioneering initiative, domestic and international donors joined forces to help create 
the “Pantanal Regional Park” (PRP, or Parque Regional do Pantanal), a new 
institutional framework potentially covering up to 40% of the region and based on 
CP principles. In 1998, a “preliminary project” started to foster community 
involvement, leading to the creation of the actual park in 2002. This initiative had 
quickly been hailed as a “best practice” and “success”, and credited with some 
influence on Brazilian policies (Comite 21, 2003, p. 18 ; FPNRF, 2006, p.9). As we 
shall see, however, the initiative eventually collapsed, plagued by problems of 
mismanagement and the undue interventionism of political authorities, among other 
reasons.
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During the fieldwork, undertaken in the summer of 2008, information was sometimes 
difficult to gather as people would often find it difficult to speak about what they see 
as a disaster for the local community. Some people felt that the present researcher 
was more of a “police inspector” sent by European donors to enquire into “what 
happened to the money” than a genuine scholar interested in the nature and impact of 
CP practices [interview 66]. Three years after the IPP closure in 2005, legal 
proceedings have been started involving some of the people legally responsible for 
the PRP, and thus there is still a great deal of tension in the air.77
Here we shall argue that the PRP project was originally designed to benefit 
traditional landowners and assigned to have certain strategic effects -  specially the 
containment of conservationist NGOs and of non-traditional economic actors 
operating in the Pantanal. Its implementation, however, turned out to have 
profoundly different effects: notably and ironically, the containment of the 
landowners themselves. This is why the present chapter will focus on the PRP’s 
original intentions, while the next will analyse why and how the containment that 
occurred was not the one intended78.
This chapter first provides background information on the Pantanal context. It shows 
that a Brazilian discourse on sovereignty and national development competes with 
the growing view that the Pantanal is a “global good public” in need of international 
attention for stricter conservation. The lax enforcement of domestic environmental 
laws in the pantaneira79 region is also emphasised, as well as the evolving use of the 
CP discourse, reflecting the tension between philosophies of conservation vs. 
sustainable use of the environment.
Second, the chapter explores the genesis of the PRP project and sheds light on its 
inbuilt containment strategy. Landowners, the local state and a foreign donor 
together built an “originating alliance” to thwart incoming actors, such as 
conservationist NGOs and more environmentally aggressive producers. The goal was 
to render the region’s environmental agenda more economically friendly. A new
77 The IPP management has been accused of tax evasion. There are also rumours of corruption.
78 This particular story explains why the presentation of the Pantanal case study has a different 
structure from the one used for the St. Lucian case study (which first looked at project implementation 
and then at power effects).
79 Pantaneiro and pantaneira mean “from/of the Pantanal”.
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form of CP was thus promoted giving pre-eminence to long-established local 
producers.
Third and finally, the chapter analyses the discourse of the PRP initiative itself, 
which amplifies the role of cattle-ranchers as the core of the traditional community. 
The way “traditions” have been defined and “cattle ranching” constructed as 
“environmentally friendly” shows a display of structural and productive power. A 
form of containment also occurred to the detriment of the Pantanal’s lower social 
groups, who were left out of the design of the participatory park and -  later -  from its 
governance. We thus show that, as in Soufriere, CP has functioned (or was meant to 
function) as a tool of social control over various groups.
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6.1. The Pantanal: a Battlefield of Priorities and  
D iscourses
This section first provides background information about the Pantanal region and 
shows how it has been constructed as a policy object by two rival discourses: one on 
global biodiversity (emphasising conservation as well as the rights and duties of the 
international community) and one on domestic development (that stresses economic 
development and Brazilian sovereignty). Second, it argues that the state-led 
conservation of the Pantanal is based on protective laws that are rarely enforced on 
the ground, thus leaving open environmental concerns. Finally, it demonstrates that 
the CP discourse on environmental issues has long been present in the pantaneira 
region but that this has changed over time: after the state-led public consultations of 
the 1970s, CP became more related to private conservation schemes backed by 
NGOs; it is only recently that CP has begun to recognise local producers as 
potentially legitimate environmental managers. The novelty and the strategic 
implications of the PRP initiative can only be identified accurately against this 
backdrop.
6.1.1. A world wonder ... in a sovereign country
The Pantanal is the largest freshwater ecosystem in the world and arguably has 
significance for the whole of mankind. It is located, however, in a sovereign country 
that is keen to safeguard its environmental and economic sovereignty.
With over 200,000 square kilometres (km2), the pantaneira region is about the size 
of England and Scotland together. Located in the heart of South America (Map 4), it 
is shared by Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay. Most of its surface, however, lies within 
Brazilian frontiers (138,000 km2) and is split between the two local states: Mato 
Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. The Pantanal is essentially a floodplain (coloured in 
green on Map 5) surrounded by a higher plateau (light brown). Together they form 
the upper Paraguay River basin, which is criss-crossed by a dense network of 
powerful tributaries (Chart 2).
Its central location on the continent makes the Pantanal a crossroad and safe haven 
for threatened species from surrounding ecosystems, notably die Cerr ado, the Chaco, 
the Amazon, and the Atlantic Forest. It thus boasts a remarkable biodiversity, with
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over 80 species of mammals, 200 types of fish and 2,000 plant species. Photo 5 
provides examples of its easily visible wildlife. Another defining characteristic is its 
seasonal rainfall and flooding cycles, which also contribute to the region’s high bio­
productivity.80 With an altitude of less than 150 metres, pantaneiro landscapes are 
virtually flat so that during the rainy season (from October to March) up to 80% of 
the territory is inundated. Besides forests and rivers, the Pantanal is made up of 
complex networks of swamplands, lagoons and man-made drainage channels (Photo 
6). As floodwaters expand and recede, aquatic plants and low grassland vegetation 
grow rapidly. This turnover of organic matter supports numerous food webs and an 
abundance of wildlife. Tropical wetlands are certainly the most “bio-productive” 
ecosystems on earth (per unit area) along with rain forests, marine-algae beds and 
coral reefs. The region is thus commonly dubbed a “biodiversity hotspot”, supporting 
“flagship” species such as giant anteaters, jaguars or the giant black eagle. It is also 
known to provide an essential habitat for the migratory cycle of many species of fish 
and birds across the two American continents.
The Pantanal is further seen as a significant contributor to climate stability, as the 
world’s wetlands are important reservoirs of carbon, comprising about 15% of 
terrestrial stocks (Patterson, 1999). On this basis, the pantaneira region has been 
constructed as an object of global significance by the international community. In 
1993, UNESCO declared the Pantanal a Ramsar Site81 and in 2000 a World 
Biosphere Reserve and a World Heritage site. Other conventions referring to the 
Pantanal as an internationally significant wetland include the World Heritage 
Convention (1972), the Convention on Migratory Species82 (1979), the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (1992) or the Convention on Climate Change (1992). There 
is no shortage of reports, articles, policy briefs, press releases and websites by NGOs, 
think tanks and researchers nurturing this discourse on the Pantanal, also heavily 
mobilised by NGOs operating in Brazil. The WWF, for instance, has defined the 
region as “globally outstanding” in terms of biological distinctiveness, “vulnerable” 
in terms of conservation, and as a “highest priority” for global conservation (Olson, 
e ta l., 1998).
80 Bio-productivity can be defined as the amount of organic matter produced per area per year.
81 In 1971, a treaty was signed in the Iranian city of Ramsar to promote the conservation of wetlands. 
It was only ratified by Brazil in 1993 after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
82 Also known as the Bonn Convention.
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Such considerations underpin the idea that the whole of mankind has a direct stake in 
the Pantanal, a right to see it preserved and a duty to make it happen. It thus comes 
with a notion of “global ownership” or “responsibility”. As an interviewee put it, 
representing the views of a local NGO:
Brazil should not be allowed to manage this area alone, especially given what it is
doing here, [interview 82]
Conversely, a strong Brazilian sensitivity has emerged over the years about its 
inalienable rights to “environmental sovereignty” [interview 100]. This national 
reaction developed as Amazonia has attracted immense international and well 
publicised attention. Countless NGOs, often financed by foreign governments, have 
poured into a region that is still barely controlled by federal and local authorities, 
given its challenging size. “International intrusions” have more than irritated 
Brazilian authorities, which now seldom miss an opportunity to remind the world 
that they are the only legitimate decision-makers [interview 73]. A tense climate has 
thus developed around the NGOs and potential foreign interference. Since 2006, 
there have even been rumours that the American government had plans for the 
“internationalisation” of Amazonia. Maps showing an amputated Brazil and the 
Amazon region under an international mandate have been circulating on the Internet 
[interview 69], This could have been passed off as a piece of insensitive humour had 
some Brazilian army officers not made public comments stating that the country 
would never accept such prospects, thus giving credence to those who consider the 
documents genuine. This atmosphere was also clearly felt when a federal minister 
declared in 2007 that if Amazonia was to be a “global public good”, then the nuclear 
arsenal of the United States should also be declared “international property”, given 
the high stakes it holds for the whole of mankind. Suspicions are also apparent 
regarding the Pantanal, as suggested by the comments of some civil servants we 
interviewed in Brasilia:
- International work in the Pantanal is welcome, as long as NGOs and others do not
forget in what country they are. [interview 68]
- The Pantanal is a Brazilian jewel. Brazil will take care of it. [interview 70]
Yet, like the Amazon region, the issue is not merely a matter of sovereignty vs. 
foreign interferences:; it also reflects tensions between the goals of development vs. 
conservation. Since the mid-1970s, both federal and local authorities have 
emphasised the need to “domesticate the Pantanal” [interview 98]. The region has
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thus been the object of multiple economic programmes designed to make it an 
“engine of development” (Junk, et al., 2009).83 However, environmental groups have 
denounced the negative impacts of human activities such as urbanisation, gold 
mining, cattle-ranching, electricity production and large transport infrastructures (see 
Appendix 9 for a summary of these issues).
6.1.2. Protecting the Pantanal: brilliant laws, hollow  enforcem ent
In order to harmonise local legislations, a “National System for Protected Areas” 
(SNUC) was adopted as federal law in 2000. It reflects the core tension of Brazilian 
environmental policies by dividing protected areas in two categories:
1. “strictly protected areas”, where the preservation of biodiversity is the central 
objective and human activities are severely restricted;
2. “sustainable use areas” where biodiversity protection is an important but not 
the sole objective, allowing for a range of economic activities to take place.
Increasingly, local levels of environmental management are those that matter in 
Brazil. While federal protected areas were predominant during the 1980s, 48% of the 
nation’s protected areas are now under the authority o f local states.84 The latter, 
however, have emphasised conservation much less than the federal government. As 
local authorities are more directly dependent on economic actors and less sensitive to 
international NGOs, they have mostly created sustainable use areas, 70% of which 
are defined as “environmental protection areas” (APAs). This SNUC category is 
often criticised by NGOs for “its misleading name”, as explained by an interviewee:
APAs are not really protected areas; they are more like a mechanism for land-use 
management.... They constrain human activities with various plans or zoning systems, 
with some small areas set aside for strict protection...But this mechanism brings little 
added value on the ground because the small sites that are set aside for strict 
protection are usually spaces that cannot be put to any other use anyhow. 
[interview 86]
83 These programmes included: the Inter-municipal Consortium for the Development of the Pantanal 
(CIDEPAN); the Program for the Development of the Pantanal (PRODEPAN); the Program for the 
Development of the Cerrados (POLOCENTRO); the National Alcohol Program83 (PROALCOOL); 
the Development Program of the Grande Dourados (PRODEGRAN); the Study of the Integrated 
Development of the Upper Paraguay Basin (EDIBAP); the Program of the Agro-Environmental 
Development of the State of Mato Grosso (PRODEAGRO); and the National Environmental Program 
(PNMA), with its sub-programme known as the Conservation Plan of the Upper Paraguay Basin 
(PCBAP).
84 In numbers, not total surface area.
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In the Pantanal, strict protection applies to 100% of the publicly protected areas, but 
this figure merely reflects the quasi-absence of any public conservation policy in the 
region. Until 1999, only two small areas had received official protection, covering 
0.6% of the pantaneiro territory.
Another aspect of environmental policy in the Pantanal is the enormous amount of 
“excellent legislation on paper” (Wade, 1999). Article 225 of the Brazilian 
Constitution defines this region as a “national patrimony” and with more 120 active 
environmental laws, the Pantanal is in theory well protected and monitored. Official 
regulations include provisions on impact assessments, public reviews, protection of 
wildlife species, controls on fertilisers, etc. Moreover, federal law requires 
landowners to preserve native vegetation along river banks (the so-called “permanent 
reserve”). They must also keep a certain percentage of their property in its natural 
state (the “legal reserve”).85 Yet, the story is very different when it comes to 
implementation. To start with, regulatory authority for the Pantanal is split between 
two states, which leads to gaps and inconsistencies. Moreover, although there is no 
lack of federal and state structures in charge of policing and monitoring86, their 
limited human and material resources contrast with the size of the region. 
Interviewees in federal ministries and agencies suggested a widespread feeling that, 
as one civil servant put it:
Whatever we do here, the landowners o f the Pantanal are kings in their kingdoms.
[interview 68]
It is also known that in the high plateaus surrounding the Pantanal the intensive 
exploitation of the land is encouraged by the state itself, with the result that the rules 
on the permanent and the legal reserve are frequently violated. Issues of corruption 
among environmental inspectors might also exist, as several informants implied 
[interviews 74, 84].
It is in this context that international NGOs started to lobby the federal and local 
governments at the beginning of the 1990s for a much stricter conservation 
approach.87 They promoted the idea of “total reserves” through the creation of further
85 20% in Mato Grosso do Sul and 35% in Mato Grosso, compared with 80% in the Amazon region.
86 They include the Brazilian Institute for Environment and Renewable Resources (IBAMA) under the 
federal ministry of the environment and, in Mato Grosso do Sul, the State Secretariat of the 
Environment (SEMA), the Instituto do Meio Ambiente Pantanal (IMAP) and the state Forestry Police.
87 Conservation International, the University of Brasilia and the Fundagao Biodiversitas were 
especially active [interviews 85, 103].
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national parks as well as more “private reserves” owned by NGOs, philanthropists or 
fazendeiros. Between 2001 and 2004, the state of Mato Grosso do Sul thus declared 
five new protected areas covering 1,400 km2. The Federal government, for its part, 
created the Bodoquena National Park (760 km2). On the whole, however, these 
lobbying successes have not changed the overall picture of public conservation in the 
Pantanal: less than 2.5% of the region is under such official protection, and moreover 
there exist scant means of enforcing it.
6.1.3. The changing faces of CP in the w etlands and their strategic  
content
The global discourse on CP has taken several forms over the years in the Pantanal. 
Here we argue that, each time, it has embodied a means of giving certain actors pre­
eminence over others in the shaping of the region’s destiny.
The participatory discourse entered the Pantanal in the 1970s, starting with large 
“strategic planning” exercises led by the local state and involved an astonishing 
number of actors in public consultations and workshops [interviews 58, 78, 90]. 
Worthy of mention are: the well-known EDIBAP (Plan for the Integrated 
Development of the Upper Paraguay River Basin) launched in 1978; the PCBAP 
(Upper Paraguay River Basin Conservation Plan) launched in 1991; the SAP 
(Strategic Action Program for the Integrated Management of the Pantanal and the 
Upper Paraguay River Basin) launched in 1996; and the INREP (Institutions and 
Research for the Pantanal) launched in 2007 and financed by the European Union 
(see Appendix 10 for more details). However, as many interviewees bitterly 
reflected, none has produced much more than voluminous reports [interviews 87, 
101, 102, 103]. They seem to have exhausted the hopes and patience of many local 
stakeholders, who feel that “the state has made [them] speak a lot but without 
listening” [interview 103]. A researcher humorously described the Pantanal as “the 
Bermuda triangle of participatory planning” [interview 102].
The second use of the CP discourse in the Pantanal has been geared towards the 
“participation” of private landowners in strict conservation schemes [interviews 83, 
88]. Taking advantage of the fact that Brazilian legislation facilitates the creation of 
privately protected areas (RPPN, Reservas Particulares do Patrimonio Natural), 
NGOs such as Conservation International (Cl) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
Chapter 6 -2 3 5
actively promoted such schemes. While Cl supported landowners in building 
“ecological corridors”, TNC helped a partner foundation (Ecotropica) to purchase 
600 km2 of land on the borders of the Pantanal National Park. Under Reservas 
Particulares, owners benefit from property tax exemptions but land protection is 
irrevocable (it cannot be subsequently de-classified) and land-use is restricted to 
ecotourism and research. In the Pantanal, a total of 13 such reserves exist to date 
covering 2,043 km2 (1.5% of the region). Through these schemes, the use of CP 
discourse was centred on the collaboration of NGOs with private landowners 
interested in strict conservation.
However, as 97% of the region is owned by cattle ranchers, certain NGOs 
increasingly felt that environmental conservation could only emerge through 
cooperation with local producers and new forms of “participation” that acknowledge, 
rather than deny, economic activities. This process started among NGOs in the early 
2000s [interviews 72, 81]. The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) is one of the 
first to have tried this path in the Pantanal. Since 2001, it has been training ranchers 
to better manage their conflicts with wildlife, especially with jaguars (WCS, 2006). 
Their predation on livestock is a permanent issue: related losses of cattle are around 
0.2% per year. This may seem low but it can mean hundreds of lost heads per farmer, 
which makes the farmers uneasy about the issue and leads to unregulated jaguar 
hunting.
Slowly moving away from its strict conservation orientation, Cl has also been trying 
to work more with cattle ranchers [interview 83]. In partnership with the Jaguar 
Conservation Fund (a Brazilian NGO) and a local university (UFMS), it developed a 
scheme in 2002 to compensate farmers for cattle lost to jaguars on eleven adjacent 
properties -  representing 1,500 km2 of safer jaguar habitat. In return, the fazendeiros 
have signed an agreement to cease killing jaguars (Cl, 2006). The project also 
supports a social programme that makes free medical and dental assistance available 
to ranch workers. The WWF started work in 1998 with fisherwomen’s groups to 
promote local arts and crafts; it also provides help to cattle ranchers on ecotourism 
and, since 2002, on organic certification [interview 81].
Working with local producers on their economic activities has thus timidly emerged 
as a third type of CP in the environmental management of the Pantanal. However, 
NGOs have kept to a rather weak version of “community participation”, with a scope
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largely limited to implementation and schemes that merely provide incentives to 
change certain production practices [interview 104]. This is still a long way from 
full-fledged participatory projects in which CP impacts all dimensions. Moreover, 
most NGOs have focused their core efforts on stricter conservation projects -  such as 
buying and fencing lands in private conservation schemes or protecting flagship 
species like the Arara-azul grande (a large blue parrot species seen in Photo 5 and 
supported by the WWF).
6.1.4. Conclusion: the novelty o f the PRP proposal
In this section we showed that the concept of CP has taken various forms over the 
years in the Pantanal, reflecting the ongoing tension between concurrent visions of 
the conservation and sustainable use of the environment. Thus, the CP discourse was 
first embodied in state-led community consultations in a range of planning exercises 
that gave the state the leading role although little action followed. It then took shape 
in private conservation efforts, providing NGOs with a key role in supporting and 
orientating these initiatives. And again, CP has very recently changed face, gradually 
integrating an approach to environmental management inclusive of local producers: 
this new generation of CP programmes involves increased power-sharing between 
NGOs and local producers -  but this is still within schemes defined by the NGOs. In 
other words, although environmental NGOs in the Pantanal sported the global mantra 
of participation since the 1990s, they implemented weak versions that only provided 
incentives rather than decision-making power to locals.
A new balance of power was to emerge with the proposal for a “Regional Park”, 
which is a legal concept imported from France giving local producers much greater 
power of decision. The idea of a community-led Pantanal Regional Park was 
radically new and the first project to involve cattle ranchers as a community, enhance 
their capacity for collective action in environmental and socio-economic areas. It 
stimulated hopes of seeing the local pantaneira community develop its own self­
designed programmes, rather than joining projects pre-defined by NGOs. This vast 
participatory scheme raised eyebrows within the NGO community, as local 
landowners (fazendeiros) were still in no way seen as good friends of the 
environment. Providing them with more power and financial means was resented by 
many environmentalists as a useless or even dangerous move.
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6.2. The PRP Genesis: a Community in Crisis, 
Searching for A llies
The proposal for a “Pantanal Regional Park” (PRP) was a fundamental step in the 
participatory discourse in the region. It involved creating a large-scale participatory 
scheme based on the voluntary membership of private landowners, while supporting 
rather than barring local productions. Here we track the genesis of this CP project, its 
originating argents, the strategic meaning of the initiative and the configuration of 
interests that it underpinned.
We first argue that a will for containment was at the root of the PRP initiative. This 
came from local landowners who were worried about the rising influence of 
conservationist NGOs and economic competitors in the Pantanal. Certainly, the 
increasing presence of these actors was threatening the environmental legitimacy and 
economic sustainability of traditional fazendeiros. Second, we show that this 
objective of double containment crossed paths with a foreign actor, the French 
government, who had a domestic model of environmental management to offer (the 
“natural regional park”), based on the co-operation of the state with local producers. 
Created in the 1960s, this model had already been exported to different countries. 
Third -  and consequently -  we contend that French experts came to act as the main 
supporter and designer of the actual PRP project, leaving little room for community 
participation in the early years.
6.2.1. The crisis of cattle-ranchers and the w ill to co n ta in  com petitors 
and conservationists
At the root of the PRP initiative is an economic and legitimacy crisis experienced by 
the long-established pantaneira landowning families involved in cattle-ranching 
[interviews 58, 77, 79, 80]. At the beginning of the 1990s, these farmers increasingly 
resented two types of threat. The first one stemmed from economic competitors 
entering the Pantanal with larger capital funds, buying bankrupted properties 
(fazendas) and importing more intensive modes of production. The second was 
linked to conservationist NGOs backed by international networks and resources 
promoting a “bell-jar” approach to conservation that shamed cattle-ranchers for their 
negative impact. In this tense context, the PRP initiative emerged as a way for
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fazendeiros to contain both types of incoming actors, regain an environmental 
legitimacy and gain some economic support.
An economic crisis: fa lling property sizes, lower beef prices and increased  
competition
Cattle ranchers in the Pantanal are facing a serious crisis of economic sustainability. 
This has to do with the size of their land properties, which is decreasing with time 
and now often falls below the threshold of economic viability. This process is linked 
to population growth and immigration combined with the deeply ingrained custom of 
dividing inheritance equally between male heirs [interviews 59, 61, 106].
Land property needs to be large to be economically viable: during the wet season, 
most of the land is flooded, but sufficient grazing area is still needed. Fazendas that 
are too small can easily run out of business in just one difficult year if floods are too 
high. At the end of the 19th century, as Wilcox (1992) explains, only a few scattered 
ranches existed in the Pantanal, which meant that human pressure was very low. 
During the first half of the 20th century ranching further developed, but the presence 
of local diseases affecting horses limited its expansion. This constraint was lifted, 
however, in the 1960s with improvements in animal health -  which greatly 
stimulated the number of immigrants flowing into the Pantanal via family links. In 
1920, the Brazilian census counted about a hundred ranches throughout the Pantanal 
with about 700,000 head of cattle, whereas by the early 1970s there were over 3,500 
ranches raising five million head. Since then, ranches have been gradually 
subdivided as families grew and immigrants settled. While a minimum of 15,000 
hectares is generally deemed necessary for a fazenda to operate satisfactorily 
(Bartaburu, 2006, p.50), 70% of land properties were already below 10,000 hectares 
in 1970, 78% in 1980 and 84% in 1996 (Wilcox, 1992, p. 242; Rodriges Santos, et 
al., 2003, p.239).
Today, an ever increasing number of ranches are under 6,000 hectares, which is the 
threshold of absolute survival according to several interviewees [interviews 58, 60, 
67]. Consequently, many properties are being sold to external farmers, locally 
denigrated as “asphalt farmers” (fazendeiros do asfalto) [interview 62]. These often 
come from the higher plateaus surrounding the Pantanal, where they enjoy a much 
higher productivity. These people thus arrive with more capital and intensive 
production techniques. This process is bitterly resented by traditional landowning
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families, who still form the bulk of landowners and do not have similar capital 
resources. Interviews with fazendeiros underlined this feeling of “threat” with 
comments such as:
- I  don’t know of a single fazendeiro [in Pantanal] who is happy with the new guys, 
although more and more have to sell their lands to them, [interview 58]
- The [newer fazendeiros], they do not know anything about us, about our history, 
about the Pantanal and they don’t want to respect the way we have been living with 
the Pantanal for generations, [interview 59]
- [They] should not be here but the law of the market is king. It is very sad. [interview 
67]
- How do you want us to compete with people who have several times the capital we 
have? [interview 64]
Cattle ranchers of the Pantanal have also been impacted by the fluctuating meat 
prices on the world markets. Formerly, the original wealth of the industry had been 
based on the export of salted and dried meat to national and international markets. 
These exports had maintained high prices until World War II, but these activities 
went into decline when refrigeration techniques lowered the demand for meat 
preserves (Junk & de Cunha, 2005). After a difficult post-war period, cattle 
producers enjoyed two decades of continuous price rises that came to an abrupt end 
at the start of the 1970s, when a sharp plunge affected world prices (Edelman, 1992, 
p. 195). This phenomenon lasted well into the 1990s and was reinforced in Brazil by 
regular outbreaks of “foot and mouth disease”, which prevented exportation to many 
foreign markets, notably the European Union.
A legitimacy crisis: the environmentalist critique and the fear of been taken  
over
Nearly 80% of land in Amazonia that was deforested between 1996 and 2006 is now 
used for cattle pasture (Greenpeace, 2009). This more than explains the reputation of 
cattle-ranchers among environmentalist working or interested in Brazil. Although the 
situation is not the same in the Pantanal, an enduring mistrust exists between NGOs 
and fazendeiros in the region. For these actors, the notion of working together has 
only slowly and recently emerged, while strict conservationist views still dominate 
the operations of large NGOs. All of this means that landowners feel threatened by 
conservationists, a feeling that was even higher 15 years ago, at the time of the 
genesis of the PRP project [interviews 62, 66],
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Interviews carried out in 2008 still manifested this tension, despite the increasing 
number of NGO projects that integrated a more collaborative spirit. Several NGOs 
still openly battle against the idea that cattle-raising is a viable long-term option for 
the Pantanal. In 2006, for instance, Conservation International released a report 
(Barcellos Harris, 2006) claiming that deforestation from increased grazing and 
agriculture had already destroyed 17% of the native vegetation in the Pantanal 
(25,000 km2). It was further argued that if  deforestation continued at the current rate, 
it would cause all of the region’s original vegetation to disappear within 45 years. 
Such analyses feed the mistrust that exists between NGOs and the landowners, who 
have a positive view of their environmental impact. Many fazendeiros openly fear 
that NGOs will in the long run:
invade the Pantanal and kick [us] out. [interview 61]
Outright hostility is sometimes present, as fazendeiros feel that large NGOs in the 
region are filled with:
people from abroad, paid 5,000 dollars a month, and who think they can tell [us] what
to do/[interview 60]
In this troubled context, the PRP project emerged as a way of enabling landowners to 
strengthen their position in the face of economic competitors and influential 
environmentalists. A dual will of containment, thus, lies at the root of the project.
6.2.2. Ideal allies: the local state and a foreign governm ent prom oting a 
dom estic m odel
The concerns of the landowners about containing incoming competitors and 
conservationists encountered those of the local state, which showed itself willing to 
respond to the anxieties of this large rural constituency. According to several 
interviewees, the public authorities were also happy to help contain the influence of 
conservationist forces that were highlighting the “global public good” reading of the 
Pantanal far more than the need for domestic development [interviews 69, 72, 110]. 
Moreover, as the NGOs considered the new “asphalt farmers” extremely worrying 
given their environmental impact, developing a strategy against them was also a way 
to regain the lead on significant environmental issues [interview 86]. Thus, the 
momentum for the PRP project was underpinned by the common determination of 
two key local actors to regain initiative from the increasingly influential incomers.
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These concerns also crossed the path of a foreign model of environmental 
management: the concept of “regional park” originally developed in France. An 
originating alliance thus emerged between the landowners, the local state and a 
foreign government interested in exporting a domestic model.
France is proud of its history in environmental management. This is true of water 
management and waste treatment -  two industries in which the country boasts some 
of the biggest companies in the world. But the same is true of its system of protected 
areas. One of its unusual aspects lies precisely in the concept of “natural regional 
park”. These entities are built on a contract between local producers to define and 
commit to certain environmental norms -  and the state, which may provide economic 
support. France developed this model in the mid-1960s and supported its 
international diffusion with funding and research programmes in countries including 
Russia, Poland, Portugal, Belgium, Chile and Vietnam. As for Brazil, the features of 
a “regional park” fitted squarely with the strategic concerns of the pantaneiro cattle- 
ranchers: strengthening their production while keeping conservationists at a distance.
The idea of a “regional park” dates back to 1966, when the Delegation a 
I ’Amenagement du Territoire called upon the French government to create a new 
integrated instrument for economic, social and environmental management based on 
the participation of local stakeholders. At the time, rural areas were undergoing a 
continuous “exodus” and the solution proposed by the authorities was a brand new 
CP instrument. A decree instituting “Regional Parks” as a legal category was signed 
by the government in 1967. Over time, this model took roots in many French regions 
with fragile natural resources and socio-economic contexts. More than 40 such 
regional parks are now functioning in France. They cover about 10% of the national 
territory, 4 million hectares, 2,000 communes (rural or urban districts) and around 
2.2 million people. Each regional park is built on an institutional entity known as a 
syndicat mixte (mixed syndicate). It brings together elected representatives as well as 
representatives from NGOs and professional associations operating in the target area. 
In the case of the Pantanal Regional Park, a similar association was created in 2001 
under the name Instituto do Parque do Pantanal (IPP) -  to which we return later.
Mixed syndicates are responsible for determining the operations of the park’s 
technical teams and the policy orientations set out in a park charter. Every regional 
park has its own Chatre du territoire (territory charter) defining the principles and
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actions to be followed and binding the public and private partners. Charters are thus 
“contracts” under which partners commit to jointly negotiated principles. They must 
be approved by the French Ministry of the Environment and result from lengthy 
negotiations between stakeholders -  typically five years. The obligation to comply 
with the charter is reinforced by the need to secure recurrent funding from the 
national authorities, and thus to show results on a regular basis. Regional parks also 
have to obtain a renewed approval of their charter every ten years. There is also an 
entity that associates French regional parks at national level: the FPNRF {Federation 
des Parcs Naturels Regionaux de France). This federation is responsible for 
managing partnership programmes, exchanges of experience and the capitalisation of 
knowledge; it also represents the regional parks as a group when negotiating with 
national authorities in the elaboration of legal texts and public policies.
The “regional park” model was first exported to Brazil through a series of contacts 
between the French embassy and the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, where this 
management model raised a lot of attention [interviews 75, 79]. In 1996, a formal 
agreement was signed establishing technical co-operation between the FPNRF and 
the government of Mato Grosso do Sul. The FPNRF was then entrusted with the 
responsibility of searching for international funds in order to create the “Pantanal 
Regional Park” (PRP). In the next section we analyse how the connection with 
foreign donors was established, as well as the latter’s critical weight in project 
design.
6.2.3. The PRP: a local in itiative m oulded by foreign experts, resisted  by 
NGOs
Section 3.1.1 suggested that CP projects can usually be classified as dominantly 
originating “from within, above or outside” the community. However, there are cases 
where the initial influence comes from an alliance of balanced sources and 
converging interests. Such was the case with the Parque Regional do Pantanal 
(PRP).
The initiators of the project were undoubtedly located within the local community. 
The dynamics leading to its creation was originally sparked off by a local politician, 
Dr. Mendes Canale, a Federal Senator in search of innovative steps to help the 
Pantanal’s cattle-ranchers improve their situation and to appease their growing
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discontent [interviews 58, 63, 64], From the mid-1980s on, Dr. Canale met on a 
regular basis with a group of well-established fazendeiros from the Rio Negro region 
of the Pantanal. He became strongly associated with the interests of local cattle- 
raisers, secured the support of the local authorities of Mato Grosso do Sul and started 
to seek broader support within the Brazilian federation and from possible foreign 
partners.
It is at this point that foreign influence started to develop. The link that was 
eventually established with France was not by chance. The state of Mato Grosso do 
Sul already had a long tradition of contacts between its local authorities and a range 
of technical experts from France on issues of economic planning [interview 75]. It 
was quite natural, thus, that Dr. Canal should seek a dialogue with the French 
embassy in Brasilia which in turn promoted France’s experience in the domain of 
regional parks. With the help of the ambassador, and the support of the Brazilian 
embassy in Paris, contacts were made with the FPNRF -  already mentioned in the 
previous section as the French association of regional parks. From 1986 to 1995, 
technical meetings took place between this organisation and the local state 
represented by a public foundation (FEMAP, Fundagao Estadual de Meio Ambiente 
do Pantanal). FPNRF technicians came to Brazil, while missions involving this 
foundation and a range of landowners were sent to Paris [interview 77].
An official demand for technical assistance was made by the state of Mato Grosso do 
Sul in 1995 and in 1996 an agreement was signed establishing co-operation between 
the FEMAP (representing state interests) and the FPNRF (acting as a technical 
body). A French volunteer paid by French co-operation was soon appointed to work 
full-time on the project. The FPNRF was also entrusted with the responsibility of 
looking for funding internationally in view of creating a “natural regional park” in 
the Pantanal. From the start, foreign expertise exerted an immense influence on the 
actual design of the project: not only had the concept been originally developed in 
France, but French experts were directly responsible for introducing the endeavour to 
potential donors [interview 64].
A support project for the creation of the PRP was thus given the name of “Apoio a 
Criagao do Parque Natural Regional do P a n ta n a lNot only was this preparatory 
project mainly planned by foreign experts, but it was also primarily funded by
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foreign donors. With a total expected cost of 1,022,550 euros,88 the project was then 
submitted to the European Commission and approved in 1998 by the General 
Directorate for External Relations (DGIB). It secured a contribution from the 
European Union of 776,000 euros, more than three-quarters of the requested funds. 
The gap was filled by the local state of Mato Grosso do Sul as well as the French co­
operation. In December 1998, the scheme was launched with the signing of a new 
co-operation agreement whereby the FPNRF was to provide a key expert, a French 
national, acting as “Principal Technical Advisor”. It is this person who subsequently 
set up a technical team and was entrusted with overseeing the course of the project. 
His influence throughout the life of the project was repeatedly underlined by 
interviewees [interviews 58, 64, 65, 103].
Another factor that furthered increased the foreign influence was the limited 
inclusiveness of “community participation” in the upstream process: initial diagnosis, 
formulation of possible solutions and final selection of a course of action (as defined 
in 3.1.3). In the project design, CP had in fact been restricted to the involvement of a 
few elite families. Interviews revealed that only a limited number of leading local 
figures were mobilised in the discussions with the Brazilian and French experts -  and 
for the trips to France [interviews 60, 61, 67]. The missions to Europe were supposed 
to involve a diversified representation offazendeiros, but several interviewees recall 
that, instead, several people from the same family were sent. In the view of an 
interviewee:
These [fazendeiros] were just doing family tourism to Europe, while the French were
deciding things [interview 61]
Meanwhile, the move towards the creation of a “regional park” was passively 
resisted and openly criticised by most international NGOs working in the region 
[interview 87]. Officially, they did not like the fact that this “regional park” did not 
readily fit into existing Brazilian law, but was meant to impose a new category on 
national legislation (SNUC). However, according to several interviewees, the real 
cause of this reluctance was their lack of trust in local fazendeiros as environmental 
managers. As a former staff member of a local NGO commented:
Don't get it wrong. Some NGOs work today with cattle-ranchers, but this does not
mean they like them. Although they share a common interest for the Pantanal, it is
rooted in very different views ....Environmental NGOs do not feel that fazendeiros are
88 Called “ECU” (European Currency Unit) before January 1999.
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their allies, much to the contrary. And it is just the same on the other side. 
[interview 88]
Or:
Why should NGOs have liked a project that gives new means and voice to the very 
people they would like to see more controlled or simply out o f the landscape? ...There 
is no way [they] could have supported it. [interview 85]
Another interviewee felt that PRP-type projects made NGOs afraid of simply losing
their emerging position on the environmental management scene:
Community projecst like the Pantanal Regional Park are meant for the locals. Large 
environmental NGOs are not part of the community... The PRP was not about giving 
Cl or the WFF more weight in the Pantanal; quite the opposite in fact, [interview 78]
Certainly, it seems highly implausible that environmental NGOs would criticise the
PRP initiative on the sole grounds that it was trying to influence legislation, which is
something they themselves do continually.
6.2.4. Conclusion
The genesis of the PRP project was thus supported by an originating alliance 
aggregating the interests of local fazendeiros, the local state and a foreign 
government. While the initiators of the scheme were located within the community 
(a set of elite families aided by a local politician and then state authorities), financial 
supporters and conceptual designers were largely foreign as technical responsibilities 
for the preparatory project were to a great extent moved to the other side of the 
Atlantic -  especially to a set of French experts. This displacement of “conceptual 
leadership” is similar to the one observed in the case of the Soufriere Maritime 
Management Association (SMMA), in St. Lucia. There, the design of the CP scheme 
was largely influenced by a regional think tank (CANARI). In both cases, a foreign 
partner became a critical guide in shaping a “community-led” participatory scheme 
and its subsequent institutional structure. In the case of the PRP, French experts had 
a ready-made CP model to offer that seemed to fit the concerns of the cattle ranchers 
and the local state. Not only does the “regional park” model place local producers at 
the centre of environmental management, in cooperation with the state, but it also 
comes with the promise of public support to local economic projects.
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6.3. “Salvation through Traditions”: Intents and  
Effects o f a Containm ent D iscourse
As we have seen, the PRP project was built on a double intent of containment -  
which can in turn operate in a variety of modes (see section 3.1.7, Table 5). One 
important mode is epistemic exclusion through the reconstruction of identities and of 
what is considered “legitimate knowledge”. This form of productive power is 
identifiable in the discourse on “traditions” that accompanied and informed the 
proposal for a “regional park”. Its core idea was that, contrary to the 
environmentalists’ fears, “traditional cattle ranching” had been the guardian o f the 
Pantanal for centuries, given its “low or even positive” impact on the environment, 
so that its continued presence constituted the guarantee of its future preservation. 
Traditions were thus presented as the best way forward to save the Pantanal from 
“destructive changes”. It was even argued that a decrease in cattle-ranching would 
damage the biodiversity of fallow lands -  a view which is the exact opposite of the 
one held by conservationists, who favour strict “reserves”, whether public or private. 
This discourse had the strategic advantage of re-positioning the “local community” 
as the “traditional care-taker” of the environment; it also legitimated economic 
support in the name of the environment -  a critical rationale for securing financial 
aid from the European donors.
But this is not the whole story. The discourse on “traditions” put forward through the 
PRP initiative also carried effects of structural power as it re-delineated which actors 
and practices were to be defined as the core of the “traditional community”. In doing 
so, the CP discourse relating to the project focused exclusively on cattle ranchers and 
landowners, leaving aside other important social groups that had been part of the 
pantaneira landscape for generations, notably fisher communities and rural workers 
of the fazendas. Although the PRP was to be an exemplary participatory scheme, 
these local stakeholders attracted no attention from donors. As a result, the strategic 
discourse on tradition did not only carry containment intents against conservationists 
and economic competitors, but also direct containment effects on lower local social
o p
groups, following an apparent process of selective oblivion.
89 As defined in section 3.1.7
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Here, we first look at the productive power intents of the discourse on the “traditional 
community”, before analysing its structural power effects.
6.3.1. Productive Power: the construction o f cattle-ranchers as
“protectors” o f the Pantanal
Cattle-ranching in Brazil has been consistently denounced by NGOs and scientists 
alike for extensive environmental degradation it causes throughout the country, as is 
famously the case in the Amazonia (e.g. Feamside, 2008). It is curious, as Wilcox 
(1992, p.233) comments, that the same economic sector should be considered a 
saviour of the environment in another Brazilian region. This is what happened, 
nevertheless, with the PRP initiative in the Pantanal. The proposal for the Pantanal 
Regional Park was precisely based upon a productive discourse90 taking exactly the 
opposite view of the one traditionally held by environmentalists pointing to cattle 
ranchers as prime environmental threats.
It is true that since the end of the 1990s, environmental NGOs working in the 
Pantanal had come to acknowledge the need to work more with cattle ranchers 
[interview 97]. Yet, this strategy did not go so far as redefining local fazendeiros as 
the preferred or even good environmental caretakers, but merely as unavoidable 
partners since they own most of the land. The climate of suspicion between ranchers 
and NGOs has never disappeared and readily translated into the NGOs’ 
dissatisfaction with the PRP project.
A discourse on “ranchers as protectors of the environment” was nevertheless 
propelled by the PRP originating alliance -  made up, as we has seen, of elite 
landowners, local authorities as well as experts from the French co-operation. This 
discourse presents cattle-ranching as an activity that developed in “harmony” with 
the environment and poses insignificant problems -  with pasturing on open range, 
little use of fencing, minimal work on the lands, extensive flooding that limits the 
amount of cattle raised, etc. Consequently, cattle ranching can be promoted as an 
environmentally sustainable activity in the Pantanal. The strongest supporting 
argument in favour of this discourse is the notion the new and incoming farmers
90 As explained in section 3.2.4, an exercise of productive power involves redefining the identity of 
certain actors to provide them with a more privileged position. Like structural power, it works on the 
body of knowledge taken for granted.
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buying lands from bankrupt landowners, are importing productive practices that are 
more damaging to the environment.91
The “greening” of traditional cattle ranchers was a fundamental and necessary step 
for them to qualify for international aid, as both French and EU contributions were 
being made on environmental grounds. On the French side, we were able to secure 
project documents that show the extent to which the discourse had been used:92
The traditional activity that has modelled and maintained the characteristic 
landscapes of the [pantaneira] region during centuries are no longer profitable in the 
current conditions of production. The regression and transformation o f this activity 
constitutes the principal threat to the continued existence o f the pantaneiro 
ecosystem....The abandonment o f lands and the consecutive absence of pasture 
grazing rapidly lead to an invasion o f colonising plant species, a progressive loss of 
biodiversity both animal and vegetal. [FPNRF, 2000, p.3]
As we see from this extract, French project managers went much further than merely
espousing the thesis of a “low negative” or even “positive impact” of cattle ranching
on the environment: they present this activity as a necessary component of the
pantaneiro ecosystem itself. Interestingly enough, however, an independent scientific
committee -  with only a consultative and advisory role for the French donor -  did
not “swallow” this discourse readily. It expressed the need to receive more
information on why the abandonment of lands by cattle ranchers should be
considered an environmental problem. As the committee put it:
More precise elements [are needed] regarding the reality o f the problems raised by the 
abandonment o f the low lands. Elements in our possession do not enable us to 
discriminate between two hypotheses regarding the abandonment of extensive cattle 
raising: 1) it does not raise any problem for the conservation o f biodiversity, so that 
the proposed [PRP] project simply aims at maintaining a human population for 
development reasons; 2) the departure o f cattle ranchers will lead to lands let fallow 
which will raise true problems of conservation (regarding landscapes, animals and 
plants) o f international importance. [FFEM, 2000, p.l]
Although we secured access to internal donor documents, we found no evidence that
this request for more information about the “green rancher” discourse was answered
by project managers. In a large-scale empirical study Eaton (2006), however, had
compared the aquatic biodiversity of lakes in cattle-free and cattle-exposed sites in
91 To make smaller properties economically viable, these ranchers increase grazing area by clear- 
cutting native forests, planting exotic grasses and using 6-wire barbed fences that obstruct the 
movements of animals. NGOs such as Earthwatch (2004) and WCS (2009) vocally denounce these 
“asphalt farmers”.
92 These documents relate to a PRP component project, launched in 2001 and financed by the FFEM, 
under the name of ‘P ro je t d'appui a  la valorisation de la  biodiversite dans le Pantanal du Rio 
Negro".
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the southern Pantanal. Despite the supposedly low intensity of traditional ranching, 
he observed dramatic differences in species composition, richness, abundance, and 
biomass for both macro-invertebrates and birds at cattle-exposed sites, leaving little 
doubt about the deep impact of cattle ranching upon the local biome.
The environmental impact of extensive ranching may be low relative to new and 
incoming practices in the Pantanal, but it can hardly be labelled “insignificant” -  
both at the present time and historically. Accounts provided by Wilcox (1992) and 
Seidl et al. (2001) help appreciate the extent to which the vision of traditional cattle 
ranching as a low-impact practice is in fact biased.
To start with, ranchers traditionally set fire to the land during the dry season as a land 
management technique to “clean” the vegetation unused by cattle and to make way 
for new growth. These fires are initially started in the grassland; but they often 
spread to savannahs, woodland and forests due to open areas, dry vegetation and 
winds. This can destroy extensive areas of wildlife habitat. Fire also contributes to 
the hardening and impoverishment of the soil, as well as to the gradual displacement 
of indigenous plant species by fire-resistant grasses and woody species. In the long 
run, these invaders take over from high quality grasses.
Since the early 1970s, ranchers have also cleared lands and planted pastures on the 
highest grounds available to increase cattle stocking during the wet season. This 
practice is widespread and is perceived as economically optimal. It has resulted in 
large deforested areas, increased land erosion, sedimentation of rivers and a decrease 
in floral and faunal biodiversity.
There is also the issue of the sheer number of animals that graze in a given area. At 
first view, the size of the Pantanal and the yearly renewal of grasses seemed to 
ensure that there would be no problem of over-pasturing. However, the Pantanal is 
not uniform in terrain and human exploitation. Some regions have been overgrazed 
and are now covered in weeds. The concentration of animals has exhausted large 
areas, reducing their ability to regenerate after the waters recede, creating problems 
for local pasture survival.
Finally, exotic plants and animals. The use of artificial pastures had not been 
significant in the Pantanal up until the 1970s. It was rare in Brazil until the first 
decade of the 20th century and was not much practised in Mato Grosso until the 
1920s. However, where exotic pastures were introduced, they have had important
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local influences on the ecosystem -  a process now reinforced by the new farmers. 
Furthermore, the historical presence of cattle ranchers also led to the development of 
exotic animal species. Feral pigs, introduced in the 1800s, still disturb soil and 
vegetation and dispute territories and other resources with native animals.
By redefining cattle ranchers as the foremost “protectors” of the Pantanal, 
international funding for local development could be secured in the name of global 
biodiversity, the influence of conservationists could be better contained and 
incoming economic competitors de-legitimised.
6.3.2. Structural Power: the exclusionary delineation  o f the “traditional 
com m unity”
The PRP project had as one of its core rationales “to regenerate and support the
Q 'J
whole pantaneira community” ; it nevertheless largely ignored some key sub­
groups of this community. In the PRP project and its discursive nebula, significant 
stakeholders living within the Pantanal were barely taken into account or even talked 
about [interviews 67, 73, 80]. This was especially the case of the fisher communities 
of the PRP area as well as the rural workers (peons) on the fazendas. Arguably, an 
exclusionary exercise in structural power took place whereby the “pantaneira 
community” was identified solely as being the landowners -  thus producing a 
restricted delineation of exactly who is authorised to speak in the name of 
“tradition”.
Structural power refers to the reinforcement of the privileged social position of 
certain actors involved in long-standing hierarchical relations (cf. section 3.2.3). In 
producing social control, it notably works through discourses that wipe out certain 
stakeholders from given issues or negotiation spaces -  following a process of 
selective oblivion. Within the PRP project, landowners benefited from this process as 
they managed to position themselves as the core group and legitimate representatives 
of the whole pantaneira community. They thus captured the advantages that this 
label offered in the eyes of the local authorities and the foreign donors.
93 Interview with a civil servant.
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The production of a “common sense” privileging landowners was supported by its 
articulation94 with a widely shared feeling among the fazendeiros themselves: the 
feeling of their “historical legitimacy”, which has become part of their common 
culture [interview 107], Several high-profile landowning families have in their ranks 
well-known historians who have researched, documented and popularised the history 
of their family in the Pantanal. Consequently, the fazendeiros ’ typical claim as to 
their “special relation” and historical or moral ownership of the Pantanal was 
extremely present in the interviews we carried out, for example in comments such as:
- The Pantanal is not just where [we] work and live. It is what we are. [interview 64]
- For generations and generations my family was born here and died here....The 
Pantanal is part of me and I  am part of the Pantanal. [interview 67]
- There are new farmers coming here buying lands from some impoverishedfriends. ...I 
am very concerned about that. These people are not part of the Pantanal, they do not 
know it, they do not love it, because this takes generations, [interview 60]
As a matter of fact, many landowning families have a history in the region often
going back to the end of the 18th century (see Appendix 11). This long history helps
understand the fact the landowners identify themselves as the core of the “traditional
community”.
However, this dominant discourse hides important complementary or even 
alternative views. Its contingency appears easily when recalling basic facts that are 
left un- or under-analysed, as is striking in PRP project documents. A look at the 
longer-term history of the Pantanal leads to a far more open view about how the 
“traditional community” may be defined.
To begin with, Junk and de Cunha (2005) recall that the human occupation of the 
Pantanal dates back about 5,000 years, to a time when the climate was moister and 
groups of Tupi-Guarani Indians started to colonise the region. When the Europeans 
arrived, the Pantanal had long been occupied by various indigenous nations but the 
size of this native population quickly shrank following wars and diseases. Thus, until 
the 17th century the whole region was an Indian territory. Many of Brazil’s 
remaining Indians still live in the Pantanal, and face major social, political and 
economic challenges (Osava, 2009). Still, the PRP project never envisioned working 
with these populations, although it claimed to be a full exercise in CP applied to the 
“pantaneira community”.
94 On these concepts, see section 1.1.4, Table 2
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Although the defined boundaries of the PRP were not meant to encompass 
significant Indian populations (concentrated today in “indigenous reserves” of often 
limited size), there is a group of stakeholders present within these boundaries who 
have ancient links with Indians and strong rights that should be considered part and 
parcel of the Pantanal’s traditional community: the populations of fishers. These are 
spread throughout the wetlands along the river banks, which are public spaces by law 
and cannot be legally owned by fazendeiros, even when these cross their properties. 
Most of these small communities live along major rivers such as Rio Paraguay, Rio 
Taquari or Rio Negro. These groups are sometimes referred to as “professional 
fishers”, because they rely upon fishing for their subsistence. Many move from one 
place to another on a seasonal basis. They fish on an artisanal not industrial scale, 
which means they have a limited impact on the environment. The volume of their 
annual fish catch is far below that of the “sport fishing” industry which each year 
brings a growing number of tourists into the Pantanal. Fishers also rely on limited 
agricultural activities but cannot run them on a large scale because the lands they 
work on do not legally belong to them. These populations are largely left 
unsupported by local public policies -  and also left out of typical accounts of the 
Pantanal’s history [interview 86]. As some of their traditions show, they were 
originally linked to the Paiaguas Indian tribe, who were expert boatmen. However, 
the racial composition of these groups has diversified over decades to include an 
increasing number of mixed-blood people and former agricultural workers who 
decided to stop working for fazendeiros. Nowadays, these communities do not 
identify any longer with native Indians and thus form a different population 
[interview 84].
Secondly, the definition in the PRP context of the “traditional community” as a 
community of landowners, has excluded from the picture thousands of simple rural 
employees - the so-called peons [interview 103]. Let us recall that ranches (fazendas) 
are deeply hierarchical social worlds, composed of two types of people: fazendeiros 
and their families on the one hand (the owners), and the employees and their families 
on the other hand. These peons have usually had the same occupation for 
generations, much like the fazendeiros. It is they who have spawned most of the local 
folklore, with their traditions and highly coloured oral myths. While fazendeiros 
often live in cities neighbouring the wetlands, peons live the whole year in the
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Pantanal, caring for the cattle. They thus form a very special and key group within 
the pantaneira community and they are the ones who, arguably, carry a large share 
of its “soul”. As a matter fact, it is largely the peon “culture and ethos” that were 
advertised to and by foreign PRP donors to highlight the “harmony of men and 
nature” in the Pantanal.95 Given the importance of peons in the pantaneira 
community, and their near-invisibility in the large CP scheme under study, we shall 
return to this sub-community in the last chapter. An enquiry into their social capital 
will help explain why the voice of peons was so little heard in the PRP context.
The discourse on “environmental salvation through the traditional community” was 
thus constructed in a way that left out key sub-communities. This production of 
“common sense” was supported by the interpellation of various interests. Material 
collected in interviews with local observers indeed suggested that this selective 
oblivion also fitted the interests of the local authorities and the foreign experts 
involved in the PRP [interviews 86, 87]. First, for the local state, it is always 
technically difficult if not politically sensitive to deal with and involve the poorer 
sub-groups of the Pantanal -  especially in a scheme under which they could have 
claimed significant resources. As for foreign experts, the fact that the more fragile 
sub-groups of the Pantanal were not taken into account made it arguably easier to 
apply and export their home knowledge and models.
6.3.3. Conclusion
In this sub-chapter we have shown that the discourse on the “traditional community” 
supporting the PRP project neatly fitted the strategic interests of the fazendeiros, 
public authorities and foreign donor part of the originating alliance. Paying greater 
attention to the long-term environmental and social history of the Pantanal, the 
contingency of this discourse was also demonstrated -  as well as the nature of its 
power intents and effects.
First, and contrary to the productive discourse on traditions, the historical interaction 
between cattle-ranching and the environment was surely not a harmonious one. As 
Wilcox (1992, p.255) argues, ranching is not some “benign partner” that coexists 
with its environment: the entry of “thousands of voracious herbivores”, and the
95 This comment refers to interviews with project managers and the project documentation they 
provided us with.
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economic inputs necessary for their survival, has had a strong impact on the 
environment, including competition for space with wild animals, the introduction of 
new diseases, a gradual vegetation change, the disruption of habitat for species, etc. 
The introduction by humans of fire and fencing, as well as exotic grasses, have taken 
their toll on local ecosystems. The embellished picture of “traditional fazendeiros” as 
“guardians of the Pantanal” was nevertheless swiftly accepted by international 
donors, despite scientific doubts, and propelled by local Brazilian authorities with a 
stake in enhancing the economic use of the region.
Looking at the structural power effects of the discourse, we showed that members of 
the originating alliance paid no attention to other “traditional” members of the 
pantaneira community -  especially to the fishers and peons. In the context of the 
PRP, the traditional community had been successfully equated to the fazendeiros. 
This winning exercise in structural power helped to reinforce long-standing local 
social hierarchies. Although fishers and peons have all been living in the Pantanal for 
generations, they were not called upon to think about the PRP, which was 
nevertheless promoted in Brazil and internationally as an exemplary CP scheme.
The vested interests behind this move are identifiable. The fazendeiros were to be the 
prime beneficiaries of the PRP and had no interest in sharing either the benefits or 
the governance of the upcoming CP structure. In the meantime, local authorities did 
not have to be concerned with poorer sub-communities that are difficult to reach and 
may want to raise new political claims. Finally, the French experts could use their 
technical knowledge on subjects on which they already had experience, dealing with 
well-defined economic actors to create regional parks.
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6.4. Conclusion
This chapter first introduced the competing discourses and related power games that 
developed in the Pantanal over the divide between conservation and sustainable use 
in a context of weak law enforcement. It also demonstrated that the CP discourse has 
been successively used since the late 1970s as a containment tool by various actors, 
each providing CP with a different strategic meaning and operational content. The 
CP concept was in fact first used by the state in the form of large public consultations 
nurturing exercises of participatory planning that mostly led nowhere. More recently, 
it was used by large NGOs to help contain cattle-ranching activities and promote a 
stricter view of conservation based on private reserves. Third, it was initially 
mobilised to provide incentives to local producers to modify some of their 
production practices. Fourth and finally, the CP discourse was brought into play by 
landowning families in crisis, in the hope of containing both conservationist forces as 
well as incoming economic competitors. This move was supported by political 
authorities anxious about local development, but also by a foreign donor, France, 
who has long been eager to promote a home-grown model of environmental 
management internationally -  the so-called “regional parks”.
It was further showed that the PRP project has neither been originated by -  nor 
connected to -  a wide part of the local community, but rather to a limited set of 
active people. Socially speaking, the originating process was narrow and elite- 
centred, as those mainly involved were a few local elite families. Meanwhile, the 
initiative was to a large extent financially supported and conceptually influenced 
“from outside”.
Third, we contended that the PRP initiative was built upon a strategic discourse on 
“traditions” that neatly suited the interests of its originating alliance. By defining 
cattle ranchers as the foremost “protectors” of the environment, international funding 
for local development could be secured in the name of the protection of global 
biodiversity, the influence of conservationists could be better contained and 
incoming economic competitors de-legitimised. Beyond these productive power 
effects, the discourse on traditions also carried structural power effects reinforcing 
the social status quo in the Pantanal. The PRP’s reading of the traditional community 
narrowly focused on landowners and excluded long-standing local groups such as
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rural employees and fishers. This selective oblivion reflected these groups’ lack of 
political weight in their own pantaneira community. Consequently, the PRP offered 
no significant opportunity to actors other than landowners to benefit from the funds 
flowing into it.
As in St. Lucia, despite a great deal of celebration o f “community participation”, CP 
has been essentially used in the Pantanal as tool o f social control -  but against a 
much more complex range o f actors: from NGOs to fishers, from “asphalt farmers” 
to local peons. All o f these findings again seem to confirm the expectations o f the 
critical narrative o f the CP discourse.
Map 4 -  The Brazilian Pantanal: at the heart of South America
Source: ANA et al. (2005), p.3
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Map 5 -  The Brazilian Pantanal: a floodplain surrounded by higher plateaus
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Map 6 -  Structuring the Pantanal: the Paraguay River and its tributaries
(Hydrographic network of the  Upper Paraguay River Basin in Brazil)
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Photo 5 -  Examples of easily visible wildlife in the Pantanal
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Photo 6 -  Typical pantaneiro landscapes during the rainy season
Source: the author
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Photo 7 -  Cattle ranching in the Pantanal with Peons at work
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Chapter 7 - The Effect of CP in the Pantanal: Social 
Control, D ispossession and Altered Social Capital
The last chapter analysed the genesis, originating alliance and strategic meaning of 
the PRP project, intended to help contain the rise of conservationist forces and new 
economic actors. It also explored the discourse on the traditional community, 
embedded in the PRP project, to show how its productive and structural power 
dimensions sustained its spirit of containment for the preservation of the socio­
economic status quo of the region. It was further demonstrated that CP had been used 
in the Pantanal as a containment tool in changing hands since its emergence in the 
1970s. These findings largely seemed to fit the empirical expectations of the critical 
narrative on the nature, use and effect of the CP discourse. In this new chapter, we 
look at the implementation, fate and impact on the local community of the PRR 
project to further assess the relevance of these expectations. Ironically, it turns out 
that CP helped to disempower the landowners themselves.
We first analyse, indeed, how the mantra of pluralism turned CP once again into an 
instrument of social control but this time against the fazendeiros. This process started 
with the four-year “preliminary project” preceding the formal creation of the park in 
2002 -  an inception phase that soon revealed divergences in the agendas of the main 
partners. Behind the smiles, the originating alliance was cracking. The French 
experts, in particular, mistrusted the influence of the pre-existing landowner 
association; they thus emphasised the need to make the local civil society “more 
plural” and increase the number of local organisations, as a necessary step towards 
the creation of a “truly participatory park”. Although this “pluralisation” work was 
conducted in the name of CP, we show that it turned out to be detrimental to the local 
community itself. Fabricated pluralism in the form of a swift and artificial 
multiplication of small associations fragmented local voices and opened the way for 
other forces to capture the PRP.
The chapter then looks at the deployment of institutional power during the core 
implementation phase: the creation of the PRP itself. Although its legal construct 
reflected the ideal of a CP characterised by high inclusiveness, scope and intensity, as
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well as co-operation with the local state on an equal footing, the picture soon became 
very different in practice. To start with, the foreign experts never left the centre stage 
of the park’s management, although they were officially meant to be mere facilitators 
and advisors. What is more, a group of local politicians started to employ political 
interventions and appointments, a process that only amplified with time. From the 
viewpoint of the landowners, who were meant to be “in the driver’s seat”, the 
inclusiveness, scope and intensity of CP shrank almost completely. To their 
frustration, the governance of the PRP disaggregated, leading to an accumulation of 
financial and technical mismanagement. Eventually, all PRP operations had to close 
in July 2005 following a financial collapse eventually revealed by the non-payment 
of major taxes.
Finally, we investigate how the multiple containment processes identified in the PRP 
project were facilitated by and impacted the local social capital. The bridging SC of 
the rural workers is characterised by a symbiotic-paternalistic relation to the 
fazendeiros that was instrumental in depriving the former from having a say in the 
PRP process. We then show that the bonding SC is characterised by a complex mix 
of norms (such as individualism and informalism) that contributed to the 
disempowerment of the fazendeiros themselves and to the final collapse of the PRP. 
Lastly, we underline that the failure of this participatory scheme stimulated local 
frustrations and a VOICE response from the fazendeiros, which may feed a collective 
learning process. In the long run, part of the local social capital may appear to be 
renewed and enable more collective action.
All of these data emphasize the relevance of the critical narrative in describing the 
impact of CP insofar as multiple forms of disempowerment are indeed observed. 
However, the mechanisms and agendas that led to this disempowerment turn out to 
be far more local and open (rather than pre-defined) than generally implied by this 
narrative. It is not global capitalism that has been furthered in the case of the 
Pantanal, but rather various and contradictory rent-seeking behaviours. Their 
stimulation has led to a fight for dominance. Its conclusion (namely the political 
capture of the PRP) was not pre-determined, although the allocation of social capital 
among local stakeholders did skew and structure the battle.
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7.1. ‘Fabricated Pluralism ’ and its Social Control 
Effect: the Prelim inary Project
In this section we look at the first implementation phase of the PRP and the way in 
which CP was, once again, transformed into social control. This time, containment 
affected the fazendeiros themselves, through the weakening of their main pre­
existing association by the mantra of pluralism promoted by the foreign partners. The 
so-called “preliminary project for the creation of PRP” (Apoio a Criagao do PRP) 
was launched in 1998 to “organise and mobilise the local population” [interview 76]. 
It had two main components: first, the speedy creation of a range of new local 
organisations, expected to “pluralize” the local civil society; second, the launch of a 
variety of development projects, de facto  functioning as “baits” to attract landowners 
into these new associations.
As foreign experts were eager to draw on “CP best practices”, they became highly 
concerned with (and directly involved in) “fixing the local civil society”, 
“democratising it”, making it “more diverse” [interview 58]. This work was 
supposed to ensure that the participatory park could be constructed on the “healthy 
basis” of an inclusive participation [interview 77]. Yet, we argue that it undermined 
the reality of CP, notably its intensity (i.e. the degree of active participation) by 
destabilising the only well-established and functioning association offazendeiros: the 
SODEPAN. In our view, this organisation was the only one that could have counter­
balanced the institutional influence of other actors, which was subsequently to grow 
-  notably that of the foreign experts and the local authorities. In this sense, the 
artificial and hasty fabrication of pluralism that took place introduced a new form of 
social control and containment, primarily affecting local elite families but also, 
through them, the whole community offazendeiros. This process, we claim, laid the 
ground for the latter’s institutional disempowerment -  which was not long in coming.
Here we first review the productive power effect of the discourse on “pluralism”: this 
challenged the influence and legitimacy of the pre-existing landowner association, 
the SODEPAN, with the wilful creation of various new organisations. We then show 
how this process was fuelled by the use of compulsory power and the expected 
benefits of “bait projects” which people could reap if they joined one of the new 
associations. Finally, we look at the containment effect of this fabricated pluralism;
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how it lowered the profile and weight of the fazendeiro community within the PRP 
scheme and how these new structures failed to secure any real lobbying power and to 
carry the voice of the fazendeiros.
7.1.1. The productive power o f “pluralism ”: destabilising the landow ner 
association w ith new ones
The initial implementation phase of the PRP, namely its “preliminary project”, was 
launched in 1998 and was meant to prepare for the creation of the park within four 
years. Its first responsibility was to delineate a territory within which landowners 
would be called upon to voluntarily join the Park. Second, it was to produce the write 
up of a “park charter”, namely a set of management principles and common 
objectives to be followed by park members. Third, the legal status, the staff and 
competences of the management structure to be created needed defining. Fourth, it 
was also supposed to lobby federal authorities and publicise the concept of “regional 
park” as a new legal category.
However, the most striking feature was the fact that the “preliminary project” called 
for a deep reshaping of the local pantaneira civil society [interview 64]. This was in 
line with the PRP’s foreign partners’ strong discourse on the need to make it “more 
plural” before the creation of the actual park [interview 76]. According to this 
methodology, the first and necessary step in creating a participatory park was the 
“preparation of the civil society”, meaning in this case a complete restructuring of its 
associative landscape. A form of productive power was thus to be exercised to lower 
the profile of the main pre-existing landowner organisation.
Before this preparatory work, there was basically one association representing the 
landowners of the Pantanal: the SODEPAN (Sociedade de Defesa do Pantanal). 
Created in 1985 in Campo Grande, the SODEPAN had been active in both Mato 
Grosso and Mato Gross do Sul as the main mechanism through which the 
fazendeiros could unite for common causes [interviews 61, 63, 109]. Its foundation 
had been motivated by the problem of illegal poaching of jacares (crocodiles) by 
outsiders on private lands in the mid-1980s, which had led to a sharp decrease in 
their population. The SODEPAN gained legitimacy and credibility in this first battle, 
helped by a change in international regulations prohibiting trade in jacare skins. 
Later on, its focus widened to encompass a range of development issues within the
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Pantanal, with special emphasis on the needs of the cattle ranchers (access to credit, 
energy, animal health, etc.) Appendix 12 shows the breadth of its concerns, which 
border on a full-fledged political programme for the region, although little attention 
is paid to rural employees, fisher groups and Indians.
Over the years, the SODEPAN had heavily lobbied the local state for delivery of 
better public services such as transport infrastructures or health, although this had 
given modest results [interview 71]. It had also encouraged research on cattle 
production in various local universities, as well as promoting public recognition of 
the “pantaneira culture” through initiatives such as the Dia do Homen Pantaneiro 
(the day of the pantaneiro man). The SODEPAN also obtained technical support and 
financial assistance from various Brazilian organisations to test economic 
alternatives such as the production of honey or ecotourism. Given this background, 
the organisation was an obvious, if not compulsory partner for the PRP project and it 
was indeed partly associated to the PRP’s early development. The fear had developed 
among the French partners, however, that the SODEPAN might “take over the whole 
initiative”, as several informants suggested [interviews 58, 66, 67]. The social 
representativeness of the association was notably called into question. Illustratively, 
the key French expert in charge the project made no reference to the SODEPAN in a 
2004 conference on the PRP experience. He even claimed that before the project “no 
institution in the territory existed that represented the people”.96
Foreign experts considered the pre-eminence of this organisation as “unhealthy”, 
“anti-democratic”, “not representative” and “too concentrated”, as an observer of the 
time recalled [interview 58]. Following this logic, the European partners pushed the 
idea that there should be more pantaneira associations to represent the various sub- 
regions and groups. As one interviewee suggested, the idea to “increase pluralism” 
was also supported by local ministries, which seemed happy to challenge 
SODEPAN’s regional influence [interview 74].
Thanks to the work of a technical team led by the same French expert, a series of 
meetings and discussions took place in various sub-regions of the Pantanal. This 
process led to the creation of three new regional associations in 1999-2000:
■ the UNIPAN (Uniao dos Pantaneiros da Nhecolandia);
96 Delorme (2004, p.7).
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■ the APANMERA (Associagao dos Pantaneiros da Margem Esquerda do Rio 
Aquidauana)\
■ and the AVRN (Associagao do Vale do Rio Negro).
Two more regional associations were subsequently created:
■ one in the region of Rio Verde;
■ and one in the region of Taboco.
These five new entities had reached a combined membership of about 250 
landowners by 2002, which was deemed an important success (PRP, 2002, p. 11). 
The process also led to the inception of three sectoral associations:
■ one dedicated to the development of educational facilities and cycles adapted
to the Pantanal (APPEP, Associagao de Parceiros, Pais e Professores da 
Escola Pantaneira);
■ another focused on the development of ecotourism (APPAN, Associagao de 
Poussadas Pantaneiras)\
■ and the last one dedicated to cattle-ranching (GTE, Groupo de Troca de 
Experiencias).
Faced with this process, which was non-negotiable in the eyes of the French (who 
were concerned with “good CP”), the feelings of the fazendeiros were mixed. 
Recalling this moment, informants made comments such as:
- Many people, like me, did not see the point o f more associations. We had the 
SODEPAN and it was working well for us. We also had a strong attachment to this 
organisation.^interview 58]
- To find solutions among ourselves, why should we need, 4, 5, 6 associations? This is 
nonsense, really, [interview 67]
- Fazendeiros can talk to one another any time. They don’t really need or even like 
formal organisations to do this. Only when they need to talk as one on some problem 
does this make sense. That was the idea of the SODEPAN. But why divide ourselves 
into more groups? Wouldn ’t this mean only that we lose strength?[interview 64]
For some fazendeiros, however, the leadership of the SODEPAN seemed to reflect
too narrow a cross-section of their community group - and the fact of being under the
leadership of only a few prominent families -  “always the same ones”, as one person
put it [interview 60]. There were also concerns that the organisation had become too
formal and institutional, while focusing on the wealthier part of the community. A
modest landowner declared during an interview:
[The SODEPAN] had become a closed society [with] a philosophy for the ‘big ones ’. The 
‘small ones’ did not really count....For example, you have to pay a yearly contribution to 
be part o f it and this has been on the rise. We [the small ones] really started to think that 
these fees were there to exclude us. [interview 61]
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Such feelings fed the growing suspicion on the part of the foreign experts that the 
SODEPAN would want to capture the PRP and “control it from A to Z”. However, it 
should be noted that this preparatory work did not lead to the creation of any form of 
representation for rural employees and fishers groups -  which further continued the 
selective oblivion.
7.1.2. Fuelling the process w ith com pulsory power: the use o f “bait 
projects”
Compulsory power takes a non-confrontational form when material resources are 
used to produce incentives for a certain expected behaviour, avoiding the use of 
outright constraint (cf. section 3.2.1). Certain incentives, however, can be so strong 
that they almost take the form of a constraint if, for instance, not taking advantage of 
them becomes a handicap relative to competitors. Here we argue that such a 
mechanism supported the reshaping of the local civil society within the PRP 
preliminary project. As soon as the latter started, a set of development projects were 
launched which proved essential in attracting “volunteers” to the newly created 
associations. They functioned as “baits”, as a former president of the SODEPAN 
commented [interview 64]. People could only join the various projects on the 
condition they joined one of the new associations. Yet, being a member of the 
SODEPAN was not considered relevant for this purpose. Over the years, these 
“baits” managed to draw over 250fazendas into the PRP initiative, covering about 2 
million hectares FPNRF (2002, p. 17).
The Vitelo pantaneiro (VITPAN) was the key project and the most appealing to the 
landowners [interview 65]. Its core idea was to develop a new line of meat products 
(pantaneiro veal) with a visible and marketable local identity to be sold at higher 
than average prices. Here again the concept came from France, mirroring the notion 
of “produits du terroir” (i.e. products with a strong local identity). This strategy is 
largely used in French regional parks to pull together local producers and sell their 
products under a common name with common (and higher) quality standards.
VITPAN involved producing meat from cattle between ten to twelve months old, 
reaching around 180 kilos and carrying a precise level of fat. These animals would be 
raised using natural pasture, without antibiotics, limited vaccinations and according 
to the best European standards of organic agriculture. Commercialisation and
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distribution were to be revamped -  and labels to be obtained from the government 
ministry in charge of agriculture, as well as well from a French enterprise. This 
situation did not please all partners as it was felt that the French were imposing a 
specific business partner without it being technically necessary [interview 65]. In any 
case, the hope was that VITPAN would renew the economic use and productivity of 
the entire region.
To join the project, the fazendeiros had to enrol on one of the new regional 
associations and pledge to follow its technical guidelines. VITPAN particularly 
appealed to small landowners (with less than 10,000 hectares) in search of a rapid 
increase in productivity. With its promise of adding value to cattle-ranching and 
improving the marketing of locally produced meat, it brandished hopes of saving the 
small fazendas. By the end of 2002, the pantaneiro veal had reached a sale price of 
700 Brazilian reais per head, which was more than twice the price of standard cattle. 
Five percent of the sale price was also paid to the PRP as a contribution to its running 
costs.
Other projects not directly related to cattle production were developed within an 
initiative entitled Project of Pilot Actions for the Valorisation of the Biodiversity of 
the Rio Negro Region of Pantanal. This programme was heavily financed by the 
French cooperation (58%) and to a lesser extent by the European Union (14%) and 
various local partners (28%).
The programme’s first dimension was the promotion of ecotourism, presented as an 
alternative for small landowners. This led to the creation, in February 2001, of a 
sectoral association, the Associagao de Pousadas Pantaneiras (APPAN) initially 
bringing together 16 fazendas, most of which were already operating lodges. This 
new organisation was meant to join the forces of pousadas (rural lodges), offer 
coordinated tourism packages, market the Pantanal destination more widely, train 
guides and better negotiate with domestic and international tour operators. It also 
developed some communication actions, including the creation of a website and 
attendance in professional fairs. In the following years, however, ecotourism did not 
develop steadily in the Pantanal, due to continued logistical constraints 
(transportation costs to start with) and sharp variations in American tourism. A 
number of pousadas have now closed down and membership of the APPAN had 
diminished by two-thirds by 2008, at the time of the fieldwork [interviews 66].
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The second aspect of the programme involved the diversification of meat production 
beyond cattle, to “commodify” and take advantage of the wildlife. The idea was to 
capture or raise wild species. With the help of French and Brazilian researchers, the 
pilot project focused on the production of porco monteiro (a wild pig) and soon 
involved 21 fazendas. It also encompassed other species such as capivara, cateto, 
ema and jacare. Commercial circuits were identified to market these new products. 
Although not a failure, this project proved to be only mildly successful in the 
following years. As of 2008, this production is extremely limited and does not extend 
to many species.97 An important step was the creation in 2004-2005 of a state-of-the- 
art multi-species meat treatment facility: the Campo Grande Meat Technology 
Experimental Station, under the responsibility of the French CIRAD and funded by 
the French Fund for the Global Environment (FFEM). To date, it is used for both 
commercial and research purposes but has not led to a steady development of a 
wildlife meat industry.
The third component of the programme was geared towards lessening the conflict 
between jaguars, pumas and cattle ranchers -  and was thus the only project directly 
related to the protection of the environment. Various techniques were presented to 
cattle ranchers to diminish the frequency of this problem. Training was also provided 
by Zimbabwean professionals to tourist guides on how to better “watch hunt”. This 
project proved useful but limited in time and scope [interview 108]. It did not 
structurally impact the issue, on which an international NGO, the Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS), is also working (cf. section 6.1.3).
Finally, the “preliminary project” leading to the PRP also engaged in educational 
actions, building upon an already existing network of pantaneira schools that was to 
be reinforced. This was the most “social” of the bait projects but roused the interest 
of only a few and already-involved fazendeiros. From the mid-1990s, some 
landowners had started to create schools within the Pantanal to avoid the departure of 
their workers’ families when their children reached school-age. All the running costs 
were borne by fazendeiros, while the state paid only the teachers’ salaries. As we 
saw, under the influence of the PRP preliminary project and its concern with 
fostering new associations, an Associagao de Parceiros, Pais e Professores da
97 One of the problems is that wildlife “consumption” in Brazil is largely assimilated with illegal 
hunting.
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Escola Pantaneira (APPEP) was created in 1998. Until 2003, with the financial 
backing of the PRP project, the number of pantaneiro schools increased from 3 to 
11, catering for almost 500 children, and their work was awarded several Brazilian 
distinctions. However, the collapse of the PRP after 2005 drastically affected this 
process which the local state did not pursue. Most pantaneira schools closed and 
only a few were running at the time of our fieldwork.
On the whole, the mobilisation of fazendeiros in new associations through “bait 
projects” was relatively effective. Nonetheless, it did encounter some limitations. 
Landowners were far less interested in environmental or social concerns than 
productive ones. As the first president of PRP recalls:
The VITPAN project was the key project in the minds o f the fazendeiros....But when 
the time came to discuss other questions such as conservation, ecotourism, education, 
the difficulty of making people meet was much greater. I f  you had a meeting on 
VITPAN, you would have 40 or 50 people, but if you had a meeting on education, then 
only 6 or 8 people would come. And even fewer for ecotourism.[ interview 58]
By 1998, meat prices were entering a new upward trend, with the progressive
devaluation of the national currency.98 This gave ranchers a strong incentive to
concentrate on meat production, which further explains the continued focus of the
PRP project on beef production and the lack of enthusiasm for more innovative
projects.
7.1.3. The containm ent im pact o f “delegitim isation”: low ering CP 
in tensity  and inclusiveness
In a few years, eight new organisations had thus been created from scratch, drawing 
together hundreds of landowners -  a process hailed at the time as a “success” by the 
French team. This result indeed looked exceptional when contrasted with the 
traditional lack of associative behaviour within the fazendeiro community. The 
creation of the SODEPAN in 1980s had already been an outstanding event in that 
regard. During the fieldwork, many interviews underlined the typical reluctance 
found among fazendeiros to team up within formal associations and engage in 
collective endeavours [interviews 63, 81, 99, 103]. This is not to say, however, that 
there is no practice of solidarity among them. Traditionally, landowners do help one
98 The Brazilian currency moved from 1.2 reais per dollar in December 1998, to 3.6 in December 
2002. During this period, the price of Brazilian beef approximately doubled in local currency, while 
its price in dollars fell.
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another but on limited matters, as good neighbours do, as this had been essential to 
their mode of living in the old days, given the geographical isolation of many 
fazendas." However, landowners in the Pantanal also have a propensity and desire to 
feel “master in their own kingdom” and they want to preserve this autonomy. Not 
only are they reluctant to have any kind of boss, but even equal partners with whom 
they would have to share decisions [interview 103]. Choices on whatever issue are 
their own. There is no practice in this community of jointly organising any sizeable 
project. As one fazendeiro clearly put it:
Any type o f co-operative, association or syndicate means that you lose part o f your
freedom, [interview 64]
The apparition of eight brand-new associations seemed unthinkable in the local 
mindset. This “associative mania”, as an interviewee put it, was even somewhat 
suspicious for those who know the local distaste for collective commitments 
[interview 67]. However, as we have seen, the hundreds of “volunteers” had largely 
been pressed into these new organisations as for a pre-condition for their joining the 
VITPAN project, which offered the prospect of rapid gains. But it rapidly became 
apparent that these volunteers had no genuine desire to become actively involved in 
any regular meetings or collective movement.
The coming years were to demonstrate that these new “regional associations” 
functioned poorly, with low and decreasing attendance rates at their rare meetings, 
unlike the more established SODEPAN. Their function of representation was thus 
not ensured, neither was their ability to simply coordinate the fazendeiros ' 
behaviours, despite the attraction of the VITPAN project. None of these associations 
managed to gain significant influence on any issue, notably when it came to 
obtaining resources from the state. As informants suggested, each association was 
“too small and inexperienced” to impose substantive negotiation on any actor within 
or outside the fazendeiro community [interview 72], This also proved true of the two 
sectoral associations, although they were highly focused on specific issues. The 
APPEP, for instance, had to run its educational programme without securing a 
significant support from the local authorities -  which, for the most part, abandoned 
the project after 2005. As for the APPAN, it tried to promote ecotourism in the
99 Roads, cars and modem life in cities (where most landowners now live) have partly changed this.
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Pantanal but without obtaining any state support or even a reasonable level of 
cooperation among its members.
In the end, this fabricated pluralism had hastily created associations that much 
resembled, as an observer put it, “dwarves or empty shells” [interview 87]. They did 
not merely prove ineffective in mobilising and organising locals on various common 
causes: arguably, they also proved damaging to the fazendeiro community as they 
lowered the profile and legitimacy of their only correctly functioning association, the 
SODEPAN. Unlike these new associations, the latter “had not been created as a 
laboratory experiment”100 and was more of a grassroots organisation, although it was 
led nonetheless by prominent local families.
The wish to avoid the capture of the PRP project by a single community association 
of limited representativeness was arguably laudable within the CP logic followed by 
the foreign technicians. Nevertheless, it caused the only well-established community 
organisation to lose its credentials as “the voice of the landowners”, its ability to 
carry the full weight of the fazendeiros when talking to the state and donors, while 
failing to create in parallel credible organisations to represent the interests of the 
community. The containment mode, here, is one of de-legitimisation, as defined in 
section 3.1.7 (Table 5).
With such “representative associations” introduced into the heart of the PRP 
governance system, CP was to be in practice of a low intensity for fazendeiros, their 
participation being more nominal than anything else. It is our contention, as well as 
the view of several interviewees, that this process laid the ground for the capture of 
the PRP project by other influential actors -  a development that occurred later on, as 
we see in the next section. The feeling even emerged among some fazendeiros that 
their sidelining had been intended from the start as a “plot”. As one interviewee put 
it:
The politicians needed to weaken the SODEPAN to take control of the park and make
it an instrument in their own hands, [interview 67]
Another observer did not hesitate to add to this “plot” the foreign technicians 
themselves:
100 Quote from a fazendeiro. [interview 62]
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The foreigners and the state relied on demagogy to fragment our community....They 
wanted to marginalise us one way or another, so that they would have a free hand. 
[interview 66]
Not only did the process of “pluralisation” set the ground for a low level of CP 
intensity within the participatory park, since it weakened from the start the standing 
of the fazendeiro voice; but it also endorsed its low inclusiveness already built into 
the discourse on “traditions” placing fazendeiros at the centre of the “traditional 
community” and excluding other social groups. This took place despite the claims of 
project designers that they had recourse to the best CP practices. For instance, 
commenting on his work, the main French expert in charge of the PRP argued that 
his team conducted a very large review of who lived and worked in the region, so as 
to ensure the largest inclusion of social actors in the scheme:
To secure participation it is necessary to know who the people living in the place are and 
what they do. This was done at the very beginning, during the first phase of the project 
through an institutional diagnosis to know who were the people living there and what they 
were doing.101
Yet, the newly created associations left out of the picture were in fact key social 
groups living and working in the area of the projected park. The rural employees (of 
the fazendas) and the fishers, particularly, were never mobilised or even consulted so 
that they could contribute a common vision. The question of their representation was 
never touched on [interviews 58, 96], Thus, the restricted range of community groups 
involved in the pluralisation process transformed the narrow CP inclusiveness (as 
defined in section 3.1.2) of the discourse on traditions into an institutional practice.
7.1.4. Conclusion: turning CP against itse lf
Here, we showed that the weight of foreign expertise influenced the preliminary 
project in a fundamental way that did not necessarily reflect the locals’ demand: a 
massive emphasis was indeed put on “fixing the local civil society first” and making 
it “more plural”, instead of building the PRP on already existing community 
institutions. This may have been praiseworthy within the logic of the global CP 
discourse; but just as “the road to hell is paved with good intentions”, we argue that 
this preliminary project turned out to be detrimental to the landowners themselves. It 
challenged the legitimacy and thus the influence of their only long-standing
101 Delorme (2004, p.6).
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association, the SODEPAN, which was the only functioning fazendeiro association 
that could have counter-balanced the influence of other actors. What the 
“preparatory” work basically did in the short run was to diminish the landowners’ 
leadership and their capacity to stand up to non-community (and predatory) forces in 
the management of the soon-to-be-created park. Four years had been enough to lower 
the profile of the SODEPAN but not to bring real life to the associations, which 
remained without substance. Meanwhile, this fabricated pluralism also endorsed a 
view of the local community entirely centred on the fazendeiros, leaving out other 
local social groups. All in all, this process made CP a mechanism of social control 
weighing upon the whole local community, this time including the fazendeiros 
themselves.
As we shall now see, the SODEPAN still managed to keep some influence at the 
beginning of the park’s functioning, since its president was elected as the park’s first 
president; but this did not prevent the fazendeiros from swiftly losing control of 
“their park”. The double process of institutional disempowerment and political 
capture that followed is explored in the next section.
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7.2. D ispossessing the Community: Institutional 
Power at Work
In this section, we look at the deployment of the Pantanal Regional Park to compare 
the theory and practice of power in the management of the institution created in 2001 
-  namely the IPP (Institute do Parque Regional or Regional Park Institute). We 
analyse this organisation as a power formation, that brings together a range of local, 
domestic and international actors who share decision-making power, albeit 
unequally. We concentrate on the mechanisms of institutional power to study the 
varying ability of these different actors to make use of the IPP.
It is first shown that the park’s legal construct theoretically created a co-management 
scheme in which decisions were to be shared by the fazendeiros and various levels of 
Brazilian governance. On paper, the balance of influence clearly favoured the local 
landowners, as the IPP was supposed to give them the “driver’s seat” and ensure a 
high level of CP inclusiveness, scope and intensity. In this sense, the IPP closely 
mirrored the founding discourse of the originating alliance', the one on “salvation 
through traditions” that gave pre-eminence to development needs in environmental 
management, and to property-owners in the definition of the local community.
Second, we demonstrate that institutional practice in the IPP led both to a 
displacement of authority away from the fazendeiros and to the emergence of a 
power formation where foreign actors play an important role. We may qualify this 
process as “passive” rather than “active” because we feel that it was not so much led 
by an active will to dispossess the locals from their prerogative, as by the 
organisational inertia of administrative management combined with the institutional 
weight of foreign experts. Certainly, the governance of the IPP was marked by the 
continued presence of foreign experts, who never left the centre of the picture, even 
after the end of the “preliminary project” and the formal creation of the park in 2002. 
These technicians stayed on, well beyond their role of “facilitators”, and exerted a 
heavy institutional power given their strong connection to donors.
Third, we identify a parallel process of active political capture whose origins we 
trace back to 1999, soon after the start of the preliminary project. Using the formal 
and informal channels of state power, a handful of local politicians began to exert a 
direct influence on the IPP structure. More specifically, through “suggestions”, they
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imposed the appointment of a range of people within both the IPP higher 
management and its technical team. Not only did these new staff members have little 
duty of accountability towards fazendeiros, but they were also pursuing unclear 
agendas. This political capture of the IPP led to a variety of management mistakes 
and irregularities that eventually brought about the collapse of the park.
Finally, we argue that this collapse was hastened rather than delayed by the election, 
in April 2003, of a new park president -  a pantaneiro artist known throughout Brazil 
whose fame the fazendeiros expected to use to regain control of the situation. This 
election, in fact, turned on the waterworks of political control and led to the complete 
disempowerment of the local community.
7.2.1. High CP inclusiveness, scope and intensity: the founding pledge of  
a co-m anagem ent schem e
On 29 August, 2002, the state of Mato Grosso do Sul created a new legal category of 
environmental protection under the name of Area Especial de Protegao Ambiental 
(AEPA). In the same decree,102 this category was immediately applied with the 
creation of the Parque Regional do Pantanal. Compared to the Brazilian legal 
framework -  the national system of conservation units (SNUC) -  the AEPA category 
did not base environmental protection on the limitation of human activities, but 
rather on their promotion. The aim of the PRP was to:
allow the pantaneiro man to continue to produce in the Pantanal, as well as preserve 
his economic, social and ecological equilibrium; [and] base economic development 
upon the human and natural heritage o f the community.
It gave itself the particular objective to:
prove the sustainability of extensive cattle raising.
The second important feature of the new legal category was its participatory nature:
The Special Area of Environmental Protection [is to be] entirely managed in a 
democratic and participatory fashion.
The management of the PRP was to be carried out on a shared basis involving the
Federal government, the local state and five rural districts (municipios): Aquidauna,
Corguinho, Miranda, Rio Negro and Rio Verde. An AEPA was also defined as an
entirely voluntary scheme, which landowners could freely join or not. As a result, the
102 Decree no. 10.906, Mato Grosso do Sul.
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territory of the PRP would not necessarily be continuous: it would be the mere sum 
of the land-properties whose owners decided to participate. Some states in the 
Brazilian federation (e.g Rondonia) had already tried to push forward new legal 
categories of conservation, but no state went further that Mato Grosso do Sul in 
trying to put local producers in the “driver’s seat”, with the adaptation of the French 
concept of “regional park” [interviews 99, 103].
On this basis, a “study territory” (territorio de estudo) was defined as the maximum 
spatial extension of the park. It encompassed four sub-regions of the Pantanal 
wetland (see Map 6). These choices were made to provide the park with an 
“ecological coherence and diversity” [interview 76]. They gave the future park a 
possible extension of five million hectares and a potential population of 14,000 
inhabitants, making it possibly one of the largest protected areas in the world. Most 
of this space (98%) was made up of private properties, ranging from 3,000 to 50,000 
hectares, where extensive cattle-raising was the main activity. Not all landowners 
potentially concerned joined the project, but 250 fazendeirois did eventually 
participate, providing the PRP with a total surface area of 2 million hectares -  nearly 
15% of the Pantanal’s wetland. This result was considered to be a great success 
during the initial five years of operation.
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Map 7 -  The Pantanal Regional Park: maximum boundaries
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On 15 February 2001, one year before the formal creation o f the PRP, the park’s 
management body was created under the name o f Institute do Parque do Pantanal 
(IPP). The IPP was later recognised103 by the local parliament as an “NGO o f public 
interest” (OSCI, Organizaqao da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Publico), making it a 
sort o f public-private construct comparable to the SMMA in Soufriere. Also like the 
SMMA, the IPP based its structure and legitimacy upon preliminary efforts to 
mobilise the local population.
The governance o f the IPP was structured on several different bodies. It was first 
under the authority of the park’s General Assembly responsible for approving a 
Charter (Carta do Parque) at each year’s opening session; for approving a multi-year 
development plan; and for checking the coherence o f expenses and realisations. The 
Assembly was supposed to meet three times a year and be composed o f the following 
members: one representative from each o f the newly created associations; one 
SODEPAN representative; all o f the individual landowners who joined the park; one 
representative from each municipio involved; one representative from the 
government o f Mato Grosso do Sul; a Governor’s representative; and finally a
103 In November 2002.
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representative from a so-called “regional union of rural workers”. The General 
Assembly thus embodied the PRP’s spirit of co-management, although a clear 
emphasis was placed on private landowners, represented both collectively and 
individually. Even the rural workers, who until then had never been mentioned in the 
process, were supposed to be represented in the Assembly according to the PRP 
statutes. However, it was impossible to confirm the actual existence of this “worker 
union” during the fieldwork, despite an in-depth enquiry. None of the peons we 
interviewed knew of its existence and no fazendeiro was able say anything about this 
organisation either [interviews 58-67, 92-96].
The second governance mechanism of the IPP was its Council of Administration 
(Conselho de Administragao), much closer than the Assembly to the park’s 
management. It was responsible for overseeing and approving the budget, strategy 
and work-plan of the PRP, as well as ensuring their satisfactory implementation by 
IPP’s higher management. Its membership included one representative from each of 
the nine “founding associations” of landowners (among which the SODEPAN), two 
state representatives (FPNRF, 2002, p. 17) and a representative from each municipio. 
However, provision was no longer made at this level for any representation of the 
rural workers.
The next step was for the General Assembly to elect IPP’s President.104 This unpaid 
position came nevertheless with large legal liabilities. Its level of influence over the 
running of the IPP proved to be largely dependent on the personal managerial style 
of the president, and whether or not delegation was used.
Finally, the IPP had a Technical Team, comprising various experts, fieldworkers 
and administrative assistants led by an Executive Secretary in charge of the 
everyday management. The team also included a French Executive Coordinator, 
whose responsibilities and hierarchical position were not clearly defined and who 
turned out to have a major influence.
The governance structure of the IPP was thus created as a space of power sharing 
between the state government, the rural districts and a local community essentially 
reduced to the landowners. The General Assembly was specifically in charge of
104 Originally, the IPP only had an Executive Board (direitoria executiva) meeting once a month. It 
was soon replaced with a President acting on a permanent basis.
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ensuring a high level of CP inclusiveness of the local fazendeiros, while the 
responsibilities of the Council of Administration were to enable strong CP scope and 
intensity. This closely reflected the founding agreement of the originating alliance 
supporting the PRP, based on the motto of “salvation through traditions” and the 
need to preserve the traditional landowners.
7.2.2. Institu tions in  practice: a passive shift o f authority and the  
em ergence o f a power form ation
Whereas the legal construct of the PRP seemed committed to a highly participatory 
governance, real institutions and people proved to work rather differently.
First, although the entire legitimacy of the IPP derived from its General Assembly, 
the latter rarely met in practice. Only a limited number of landowners were present at 
each session and attendance decreased over time [interviews 58, 66]. The Assembly 
did not play its role of a forum to debate the definition of the park’s Charter, for 
instance, which was to be the key document embodying the PRP’s vision and the 
common pledges of its members. As a matter of fact, this Charter was never 
completed and adopted beyond a working version written during the preliminary 
project (Gouveia, 2006). The Assembly thus played hardly any role beyond electing 
the IPP presidents, and even less of a role considering that there was only one 
declared candidate in each of the two elections of the park’s short history. As for the 
Assembly’s social inclusiveness, as we mentioned, the existence of the “regional 
union of rural workers” that supposedly had one representative on the Assembly was 
not corroborated by fieldwork.
The Council of Administration had a more practical say in the running of the IPP 
than the Assembly, but it also met less often than planned and with uneven 
attendance [interview 64]. In practice, the people on the Council had either little time 
or not enough technical competence to monitor what was happening within the IPP. 
Over the four years of functioning, the Council in fact relied upon the elected 
President to oversee operations. As several interviews confirmed, the most the 
Council could do in case of discontent with the IPP was to talk to its elected 
president [interviews 67, 72, 73].
As for the park’s Presidency, its institutional practice evolved over time. During the 
first two years of IPP operations (2001-2003), the post was held by the former
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president of the SODEPAN. This fazendeiro from a long-established pantaneira 
family took a very active role in the everyday running of the structure. As an 
informant explains, he “would sign every cheque” [interview 64]. However, tensions 
in the governance of the IPP soon appeared as this president started to lose 
management power to the benefit of the foreign experts still present within the 
scheme.
The IPP’s technical team included several foreign technicians who were running 
their programmes largely independently from IPP’s higher managemen 
[interview 67]. Most notably, the French expert that had been acting during the 
preliminary project as Principal Technical Advisor had stayed on. During this new 
phase, he enjoyed the new (and rather ambiguous) title of “executive coordinator” 
and in practice had a large say in anything taking place within the structure. Sent by 
the French FPNRF, he exercised throughout significant institutional power due to his 
direct connection to donors -  both current and potential, French and European. For 
any decision that mattered, although he had no formal obligation to do so, the 
president always had to negotiate with this executive coordinator, who often opposed 
his views, as for instance concerning the technicalities of the VITPAN project. Over 
time, a growing uneasiness developed between the two men. During an interview in 
2008, the former IPP president suggested that this tension stemmed from the fact 
that, in the eyes of the French expert, he was too connected the SODEPAN, the very 
organisation that had been challenged by the preliminary project [interview 58].105
Foreign experts in CP schemes are officially meant to be temporary catalysts; but in 
the case of the IPP, they never left the centre-stage, staying on well after the 
preparatory project and directly running some of the PRP programme components. In 
this sense, the IPP did not actually embody a simple co-management scheme, pulling 
together landowners, the state and rural districts. The self-inertia of each of its 
governing bodies (e.g. low attendance), combined with the continued presence of 
foreign experts turned the IPP into a power formation through which a range of local 
decisions had to be negotiated between local and international actors.
In the following years, the governance of the IPP was to change even further and 
faster through an active process of political capture. Since 1999, the IPP had been
105 This interpretation was confirmed by several interviewees.
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attracting increasing attention from the state. A few local politicians106 started to 
“suggest” to the IPP (and in fact impose on it) various people with political 
connections, who would work there on favourable salary terms. By the end of 2002, 
the IPP team already employed 21 people, including thirteen engineers, six field 
technicians and administrative agents as well as two researchers -  a rather heavy 
staff compared to the organisation’s budget. Although the latter was not at the time 
encountering any financial difficulty, its governance was obviously becoming 
disarticulated. But things were to get far worse.
7.2.3. The active use o f institutional power: political capture for unclear  
agendas
Step by step, the local state increased its influence over the IPP, which resulted in the 
Council of Administration and the President losing control. Through state ministries, 
a small group of influential politicians seemed to be operating in the interest of both 
their political party and of certain individuals who had useful personal acquaintances. 
According to several interviewees, this political capture had been well prepared 
during the 1998-2002 preparatory project [interviews 67, 89]. In retrospect, this 
seems to have operated first through a move to draw the PRP initiative closer to 
higher state authorities, arguably to ensure a more direct and personal influence of 
specific people. Then, when the IPP started to fully function, this slow takeover 
operated increasingly through the direct imposition of certain persons within the 
management team -  a process that got out of all control and proportion after 2003.
As early as 1999, after a period of indecisiveness, the local government became 
increasingly interested in the PRP project as it was managing to attract international 
funds [interview 74]. With respect to state involvement, the project was initially 
located within the FEMAP, a state foundation entrusted with the implementation of 
environmental policies defined by the local ministry of the environment (Secretaria 
de Meio Ambiente). But this was soon judged to be too far-removed from the highest 
authorities. The official concern was that the institutional positioning of the PRP 
project did not allow it to “secure the full implication of all ministries” (finances, 
infrastructure, production, environment) given their “vertical mode of
106 These people could not be nominatively identified during fieldwork.
Chapter 7 -  284
functioning”.107 Consequently, and to ensure “better cooperation of the PRP project 
with the local state”, a new convention was signed between the Mato Grosso do Sul 
and the French FPNRF on 28 June, 2000. Responsibility for the PRP was transferred 
higher up to the Secretaria de Estado de Governo, which has direct authority over all 
other ministries. Meanwhile, the responsibility for administrative support was also 
transferred from the FEMAP foundation to an economic development agency under 
closer political control -  the CODEMS (Companhia de Desenvolvimento Economico 
de Mato Grosso do Sul).
It was thus on the basis of already strong state supervision that the IPP was created in 
2001, with the addition of two state representatives to its Council of Administration, 
including a personal representative of the Governor himself. The IPP was also to be 
financially supported by the state through a yearly financial subsidy, which gave the 
public authorities even more power over the structure. As a former employee of the 
IPP put it, commenting on what he saw happening:
How could the IPP refuse these instructions and people sent by those financing [us]?
[interview 65]
During the first two years of IPP operation, its president managed to play a real role 
in the everyday management. During this tenure, the organisation seems to have 
functioned relatively smoothly under tight financial control, although the overall 
budget was still small as more international funds were to be received at a later date 
[interview 116]. As we have seen, however, the president had started to share his 
decision-making power with foreign technicians. Yet there was also another internal 
group of rising influence within the IPP, made up of an increasing number of people 
appointed through political connections and who acted as if they were unaccountable 
to the president [interview 63].
By the end of 2003, the president felt that he had lost almost all of his management 
power and that a “coalition of interests” had emerged against him formed by these 
two groups: 1) the French experts, who were not at ease with a president drawn from 
SODEPAN; 2) the staff members sent by state politicians, whose basic interest in
107 Quotes in this paragraph are drawn from an interview with a former civil servant.
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1 ORworking there was material. Most interviewed fazendeiros were vocal in 
denouncing this process. As a former vice-president of the IPP claimed:
Many of the people sent by the government did not do any thing....They were cetainly 
not working, they were only pretending. But they still had to be paid. And paid well. 
[interview 64]
Describing the way in which they were appointed, he explained:
You know, you have a politician who says: ‘This one will go and work there' and that 
is it. What can you say? The same person has power over the ministries on which the 
IPP depended.
Other observers added:
- They gave positions to friends and people who helped the parry, [interview 86]
- It was a distribution o f cakes....It was all part o f an electoral strategy, [interview 62]
A university professor, also a fazendeiro, feels that this process was more than 
nepotism and may have financed political parties through a system of financial 
“triangulation”. In his view:
The government used the IPP structure to ‘triangulate ’ resources. It was giving funds 
to the IPP, but the IPP had in turn to contract certain people, for certain political 
reasons, affiliations and goals, [interview 67]
According to this person’s own estimates, between 5 to 6 million Brazilian reais
(around 2 million euros) were “triangulated” during the lifetime of the institution.
As researchers, we are in no position to make statements about what “really”
happened on such issues, as this is for Brazilian justice to determine. We may only
note that, as of 2009, a public investigation is underway.
7.2.4. False hopes o f com m unity repossession: hastening the final 
collapse
These multiple power games did not prove sustainable for very long. First, political 
capture did not come with efficient management -  quite the contrary -  and it was 
increasingly clear to many observers that the park was not being run satisfactorily. 
Second, as the governance situation became increasingly intricate, the IPP also began 
to encounter technical problems in implementing its projects, especially the Vitelo 
pantaneiro [interview 65]. As we saw, this VITPAN project was the soul of the PRP 
for most landowners and the one that raised the highest hopes. Its malfunctioning
108 Such as better salaries or cars. This judgement was provided by two interviewees, including a 
former IPP vice-president.
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spilled over onto the entire community and an atmosphere of discontent had largely 
spread by the beginning of 2003.
Hoping to fix these governance and technical problems, the General Assembly met to 
elect a new president on 23 April, 2003. This date proved to be the turning point in 
the IPP’s short history. The Assembly designated as president Almir Sater, a famous 
pantaneiro singer known throughout the federation and who also owns a large 
fazenda in the Pantanal. There were several rationales behind the choice of this 
highly public figure, which we elucidated with the help of a range of informants 
[interview 67, 103, 107].
First, the idea behind this election was for the fazendeiros to give a higher profile to 
the regional park, attract more attention, sympathy and eventually financial 
resources. The discourse was to “move to a second phase” whereby the project 
would scale up and blossom. Another important motivation was to use the authority 
of a well-known name to counter-balance the growing influence of non-community 
actors. Third, “Almir Sater” also sounded like a “consensual name” to a community 
that was experiencing divisions over its most cherished project, VITPAN.
But this was not all. This election also had a strategic meaning for the foreign experts 
and the politically appointed staff members who, paradoxically, also supported Almir 
Sater. As an interviewee explained:
Not only was the candidacy of Almir Sater one o f “consensus ” that seemed to maintain 
unity among fazendeiros; it was also the candidacy preferred by the technical team of 
IPP, because these people knew that Sater would not work locally, unlike the previous 
president. More importantly, he would not sign every cheque! [interview 109]
As another interviewee put it:
Everybody was happy with the choice of Sater as president: the fazendeiros were 
reverting to a sort of ‘'dad" while the people within the IPP knew that he would be an 
“absent dad", [interview 66]
As it turned out, the new president did in fact give complete autonomy to the IPP’s
technical team from the moment he was elected, as he chose to leave all managerial
responsibilities to an executive secretary whom he monitored only rarely. As one
fazendeiro commented:
The election o f Almir Sater amounted to a total desertion ofpost, to the benefit o f the 
“technicians", who inclduednofazendeiro. [interview 59]
The executive secretary had been formally chosen by Sater but, according to many
interviewees, the choice of the person reflected the “strong “advice of a senior
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politician [interviews 59, 66, 67]. The appointed Secretary was little known to the 
fazendeiros and ran the IPP in a way that is now widely judged by locals as 
“incompetent”, “crooked” or both. Through the Council of Administration, or in 
informal meetings, fazendeiros did complain to the President on several occasions 
about the obvious mismanagement of the IPP. Accordingly, Almir Sater twice 
changed the executive secretary, but to no avail, Mid the new appointments were also 
subject to similar influences from politicians. Those appointed to this job position 
never seemed to enjoy any real trust from the landowners.
Under these political influences, the IPP thus continued to add new staff throughout 
the period, to reach over 50 permanent members, while its financial resources were 
growing at a much slower pace. People from various public institutions were 
integrated on unclear technical grounds, and they were paid better salaries than in 
local bureaucracies. Two local ministries (production and environment) had frequent 
recourse to this practice. This proved far too heavy for a new and fragile 
organisation. As one observer commented:
At this point, the IPP had turned into a hanger for state jobs. [It had] opened many
fronts but none was functioning correctly, [interview 64]
As suggested by the lawsuits in progress in 2009, financial mismanagement also 
appeared. To start with, the various executive secretaries regularly paid project 
expenses with funds from other projects. Some observers also feel that they indulged 
in a variety of expenses of secondary importance such as trips, meetings and 
extensive office equipment. Most notably, they “forgot” to pay a range of local and 
federal taxes, involving huge sums of money. Problems were further exacerbated 
when the state stopped meeting its financial commitments from 2003 onwards. 
What’s more, although this does not constitute proof, there are rumours of personal 
or political misappropriation of funds.
All of this led to the closure of all IPP operations in July 2005. In 2008, at the time of 
the fieldwork, the IPP still existed as a legal entity but as a heavily indebted one 
under public investigation. Its outstanding debt (including unpaid taxes and salaries) 
was close to one million Brazilian reais in mid-2008 (about 400,000 euros).
Feelings of frustration among fazendeiros are running extremely high over the “PRP 
scandal”, as one called it [interview 66]. The animosity is directed mainly against the 
state government and politicians whose undue interventions were, in local opinion,
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what led to this catastrophe. To a lesser extent, frustration is also expressed against 
the foreign influence that “complicated everything”. As of 2009, Almir Sater was 
still president of what remains of the IPP and was possibly due to face legal action. 
He is now openly criticised, although most fazendeiros still have a great respect for 
this public figure who embodies the Pantanal in the eyes of many Brazilians. Many 
landowners feel that Sater had just been “too naive” and “manipulated”. A fazendeiro 
summarised the general feeling of injustice regarding the failure of the IPP:
The debt is now ours, but it should be the government’s. [interview 67]
7.2.5. Conclusion
In this section we enquired into the management and short history of the park: its 36 
months of existence, from its creation in August 2002 to the end of its operations in 
July 2005. We showed that the institutional practice of community participation 
proved biased on several levels. First, it was skewed from the start by the ambiguous 
notion of the “local community”, which in the end meant nothing more than the 
“landowners”: it thus left aside agricultural employees {peons) as well as other 
communities (fishers), well illustrated by the institutional structure of the park. 
Second, the heavy presence of foreign experts with no formal rights but substantial 
institutional power is another defining characteristic of the whole PRP experience, 
from its inception right through to its demise. Third, growing political capture took 
over the IPP, through the imposition of state-appointed people with weak 
management skills but strong personal connections, political affiliations and private 
interests. Overall, these successive processes of productive and institutional power 
completely dispossessed the locals -  the fazendeiros and others -  of all participation 
in the running of this “participatory park”.
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7.3. Understanding Containment: the W eight o f and  
Impact on Social Capital
Mille feuilles (“a thousand leaves”) is a typical French cake composed of many 
layers of thin pastry dough and is often used as a metaphor to depict a system 
comprising a great many different levels. As we have seen, the PRP story offers a 
similar complex mix of multiple containment dynamics. These include intents 
against or actual effects produced on conservationist environmentalists, incoming 
economic actors in the region, rural employees, fisher groups... and the fazendeiros 
themselves. In this section, we question how this mille feuilles containment was 
connected to and impacted the community’s social capital. Here, we first explore the 
Pantanal’s rural workers, who were entirely eliminated from all PRP processes: we 
suggest that this disconnection was catalysed by their symbiotic relationship with the 
fazendeiros ’ long-established paternalism and by a resulting social capital estranged 
from any form of institutional or collective action. Second, we turn to an analysis of 
the social capital of the crushing majority of the Pantanal’s landowners. We argue 
that their ingrained habits of individualism and preference for informal modes of 
communication (as well as other social norms) contributed to their own estrangement 
from the PRP’s institutional functioning. In turn, this facilitated a rise in the 
influence of actors more accustomed and more skilful with institutions, such as 
politicians and technical experts. Finally, we suggest the PRP “failure” may 
nonetheless have sown the seeds for a renewed local social capital -  at least for the 
fazendeiros. It has certainly stimulated self-criticism, and critical thinking about what 
collective action is and means, what needs to be changed in the way landowners co­
operate and what precautions need to be taken regarding state involvement in 
community endeavours. This process is particularly observable in the way 
fazendeiros shifted from LOYALTY to VOICE as their response strategy to the 
deterioration of the PRP, even if this came too late to avoid collapse. Collective 
learning seems to be appearing, as well as a desire for new common initiatives. 
However, what this may lead to in the future is far from clear given the deep inertia 
that still characterises the Pantanal.
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7.3.1. Sym biotic paternalism: keeping p eo n s  away from institutions and 
collective action
The complete absence of peons (rural workers) from the design and governance of a 
vast CP project in the Pantanal mirrored the singular social capital and structural 
position of this sub-community. In section 3.1.9, we defined SC as the collective 
bonds of a given group both on an internal level and with other groups. In the case of 
the peons, what seems to be primarily at stake is their bridging SC -  namely the way 
they connect to other groups. Peons are indeed deeply linked to fazendeiros in a 
structurally dependent way [interview 105]. Accordingly, the incapacity of peons to 
emerge as an autonomous community actor worth considering and integrating into 
the PRP project reflects several social traits: the peons ' complete absorption into the 
small world of the fazenda', their structural domination by the landowners through 
long-established paternalism; their lack of experience (and of apparent capacity) in 
collective claims and actions; their self-withdrawal from the more “modem and 
aggressive world” that lies outside the Pantanal; and their subjective feeling of 
relative freedom and contentment with their life [interviews 92-96].
During the whole PRP process, no attention was paid by the Brazilian or foreign 
promoters to the inner structure of the traditional pantaneira fazenda, although the 
PRP project had been designed for their survival. This meant that the entrenched 
paternalism underlying the age-old social functioning of the fazendas remained 
untouched and unquestioned. Fazendas are small and closed social universes 
founded on the hierarchical and binary distinction between the fazendeiros and their 
families (the owners), and the agricultural employees and their relatives (the peons) 
[interview 103]. In the life of a peon, paternalism is everywhere. These people work 
for very modest wages, while in exchange the landowners provide them with modest 
accommodation for their families, meat and other foodstuffs, as well as assistance in 
times of hardship -  for instance in case of health problems. As mentioned earlier, 
some fazendeiros even tried to enhance the education services available to children, 
but with limited results.
To some observers, this may look like a healthy relationship. According to the 
anthropologists we met, peons have a strong subjective feeling of their own freedom:
Peons live in the open air with no boss on their shoulders every day. ... And if they are 
not happy with their condition or employer, they know they can always take their horse 
and move to the next fazenda, [interview 104]
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This capacity to move from one employer to the other has apparently sustained a 
feeling of subjective autonomy among peons for generations. One may question, 
however, the extent to which this capacity to change is a real source of autonomy. 
When they move on to the next fazenda, peons enter a similar world with the same 
lack of opportunity for personal growth. Their level of education is usually very low 
and many of them are barely literate. Although many have learnt basic literacy skills 
at school, their lifestyle provides them with little writing or reading practice.109
Interviews with local anthropologists suggested that peons form a society of their 
own, with its own beliefs, including a strong folklore that populates the Pantanal with 
mythical characters and spirits [interviews 102, 103, 104]. Peons live in a 
fundamentally different spiritual world from the fazendeiros, who are nowadays 
modem urban people. Interviews with peons strongly corroborated this fact: their 
view of time, for instance, seems circular with little awareness of anything changing 
around them. It was especially striking to see that during an interview none could 
articulate a structured or informed discourse on what was going on, rightly or 
wrongly, within the Pantanal region. While one would suppose them to be the best 
possible experts of the region, their understanding of it seems severely limited by 
their lack of general awareness or even desire to know about the “outside world” 
[e.g. interviews 92, 93].
As for their symbiotic connection, peons do not only provide cheap labour to 
landowners; they also constitute an effective asset for public relations when the 
fazendeiros need attention and support. While most of the latter now live in cities and 
only visit their property when necesary or during their spare time, the peons reside 
permanently in the wetlands and it is they who are seen on the magnificent pictures 
known throughout Brazil of “cowboys” riding horses, leading cattle herds 
(comitivas) in the open landscape (see Photo 7) and telling stories from their unique 
folklore. It is thus the peon who emblemizes for the outside world the pantaneira 
community and who enjoys a favourable reputation and public affection. It is also the 
peons who spread the feeling in public opinion -  and in the donors’ headquarters in 
Europe -  that life remained “traditional and in harmony with the environment”. Yet, 
peons were to gain nothing from the the vast PRP project or have any say in its
109 In this regard, peons very much resemble the fishers in St. Lucia, most of whom had some formal 
but largely forgotten education.
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implementation. Their presence was reduced to appearing on leaflets and PowerPoint 
presentations showing the region’s lifestyle.
Politically speaking, peons are not demanding people. Despite centuries of work on 
fazendas as a well delineated group with its own identity, they have never organised 
any form of collective representation to dialogue as a group with the fazendeiros on 
any issue. All concerns are treated informally and individually. The peons we talked 
to specifically stated that they did not know of any “worker union” representing their 
interests -  an absence of unionism that is typical of paternalistic societies.
During face-to-face interviews, peons came across as simple and quiet people, 
markedly shy with an apparently ingrained low profile when discussing with white 
people. Fazendeiros are indeed typically much “whiter” than peons, who often have 
Indian blood. Interviewees would only answer our questions briefly and without 
providing comments beyond what was asked. They all showed a lot of restraint when 
describing their life, their jobs and their relation to the fazendeiros. The overall 
impression was one of a typically “peaceful” or even “passive” peon temperament, 
largely confirmed by various informants.
We left the fieldwork on the fazendas with a diffuse feeling,that peons were 
essentially people who are locked up in a small and circular world which offer them 
no opportunity to develop. They seem to have little means or desire to free 
themselves from this “safe but closed world”, as a local put it [interview 88]. 
Although it is difficult to point to any explicit mode of outright exploitation, 
fazendas do seem to be autarchic societies that allow cohesiveness and hierarchies to 
function hand in hand.
In section 3.2, we referred to Lukes’ definition of “subjective interests” as those that 
“are consciously articulated and observable”, whereas “objective interests” are goals 
and desires that actors “would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice” 
(Lukes, 1975, p.34). The world of fazendas seems to us to be a case in point where 
such concepts may be usefully applied -  although this is inescapably a matter of 
normative judgement rather than positive analysis. The paternalistic relation between 
peons and landowners is so successfully constitutive of their identities that no desire 
for change seems to emerge from them. How could a CP scheme successfully 
involve populations with such a mindset, when structural power is so strong and 
effective?
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7.3.2. Individualism  and informalism: the institutional inaptitude o f m ost 
fa zen d e iro s
The implementation of the PRP process was paralleled, as we have seen, by two 
powerful containment dynamics that disempowered the fazendeiros themselves. One 
benefited foreign technicians while the other nurtured the institutional capture of the 
IPP by a few politicians and well-connected people. Here we argue that these two 
exercises of institutional power were greatly facilitated, not only by the weakening of 
the SODEPAN (cf. section 7.1.3), but also by the institutional inaptitude of the vast 
majority of the fazendeiros. By this concept, we refer to the latter’s difficulty and 
relative inability to engage with formal collective actions and institutions. This 
feature led to a chronic lack of institutional monitoring of the PRP’s governance on 
the part of the landowners; it also generated free-riding behaviours that disarticulated 
the implementation of important projects.
In the last section we claimed that bridging SC was important to understanding the 
situation of peons within the PRP scheme. We now contend that bonding SC  is what 
best sheds light on the position and evolution of the fazendeiros within the project. 
As explained in section 3.1.9, bonding SC refers to the nature and strength of ties 
within a given group. What seems to have especially mattered in the PRP story was a 
combination of social norms that together produced: 1) the landowners’ inability to 
co-operate and co-ordinate on important PRP projects; 2) an inability to engage with 
formal institutions beyond entrusting one single person with this responsibility.
The lack of co-operative behaviour between fazendeiros seems rooted in their time- 
long feeling of “being alone on their land” and not being able to count upon anyone 
but themselves. All interviewed fazendeiros openly acknowledged a strong 
“individualism”, which they present in a positive light as a desire for “autonomy”. 
One landowner, however, provided an extra insight:
No, there is no tradition of associating among us. Associations, co-operatives, etc., all 
of these things are fragile in the Pantanal. This is because of the following: here, there 
is a culture o f ‘immediatism’: the expectation that things should bring benefits 
immediately....We do not like acting in groups unless we see results right away. 
[interview 64]
During the IPP’s life-course a number of projects were launched that encountered 
recurring problems linked to the difficulty to co-ordinate. This was specifically the 
case with the critical VITPAN project. The issues it ran into did indeed suggest 
“individualism and immediatism” as strong community features. VITPAN was a
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complex scheme that required a fair level of co-operation and good will from 
producers. Most needed was a rigorous standardisation of meat production to market 
a collective output under a single label -  which had to be reliable for consumers. 
Disagreements soon appeared over the appropriate production techniques and 
standards to be used -  and even over the transport routes for meat collection that 
were unequally convenient for various producers. Procedures were little or unevenly 
applied resulting in an unsatisfactory product quality that caused distributors to lose 
interest [interview 65].
There was also a growing mistrust among producers due to free-riding behaviours. 
Each certainly had a personal interest in not respecting the maximum age limit at 
which the young cattle were to be sent to the slaughter house. The financial incentive 
was that over-age animals were weightier and thus brought in more money when 
sold. Their meat, however, would be too fat and spoil the whole production line. 
During an interview, the first IPP President recalled that, at the end of his term, a 
“dispute had developed on VITPAN among the fazendeiros who were divided into 
three or four fighting groups” [interview 58], These tensions were such that, even 
after two full years of effort, the IPP was still unable to bring producers into a single 
co-operative, which was a necessary step to organise this new economic sector.110
According to many, this low capacity for collective action has also prevented 
fazendeiros from exerting their full influence on the IPP management, as their 
credibility and moral leadership as reliable partners was diminished. But even 
without this, the fazendeiros ’ influence was hampered by another difficulty: their 
overall low capacity for institutional involvement and a trait typical of the vast 
majority of the landowners. To describe this, a local observer suggested the term: 
“informalism”.111 This first translates into the rare and fragile existence of 
community organisations (cf. section 7.1.3), but also into the cattle ranchers’ lack of 
interest and interaction with organisations that try to provide them with services.
Issues faced in the Pantanal by the EMBRAPA, the key public institution in Brazil 
for agricultural research, are illustrative of this situation. This organisation has been
110 According to a former member of the IPP, the technical team did not adopt a clear stance on 
technical matters and thus stimulated conflicts.
111 This concept was suggested by a researcher of EMBRAPA in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul 
[interview 74].
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working for decades in the region on numerous technical issues related to production 
and conservation. Interviews carried out in 2008 in Campo Grande showed that, 
today, its main concern is not finding more technical solutions for cattle ranchers, but 
merely implementing and diffusing those that have been long identified. Moving 
innovations from an institution to pantaneiro producers has proved incredibly 
challenging [interviews 72, 73, 74].
This dilemma has led the EMBRAPA to channel more resources into researching 
social dynamics, since locally they seem to prevent the appropriation of both 
agricultural techniques and research institutions. An increasing attention is paid to 
the way change occurs among traditional cattle ranchers, involving the sociology of 
knowledge and information networks. Researchers have been looking at the 
processes through which technological changes are adopted, ignored or rejected (eg. 
Cezar, 2000). They showed that formal sources of knowledge and technical advice, 
such as written information or training opportunities, are largely ignored by the 
fazendeiros of the Pantanal.
To start with, people do not like to read or have the impression of “being taught”. 
What is more, the crushing majority offazendeiros do not feel they have the capacity 
to participate personally in formal processes -  due to lack of time, their often 
advanced age or the cultural distance that inevitably exist between a traditional 
rancher and a technical expert -  a distance that also characterised the IPP. Although 
EMBRAPA had developed a policy of making fazendeiros “participate” in its 
research decisions, its own evaluation review shows that this has largely failed to 
date. Even its “open door policy” whereby fazendeiros can come anytime and have 
informal discussions with researchers did not solve the problem: ranchers just do not 
“push the door” [interview 74].
The EMBRAPA is now looking at developing a participatory system of knowledge 
and information dissemination that goes beyond people joining formal settings. The 
fazendeiros prefer to rely upon informal modes of communication. Conversations 
and direct observation of neighbouring fazendas are the most usual ways of obtaining 
information. As a result, learning networks are structured around a limited number of 
“trusted persons” {pessoas de confianga) who act as models for other fazendeiros and 
somehow become “opinion leaders”. These “trusted persons” typically use a much
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larger information network; they recognise more the usefulness of formal institutions 
and are better able to use them.
From this discussion, it appears that within the IPP, fazendeiros also reverted to 
trusted persons to monitor the institution on their behalf and convey their views and 
concerns within its governance mechanisms. However, the sole reliance on two 
successive PRP presidents proved insufficient to counterbalance other forces; it also 
prevented the Council of Administration from playing its key role of continuous 
monitoring.
7.3.3. From LOYALTY to VOICE: renew ing the local social capital?
For all its shortcomings, and in fact because of them, the PRP project may have 
induced a process of self-reflection within the fazendeiro community about the need 
to strengthen their capacity for collective action. This is suggested, first, by the way 
their discontent found evolving modes of expression. In section 3.1.9, we detailed 
how frustrations subsequent to an unsatisfactory CP scheme may lead to three types 
of community response: EXIT (material or psychological withdrawal); LOYALTY 
(silence and resignation, in the name of a higher principle of cohesion); or VOICE 
(open complaints and actions for change). We then argued that the VOICE strategy 
can best lead to a renewal of the local social capital enabling more collective action 
in the future. Here, we argue that the fazendeiros have indeed moved from 
LOYALTY to VOICE faced with the collapse of CP in the PRP project, opening up 
the possibility of community co-operation on new and more effective terms. 
However, although the fazendeiro community seems to be moving along a positive 
learning curve, only time will tell whether inertia will eventually win the day.
The choice of LOYALTY
After 2003, given the path taken by the IPP, its collapse was being predicted by 
many fazendeiros [interview 61]. Faced with this prospect and the president’s 
relative inactivity, the members of the Council of Administration chose LOYALTY 
rather than VOICE as their response strategy, reflecting an approach to the problem 
largely shared within the fazendeiro community. After a few warning discussions 
with president Almir Sater, they became resigned to watching an “announced 
tragedy”, as a protagonist of the time put it [interview 60]. As we saw in section
Chapter 7 -2 9 7
7.2.4, Almir Sater responded to these concerns by appointing two successive 
executive secretaries, but each time influenced by political recommendations that did 
not appease the landowners. As they feared, these changes led to no managerial 
improvement -  quite the opposite.
Council members could have exercised their veto power on the IPP management, but 
they refrained from doing so as, in the public eye, this would have been equated to 
disowning Almir Sater. Inter-personal loyalties and friendships arguably took their 
toll on the IPP governance at this point. As a fazendeiro recalls:
At one point, we stopped complaining to Almir. Nobody wanted to criticise him too 
much and put him in a comer....We felt he was not in control anyhow, [interview 64]
As another put it:
Almir is a childhood friendfor many of us. We went to school together....He is the best 
of us all when our community needs to be heard out there. We cannot harm him. This 
would be harming ourselves, [interview 67]
This community group was thus placed in a schizophrenic situation whereby they
saw disaster looming but would not use the legal recourses they had in their hands to
either remove the president or force a new executive secretary upon him. As one
fazendeiro further explained:
The Council of Administration had power over the president, it had enough power to 
shake up the whole thing. But doing so or not also depends on personal relations. 
Power is one thing, andpeople-to-people relations are something else....People on the 
Council thought: T do not want to damage the reputation of the president; I  will not 
use my veto power to remove everybody there; I  could but I  will not ’. [interview 62]
Here, we see how social bonds can prevent checks and balances from working
correctly in a community organisation, which leads to the choice of LOYALTY
rather than VOICE even if collapse is clearly foreseen. The need for unity, the desire
not to diminish the reputation of someone who is close and highly placed, as well as
the tacit rule against public conflict within the community, left the IPP with poor
regulatory mechanisms. At first, this choice of LOYALTY may seem incoherent
with the pervasive individualism of the fazendeiro community, previously analysed.
But it is quite possible to imagine a community harbouring strong norms about
avoiding overt public conflicts and displays of disunity, while still relying on
individualism in more private interactions.
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VOICE: opening up the possibility of a collective learning process 
Although LOYALTY was the response chosen by the fazendeiros, the PRP collapse 
was not so “digested” easily and, in the following months, another response began to 
emerge, which was closer to VOICE -  with more open discussions about what went 
wrong, what should have been done and what could be done next. Interviews 
certainly suggested that the PRP had raised hopes and expectations that have not 
disappeared with its collapse [interview 63]. Above all, the “catastrophe” -  as it is 
often referred to -  has now led community members to question the pros and cons of 
their own dual norms of cohesion and individualism. Many fazendeiros seem to 
acknowledge that individualistic free-riding behaviours have been detrimental to 
PRP projects and that “things need to change in the future”. As one puts it:
Changes are slow to take place here. Pantaneiros need to organise themselves much 
more and much better.... We need to stop working each in our little corner. We need to 
add one person to the other....The Park was the best idea for us in years but this 
opportunity was spoiled, [interview 59]
As for “cohesion at all costs” (in the name of public unity or personal friendships),
several informants suggested that this principle is being critically discussed among
landowners and that these would be unlikely to resort to this norm as automatically
should another dilemma appear. The presence of a collective learning process is also
suggested by the fact that the fazendeiros relate differently to the state after the PRP
failure. They heavily condemned the political “intrusions and interferences” that took
place within the IPP and have grown more wary than ever before about public
involvement in their own affairs. Some think, however, that such a political capture
was and would still be unavoidable:
In a new IPP, it would be difficult to do much better [regarding the influence o f 
politicians]. A time always comes when you depend either upon municipal, state or 
federal decisions. Whether this is through taxes or anything else, there are always 
strong strings attached [so that politicians] can always ruin things whenever they 
want, [interview 66]
Other fazendeiros believe that political infringements are directly linked to the 
“corruption of the current government”, “something that may change when a new 
government comes” [interview 61]. Meanwhile, others feel that state influence could 
be managed providing that the recourse to public resources in a participatory scheme 
is absolutely minimal. The prospect of co-managing a joint organisation with the 
state has now little credibility among landowners, but this is not to say that the idea 
of the PRP has been abandoned. On the contrary, making the PRP an even more
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“community-owned organisation” seems the right way forward to many 
interviewees. Several fazendeiros we met were actively suggesting to their 
community that they re-launch the PRP once its debt has been cleared, a process that 
may take time and might involve the penal responsibility of the last president. As a 
fazendeiro put it, in a rather poetic tone:
The IPP is like a baby we love and who is now sleeping. We watch over it with tender 
eyes and we wait for its awakening, [interview 64]
Unwritten future
On the whole, our fieldwork interviews evidenced a strong sense that a failed 
participatory scheme can stimulate a process of collective learning and a renewal of 
local social capital. Illustratively, a recent local Association of Organic Cattle 
Producers has been growing fast, working exclusively with private funds and with 
the support of an NGO for organic certification. This co-operative has been doing 
rather well so far, setting common production standards and organising a commercial 
network collaboratively. In this endeavour, the fazendeiros have carefully avoided 
any state funding. To date, 30 fazendas are working on this organic beef scheme, 
producing around 100,000 heads of cattle a year. This seems very encouraging but 
there is also no lack of evidence showing that changes do take a long time to emerge 
in the Pantanal. As one fazendeiro explained:
When one develops a new system, a new model, there must be a time of investment, a 
period of transition and often o f disappointment. You need to work a lot with your 
head and your hands. And you need to change mentalities. In Pantanal, this can 
happen, but it is very slow.... It can take 10 or 15 years to really change anything here. 
[interview 66]
Practices of land inheritance provide a good illustration of this. Although most 
fazendas are struggling simply to survive, social norms on the division of inherited 
lands are not adapting fast. The tradition of dividing properties between the male 
heirs has still not significantly altered, even though many properties are falling below 
the minimum viable size (cf. section 6.2.1). A few of the fazendeiros interviewed 
allegedly asked their children “not to divide the land and work together”, but this 
does not appear to be a widely shared and well accepted approach. Such inertia 
leaves open the question of the capacity of this community group to survive the 
coming decades.
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7.3.4. Conclusion
In this section, we showed how the various containment processes embedded in the 
PRP project were connected to and impacted the social capital of the community. We 
first identified how the bridging SC of the peons is entirely embroiled in a symbiotic 
and paternalistic relationship with fazendeiros, which inevitably prevented them 
from being given (or trying to obtain) a voice in the PRP process. We then argued 
that the bonding SC of the fazendeiros is of a complex nature, mixing elements of 
individualism, cohesion, immediatism and informalism that all played a role in the 
PRP’s collapse. Finally, we suggested that, in the longer term, the frustrating failure 
of such an ambitious participatory scheme may have stimulated a learning process 
likely to foster local capacities and new community endeavours. As of 2009, the 
choice of VOICE as an alternative response strategy to frustrations has stimulated a 
“community introspection” into the roots of what went wrong -  a move that may 
prove beneficial to its capacity for collective action in the long term.
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7.4. Conclusion
From the PRP’s origins to its collapse, several containment processes developed 
within the Pantanal regional park, which was nevertheless intended to stand as a 
prime example of a CP scheme. These processes were either simultaneous or 
successive, some going no further than intentions, others producing real impacts. The 
first layer of this '’''mille feuilles containment” was the will of the long-established 
local producers to counter incoming environmental conservationists and economic 
actors challenging their economic model. A second layer, grounded in a discourse on 
“traditions”, deprived the rural employees and fishers groups living in the Pantanal 
for generations of a voice. A third layer appeared in the course of implementation, 
this time affecting the fazendeiros themselves through various processes, notably a 
“political capture” of the PRP by a few local politicians. We also showed that the 
nature of the local social capital, such as the long-standing preference of fazendeiros 
for individualism and informalism, paved the way for their own disempowerment.
Even the most supportive proponents of CP will not argue that such schemes always 
succeed. A critical difference, thus, between the emancipatory and the critical 
narratives in understanding the PRP story lies in their respective theories about what 
explains its failure. The emancipatory narrative would surely label it as a case of 
“implementation failure”, unfortunately captured by crooked politicians. The basic 
ideas and processes of the CP scheme would nonetheless still be held to be sound and 
relevant: die failure would be attributed to those in charge for failing to bring the 
ideas and processes to life properly and to corruption for further destabilising the 
project. On the other hand, the critical narrative would consider this view as naive 
and oblivious to key factors. Its own understanding of the failure would bring 
structural issues to the fore, such as disparities in social capital, making CP schemes 
structurally prone to be captured and diverted from their supposed course.
Given these multiple dynamics, what took place in the Pantanal largely illustrates the 
critical narrative of the global CP discourse. However, it is also noticeable that what 
unfolded through CP is not a top-down, global agenda set by some powerful external 
forces. It is rather a fight for influence involving various actors, the outcome of 
which was not easily predictable. In fact, it is neither neoliberalism nor capitalism 
that has been promoted through CP in the Pantanal, but rather various conflicting
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local rent-seeking behaviours. These included attempts to perpetuate a pre-industrial 
type of economy characterized by low productivity, as well as the will of parts of the 
local state to “capture” the scheme. These dynamics proved so dysfunctional that the 
CP scheme itself eventually collapsed.
These observations significantly amend our understanding of the critical narrative, 
de-emphasising the causal significance of notions such as “global orders” or “global 
capitalism” and re-emphasising the role of local politics and contingencies. Although 
most of the disempowerment effects predicted by the critical narrative are indeed 
observed on the ground, they did not seem to occur because of reasons expected by 
this narrative: “global forces and domination mechanisms” seem much less 
significant than local struggles. As for participatory “conservation”, it can for sure 
partner with “capitalism” -  as exemplified in the St. Lucian case study and as 
Brockington et al. (2008) strongly argued. Yet it can also partner with a range of 
other local goals and dynamics.
Finally, we identified emerging forms of resistance on the part of subjugated actors 
that also qualify the critical narrative. The failure of the PRP does seem to have 
initiated a process of self-analysis and social learning among the fazendeiros, which 
may renew their capacity for collective action through formal institutions in years to 
come.
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Conclusion
In the end, what we see from the empirical data collected in Brazil and the Caribbean 
impressively fits the expectations of the critical narrative of global discourses. Along 
all of the nine dimensions of the analytical framework we devised, most of the more 
pessimistic possibilities about the level and quality of community participation have 
materialised on the ground. The two CP schemes we studied were largely externally 
designed and led; they displayed low participatory inclusiveness, scope and intensity; 
they significantly dispersed local decision-making power away from local 
stakeholders; and they set in motion mechanisms of social control that impaired large 
sections of the local community -  such as traditional fishers, rural workers or even 
relatively wealthy landowners. It is thus tempting to declare that, in our data, the 
critical narrative boasts a “KO win” over the emancipatory narrative.
In St. Lucia, the Souffiere Maritime Management Area has been functioning 
primarily as a way for interest groups connected to the tourism industry to take hold 
of the local context: “bring Souffiere into line” and keep check of “troublesome 
locals”. In doing so, it has followed the path of other “participatory” mechanisms 
created in Soufriere over the past twenty years. Social control and access to natural 
resources were reffamed to the benefit of certain actors left untouched, while others 
saw their usual practices and identities radically challenged. As for the 
“participation” of the weaker local stakeholders, this has seen its meaning emptied by 
a variety of containment tactics that we listed at length, including encirclement, 
epistemic exclusion or skewed representation. Despite the institutional and 
psychological withdrawal of key stakeholders, the myth of an ongoing 
institutionalised “dialogue” has nevertheless been maintained until today.
In the Brazilian Pantanal, over the same period of time, the CP discourse has been 
used by a variety of actors to help contain others: the state trying to take the lead in 
regional policy planning or NGOs battling against an economic use of the land. In 
the case of the Pantanal Regional Park, launched in 1998, a discourse on the 
“traditional community” was developed by an alliance of actors that primarily suited 
the interests of cattle ranchers concerned with their economic survival. By defining 
the latter as “protectors” of the environment and as the core of the “local 
community”, the influence of conservationist NGOs could be better contained and
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incoming economic competitors de-legitimised. At the same time, the definition of 
the “traditional” narrowly focused on the landowners: it excluded long-standing local 
stakeholders such as rural employees and itinerant fishers. Through the use of CP, 
the socio-economic status quo of the region was thus to be preserved from various 
influences. However, things did not stop there. Still another process of containment 
emerged, one that affected this time the landowners themselves. It led to their 
progressive exclusion from the governance of the participatory Park. Not only did the 
landowners witness the increasing influence of foreign “expertise”, but an outright 
“political capture” also developed that transformed the park into a mere financial tool 
in the hands of a few local politicians until its swift collapse in 2005.
While our empirical data largely match the critical narrative, they also bring a fresh 
understanding about how the latter works on the ground. They underline its relative 
contingency -  rather than inevitability -  and points to a range of nuances in its 
central story.
First, over the years, much of the scholarship critiquing CP had depicted 
“participatory rhetoric” as essentially enabling, supporting and legitimating a 
neoliberal type of economic transformation and governance. It has been analysed in 
this light as contributing to the expansion of the current global capitalist order (e.g. 
Marti & Ritchie, 1999; Mohan & Stocke, 2000; Miraftad, 2004; Berner & Phillips, 
2005; McCarthy James, 2005; Bosman, 2007). In the context of biodiversity 
protection, Brockington et al. (2008) emphasised a similar view. What we observed 
in our data, however, is a more complex and less monolithic picture. It is not the 
unlimited reign of some form of global neoliberalism that emerged through CP in our 
case studies. In St. Lucia, the marketisation, commodification and creeping 
privatisation of local space certainly worked hand in hand with the tourism industry 
operating on global markets. Yet, in the case of the Pantanal, the CP discourse was in 
fact used against unrestrained competition and more competitive incoming economic 
actors, and in the hope of safeguarding a long-established form of cattle-ranching -  a 
society based on relatively backward economic and social practices. As for the 
subsequent political capture of the Park by local politicians, it was certainly not 
carried out in the name of neoliberalism or the retreat of the state -  quite the 
contrary. Thus, in political economy terms it seems as if the CP discourse may be 
used for varying ends and can take on different faces and meanings accordingly. It is
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not always the forces of capitalism and neoliberal capitalism that seize control of 
global discourses.
Second, the critical scholarship has also tended to portray CP as giving the lead and 
most benefits to the already stronger local stakeholders, thus reinforcing or leaving 
unchanged local hierarchies and social structures (e.g. Cleavers, 2001; Hildyard, et 
al., 2001; Corbridge & Kumar, 2002). In our data, however, CP does not exactly 
appear to be such a clear-cut mechanism, leading to pre-defined results. It rather 
emerges as a containment tool that various actors scramble to make use of. CP is 
very much like a hammer placed on a table, neither good nor bad in itself, but which 
people fight to grab and use against others. In this fight, each and every one pursues 
their own rent-seeking strategies and tries to reinterpret CP to their own advantage. 
This leads to a profusion of competing meanings attributed to the global discourse at 
stake. In St. Lucia, for instance, both the fishers and the tourism industry battled to 
seize the CP tool to promote their role and secure the benefits of an “economic rent”, 
namely unrestrained access to the key coastal sites of Soufriere. In the Pantanal, the 
landowners used CP to make the most of an “identity rent” -  by redefining 
themselves as an “eco-friendly traditional community” in need of (legitimate) 
international support.
An alliance emerged between the latter, the sate and international donors but did not 
prove sustainable over time. Local politicians, notably, manipulated participatory 
institutions to use the Park as a “political rent”, as an instrument to dispense material 
rewards to selected people and organisations. The Park later collapsed under the 
alliance’s internal contradictions. It cannot be said, however, that politicians “won” 
over other stakeholders: they did not “checkmate” any of them; what happened was 
more like a “draw”. Thus, who manages to capture CP and for what agenda very 
much depends on the outcome of local battles. It is the non-predefined interaction 
between local rent-seeking strategies that seem critical to an understanding of how 
the CP discourse impacts local contexts. Global discourses are disputed and 
reinterpreted by allied and/or competing interest groups -  but the strongest ones do 
not necessarily reach their goals. Competitive dynamics open the possibility for 
varying outcomes in space and time.
Third, not only does CP not always allow “the strongest to take all”, but forms of 
resistance do emerge on the part of subjugated actors. The fact that the critical
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narrative finds itself essentially confirmed by this work should not hide or minimise 
the fact that resistance to containment is also observable. Moreover, it seems very 
difficult to pre-judge the end impact of these different forms of resistance. To help 
understand them, we provided a dynamic analysis of the response strategies of 
groups under active containment (Voice, Exit or Loyalty) and their impact on the 
local social capital. It emphasised the diversity of potential outcomes that processes 
of resistance may have in the long run. We thus joined our voice to the set of 
scholars that stress local resistance to global governance (e.g. Cocrhane, Duffy & 
Selby, 2004) by adding the notion that the strongest emancipatory content of CP may 
lie in these response processes. Our fieldwork identified such developments, at times 
noisy and at times muffled. In the St. Lucian case, resistance was most visible in the 
violent mid-1990s episodes of political strife in which the coastal fishers voiced their 
discontent through outright politicisation at the national level. Their Voice strategy 
came in fact very close to stopping the CP process and winning over the allied forces 
of conservationists and tourism interests. Similarly, in the Pantanal, the failure of the 
Regional Park has sparked a process of self-analysis among the landowners that, in 
the years to come, may renew their capacity for collective action and self-defence 
against the external capture of CP initiatives.
Finally, social capital has also emerged in the data as a central variable in 
understanding and predicting the ability of a given sub-group to take advantage of 
participatory processes. Ironically, while CP brings to the top of its global agenda the 
necessity to make the weakest actors join decision-making processes, it is precisely 
these actors who have the lowest social capital and capabilities -  and thus tend to be 
excluded from any realistic means of using the discourse to their advantage. This 
study thus suggests that there is a particularly strong need to focus on the 
institutional inaptitude of sub-groups in a socio-historical perspective, taking stock 
for instance of behavioural norms such as individualism or informalism. Contrary to 
much of the critical literature on CP, we demonstrated that the concept of social 
capital need not be viewed as a “highly reductionist approach to political economy” 
that hides conflicts with a “language of trust, networks and associations” (Mohan & 
Stocke, 2000, p.255). Even the mainstreamed meaning of “social capital” can shed 
light on the mechanics of domination, in line with the original intent of the concept 
(e.g. Bourdieu, 1980).
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Insights on critical theories
The picture of global governance that emerges from this research helps point out the 
respective merits and limits of three core concepts of critical IR theory: dependency, 
hegemony and governmentality.
Theories of dependency argue that peripheral or semi-peripheral countries are 
infiltrated by powerful actors and dynamics that maintain a relation of domination to 
the benefit of core, rich Western countries. In our case studies, many critical 
commentators would equate these countries’ interests with the furthering of 
capitalism and the extension of global markets. To some extent, this is what we 
observed in St. Lucia, through the marketisation, commodification and privatisation 
of coastal spaces. However, the dynamics observed in the Pantanal were radically 
different, as in this case CP helped maintain a traditional economy. Neoliberal 
capitalism does not thus seem to be an intrinsic outcome of the CP discourse, but just 
one among others depending on the imbrications of rent-seeking strategies pursued 
by local actors. Outcomes, again, do not seem pre-defined but rather the result of the 
fight to seize CP as strategic tool. Moreover, we did not observe a clear pre­
eminence of Western actors in local dynamics, but rather varying coalitions of 
interests of which they were part without necessarily acting as the leading component 
or the initiator. Now, if one argues that in the Pantanal and Soufriere, the real 
“interest” of the rich countries lay in global environmental protection, then in that 
sense too, their objectives were far from being met. It thus seems difficult to argue 
that our data gives a strong dependency flavour to the critical narrative that emerges. 
Unlike Mohan (2001) or Hildyard et al. (2001), we are not therefore tempted to 
conclude that CP essentially works to conceal the power of the Western world. 
Similarly, we do not support the view of Sekhri (2009) that dependency theory still 
stands as an essential analytical framework. We would rather share the more 
moderate view -  seemingly shared by Gosh (2001) -  that dependency as a 
phenomenology still provides useful research questions that highlight certain 
developments, although one should not rely upon it as a robust explanatory 
framework or even as a comprehensive descriptive tool.
The concept of governmentality, for its part, carries the notion that power is faceless, 
has no precise location but is nonetheless very specific in its impacts. It is exercised 
through the globalised procedures, practices, rules and routines through which lives
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are governed, managed and regulated “at a distance”. The present research, however, 
does not easily fit with this outlook as it seems too remote from the actual actors, 
dynamics and institutions where action takes place and outcomes are determined 
locally. We are led to join students, such as Cooper & Packard (1997), Gould (2005) 
or Mosse (2005b), who feel that all-encompassing governmentality approaches 
conceal “the contingent networks of practice, the diversity of actors, brokers, 
perspectives and interests behind universal policy models” (Mosse, 2005, p. 14). Our 
data support the contention of Li (1999, p.295) that the emergence of a given 
discourse owes as much to local interests, understandings and strategies as it does to 
global forms of disciplinary power. The analysis of global discourses as a form of 
global governmentality seems empirically fragile. The scaling-up of Foucault’s 
perspective of power to the study of global orders and discourses tends to generate 
accounts that overstate their “unity, evenness and indivisibility” (Selby, 2007, p.336). 
This tendency has been prominently exemplified by Hardt and Negri (2001), who 
saw the logic of a global “Empire” at work that encompasses “the spatial totality” of 
the world, with “no territorial boundaries [limiting] its reign” (preface, p. 14). Our 
data suggest that such approaches fall short of providing tools for analysing local 
incarnations and local uses of global discourses. A more convincing theory of global 
governmentality would in fact provide ways to understand the variability in practices 
across local contexts, rather than picturing a single unified and homogeneous 
dynamic -  but such a framework has yet to be developed. Governmentality outlooks 
over-emphasise the evenness and inevitability of their critical vision and neglect their 
contingencies. They also stress that subjectivities are modified to create self­
regulating and auto-correcting selves, something we barely observed. We would not 
agree, thus, with Agrawal (2005) in saying that CP schemes mange to produce new 
types of subjectivities. We would rather agree with Neumann (2001) that these 
programmes are interlinked with continued threats of violence that help to discipline 
locals. Just as “buffer zones” served in Tanzania as a “discipline-mechanism”, the 
zoning plan in St. Lucia operated with people who had full knowledge of the ever­
present potential use of force. What is at work here, in our view, is not the creation of 
new subjectivities but more “old-fashioned” disciplinary mechanisms. Further to this, 
we also identified many forms of resistance in both St. Lucia and Brazil. Therefore, 
we agree with Duffield (2001) that global governance discourses simultaneously 
create the conditions of autonomy and resistance in response to their attempts to
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extend their reach. In the end, these discourses highlight pre-existing forms as well as 
produce novel varieties of resistance, whether passive or active, visible or invisible, 
silent or vocal (Duffy, 2005, p.311) -  often on the part of the less powerful groups. 
Data are a far cry from a successful internalisation of disciplinary norms.
Third and finally, the concept of hegemony offers a model of the exercise of power 
that works through alliances and compromises among interest groups (in the form of 
“historic blocs”) that co-operate to dominate by ideological means. Gramsci 
developed this perspective to elucidate the functioning of “cultures of consensus” at 
the domestic level, while Robert Cox analysed how these can be projected at the 
international level, providing a global spread to certain forms of hegemony. Pursuing 
this path, we conclude that hegemony also needs to be understood in terms of local- 
global networks of actors. Such networks reflect alliances of interests from diverse 
horizons -  which we called “power formations” and which brought together the 
“originating agents” of the CP schemes we researched. In both of our case studies, 
we did observe actors defining together a common discourse that caters for the core 
interest of each -  the tourism industry and environmentalists in Soufriere; and in the 
Pantanal, the landowners, the local state and a foreign donor. These blocs work to 
shape local understandings, “local hegemonies”. Yet, they were also shown to be 
fragile, as their goals sometimes change over time112 or emerge in practice as ill- 
assorted.113 Moreover, data showed that processes of resistance to such local 
hegemonic dynamics can also emerge, especially through endogenous processes of 
frustrations. From there, one can analyse how new blocs and alliances may form over 
time.
In a nutshell, within the existing variety of critical approaches, those based upon the 
dialectics of hegemony and historic blocs rank among the most fruitful if we are to 
grasp the local embodiments of discursive forms of global governance. Nevertheless, 
we call here for the use in IR of a renewed and expanded concept of hegemony. The 
concept that has been employed in this field of study has too often been confined to 
state-centric analysis, being “pre-occupied with understanding how class relations 
within national blocs and alliances are configured so that they conform to the 
hegemony instigated by the leading classes within the dominant state" (Worth, 2010,
112 For instance the goals of the state in the Pantanal changed over time -  from cooperation to capture.
113 For instance, foreign experts imposed to the landowners of the Pantanal a « forced pluralisation ».
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p. 10). We add our voice to those of scholars such as Worth who advocate for a 
model of hegemony that allows for variations and contradictions, a concept that is in 
fact probably closer to the one originally designed by Gramsci in the domestic 
context, one that looks at hegemony as a multilayered process that needs to be 
“continually renewed, recreated and defended” (Worth, 2010, p.l 1).
We also strongly agree with Mann (2008) who emphasises that a Gramscian 
approach requires an explanation not only of the material fact of hegemony, but also 
of how it works ideologically, in the world of ideas -  something which is rarely 
consistently undertaken by IR scholars. As Mann put it, a Gramscian outlook “must 
do more than point out that the ruling bloc is hegemonic and demonstrate the 
material evidence of its power; it must also explain how and why that hegemony 
operates in the social life of thought...[within] norms, morality, common sense” 
(p.336). This is what we did in detail in St. Lucia and Brazil when we looked at how 
“strategic discourses” had been built by allied actors, partly catering for and drawing 
upon subordinated interests.
Gramsci is in fact seldom cited in the literature on the political economy of 
environmental schemes, whereas Foucault is abundantly quoted. The critical 
approach in terms of hegemony is nonetheless clearly the one most supported by our 
empirical findings. While dependency and governmentality frameworks give pre­
eminence to diffuse global dynamics as well as to non-local actors, hegemony helps 
us analyse a more locally based and complex picture. We are led to conclude that it is 
the local conditions that determine the end impact of a global discourse -  rather than 
the other way round. The pattern we identified is not one where global actors step 
into local contexts and shape local alliances to their own wishes, but rather one 
where local actors create their own alliances, select and use available global 
discourses that are useful to their own ends and seek external allies to do so. All of 
this creates local-global networks (within what we called “power formations”), but 
ones that are largely locally initiated, that may not be sustainable and that sometimes 
cater to incoherent goals leading to implosion.
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Insights on methodologies in IR
When it comes to studying global discourses, we agree with Dryzek who deplores 
that “those who do appreciate their role...often treat them as singular and accepted, 
rather than multiple and contested” (Dryzek, 2006, p.vi). This is true not only at the 
macro level of global governance but also at the more micro and local level -  where 
there is a huge need for fieldwork by IR scholars, so as to look at how discourses are 
reinterpreted and used in diverging strategic ways by various actors.
As the reader recalls, this research sprang from the observation that in the study of 
global governance IR scholars were still giving relatively little attention to the role 
and impact of global discourses, as well as to the diversity of their power dynamics. 
These gaps are particularly visible at the local level of global governance, which 
remains vastly under-analysed, despite the fact that the global still has final impacts 
on the local. This situation seems paradoxical given the well-known emphasis in the 
IR field on the question of power, as well as the “discursive turn” that IR research 
has firmly taken. But this becomes more understandable in the light of disciplinary 
boundaries. Although the IR discipline has been a prime analyst of global 
governance as a novel object, it has yet to adapt some of its research methods to the 
subject. Global governance is still analysed primarily in terms of big actors ( states, 
companies, large NGOs and networks), big institutions, big events, big deals, etc. It 
is a matter of sheer observation that few local-level case studies using micro-data are 
carried out to nourish the debates on the meta-narratives of power often called on by 
IR scholars. A whole continent of realities and analysis on the smaller and more local 
actors and dynamics are thus left in the shadow.
A small but increasing number of scholars are acknowledging this growing 
discrepancy between the IR field and global governance as one of its key field of 
enquiry. They are calling upon students to go to the field, get their boots muddied, 
cross the traditional boundaries of their discipline and confront their wide narratives 
to diverse and complex local situations (e.g. Duffield 2001; Jackson, 2004; Duffy 
2005; Mosse, 2005). The present work has tried to follow this path, contributing in 
some way to what might be called the “ethnography of global governance” 
(Feldman, 2009) -  something we believe has a promising future in global governance 
studies.
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To sustain this endeavour, there is a need to bring closer together conceptual 
innovations in IR and empirical analysis through original frameworks. This is what 
we tried to do, in two ways. First, in carrying out field enquiries, this research has put 
into practice a comprehensive grid of power relations drawn from recent works in IR. 
Its fourfold framework (compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power) 
had never been used as such in this type of field study before. The result, we believe, 
was the ability to capture power mechanisms in a broader diversity than is usually 
the case. This, in turn, underpinned Santos’ view that “power is never exercised in 
pure, exclusive form, but rather as a power formation, that is a constellation of 
different forms of power combined in specific ways” (Santos, 1995, p.406). This 
approach also enabled the identification of subtle and sometimes contradictory power 
dynamics found in local institutions and discourses. Another methodological 
contribution lies in the fact that this work devised and implemented its own 
procedure to compare large IR macro-narratives with intricate micro-data. The 
driving idea was to build a framework that allows testable implications to be derived 
from otherwise somewhat vague narratives. Brick by brick, a conceptual bridge was 
put together that identified these narratives’ expectations and checked them against 
empirical observations. This approach may inspire further work among IR scholars 
when testing large worldviews and alternative theories.
*
To conclude, our findings raise doubts about the ethico-political rationale of CP as an 
emerging principle of global policy-making, given its meagre contribution to 
enhancing the voice of the poorest and weakest. To make it a more valuable 
democratic tool, participation may need to be reconceptualised in more politically 
radical terms, in connection with notions of rights, governance or citizenship (e.g. 
Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Gaventa, 2004). At the very least, more research needs to be 
carried out on understanding the difference between the participation of a given 
group in a CP institution and the proper and effective representation of its interests, 
instead of equating a priori the two notions. As this study has shown, one of the 
major difficulties faced by any sincere “participatory institution” is its typical 
inability to work with people whose information, decision and mobilisation networks 
as well as modes of expression are informal and ill-adapted to dialogue with 
structured organisations. This issue is not just a problem; it is also an asset in the
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hands of other interest groups that can better capture participatory institutions for 
their own ends. The challenge is even greater when weak groups are embroiled in 
social interactions whereby other groups exert strong forms of structural power. 
Innovative forms of representation of weak interest groups may thus need to be 
explored, for instance, involving epistemic communities in new ways while avoiding 
the pitfalls of agenda-ridden “facilitators”. Civil society organisations, upon which so 
many hopes are nowadays placed in so many contexts, might not be sufficient or 
even appropriate for this task.
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Appendix 1 -  Approaching “Global G overnance”: actors, 
m echanism , agendas
Although the term was bom in the field of political economy and international 
relations, global governance is now used in many others including economics, 
finance, environment, public health, conflict management, etc., as well as in national 
political debates. Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) are often credited for first 
developing the notion in an effort to understand how a growing number of global 
issue areas are increasingly impacted by a wider range of actors, networks and 
systems of rules. The concept then spilled over from academic circles into the world 
of international policy making. A Commission on Global Governance, chaired by the 
Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, was appointed for this purpose in 1992 by 
the Secretary General of the United Nations. Its 1995 report, Our Global 
Neighborhood, pushed the concept to the fore in the commonly used vocabulary of 
international organisations and global fora. From there, the notion has taken root in 
various global policy areas with two fundamental meanings: a descriptive one that 
emphasises who does what and how, and normative one that questions the legitimacy 
of the discernible agendas.
The positive meaning of fglobal governance*: emphasising who and how?
At a first level, “global governance” is used as a descriptive (positive) concept, 
pointing to the fact that an increasing number of actors are involved in a growing 
number of topics of global interest. The term refers primarily to the idea that actors 
other than governments have become important players on the international scene. A 
significant part of the debate is thus dedicated to identifying which actors are 
influential internationally, why and how. Susan Strange (1996) and James Rosenau 
(1995), two founding figures of International Political Economy, were among the 
first to draw attention to the increasing interactions between governments, 
multinational corporations, international organisations as well as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), whether local, national or international. Rosenau further 
highlighted the role of transnational elites, scientific communities and groups of 
experts. Sub-state groups or regions (e.g. Ohmae, 1996), supra-national organisations 
as well as intergovernmental groups and a whole range of civil society actors (trade 
unions, political parties, religious groups, associations, etc.) were all later
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acknowledged as significant players to be brought into the picture (e.g. Higgott, et 
al., 2000).
Still, the positive use of the concept is not only concerned with actors, but also 
processes. In that regard, it has had the tendency to include all new practices that 
have emerged on the global stage following the rise of these new actors (Muller, 
2005). An illustration of this is the definition provided by the Commission on Global 
Governance (1995, p.7) which defines it as “the sum of the many ways individuals 
and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”. This all- 
encompassing perspective has contributed to strengthening global governance as an 
identified policy area, but has been criticised because of its weakly defined research 
programme. As Muller and Lederer (2003, p.5) put it:
While these actor-centred approaches have convincingly shown that new actors 
have indeed become relevant agents in global affairs, they nevertheless could not 
capture in a systematic way what positively defines global governance as a practice.
Among the scholars trying to refocus global governance as a workable and 
descriptive research programme, Rosenau suggested focusing attention on what he 
calls “spheres of authority”; namely, spaces of interactions that are able to set norms 
at various levels and order behaviours. In this more limited perspective, global 
governance encompasses, “the structures and processes necessary to maintaining a 
modicum of public order and movement toward the realisation of collective goals” 
(Rosenau, 1997, p.367). This understanding draws attention to the evolution of new 
forms of governance in various specialised spheres of international life.
For some scholars, however, there is still a debate over the relevance of global 
governance as a descriptive concept. Mainstream IR theorists have a fundamental 
difficulty with global governance because of their view of the international system as 
essentially anarchic (Jahn, 2000). For many, the discourse on global governance is a 
simple continuation of the “interdependence literature”114 of the 1970s, or of the 
discussion about “international regimes” in the 1980s, which was very much centred 
on states. Some of these scholars have nonetheless started to take non-state actors
114 The notion of “complex interdependence” was developed by Keohane and Nye (1977). It referred 
to the trans-national interdependencies between states and societies. These authors argued that the 
decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other interdependences 
increase the probability of co-operation among states.
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more “seriously”, but many do not look on them as independent agents and define 
their roles in relation to the nation-state or to intergovernmental systems.
The normative meaning: questioning agendas?
Beyond its descriptive use, “global governance” is often employed to refer to 
normative projects, agendas that demand action either in favour of, or counter to, a 
range of current global dynamics. This more political use of the notion can be either 
explicit or hidden, or somewhere in between.
On the very explicit side, many authors of the political left refer to global governance 
as an outright political project, either as the global elite project of imposing 
neoliberalism or as the counter project of taming market forces through international 
regulations and new democratic institutions. Most commonly, however, these authors 
set aside the term “global governance” to refer to the counter project seen as the 
political alternative to neoliberal globalisation (e.g. Brand, et al., 2000). Global 
governance is thus intrinsically combined with progressive democratic demands and 
expectations and stands opposed to what is seen as the post-war “compromise of 
embedded liberalism” -  famously defined by Ruggie (1982, p.393) and often equated 
with globalisation itself, based upon multilateral trade and fostered by institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation or the World 
Bank.
Along these lines, various approaches to democratising globalisation have emerged, 
which all advocate renewed forms of global governance. A first approach, sometimes 
labelled “neoconservative”, relies on the call to democratise all the states per se, if 
necessary by force. Another is cosmopolitan democracy, which aspires to reinvent 
formal multilateral institutions and make them more powerful and accountable to the 
people. One of its key theorists is David Held, who has developed a global social 
democratic framework (Held, 2004). Still another approach to global governance as a 
democratic response to globalisation is based on the concept of deliberation. This 
may be labelled “transnational discursive democracy” and argues that democratic 
global politics may “most fruitfully be sought in the more informal realm of 
international public sphere and the engagement of discourses they can feature” 
(Dryzek, 2006, preface, p.vii).
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Interestingly enough, rare are the neoliberals or conservatives that use the term 
“global governance” as a flag to support their global agenda of more open markets 
and reduced state control. As suggested by Muller (2005), this may be related to their 
dislike of anything that may sound like an overarching public authority. 
Nevertheless, it is hardly necessary to read between the lines to see that neoliberals 
have a clear view of the kind of global rules and regulations they want to see 
implemented: therefore, they do work with an implicit concept of “global 
governance”.
The normative use of the concept can also be less explicit and almost go unnoticed. 
This is the case when global governance is merely and almost “naturally” compared 
to the notion of “government”, on the basis of their common need to “solve 
problems”. Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) speak for instance of global governance as 
“governance without government” (p.l). More explicitly, Finkelstein (1995) posits 
that global governance is about “doing internationally what governments do at 
home” (p.369). Yokota (2004), for his part, provides an interesting normative 
definition of global governance, as “the standard by which to judge international 
organisations and regimes, coalitions of nations or individual states, when they act 
globally to address issues that emerge beyond national borders” (p.8).
This “problem-solving”’ use of “global governance” does not openly take any 
political side, although it essentially harbours the view that some kind of “global 
pubic interest” exists and needs to be pursued, which is already in itself a political 
statement. Quite commonly in academic and professional circles, the normative 
approach to global governance takes the form of an attempt to identify “problems” 
and formulate “solutions” of international co-operation and dispute settlements. 
Although they often look rather technical and depoliticised, such analyses carry 
normative outlooks, since the identification of any “problem” presupposes some 
norms and standards: a vision of the common good, of social justice, of a desired 
state of affairs for the world, of a specific interest to care for, etc. Such policy 
analysts often speak of ways and means to measure and increase the effectiveness, 
efficiency, equity and accountability of governance mechanisms, as well as their 
compliance with various ethical or political principles. However, one must remember 
that such “problem-solving” approaches can only be infused by political views,
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whether social democratic or neoliberal or other. When action is called for, ethics and 
politics are already there, no matter how technical the discourse is.
As we see, both the positive and normative concepts of global governance emphasise 
co-ordination as its defining issue, raising questions about its actors, mechanisms and 
agendas.
The issue behind the issue: the rise and puzzles of “hyper-collective action”
The changing nature of collective action at the international level, and the difficulty 
of assigning it clear goals and processes, is very much the issue behind the issue of 
global governance. Today’s global issues, such as environmental protection or 
international health, are less and less “ordinary problems” of international co­
operation. Formerly, conventional collective action in international relations 
typically involved the co-ordination of a limited number of relatively homogeneous 
actors (for instance, a community of states), gathered in the name of their decision­
making power and capacity to act on a given problem. Co-ordination would take 
place through “governance arrangements” that can be institutionalised through 
international law, the creation of delegated organisations (such as the IMF) or 
meetings meant to facilitate decision-making (G8, G20). Not only do these forms of 
co-ordination have great difficulties in overcoming individual egoisms, but they are 
also increasingly ineffective technically to tackle a growing range of issues.
What we are witnessing today are new forms of co-operation that bring together a 
much greater number of more heterogeneous actors. The rising quantity and 
qualitative diversity of actors involved in emerging regulatory processes is partly 
linked to technical factors: the complexity of the issues and interactions that need to 
be engaged; the sheer volume of necessary human and financial resources; the 
diversity of skills that need to be mobilised and the need to coordinate various levels 
of action, down to local contexts or even individuals. But this growing profusion of 
actors also results from political factors such as the common will to make democracy 
progress in various forms, or ethical choices such as considering local problems (e.g. 
poverty) as global ethical issues. In these new forms of co-operation, actors are not 
involved in the name of their supposed capacity to decide, but on the wider basis of 
their self-involvement as affected stakeholders. An increasing number of actors 
invite themselves into the legislative sphere (conception, decision-making), the
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executive sphere (implementation, evaluation) or the judiciary sphere (conflict 
resolution, compensation mechanisms...) of international regulation, where states are 
less and less alone. Even in traditionally sovereign issue areas (such as peace­
keeping, trade openness or debt cancellations), new actors are slipping in thanks to 
their pressures on public opinion, decision-making mechanisms or the services they 
are able provide in implementation phases. International collective action is thus 
becoming far more fragmented. This reality is even more apparent when it comes to 
issue areas that are extremely complex and diffuse to manage, as for instance the 
promotion of human rights, gender equality, economic and social development of 
poor countries, or the production of international collective goods such as the fight 
against transmissible diseases, climate change and the loss of global biodiversity.
To underline this phenomenon, which they see as the defining problematique of 
global governance, Chamoz and Severino (2009) have coined the notion of “hyper- 
collective action”. Compared to the conventional type, hyper-collective action 
concerns a much larger number of more heterogeneous actors. Looking at recent 
successes in international mobilisation, one sees that the collective action of this 
constellation of actors has tended to structure itself through forums (such as the 
World Social Forum or the World Economic Forum), discourses (such as debt relief 
campaigns or human rights discourses), partnerships (The Global Compact), 
platforms (the Save Darfur coalition, Interaction, CONCORD or Eurodad), networks 
(Global Development Network, Development Gateway) and epistemic communities 
(in the form of thematic journals or think tanks) (Ray & Severino, 2010). Such 
processes of hyper-collective action draw on multi-scale coordinations whereby even 
local actors develop international connections. Its co-ordination mechanisms include 
softer governance structures, such as polycentric networks or discourses liable to 
guide the actions of widely different actors.
Typical problems of hyper-collective action go well beyond the traditional one of 
dealing with egoisms; they include the management of various levels of action, 
cultural and organisational differences, varying individual objectives, as well as the 
dilution of responsibilities regarding the achievement of common goals. Hyper- 
collective action is thus not co-operation in the conventional sense of the word: it 
may not be possible to identify a centre, a defined doctrine or even a clear 
intentionality. It does however create a movement whose effects are neither tidy nor
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guaranteed but that nevertheless may bring many status quos into question -  and thus 
raise enmities.
The era of hyper-collective action is unlikely to be that of states’ evanescence, quite 
the contrary. The global crises of the new century are calling the latter to reposition 
themselves as the “conductors of a grand polyphonic symphony” (Ray & Severino, 
2010, p. 16). Their collective task will be to help structure hyper-collective actions 
into effective global policies that ensure the additionality of every stakeholder’s 
contribution. But the right paths are still to be found. As Ray and Severino explain, 
one of the advantages of these new collaborative processes is that, although 
hypercollective motion needs a critical mass of actors progressing in the same 
direction, it does not require that every single actor concerned follow suit. While 
many international negotiations need unanimous backing to yield results, it may be 
easier to ensure that the median player is comfortable with the direction or that the 
front-runners are exploring the right innovative paths than convincing the last 
naysayer that they should join the movement. On the other hand, the downside is that 
it is probably utopian to hope to fully co-ordinate the action of this polycentric group 
of actors. What may be possible, however, is to provide a flexible framework to 
orient the direction of this atomized group of players, one that will help make their 
trajectories converge and synchronize more.
The following table summarises some of the key differences between collective and 
hyper-collective action. On this basis, the next section emphasises the need for a 
discursive approach to global governance.
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Comparing collective and hyper-collective action
Collective Action Hyper-collective Action
Examples
Peacekeeping operations, trade 
negotiations at the WTO, World 
Postal Union, international treaties on 
Human Pights, etc.
Protection of biodiversity, fight against 
climate change, prevention of global 
pandemics, implementation of the 
Millennium Declaration on 
development goals, etc.
A
Nature Homogeneous Heterogeneous
C Number Limited /  Finite /  Closed Wide /  Indefinite /  Open
T
O
R
S
Grouping
principles
Grouping of 
centres of authority
Grouping of 
stakeholders
P
R
O
Scale of 
coordination
Single
(only international actors have 
international relations)
Multiple 
(local actors develop self-standing 
international relations)
C
E
S
Instruments
Institutions or 
“international regimes”
Complex governance 
arrangements, networks, 
partnerships and discourses.
S
E
S
Typical problems
Individual egoism blocks 
the collective optimum
Articulating scales 
Dilution of responsibilities 
Cultural differences
Source : adaptedfrom Chamo  ^<& Severino (2009)
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Appendix 2 -  The diffusion of global d iscourses
Political scientists, sociologists and economists have devised “diffusion theories” 
that seek to shed light on the pattern of diffusion of particular policy discourses -  
tracing global convergences to either changing ideas or changing incentives. Dobbie, 
et al. (2007) identify four distinctive outlooks in the social sciences.
To start with, constructivists see the diffusion of global discourses, notably liberal 
ones, as a matter of ideology in a broad sense. Over the past few centuries, a “world 
polity” has emerged along with a global political culture that modified the consensus 
on the appropriate goals, legitimate actors and optimal means of political entities. For 
constructivists, conventions are socially generated and understanding how public 
policies become socially accepted is the key to understanding their diffusion. For 
instance, early studies traced the diffusion of educational and human rights policies 
from the First to the Third world, showing that most countries changed policies not 
when they were developmentally ready and able to implement them, but when they 
were influenced by global norms (Boli-Bennett & Meyer, 1978). According to 
constructivists, this process of social construction is constrained by bounded 
rationality: the lack of information and cognitive capacity to assess the costs and 
benefits of each and every alternative (March & Simon, 1993). Hence, the 
importance of leading countries, experts, epistemic communities, transnational 
advocacy and knowledge-based networks (economics, lawyers and scientists), 
international organisations or “norm entrepreneurs” such as local or international 
NGOs. Such actors “call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language 
that names, interprets, and dramatises them” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.897). 
They act as channels for flows of information, values, ideas but also money and 
material resources (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
Second, coercion theorists depict a world in which a few powerful players exercise 
disproportionate influence. These can be governments, international organisations or 
nongovernmental actors such as private firms, think tanks, NGOs, etc. They can 
operate through physical force (Owen, 2002), the manipulation of economic costs 
and benefits, and even the monopolisation of information or expertise. 
Conditionalities attached to financial aid or trade agreements are prime examples of 
coercion. The EU’s negotiations with Latin American countries over free trade
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contained, for instance, a contentious clause on democracy (Sanahuja, 2000). As for 
human rights, Burton (2005) showed that when countries are promised preferential 
trade arrangements for human rights enhancement, they are more likely to make 
concrete improvements. A more pervasive form of coercion operates through 
hegemonic ideas. Hegemony in the Gramscian sense refers to the control of social 
life by a group or a class through cultural means (Femia, 1983). Powerful countries 
with research infrastructure, the critical intellectual mass, and well-developed 
connections between the policy world and research nodes are unduly influential in 
the framing of policy discussions (Hira, 1998; Krugman, 1995). Whether through 
conditionalities or expertise, what unites these different perspectives on coercion is 
their common focus on the influence of an external source of pressure or ideas. The 
reasons why powerful actors care about policies or institutions of other countries can 
be manifold: national security, encouraging the repayment of debts, protecting 
foreign investments, enhancing international political, economic, financial or 
environmental stability, etc.
Third, competition theorists, like most coercion theorists, trace policy changes to 
shifts in external incentives but they describe a very different mechanism: a policy 
that gives one actor a competitive edge on global markets leads others to follow suit, 
even if they would have preferred, ex ante, not to adopt the policy. Such processes 
may involve various rights and labour standards, the protection of children or 
environmental norms. The typical story that came out of the 1990’s was one of a 
“race to the bottom” leading to lower standards -  as the preferences of global 
business trumped the preferences of domestic groups. However, new dynamics are 
now emerging as an increasing number of companies seem to consider “corporate 
social responsibility” as a competitive asset. In this diffusion model, power plays a 
role but it is the power of market as a decentralised force rather than the power of 
defined actors as conventionally understood. It can work both ways. Competition 
theorists, like most coercion theorists, trace policy changes to shifts in external 
incentives.
Finally, learning theorists, like constructionists, trace changes in policies and ideas 
but not through rationally bounded processes of imitation or socialisation -  rather 
through rational cost-benefit analysis. The driving question here is how decision­
makers draw lessons from the experiences of other actors.
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Appendix 3 -  The global extinction crisis
A UN convention defines biodiversity as “the variability among living 
organisms...which includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems” (UN 1992c, art. 2, § 1). Most scientists agree today that a global mass 
extinction is taking place (Wilson, 1992; Leakey & Lewin, 1997; O’Riordan & Stoll- 
Kleemann, 2002). Still, the study of “rates of extinction” is particularly difficult. It is 
never easy to prove that a species does not exist anywhere any longer; moreover, the 
number of total species in the world is not known. Estimates vary from 7 to 30 
million -  with only 1.75 currently known. (Mace, 2004; Baillie et al., 2004). A third 
of all wildlife might have disappeared already over the past thirty-five years (WWF, 
2008). Brockington et al. (2008, p.61) note that “the crisis is real but the mandate is 
not scientific” (p.62). Even if extinction takes place, the cost to humans is indeed 
hard to quantify given the methodological challenges (Costanza, et al., 1997). Yet, 
there are grounds for believing that it is high if one admits that biodiversity can be at 
the same time a local, global, public and private good (Perrings & Gadgil, 2003). 
From the point of view of the global community, the reduction of biodiversity comes 
with a shrinking of the world’s gene pool, while the amount of genetic material 
available works as an “insurance” against unknown threats. It also negatively 
impacts ecosystems which provide critical global ecological goods and services: 
ecosystems provide oxygen, clean water, recycle wastes, control soil erosion, 
pollution and pests, pollinate plants, etc. Human societies often take these 
contributions for granted, but they would merely “cease to exist in [their] absence” 
(Kampeng & Zhishi, 2003, p.343). Finally, there are also global ethical issues linked 
to biodiversity. Humans, as the planet’s dominant species, may have a moral 
responsibility towards the species and environments nature has produced. 
Meanwhile, current generations have arguably no right to damage a legacy they 
inherited and will pass on to their children.
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Appendix 4 -  A nalysing CP schemes: a summary table
Issues Main potential forms Definitions ( = )  and Warnings ( ▲ )
1. CP ORIGINS
Who initiates?
Possible configurations: the CP project 
may predominantly originate:
1. from within the community
2. from above
3. from outside
4. from balanced sources
• Origins = what are the “originating agents” (Initiators, Supporters, Designers)
• Initiators = agents who had the original impulse for change. Supporters = those 
who supported this move with resources. Designers = those who designed the 
actual project.
• Participation from within = Home-grown, bottom-up initiative. Origination by 
local groups, associations or individuals.
• Participation from above = mainly originated by public authorities.
• Participation from outside = mainly originated by external agents (international 
organisations, foreign governmental agencies, non-local NGOs or foundations, 
etc).
• Participation from balanced sources = originated in a balanced way by various 
interest groups (for instance part of an alliance).
2. CP 
INCLUSIVENESS
Who participates?
Six possible configurations along two 
criteria:
1. Diversity of community sub-groups 
involved (wide vs. narrow inclusion)
2. Participation within sub-groups 
(non-elite centered, socially mixed 
or elite centered)
• Inclusiveness= what specific groups or individuals are significantly involved.
▲ Need to analyse the community and its sub-groups. How they are socially 
differentiated (status, assets, interests, etc.).
3. CP SCOPE
Participation in what 
and when?
Potential areas of participation (upstr 
vs. downstream participation)
Initial diagnosis.
Upstr
Cl
1. Listing of potential solutions
2. Selection of a course of action
3. Preparation of 
implementation
4. Implementation
5. Evaluation and on-going
correction »Downsi
6. Envisioning the future
earn
earn
3
A
▼
ream
>
• Scope= areas of participation (i.e. entry-points or channels of participation).
The question is: what exactly is participated in and when?
• Initial diagnosis = who expressed opinions, wishes and desired goals and 
when?
• Listing of solutions =  who joined debates about possible plans and when?
• Selection a course of actions =  who made key decisions and plans, and when?
• Preparing for implementation = who participated in mobilisation, training, etc?
• Implementation = who participated in key managing institutions? Who 
contributed
to costs, construction, operation, maintenance, monitoring?
• Evaluation =  who has a role in on-going appraisal and identification of 
evolving needs?
• Envisioning the future = is there a space to discuss potential changes?
4. CP INTENSITY
How active is 
participation?
Possible intensity levels (from inacti 
to active participation)
Inact
1. Nominal participation. A
2. Passive participation.
3. Consultative participation.
4. Bargaining participation.
5. Deliberative participation. *
Acti
ve
ive
ve
• Intensity = degree of active participation and agency of actors involved.
• Nominal -  formal membership but no attendance at meeting.
• Passive = people attend meetings but listen passively.
• Consultative = people give information and opinions but have no decision­
making power
• Bargaining participation = people have a say in negotiations; they behave as 
self-interested deal-seekers; power differentials largely determine outcomes.
• Deliberative participation = collective partnership in search of consensus.
▲ Need to analyse the everyday and practical functioning of participatory
mechanisms (e.g. agenda setting; social interactions during meetings, etc.).
5. CP ALLOCATION 
OF COSTS & 
BENEFITS
Who benefits most?
Things to look at:
1. Absolute gains and costs (incentives)
2. Relative gains and costs (perceived 
fairness)
3. Feelings of empowerment or 
disempowerment.
• Gains and costs = expected short or long-term, individual or collective benefits; 
related business contracts; social prestige, gains from Economic Demonstration 
Projects” (EDPs).
• Compensation of most affected groups = cash or in kind payments; EDPs -  but 
generally not enough to satisfy everybody.
6. CP EFFECTS ON 
POWER 
FORMATIONS
How is local influence 
distributed among 
spatially differentiated 
stakeholders?
In CP schemes, the main configurations
include:
1. Community-centered power
2. CP in co-management with public 
authorities
3. Larger “power formations” with 
potential “regional” and “global” 
levels.
A Although they are in theory community-centred, CP schemes in fact may entail 
the involvement of a wide range of domestic, international public and private 
actors.
• Power formations = spatial configuration of actors sharing significant local 
power -  through various structures, processes and events. These formations 
may include local, domestic, regional and global levels.
• Local-global formations = situations where local influence is shared by 
domestic and non-domestic actors.
• Rebound effect = while CP is supposed to center decision-making on the 
community, it may work in practice as an “entry gate” for a range of non­
domestic actors and thus lead to a wide local-global formation.
7. CP EFFECTS ON 
SOCIAL CONTROL
Are there identifiable 
processes of 
containment?
Social control may functions through 
various modes of containment:
1. Alliance
2. Biased design
3. Biased implementation
4. Compromise
5. Delegitimisation
6. Encirclement
7. Epistemic exclusion
8. Institutionalisation (formalisation)
9. Skewed representation
10. Omission
11. Persuasion
Social control = refers to the active containment of certain groups and the 
reinforcement of certain privileged groups or hierarchical social categories. 
Containment = refers to the management of CP so as to maintain control 
over certain target groups and avoid, block or minimise their disruption 
of other goals.
Alliance = stakeholder groups with shared interests may form an alliance to 
increase their legitimacy and bargaining power over target groups.
Biased design = participatory schemes may focus attention on certain issues and 
leave out others, thus enabling certain stakeholders to stay beyond any reach or 
duty.
Biased implementation = monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms in the CP 
scheme may, in practice, function preferentially against defined target groups. 
Compromise = strategic trade-off of interests meant to provide leverage on 
target groups on other issues.
Delegitimisation = representatives of the target group are discredited as non­
legitimate.
Encirclement = participatory mechanisms may be flooded with interest groups 
“encircling” target groups.
Epistemic exclusion = exclusion of target-groups from the production of 
legitimate knowledge, views and norms. Dominant discourses reinforce the 
legitimacy of pre-existing social structures.
Institutionalisation (formalisation) = target groups are brought into an 
institutional / formal framework which, in itself, constitutes an obstacle for 
them to participate - as they may not be used to institutional / formal / lengthy 
negotiations.
Skewed representation = target groups are said to be correctly represented in 
CP mechanisms while in fact they are not.
Omission = target groups are not even mentioned and thus not brought into any 
part of the CP process.
Persuasion = positive affirmation of the benefits of a CP scheme, invoking the 
interests of the target groups._________________________________________
8. CP EFFECTS 
THROUGH 
MARKETISATION & 
COMMODIFICATION
Two congruent effects linked to global 
capitalism:
1. Marketisation
2. Commodification
• Marketisation = process of greater connectedness and dependence on non­
community producers, consumers and investors, whether domestic or 
international.
• Commodification = process by which things that did not have an economic 
value are assigned one and thus become tradable goods.
A Commodification does not just take place for physical things: skills,
knowledge, behaviours and culture can also be commodified and marketed.
9. CP TWO-WAY 
INTERACTIONS 
WITH SOCIAL 
CAPITAL
How does SC strengthen 
or constrain CP?
How does CP strengthen 
or weaken SC?
Key forms of social capital:
1. Bonding social capital
2. Bridging social capital
3. Linking social capital
4.
Potential responses to frustrating CP and 
their outcomes on SC:
1. VOICE -> Renewed SC
2. LOYALTY -► Unchanged SC
3. EXIT -► Weakened SC
• Social capital = collective bonds both within and among groups -  in the forms 
of memberships of groups and networks; as well as social norms and beliefs.
• Bonding SC = strengthens ties within groups of people sharing many similar 
characteristics. Bridging SC = connects different types of people. Linking SC = 
connects to people in position of authority.
A SC can strengthen or undermine CP. There is no automatic relation between SC 
and free-riding behaviours or social inequalities. Role of social norms such as 
individualism, loyalties, political divides, history of collective action, etc.
A Social frustrations following unsatisfactory CP may lead to three types of 
responses: VOICE (complaints and actions for change; SC likely to be 
renewed'): LOYALTY (silent acceptance. SC likelv to remain unchanged); 
EXIT (actual or psychological withdrawal; SC likelv to be weakened).
Appendix 5 -  Forms o f power o f Global Discourses: a 
summary table
Forms of Power Definitions Elements to look at
1. Compulsory Power
Direct control of an 
actor A over an actor 
B, by the use of 
material and 
ideational resources 
to produce incentives 
or constraints.
• Material, ideological and normative resources 
to produce incentives or constraints.
• Intended and unintended power effects.
• Resistance by B, based on what resources?
2. Institutional Power
Indirect control of A 
over B through the 
mediation of formal 
or informal 
institutions.
• Mediating institutions between A and B 
(notably organisations and markets).
• Ability of various actors to use the 
institutions.
• Winners and losers of institutional processes. 
Agenda setting processes, biases and 
omissions. Social, spatial or temporal 
distances between actors.
• Analysis of A/B dependence (e.g. through 
dependence on external markets).
3. Structural Power
Privileged positions 
given to certain 
actors through long­
standing binary 
social categories.
• Hierarchical/binary positions and structural 
categories, relations of domination.
• Functional advantages, capacities, self- 
understanding of each category.
• Whose objective interests are supported by 
these categories?
• Hegemonic ideologies working in the 
“objective interest” of the upper class.
• Subjective interests of the lower class 
underpinning their domination.
• Discourses keeping out certain stakeholders
4. Productive Power
Privileged positions 
given to certain 
actors through new 
and emerging 
discourses.
• Re-definition through discourses of the 
legitimate body of values and knowledge, of 
what is taken for granted.
• Emergence of non-binary / new social 
categories.
• Anti-politics (e.g. suppression of legitimate 
options through “expertise”)
• Governmentality: self-regulation for pre­
defined results
• Re-definition of what is “traditional”.
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Appendix 6 -  Potential observations o f power m echanism s according to the critical narrative o f 
CP schem es
Forms of powers
Dimensions 
of CP schemes
Compulsory power Institutional power Structural Power Productive Power
G S 
E I 
N S 
E
1. CP ORIGINS
Indirect control of goals by 
external supporters (e.g. donors) 
given their financial weight, 
explicit or implicit 
conditionalities.
Fund-raising and design processes 
take initiatives away from locals 
and pass them to more powerful 
(and institutional) actors.
Local elites may try to influence 
CP design to strengthen their 
privileged structural social 
position.
Anti-political effects and 
privileged influence of expert-led 
and scientific knowledge, often 
coming from outside the country.
I
M
P
L
E
M
E
N
T
A
T
I
o
N
2. CP 
INCLUSIVENESS
- Uneven material, financial and
conceptual means among 
stakeholders resulting in different 
ability to contribute to CP 
processes.
- Presence of disincentives or low
incentives for a range of 
community actors to join in.
The everyday functioning of 
“participatory mechanisms” in 
practice leaves little room for 
weaker community stakeholders.
- Social hierarchical categories 
active in “participatory processes” 
(not free from on-going power 
relations).
- Discourses on “tradition” may be 
constructed to avoid challenging 
social structures.
- Anti-political effects of 
scientific, expert, international and 
state discourses.
- Self-regulation may increase 
scope, but with little inclusion in 
decision-making.
3. CP SCOPE
4. CP INTENSITY
5. CP ALLOCATION 
OF COSTS & 
BENEFITS
- Stronger stakeholders have 
material, financial and conceptual 
means to influence rules and pilot 
economic projects.
- Pilot economic projects mobilise 
or manipulate interest groups.
Stronger stakeholders make better 
use of institutionalised decision 
processes allocating resources and 
benefits.
Stronger local stakeholders may 
develop discourses (e.g. on 
traditions and the environment) 
reinforcing their position, 
legitimising resources given to 
them.
Stronger local stakeholders may 
manage to incarnate “modernity”, 
the “future” or “the way forward”. 
Weaker ones may be associated 
with “the past”.
6. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
IMPACT ON CP
- Low bonding SC leads to 
unequal sharing of project benefits
within the community.
- Linking SC of local elites 
enables them to capture more
benefits.
- Low bridging and linking SC 
lead weaker stakeholders to
manage their involvement in key 
participatory institutions 
inefficiently.
- Low bonding SC leads weaker 
stakeholders to badly manage their
involvement in pilot economic
A low bridging SC often 
underpins dividing structural 
social categories - that restrict CP 
possibilities.
High bonding, reaching and 
linking SC may enable some 
groups to develop and impose a 
new discourse, reinforcing their 
privileged position.
projects.
I
M
P
A
C
T
S
7. CP EFFECTS ON 
SOCIAL CAPITAL
VOICE can take the form of direct 
action (agitation, refusal to 
comply with the rules...) to force 
other outcomes.
VOICE can take a political form 
(through democratic institutions 
and representatives).
VOICE can take the form of a 
“traditionalist” discourse 
emphasising the legitimacy and 
positive social role of weak 
community actors.
VOICE can take the form of new 
discourses being developed to 
contest the legitimacy non­
community actors and CP 
outcomes.
8. CP EFFECTS ON 
SOCIAL CONTROL
Compulsory control through 
surveillance systems, fines and 
legal sanctions. Range of 
disciplinary practices.
Participatory institutions turn into 
mechanisms to oversee and 
influence weaker social group -  or 
to benefit certain groups/private 
interests.
Hierarchical social categories are 
reinforced rather than challenged 
by key discourses and 
participatory mechanisms.
- New discourses (e.g. modernity) 
lead to increased control over 
certain groups (e.g. through self­
regulation or “epistemic control”). 
- Discourses also increase the 
legitimacy of strong actors.
9. CP EFFECTS 
THROUGH 
MARKETI-SATION 
& COM­
MODIFICATION
Increased sensitivity of the 
economy to external market prices 
and world demand. World 
consumers and investors increase 
their local compulsory power.
Increased need for local actors to 
be able to deal with markets as 
complex “institutions”: need to 
master marketing and 
communication tools to reach out 
to external clients.
The increased outward looking 
nature of the local economy 
favours already strong economic 
actors who can respond to 
changing demands and survive 
shocks.
This again favours stronger 
economic actors.
- Commodification: 
transformation of local resources 
into “products” tradable on 
markets (notably outward looking) 
and re-adapted to market norms 
and expectations.
- Discourses on “modernity” and 
the “’’economy” focuses on 
desirable openness to new / 
dynamic external markets.
10. CP EFFECTS ON 
POWER 
FORMATIONS
Legal, material and financial 
means of other actors to influence 
CP an local situations.
The institutionalisation of CP 
opens channels for and facilitates 
the influence of other actors.
Competing discourses (traditional and new ones) on the part of various 
actors strengthen the legitimacy of their local influence. For instance: 
State discourse on sovereignty; international NGOs and ‘global public 
goods’; community and “participation”.
Appendix 7 -  Research m ethods
This study adopts a qualitative case study approach based upon four months of 
fieldwork. Data were collected using face-to-face interviews, participant observation, 
focus groups and a range of written documents115. These elements are briefly 
discussed here as they played out concretely.
A Field Level Q ualitative Research
Several reasons led to the choice of a case-study and qualitative approach. First, as 
Robson (1993, p. 143) suggests, “if your main concern is understanding what is 
happening in a specific context, and if you can get access to and co-operation from 
the people involved then do a case study”. Second, the choice of a qualitative 
research design was also linked to the need to focus on the process and not only the 
outcomes of the initiatives under study, a point underscored by Creswell (1994). 
Third, a key strength of case-study research is the opportunity to use multiple 
methods and sources of data. Yin (1984, p.91) notes that any finding or conclusion is 
likely to be “more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources 
of information, following a corroboratory mode”.
Qualitative research has gained recognition as a valuable method to explore life 
experiences and social processes (Creswell, 2003). It involves conducting research 
within the everyday setting of people to gain insight through direct interactions and 
observation. It focuses on understanding ordinary behaviour and enables an evolving 
process of data collection since the researcher has the ability to modify its work as 
new opportunities arise during fieldwork. Qualitative research is further based on 
inductive reasoning where direct observations are used to identify patterns, 
hypotheses and eventually develop theories. Based on personal experiences and 
interactions with a diversity of people throughout fieldwork, it is nurtured by 
interpretations by the researcher and may thus be influenced by his personal values, 
biases or interests (Van Maanen, et al., 1982). It is thus important to acknowledge 
that qualitative research does not attempt to separate the researcher from the study to 
seek “objective results” in the strongest positivist sense. In the course of this work,
A large share of these primary data is available on the DVD to be found in the Annex.
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although sources were carefully triangulated to identify consistent and genuine social 
patterns, one cannot escape the fact that all data have eventually been interpreted and 
processed through the researchers’ individual understanding of people’s perceptions 
and thoughts, a cognitive process that has inbuilt limitations.
To complement qualitative data, quantitative information was gathered whenever 
possible through existing sources such as the population census, economic or 
environmental assessments and (some rare) public perception studies. They proved 
useful in understanding some general trends, but such data were of limited relevance 
to addressing core research questions that have to do with how people feel and 
interact. The drafting and implementation of two questionnaires was seriously 
considered as they would have been useful in systematising and quantifying 
perceptions identified through interviews and focus groups. However, two sets of 
constraints led the researcher to give up on this idea. In St. Lucia, the political issues 
raised by participatory schemes were so contentious that relying on a questionnaire 
was not a discrete enough research method to be fruitfully used. The people and the 
tense context there made it clear that passing around such a questionnaire would 
further stress the environment under study and raise further concerns about what was 
going on, a move that would have jeopardised (an locally politicised) the whole 
study. In Brazil, a questionnaire would have been useful to gather perceptions of 
rural employees, the peons, a vast and key social group. However, the massive space 
in which they are scattered did not allow the researcher, technically or financially, to 
apply a questionnaire to a sufficient number of people to make it statistically 
relevant. Another issue was the fact that it is both difficult and very embarrassing for 
respondents to write down what they think about their work conditions, inter­
personal relations and felt power relations. The researcher eventually felt that oral 
discussion was the only way to properly gather this information.
Interviews
Interviews were chosen as the primary data collection technique because they allow 
gaining an understanding of the inner experiences of people, an understanding which 
is critical when analysing issues such as participation, socio-political dynamics and 
power relations. Interviews also provide access to the context and meaning of actors’ 
behaviour (Seidman 1998). A total of 110 formal interviews were undertaken for this 
study, half in Brazil and half in St. Lucia, a number that does not include informal
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conversations and meetings without note-taking. They were conducted in person 
either in the participant’s home or workplace at a time convenient to them. 
Administering interviews in the participants’ own surroundings enabled the 
researcher to gain a better sense of their life perspective. Interviews typically lasted 
between 60 to 90 minutes, with occasional interviews being cut short after 30 
minutes (due to the lack of relevant material or good will on the part of the 
participant) and some others lasting several hours (such as with a very charismatic 
Rasta lady in St. Lucia who gave a detailed account of her incredible life). Interview 
length very much depended on the responsiveness of the participant, the relevance of 
the material being provided and the number of new thematic paths that would appear 
during the discussion.
The way interviews are conducted, how questions are constructed and presented, and 
the answers recorded all impact on the quality and quantity of data collected. The 
vast majority of my interviews followed a semi-structured format with a discussion 
guide to direct the conversation. Semi-structured interviews have much of the same 
flexibility as unstructured interviews but are useful in that they follow a specific 
agenda to ensure that key questions, either common or tailor-made, are being asked 
to participants. I tailored in advance these guides for each specific meeting, based 
upon what I thought were the distinct knowledge and experiences of the person.
During the interviews, both open-ended and direct questions were used. Open 
questions are useful in the way they provide respondents with considerable room to 
express themselves, as they exert little control over their responses. Open questions 
also allow interviewees to answer in a manner that they feel comfortable with, for 
instance by telling a story. They enable the researcher to identify topics of interest to 
the participant and ask further relevant questions. Nevertheless, direct questions were 
also used to ensure that essential information and perceptions were obtained. Within 
the first few minutes of the interview, I was often able to gauge how participants 
would respond to a line of questioning. If I perceived that participants were reluctant 
or unable to expand on their answers, I would focus more on using direct questions, 
for instance when the respondent kept being rather cold or closed. Conversely, when 
participants were willing and able to develop their responses, I relied more on open 
questions.
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Interview sequences
The majority of interviews were scheduled in advance, so each one would be 
prepared, as mentioned above, with a set of key questions and themes. I would then 
try to arrive well in advance in order to avoid giving a first negative impression. At 
the beginning of each interview, I would introduce myself as a researcher, as well as 
the purpose of the study. In many instances, however, I found it difficult to reveal the 
exact outlook of the study and its concern with power relations. As experience 
showed, this angle does tend to look suspicious to many stakeholders, as they may 
think they are being judged. After debating at length with myself whether this 
approach was ethical, I decided most of the time to give a rather general view of my 
work and of its research question. On the whole, to make things smoother, I thus 
tended to introduce this work as being “problem-solving” in nature, rather than 
related to critical social theory and power among actors.
Once presented in this way, I would then collect limited key information from the 
participants, such as age, marital status, current work and number of children, to gain 
a rapid understanding of their life situation. After this, I would ask them to reveal 
their life in their own words, starting with where they were bom and following on 
with studies (if any) and major life and work experiences. I found this way of 
opening interviews a successful one in manifesting a genuine interest for individual 
life stories. This process was also useful in easing the atmosphere and facilitating 
further discussion. To give their own version of their social identity is something I 
realised people generally want to do, one way or another, during an interview. I thus 
figured that giving them the opportunity of doing so right at the start of the 
discussion often made them more comfortable with this rather peculiar process (at 
least for many respondents) of being interviewed and (often) recorded.
Once this large background information had been collected (a process that could take 
up to a good third of the interview time) questions would go down the list o f themes I 
had determined beforehand. However, all interviews were fully semi-structured in 
the sense that I was always eager to diverge from the discussion guide and dig further 
into some fresh theme or piece of information that was being provided. Most of the 
time, I would also let the participant tell at length what he had in mind on whatever 
topic he wanted me to know about. This rather relaxed and flexible interview style
Appendices -  338
usually led to lengthy interviews, in a stress-free and empathetic atmosphere, 
yielding rich data and in-depth personal viewpoints.
Use of a voice recorder
With systematic and prior consent from the participants, the vast majority of the 
interviews were recorded using a digital audio device. I felt that recording the exact 
words was important since this study partly relies on discourse analysis. Recording 
also allowed me to focus more on the content of the conversation instead of having to 
concentrate systematically on taking copious notes. Finally, given issues of language 
and accents, using an audio recorder proved invaluable to listen repeatedly and 
decipher the most difficult parts of what was said (notably in Portuguese).
In order to maintain an informal atmosphere and considering that participants were 
sometimes illiterate, I chose not to present them with a written form of consent. 
Rather I asked for verbal consent prior to presenting the audio recorder or at the very 
beginning of the actual recording. I would always introduce the issue in the same 
manner, saying that the audio recoding is and only is for my personal use, that data 
are fully “anonymised” and that I am happy to stop the recording at any point during 
the interview should the respondent wish so.
Most participants were receptive to the audio-recorder and note-taking. I often felt 
that they even felt valued to be taken so seriously. However, as experience 
confirmed, not all participants were comfortable with being audio-recorded. In some 
instances, I perceived clearly that respondents were suspicious and reluctant from 
the outset, so I did not dare to introduce the audio recorder and take the risk of 
deteriorating further the level of trust. In such circumstances, I relied on taking notes, 
although in even rarer cases, I even avoided doing even this. I must say I sometimes 
thought about recording interviewees in a hidden way, but I resisted this temptation 
which I labelled as being a “rogue researcher”. ..
Each of the 110 formal interviews led to written notes or full transcriptions word for 
word. All of this material is available in the DVD provided in the Annex. Information 
that would identify participants has been removed from transcripts.
Language issues and recourse to a translator
In Brazil, interviews were conducted in English, French or Portuguese depending on 
the language participants felt most comfortable with, my command of English and
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French raised no technical problems, while Portuguese is far more challenging for us. 
In some instances, I had to ask for the support of a Brazilian research student I met in 
Campo Grande. He was interested in my study and agreed to help out as a live 
translator during interviews. He proved very good to spot the moments I was lost 
during conversations and he would then briefly sum up what the respondent was 
saying or translating key sentences. I owe him a great deal.
As for St. Lucia, although English is the official language of the island, most citizens 
also speak a dialect of French Creole referred to locally as Patois. In the rural areas, 
or in poor fishing communities, it is more common to hear Patois, especially among 
the older generations. Although I am myself French, I did not manage to pick up the 
local Patois, which I found was more remote from my native language than local 
people would acknowledge. Consequently, the majority of the research was 
conducted in English with a few exceptions where participants were more 
comfortable answering in Patois while generally understanding the questions in 
English. On several occasions, I sought help from a local student with whom I had 
sympathized and who agreed to help out as a translator. Some of these interviews 
were very informal and not anticipated, so not all of them were audio-recorded. 
However, written notes were taken soon afterwards.
P articipan t observation
Participant observation took place throughout fieldwork in Brazil and St. Lucia. The 
rationale for this was varied. First, a qualitative approach emphasises getting close to 
people to understand more authentically their realities and the details of their 
everyday lives (Oakley and Marsden, 1990). Second, behaviour is significantly 
influenced by the setting in which it takes place, so one should try to study it in 
situations where all contextual variables are operating (Gilbert 2001). Third, to 
capture social and power relations, one should directly observe verbal and non-verbal 
interactions between people.
Participant observation was conducted both in the everyday context and on special 
occasions, such as important meetings or social gatherings, and these were 
transcribed into field notes. Part of them resulted from a spontaneous invitation to 
join in, such as for instance accompanying horse tours in the Pantanal, patrolling 
along the coast with the marine rangers in St Lucia, attending public outreach and 
community meetings in the town of Soufriere, or joining the annual Fisher feast on
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St Peter’s days. Other observations resulted from an explicit demand I formulated, 
for instance to attend in Campo Grande the board meeting of APPAN, an association 
of landowner involved in ecotourism, or to join rural employees in their work with 
cattle. In St Lucia, I further spent a lot of time in the offices of the participatory 
structure I studied, the so-called Soufriere Maritime Management Association 
(SMMA). This allowed me to observe the comings and goings of community 
members interacting with the institution. I also regularly attended evenings in local 
bars where quasi ritual daily meetings take place among the larger Soufriere 
population, including businessmen and community leaders. It is in this rather 
sympathetic setting, albeit challenging for a white and foreign researcher, that some 
key information and perceptions were delivered to us. During all participant 
observations, my identity as a researcher was made clear to those in attendance, or at 
least those in direct interaction with us.
Such direct observations played an important role in building trust and reputation as 
someone genuinely interested and involved with the community. Not only did it 
contribute to identifying important contacts and sources of information, but it also 
made me available to those interested in my work. In this way, just as I selected 
informants, I was myself selected by some people who learnt of my presence and 
wanted to exchange ideas or share their experience.
Focus groups
Focus groups provide an open and flexible forum in which issues of interest can be 
developed into a collective discussion. Groups I was able to hold were always 
informal and sometimes totally spontaneous and unplanned, as some of them would 
start off just by stopping in a street, engaging in conversation with a person and with 
more people joining in over time. Focus groups proved useful to understanding how 
and why certain parts of the community felt the way they did. In St. Lucia, they often 
stimulated a collective voice that really needed to be expressed, or so I felt, as in the 
case of the poorer fishers in the town of Soufriere. I also felt that focus groups were a 
more appropriate method than one-to-one interviews when engaging with people 
whose everyday culture and practice is more based upon public (and loud) 
conversations across the street rather than soft discussions in an office or in a bar. In 
some rare instances, I further felt that talking privately to a white foreigner could
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prove a problem for a respondent in the eyes of its community, and in such situations 
collective discussions were more advisable.
Focus groups took place in St. Lucia in six specific settings and several times in 
each: with fishers along the shoreline; with fishers again after public events; with 
marine rangers before, during or after their boat patrols; with project staff members 
at the office, where I spent a lot of time; and with a set of young locals I often met. In 
Brazil, however, focus groups were more difficult to make happen, due to both 
spatial and cultural constraints. The huge territory under scrutiny, the Pantanal, has a 
very low human density and the fazendas I visited are highly isolated from one 
another, making any meeting virtually impossible to organise, a constraint also felt 
by the participatory scheme I studied. I managed nevertheless to arrange informal 
focus groups within some fazendas among rural employers {peons), but results were 
disappointing. It turned out that collective talks of peons in the presence of a 
foreigner led to fewer discussion rather than more, a fact that has to do, in my view, 
with their strong community culture and shy personalities by Western standards.
Written documents
Before, throughout and after the fieldwork a wide range of written documents was 
collected. They provided background, complementary or inside information that 
helped identify critical issues, triangulate conclusions and increase their reliability as 
well as identify important informants. First, project-related documentations were 
gathered from international donors and local project managers, such as original 
proposals, technical briefs, in-depth studies by related consultants, minutes from 
public or internal meetings, public statements, evaluation reports and accounting 
documentation whenever possible. This type of data helped to reconstruct in great 
detail the history of both participatory projects history, in their various phases and 
life contingencies.
Second, a range of newspapers and magazine articles related to the projects or 
regions at stake were collected, relying on local libraries and national archives in St 
Lucia and on various documentation centres in Brazil, including university libraries 
and research institutes. This type of documentation helped assess the likely state of 
public opinion on certain issues at certain points in time, as well as the content of 
related political discourses.
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Third, a host of public policy documentations was pulled together from both the local 
and national authorities in the two countries. They include policy statements, reports, 
development plans and regional assessments. National archives were heavily used for 
this purpose in St Lucia, while in Brazil this work relied more on specialised libraries 
such as that in the EMBRAPA research institutes in Campo Grande and Corumba. 
This sort of data helped understand the public policy framework, concerns and 
mindset in which authorities eventually allowed for the development of participatory 
initiatives. They usefully complemented interviews with civil servants in central and 
local ministries.
Fourth, written documentation was gathered through direct contact with NGOs, 
about both their own projects and regional environmental issues. Most were public 
documents but some were internal ones. Such documents allowed for a better 
understanding of civil society discourses and practices regarding participatory 
environmental schemes.
Finally, local academic literature and scientific studies were systemically sought. 
This endeavour proved fruitful in Brazil where a large range of studies relevant to the 
Pantanal case was assembled. However it proved unsuccessful in St. Lucia, a small 
Caribbean island with little scientific production of its own and even less on the 
specific issues of coastal management in Soufriere. Nevertheless, interesting and 
relevant local ideas about some key issues were found in the form of pamphlets and 
history books that I found in libraries or bought in Castries’ bookshops. In order to 
gather and store this huge amount of written documentation while I was moving 
about and set to fly back to Europe, I used a digital camera and took thousands of 
pictures.
Field stay
Research was conducted in Brazil in March and April 2008. Some interviews took 
place in Brasilia, the federal capital, while fieldwork and the remaining interviews 
were situated in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, in Campo Grande, Corumba and 
within the Pantanal nature area itself. Campo Grande, the state capital, is the biggest 
city nearest to the Pantanal and is home to a range of involved public and private 
actors. Fieldwork also took place in a range of ranches (fazendas), some of which 
were close to main roads while others were far remote within the Pantanal. This 
allowed for a direct observation of “pantaneiro life” and people, as well as interviews
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of other stakeholders. Travel between fazendas was difficult and confined to 
secondary and damaged roads.
In St. Lucia fieldwork took place during June and July 2008. Interviews with 
national NGOs and public authorities were conducted in Castries, the capital, 
whereas the rest of work was located in Soufriere, where the participatory scheme 
under study, the Soufriere Maritime Management Area, unfolded. Soufriere is a town 
on the Southwest coast of the island with a population of 4,000. It was the former 
capital of Saint Lucia during times of French rule and is now a rather sleepy fishing 
port with an emerging tourism industry. It boasts the key tourist attractions of St 
Lucia, notably the majestic Gros and Petit Pitons (conic volcanic formations raising 
directly up from the coral reef beds and forming part of a UNESCO World Heritage 
site) or a “drive-in” volcano featuring open air sources of sulphur. The region is 
popular for snorkelling and scuba diving.
Conducting research in a foreign culture and country brings a multitude of factors 
that affect the process. Spending a long time at the research site is a common strategy 
to acclimatise to the research setting (Creswell 2003) and I decided to proceed that 
way. Starting from a position with no particular knowledge of Brazil or St. Lucia, 
and even less of the specific places I studied, it was necessary to first familiarise 
myself with them. In order to do so, I conducted unstructured observations for the 
first week or so upon arrival. This initial reconnaissance allowed me to observe the 
surroundings and gain a rudimentary understanding of it. I began to interact with 
local people and become familiar with the towns of Soufriere and Campo Grande.
During my initial observations, I also developed a better awareness of the 
appropriate behaviour in which to conduct myself as a researcher, a foreigner and a 
white person - given the local histories of slavery and racial tensions. I felt it was 
extremely important to carry myself in a reserved and respectful manner, so I took 
care to demonstrate deference towards older people, as well as avoiding riding a car 
within Soufriere town, the fact of owning a car being quite socially divisive in this 
community. These precautions enabled me to build, I think, better connections and to 
gain wider trust.
Regarding living arrangements, any field researcher contemplates the idea of staying 
a significant amount of time in some stakeholder’s personal homes, such as with a 
fisher family in St Lucia or a rural household in the Pantanal. Such experience
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certainly brings a range of insider information and a closeness to the object study that 
cannot be reached otherwise, including through the development of personal bonds. 
However a range of constraints and concerns prevented me from adopting this 
approach in both of my fieldwork areas. First, although my work focused on specific 
communities, these are not homogeneous and I had to study a range of groups, often 
conflicting. In politicised and socially divided environments such as in St. Lucia, 
staying at a local home would have been interpreted as losing neutrality and siding 
with one party against others, for instance, poor fishers against business groups. This 
would have harmed my ability to proceed serenely with my research Second, while I 
did spend two months in each setting, I believe more time would have been 
necessary to develop close ties to a local family to arrange such a scheme. Thirdly, 
there were also material reasons that led me not to ask for such arrangements, 
including the small size and precariousness of community houses. It would not have 
been easy for a family to cater for a foreigner, no matter how flexible and adaptable 
the latter is ready to be. Finally, there was also the issue of my moving about quite a 
lot in both countries, between Soufriere and Castries in St. Lucia, and between cities 
and the Pantanal in Brazil. In the end, my living arrangements comprised basic 
hotels.
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Appendix 8 -  Notes on St. Lucia politics
The island is an independent parliamentary democratic Commonwealth Realm with 
Queen Elizabeth II as its head of state. She is represented by a Governor General 
who has mostly symbolic responsibilities. The Prime minister is the leader of the 
majority party of the parliament and has most of the actual power. The St. Lucia 
Labour Party (SLP) won the first post-independence elections in July 1979, taking 12 
of 17 seats in parliament. But St. Lucia was soon to be dominated by the United 
Workers’ Party (UWP) which governed the country from 1982 to 1997 with John 
Compton as premier, a man who had already run the country before independence 
for fifteen years. In 1996, Compton announced his resignation as prime minister in 
favour of his chosen successor Vaughan Lewis, former director-general of the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The SLP also had a change of 
leadership with former CARICOM official Dr. Kenny Anthony succeeding 
businessman Julian Hunte. In elections held in May 1997, the SLP won all but one of 
the 17 seats in Parliament. It was re-elected in 2001, but in December 2006 the 
UWP, once again led by Sir John Compton, defeated the SLP. Compton died in 
September 2007 and was followed by Stephenson King as Prime minister.
Appendices -  346
Appendix 9 -  Human threats to the Pantanal: a summary  
o f concerns
Below we summarise some of the main concerns regarding the human impact on the 
Pantanal (Earthwatch 2004; Junk & de Cunha, 2005).
The Pantanal is a fragile ecosystem with already high natural-stress factors, such as 
pronounced floods and dry periods, low nutrient levels and fires. Anthropogenic 
threats are not only global, like climate change, but also local, since the region is 
being affected by economic growth inside its borders as well as by side effects from 
the larger catchment area surrounding the Pantanal, where intensive agriculture is 
practised.
Traditional actors in the region include cattle ranchers, agricultural employees, 
Indian communities and federal government agencies. Prior to the 1970s, these actors 
had a rather limited impact on the Pantanal as they did not have the capacity to cause 
massive environmental change, such as altering the flood cycle by building dams or 
affecting water quality via sediment build-up in rivers. However, as economic 
development proceeded, new stakeholders emerged along with industrialisation, 
from agriculture, modernised cattle ranching, the transport industry, hydroelectric 
energy production and mining. Human population increased markedly in the states of 
Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, which share the Brazilian Pantanal. This was 
accompanied by a shift towards rapid urban growth in several centres, which affected 
the area through increased transportation needs and water pollution.
Urbanisation, however, is not the only threat affecting water quality and patterns in 
the Pantanal. The sources of most rivers that drain into the region are in the 
surrounding highlands. In these areas, the Brazilian government has been subsidising 
intensive agricultural operations since the 1970s, as it did throughout the country, 
including in Amazonia. In several regions around the Pantanal, large portions of the 
original Cerrado forests have been clear-cut and converted to industrial farming 
operations for soybean, sugar cane, wheat, com and cotton cultivation. Millions of 
square kilometres of savannah have been turned into open fields. According to a 
2006 report released by Conservation International (Barcellos Harris, 2006), grazing 
and agriculture, including the transformation of native pasture to farmland, has 
destroyed almost 45% of the original vegetation in the Paraguay River basin, which
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contains the Pantanal. As of 2004, approximately 44% of the area’s original 
vegetation had been altered, with some districts losing more than 90% of their 
natural cover.
Consequently, many river and stream banks have been deforested, increasing 
downstream sedimentation. Because soils in much of the Cerrado region are 
relatively poor, and because of the need to sustain fertility and fight pests, there has 
been extensive use of fungicides, pesticides and fertilisers. Since water management 
practices are not very advanced, this has resulted in extensive agrochemical runoff 
and soil erosion, affecting Pantanal farmers. Local hydrological patterns have been 
profoundly changed, as witnessed for instance with the Sao Louren9 0  river. This has 
made navigation difficult, and has hindered fish migration as well as traditional 
cattle-raising. The worst case is the Rio Taquari basin, where large sections of the 
channel have degraded or shifted, inundating 11,000 km2 of cattle ranges, and 
causing a sharp decline in fish stocks. The channel and habitat complexity is reduced 
dramatically, blocking migratory fish routes, altering flood plain/channel 
interactions, and causing loss of species.
Another issue is mining and mercury pollution. Since the 1980s, gold mining in the 
lowlands near the city of Pocone (see Map 5, Chapter 6) has been releasing mercury 
into the environment, but superficial gold deposits are now exhausted and mining 
activities have declined during recent years. Nevertheless, extractive operations still 
have the potential to significantly impact the Pantanal. Direct impacts from iron, 
manganese and diamond mining in the watershed include destruction of vegetation 
and habitat, soil erosion and river sedimentation, changes in river-bed topography 
and water pollution. Gold mining represents a significant environmental and human 
health risk in parts of the Pantanal. Large amounts of mercury are being used by 
miners in order to amalgamate gold particles contained in the mined soil and mud 
slurry. There are to date several documented cases of significantly elevated mercury 
levels in native fish and birds, particularly in the northern Pantanal.
Turning to electricity production and its ecological impacts, as of 2008 there were 
nine hydroelectric power plants with a total capacity of 323MW operating in the 
Pantanal catchment area. A large hydroelectric facility was recently constructed on 
the Manso River (220MW), a key tributary of the Cuiaba River, under an initiative 
by the Brazilian federal and state governments. Changes in hydrology caused by the
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large Manso River reservoir (387 km2) have begun to affect flora, fauna and also 
fishers and cattle ranchers inside the Pantanal. In the future, the number of reservoirs 
may further increase by up to 20, with a total capacity of over 1,000MW. It is 
expected that the cumulative effect of these projected reservoirs will be to strongly 
modify the region’s hydrological structure (Girard, 2002).
Regarding transportation infrastructure, several large projects were initiated to 
transport commodities more easily to large metropolitan areas and seaports. These 
included three waterway, or “hidrovia” projects: the Araguaia-Tocantins; the 
Paraguay-Parana Hidrovia; and the Ferronorte railway. Economic pressure is being 
applied by agro-businesses and the mining industry outside the Pantanal to canalise 
the Paraguay River so that soybeans and minerals can be more cheaply transported to 
the Atlantic Ocean. The Paraguay-Parana Hidrovia project, involving Brazil, 
Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay and Argentina, is of particular concern. Its goal is to 
straighten and dredge the upper Rio Paraguay to increase its capacity for barge 
traffic. It is argued by environmental groups that the project would permanently alter 
flow patterns in the region and drain an estimated 50% of the wetlands, causing a 
collapse of the most productive food networks in the Pantanal. The original project 
lost funding and was abandoned based on conclusions from an Environmental Impact 
Study and an effective public awareness program run by Coalizao Rios Vivos, 
WWF, Conservation International (Cl) and other NGOs. Still, the hidrovia continues 
to be on the agenda and a series of separate, small-scale hidrovia projects are being 
initiated along the upper Rio Paraguay.
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Appendix 10 -  State-led participatory planning in  the  
Pantanal: m any reports but little action
As early as 1978, the government of Brazil together with the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
conducted a three-year planning process titled “Plan for the Integrated Development 
of the Upper Paraguay River Basin” (EDIBAP). This exercise resulted in a series of 
economic development proposals for the Pantanal region, based on the principles of 
environmental conservation, ecological balance, and the rational use of land. The 
subsequent strategy recommended specific actions to address social problems and 
assess the impact of several proposed development projects on the water system of 
the Paraguay River Basin in Brazil. It included flood-control measures through the 
construction of reservoirs at several locations, which would also serve to improve 
river navigation without significantly changing water behaviour downstream. Many 
hopes were raised by this massive proposal, but little action followed.
In 1991, Brazil’s federal government launched a vast participatory undertaking 
leading to the creation of the Upper Paraguay River Basin Conservation Plan 
(PCBAP). Conducted by the government of Brazil and the World Bank, this plan 
relied on an environmental zoning approach to delineate general and site-specific 
guidelines for the conservation, rehabilitation and preservation of degraded lands. 
The PCBAP proposed the creation of a real-time flood-warning system designed to 
prevent negative impacts in urban and rural areas. Again, almost none of the 
recommendations were implemented.
In 1996, the Brazilian government requested technical and financial assistance from 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in order to prepare an integrated management 
program for the entire basin based on the guidelines of the PCBAB. From 1994 to 
2004, 44 studies and a variety of demonstration projects were carried out, resulting in 
a new Strategic Action Program for the Integrated Management of the Pantanal and 
the Upper Paraguay River Basin. More than 250 federal, state, and municipal 
organisations, NGOs, private companies, international institutions, and organisations 
from other countries were directly or indirectly involved in project activities, mainly 
through participation in a series of public events. The work thus entailed the 
involvement of over 4,500 participants. The main output of this work is a 300-page
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report that will (it is hoped) serve the needs of government authorities, decision­
makers and others with an interest in the sustainable development of the Pantanal.
Still, the consultation process did not end there. In 2007, the European Union 
financed a new massive participatory analysis of the Pantanal and its challenges, 
based on major scientific input and stakeholder consultations. Called the INREP 
(Institutions and Research for the Pantanal) the project led to several dozen public 
meetings, a range of new scientific studies and a series of reports meant to define a 
“research agenda to support policy institutions, legal frameworks and social action” 
in the Pantanal. The results of the project have been presented in Brazil, Paraguay 
and to the European Commission in Brussels, but the local people and organisations 
of the Pantanal have yet to see any results.
Interviews carried out in 2008 made it clear that these often-redundant consultative 
exercises, generally led by external (and often foreign) facilitators, are producing few 
results.
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Appendix 11 -  European presence in the Pantanal: a brief 
rem inder
As Earthwatch (2004) recalls, drawing on Correa (1999), European explorers (Jesuit 
and Spanish priests) entered the Pantanal in the mid-1500s. The Portuguese, who 
were looking for slaves and precious metals, began exploring the region later, in the 
1600s. Gold was discovered near Cuiaba in the north of the Pantanal in 1719, and a 
number of fort and cities, like Corumba, Caceres, Coimbra, Pocone, and Miranda, 
were founded towards the end of the 18th century. Subsequently, the decline of gold 
mining forced merchant families to seek land grants and to establish cattle ranches. 
Loyal to the Portuguese king, they were rewarded with political and economic 
favours but became victims of anti-Portuguese riots after Independence in 1822. 
Later, the Paraguay War caused disruption in the region, as Paraguayan and Brazilian 
troops requisitioned cattle and ranch properties, forcing the population to flee. After 
the war, the former settlers and their relatives returned to begin anew, rebuilding 
stocks by introducing new cattle, or rounding up remaining feral steers (Wilcox, 
1992). Cattle-ranching was then stimulated by the export of dried meat, which 
declined after 1945 with refrigeration techniques. Since then, cattle ranchers have 
been subject to the ups and down of meat prices.
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Appendix 12 -  A programme for Pantanal: SODEPAN’s 
vision
Here are the main socio-economic objectives of the SODEPAN for the Pantanal region 
(SODEPAN, 2009):
Access to credit. Reduce red-tape and increase financial support for cattle producers through 
the FCO (Fundo Constitutional de Financiamento do Centro-Oeste), a public fund that is a 
key source of financing for fazendeiros.
Animal health. Improve animal-health support and protection for the producers. Reorganise 
the LAGRO (Agenda Estadual de Defesa Sanitaria Animal e Vegetal), the state agency in 
charge of animal health. Improve guarantees through mechanisms such as the FEFA (Fundo 
Emergencial da Febre Aftosa), an emergency fund to help producers cope with outbreaks of 
the foot and mouth disease.
Energy. Complete the “Light for All” programme in the Pantanal.
Environment. Revitalise the Taquari River by containing the sediments coming from the 
plateaus and creating dikes to stabilise the riverbed. Speeding up procedures for 
environmental licensing of farming activities. Define precise time periods for controlled 
fires.
Research. Stimulate applied research by institutions such as the EMBRAPA and 
universities.
Social policies. Ensure professionalised basic education within the Pantanal, by obtaining 
continuous public support for the “Pantaneira schools” in partnership with farmers (payment 
of professors, building and equipping new classrooms and lodging for pupils). Creation of 
state agricultural schools (Escolas Rurais Estaduais) in key locations within the Pantanal, so 
as to maximise attendance and offer education up to the level of agricultural technician. Re­
certification programmes for professional fishers, so they can become, for instance, tourist 
guides, artisans or environmental assistants.
Transport and telecommunications. Installation of telecommunication towers in key 
locations to ensure complete mobile phone coverage. Development or repair/recovery of 
various roads, bridges and river transport
Tourism. Creation of an aerial bridge between Foz do Igua<?u and Bonito. Creation of a 
regional airline operating small aircraft (11-seat, single-engine airplanes) to carry tourists to 
all requested parts of the region. Creation of new direct bus lines between various points of 
interest. Paving of the 77km of road between the three tourist centers of Mato Grosso (Pora 
Tip, Pretty and Corumba).
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